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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most prevalent features in John Chrysostom’s writings is his numerous 
portrayals of exemplar figures.  In this thesis, we will argue that these exemplar portraits 
are largely determined by the literary strategies and analytical frameworks propounded 
by two major traditions: the Greco-Roman tradition of paideia, philosophical ethics, 
biography and rhetoric, and the Christian tradition.  When due attention is paid to the 
strategies of exemplar discourse in both traditions, a hermeneutics of exemplar portraits 
may be developed.  Such a hermeneutical approach will not only elucidate Chrysostom’s 
pedagogical and ideological objectives for these portraits, but, more importantly, deepen 
our understanding of his ethics and theology as a whole.  As our analysis of his portrayals 
of King David, the apostle Paul, Christian ascetics and martyrs show us, Chrysostom’s 
ethical framework is greatly indebted to the Greco-Roman tradition of virtue ethics. 
Furthermore, the approaches that Chrysostom adopts to present his exemplars also rely 
heavily on the narrative strategies and rhetorical techniques bequeathed to him by the 
Late Antique biographical and rhetorical traditions.  Having said this, the forms that his 
exemplar portraits take are also distinctively Christian because they declare powerfully 
Chrysostom’s soteriological convictions, namely, that Christian salvation is nothing less 
than the transcendence of one’s human limitations by the power of the Holy Spirit, so that 
one can participate in Christ’s deified life in the human body and live a life that is not 
dissimilar to the angels.  In the case of his martyr portraits, the articulation of this 
soteriological and ethical vision would compel Chrysostom to introduce two innovations 
to his rhetorical approach, namely, the reconception of the martyr as an icon of God’s 
grace and power, and a new emphasis on his audiences’ identification, imitation and 
veneration of the martyr. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
St. John Chrysostom: The Man and His Legacy 
 St. John Chrysostom (c. 349-407): monk, preacher and bishop - a man whose life 
and writings have won him much acclaim and not a few critics, since his day until the 
present age.  Barely a decade after his ordination, he was already listed in Jerome’s Live of 
Illustrious Men (c.392) as an author of many books, including the De Sacerdotio.1  Five years 
later, he was whisked off to Constantinople (c.397), where he was appointed as the new 
bishop of the prestigious see – a decision that was undoubtedly influenced by his 
accolades as a preacher par excellence.2  As a bishop, his ecclesiastical reforms were 
admirable to many, and yet also earned him several enemies in the imperial city.3  The 
latter, in particular, were to conspire against him and, ultimately, had him exiled to 
Cucusos and, later, to the remote eastern shores of the Black sea, where he would perish 
en-route to the city of Pityus.4  Three decades later, he was reinstated and his relics 
welcomed into the Church of the Holy Apostles by a host of his supporters and a 
repentant emperor.5  In the centuries to come, both the Eastern and Western Churches 
would esteem him as not only the ‘Golden-Mouth’ preacher, but also one of their most 
                                                 
 1 Jerome, de vir. 129. 
 
 2 J. N. D. Kelly, Golden Mouth: The Story of John Chrysostom: Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (London: 
Duckworth, 1995), 104-5; Palladius, dial. 5. 
 
 3 For Palladius, ‚because of all these reforms *by Chrysostom+ the church was flourishing 
more excellently from day to day.  The very colour of the city was changed to piety; everyone 
looked bright and fresh with soberness and Psalm-singing.‛  Sozomen, on the other hand, notes 
that Chrysostom’s various reforms ‚incurred the hatred of the clergy, and of many of the monks, 
who called him a hard, passionate, morose, and arrogant man.‛   Kelly, 118-27, 250-51; Palladius, 
dial. 5 (Translated by Meyer, ACW 45, 40); Sozomen, hist. 8.9 (Translated by NPNF II.2, 405). 
 
 4 Kelly, 282-85. 
 
 5 Socrates, hist. 7.45, Theodoret, hist. 5.36.1-2. 
2 
 
renowned teachers.  In the East, he is regarded as the most accurate interpreter of the 
Pauline epistles, or, as Isidore of Pelusium (d. 449) puts it, a St. Paul speaking in the Attic 
tongue.6  In the West, he is well-read and respected by figures as diverse as Aquinas 
(c.1225-1274), Erasmus (d.1536) and Calvin (1509-1564), and eventually recognized as one 
of the ‘Doctors of the Eastern Church’ in 1568.7 
 In modern times, the ‘Golden-Mouth’ preacher has proven to be no less fascinating 
for scholars.8  Over the last two hundred years, more than seven biographies have been 
written about his life and ministry.9  Despite the skepticism of A.H.M. Jones, recent 
                                                 
 6 Isidore remarks that ‚if the divine Paul had taken up the Attic tongue to interpret himself, 
he would not have done it differently than this renowned man has done.‛  This epithet would be 
reinforced in subsequent Byzantine hagiography, as is the case of the eighth century Vita by George 
of Alexandria.  In his biography, George would have Chrysostom’s secretary, Proclus, witness the 
apostle whispering into the ears of the bishop as he composed his homilies.  Eastern Orthodoxy’s 
esteem for John as Pauline exegete par excellence would persist even until the twentieth century, as 
may be seen in Theodore Zese’s appraisal of the bishop in 1982.  Isidore, Ep. 5.32 [Translation 
quoted from Margaret Mary Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline 
Interpretation, Hermeneutische Untersuchungen Zur Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 31]; 
George of Alexandria, vita Joh. Chrys. 27 [François Halkin, "Douze récits byzantins sur saint Jean 
Chrysostome," in Studia hagiographica (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1977), 142-148]; Theodore 
N. Zese, ‚ΑΠΟ΢ΣΟΛΟ΢ ΠΑΤΛΟ΢ ΚΑΙ ΙΩΑΝΝΗ΢ ΧΡΤ΢Ο΢ΣΟΜΟ΢,‛ Kleronomia 14 (1982): 313-
23. 
 7 Aquinas is reputed for being willing to give Paris for a copy of Chrysostom’s Gospel of 
Matthew.  For Erasmus’ esteem for Chrysostom, see Robert D. Sider, "'Searching the Scriptures': 
John Chrysostom in the New Testament Scholarship of Erasmus," in Within the Perfection of Christ.  
Essays on Peace and the Nature of the Church in Honor of Martin H. Schrag, ed. T.L. Brensunger and E.M. 
Sider (Nappanee, IN: Evangel Press, 1990), 83-105.  As for Calvin, he actually attempted a 
translation of Chrysostom’s homilies.  Unfortunately, this project did not materialise.  Nevertheless, 
he did complete a Preface for this project, where he praised Chrysostom’s exegetical skills, as well as 
criticized him for his over-emphasis on the role of human free will in soteriology.  John H. McIndoe, 
"John Calvin: Preface to the Homilies of Chrysostom," Hartford Quarterly 5 (1965): 19-26. 
 
 8 Even in as early as 1970, Robert Carter would caution that Chrysostom studies have 
become so extensive that, apart from some form of ‚structured co-operation,‛ the enterprise ‚could 
result in a vast heap of unrelated studies which fail to converge into a meaningful structure and 
which often overlap needlessly.‛ Robert E. Carter, "The Future of Chrysostom Studies: Theology 
and Nachleben," Studia Patristica 10 (1970), 14. 
 
 9 See, for example, W. R. W. Stephens, St. John Chrysostom: His Life and Times (London: John 
Murray, 1880); Aimé Puech, St. Jean Chrysostome et les mœurs de son temps (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 
3 
 
scholars, most notably, Mayer and Allen, have also found Chrysostom’s homilies to be a 
rich source of information for both his life and those of Late Antique Christians.10  
 Significant attention has also been paid to the extent to which Chrysostom’s 
preaching is influenced by the Greek rhetorical tradition that he is trained in.  Reflecting 
an attitude common in the late nineteenth century, Peuch denies any form of pagan 
influence upon Chrysostom’s homilies in general – a sentiment that is reaffirmed, though 
to a lesser extent, by Simonetti in the mid 1950s, and more recently, by Piédagnel and 
Kennedy, in their evaluation of Chrysostom’s use of the enkōmion paradigm.11  Contrary to 
this are the more convincing arguments by Delehaye, Ameringer and others, whose 
research clearly shows the pervasive influence of Greek rhetoric upon Chrysostom’s 
homiletics, particularly his panegyrics. 12  Indeed, it is this latter appraisal that has taken 
                                                                                                                                                    
1891); Chrysostomus Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time, 2 vols. (London: Sands, 1959); Donald 
Attwater, St John Chrysostom: Pastor and Preacher (London: Harvill Press, 1959); J. N. D. Kelly, Golden 
Mouth: The Story of John Chrysostom: Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (London: Duckworth, 1995); J. H. W. G. 
Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops: Army, Church, and State in the Age of Arcadius and Chrysostom 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); Pauline Allen and Wendy Mayer, John Chrysostom, The Early Church 
Fathers. (London: Routledge, 2000).  
 10 For Jones, what can be gathered from Late Antique sermons about life in that period may 
be likened to finding a few wheat in the midst of an overwhelming quantity of chaff (that is, 
Scriptural exegesis or generalized moralization) - the effort is simply not worthwhile.  Mayer and 
Allen, however, have argued otherwise, asserting that Chrysostom’s homilies, in particular, are rich 
minefields of information about Late Antique society.  A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-
602 : A Social, Economic, and Administrative Survey: Volume 1 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), vi-vii; 
Pauline Allen, "Homilies as  Source for Social History," Studia Patristica 24 (1991): 1-5; Pauline Allen, 
"John Chrysostom's Homilies on 1 & 2 Thessalonians: The Preacher and His Audience," Studia 
Patristica 31 (1995): 3-21; Allen and Mayer, John Chrysostom , 34-40. 
 
 11 Puech, Jean Chrysostome, 121; M. Simonetti, "Sulla struttura dei panegirici di S. Giovanni 
Crisostomo," Rendiconti instituto Lombardo di Scienze e lettere (series 3/17) 86, (1953): 179; George 
Alexander Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1983), 249, n. 107; Auguste Piédagnel, ‚Le genre littéraire,‛ in Panégyriques de S. Paul, ed. Auguste 
Piédagnel, SC, vol. 300 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982), 21-38. 
 12 Thomas Edward Ameringer, The Stylistic Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical 
Sermons of St. John Chrysostom: A Study in Greek Rhetoric (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America, 1921); Hippolyte Delehaye, Les passions des martyrs et les genres littéraires (Bruxelles: 
4 
 
root in recent scholarship, so much so that Wilken, Hunter and Mitchell can take it for 
granted that Greek rhetorical techniques, like the psogos, synkrisis, enkōmion and the 
ekphrasis, play a significant role in the ideological discourse of Chrysostom’s writings.13 
 With regard to Chrysostom’s theology, scholarly discussion can only be livelier, for 
a figure whose exegesis is highly respected by all the major Christian traditions.  Having 
said this, the general consensus, until the mid twentieth century, at least in the West, has 
been less than fair to the Antiochene theologian.  For those looking for a systematic 
defence or the exposition of orthodox dogma, Chrysostom’s writings come across more as 
the work of a Christian moralist and pastor, rather than that a serious theologian – a 
consensus that is well-summarized in Campenhausen’s popular Fathers of the Church: 
Questions of dogma played scarcely any part in his life. [< he+ did not contribute to 
the dogmatic elaboration of Christological theory nor take much interest in the 
academic disputes of the day in this field.14 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bureaux de la Société des Bollandistes, 1921), 202; Harry M. Hubbell, "Chrysostom and Rhetoric," 
Classical Philology 19 (1924): 261-276; Mary Albania Burns, Saint John Chrysostom’s Homilies on the 
Statues: A Study of the Rhetorical Qualities and Form (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America, 1930). 
 13 Mitchell’s research will be discussed more extensively in the latter part of this 
Introduction.  Robert Louis Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality in the Late 4th 
Century, Transformation of the Classical Heritage (Berkeley, CA; London: University of California 
Press, 1983); David G. Hunter, ‚John Chrysostom's "Adversus Oppugnatores Vitae Monasticae": 
Ethics and Apologetics in the Late Fourth Century‛ (Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1986); 
Mitchell,  94-380. 
 
 14 For a similar criticism, see also Wallace-Hadrill and Rashdall.  Yet, as Malingrey and 
Schatkin point out, this is a mistaken assessment, since ethics is always a natural outworking of 
Chrysostom’s theology, as is also the case for many of his contemporaries.  Hans von 
Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Church, trans. L.A Garrard (Peabody, Massachusetts: 
Hendrickson, 1998), 140, 144; D. S. Wallace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch: A Study of Early Christian 
Thought in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 164; H. Rashdall, The Idea of the 
Atonement in Christian Theology, Being the Bampton Lectures for 1915 (London: MacMillan, 1919), 92; 
John Chrysostom, Sur la sacerdoce trans. Anne Marie Malingrey, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1980), 261 n.2; Margaret Schatkin, "John Chrysostom as Apologist," Analekta 
Vlatadon (1987): 20. 
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 Such disdain for Chrysostom’s theology, for the most part, may be attributed 
to the Western theologians’ inclination to benchmark Chrysostom’s teachings with the 
tenets of the Magisterial Reformers, or, to be more specific, their presumption that ‚grace 
and justification< *is+ the unquestioned centre of Pauline theology.‛15  This criticism 
remains valid even for those who are more sympathetic to John’s theology.  Kenny, for 
example, while anxious to acquit Chrysostom of the charges of Semi-Pelagianism, has, 
nevertheless, lapsed into a similar tendency by considering such a charge in the first 
place.16  Fortunately, such theological sentiments have improved significantly over the last 
two decades.  Increasingly, scholars are more willing to study Chrysostom’s theology on 
its own terms and merits, that is, paying due attention to his historical and theological 
context, and also to the occasional nature of his writings.  What emerges thus far is very 
encouraging and clearly confirms the theological stature that has been ascribed to him by 
his pre-modern readers.17  
                                                 
 15 The earliest proponent of this approach is most certainly Calvin, who, in his Preface to 
Homilies of Chrysostom, would criticize Chrysostom for his overemphasising the role of human 
agency in divine soteriology.  For criticism of this approach, see Mitchell and Young.  McIndoe, 19-
26; Mitchell,  11; Frances M. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its 
Background (London: SCM, 1983), 150. 
 
 16 It is noteworthy that ‘Semi-Pelagianism’ is a Protestant term that originated from the late 
sixteenth century.  A similar tendency is also evident in the assessments of Hoffmann-Aleith, 
Merzagora and Krupp.  For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Margaret Mitchell’s Heavenly 
Trumpet, 28-33.  Augusta Merzagora, "Giovanni Cristomo commentator di S. Paolo: Osservazioni su 
l’esegesi filosofica (I)," in Studi dedicati alla memoria di Paolo Ubaldi, Serie Quinta: Scienze Storiche. 
(Milan: Società editrice ‚vita e pensiero‛, 1937): 205-46; Eva Hoffmann-Aleith, "Das 
Paulusverständnis Des Johannes Chrysostomus," ZNW 38 (1939): 181-88; Arthur Kenny, "Was Saint 
John Chrysostom a Semi-Pelagian?," ITQ 27 (1960): 29; Robert Allen Krupp, Shepherding the Flock of 
God: The Pastoral Theology of John Chrysostom (New York: P. Lang, 1991), 86. 
 
 17 Both Ayers and Pierson, for example, have drawn attention to the occasional nature of 
Chrysostom’s writings.  Consequently, his ideas are never systematically organized and much care 
must be taken in one’s analysis before he can arrive at a proper understanding of Chrysostom’s 
theology.  For recent theses on Chrysostom’s theology see, for example, Panayiotis E. Papageorgiou, 
6 
 
 In the case of Chrysostom’s ethics and pastoral ministry, scholars have been far 
more unanimous in their agreement that the bishop is one of the greatest pastors and 
moralists of his time, or indeed, of the whole Church.18  ‚Practical and moral problems,‛ as 
Campenhausen observes, ‚were paramount in his interpretation and application of the 
Biblical texts.  His sermons contain a great deal of exhortation and moralizing.‛19  Such 
pastoral exhortations frequently present themselves as emphases on the cultivation of 
spiritual disciplines, such as repentance, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and the reading of 
Scriptures.20  On occasions, they are also expressed in terms of rhetorical attacks on the 
pagan habits found among Christians, e.g., the patronizing of theatres, the use of amulets, 
divinations and incantations, or even Judaizing behaviour.21   
 Chrysostom’s ethical discourse, as Young has demonstrated, is grounded largely in 
the exegesis of Scripture, so much so that his biblical interpretation may well be regarded 
                                                                                                                                                    
‚A Theological Analysis of Selected Themes in the Homilies of St. John Chrysostom on the Epistle 
of St. Paul to the Romans‛ (Ph.D., The Catholic University of America, 1995); James Bennett Ayers, 
‚John Chrysostom's Doctrine of Conversion‛ (Ph.D., Boston College, 2001), 3-4; Maria-Fotini 
Poidoulis Kapsalis, ‚Image as Authority in the Writings of John Chrysostom‛ (University of St. 
Michael’s College 2001); Lloyd G. Pierson, ‚An Analysis of John Chrysostom's Underlying Theory 
of Christ's Redemption in the Letters of St. Paul‛ (Ph.D., Saint Louis University, 2004), 3-4. 
 
 18 Stephen  Neil, Chrysostom and His Message: A Selection from the Sermons of St. John 
Chrysostom of Antioch and Constantinople (New York: Association Press, 1962), 14; Wallace-Hadrill,  
164. 
 
 19 Hans von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Greek Church, trans. S. Godman (New York: 
Pantheon, 1959), 134. 
 
20 Krupp,  110-11, 141-46; Susan Donegan, "St John Chrysostom: An Argument for a Greater 
Appreciation of His Theology of Salvation," Diakonia 23, no. 1 (1990): 21-42; Iain Torrance, "God the 
Physician: Ecclesiology, Sin and Forgiveness in the Preaching of St. John Chrysostom," The Greek 
Orthodox Theological Review 44, no. 1-4 (1999): 163-73. 
 
21 Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time, vol. 1, 82; Wilken,  116-27; hom. in 1 Tim. 10 (NPNF 
I.13, 440); adv. Iud. 1.3 (FC 68, 10-14).  
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as paranetic in nature.22  This is corroborated by Osborn, who, in one of the more 
substantial treatments of the subject, argues similarly that Chrysostom’s ethics is 
predominantly motivated by a high regard for God’s righteousness, fellowship with Christ 
and the centrality of Christian faith and love – tenets, which, of course, find their origins in 
the Scriptures.23  Nonetheless, he also recognizes, along with Whittaker and others, that 
Chrysostom’s ethical ideals operate, by and large, within the framework dictated by the 
Greek ethical traditions, especially the Platonic tradition of virtue ethics.24  What emerges 
from this is clearly a creative interweaving of Greco-Roman and Christian ethical ideals, 
with the net result being a distinctive Christian vision of ethics.25   
                                                 
 22 Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 2002), 235, 248-64.   
 
23 Osborn’s study is an attempt to elucidate the early church fathers’ ethics from a thematic 
perspective, that is, to examine their views on righteousness, discipleship, faith, freedom and love.  
Such an approach, however, imposes a priori categories upon Chrysostom’s writings and helps little 
to further, if not hinder, our understanding of the ethical structure underlying Chrysostom’s 
exhortations.  Eric Francis Osborn, Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 114-42. 
 
 24 At the conclusion of his study, Osborn even suggests, perhaps unfairly, that Chrysostom, 
towards the end of life and exile, had become more Stoic-Platonic than Christian in his ethical 
outlook.  Osborn, Ethical Patterns, 121; Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time, vol. 1, 308; John 
Whittaker, "Christianity and Morality in the Roman Empire," Vigiliae Christianae 33 (1979): 214, 219-
221; Joseph Woodill, ‚The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity‛ (P.h.Diss., 
Fordham University, 1996), 52-70. 
 
 25 Papageorgious, for example, has drawn attention to Chrysostom’s ready adoption of 
Stoic psychology and his creative development of distinctively Christian virtues in his ascetic 
discourse.  This is also corroborated in Clark’s earlier study of the relationship between 
Chrysostom’s ascetic ideals and his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 7.  See Chapter 1 for a more detailed 
discussion of Chrysostom’s ethical vision.  Panayiotis E.   Papageorgious, ‚A Theological Analysis 
of Selected Themes in the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans ‛ (P.h.D, Catholic University of America, 
1995); Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 259-329. 
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 One of the most concrete ways in which this ethical vision has worked out is in 
terms of Chrysostom’s continual attempts, throughout the two decades of his ministry, to 
forge a distinct Christian identity that would differentiate his congregations from the 
Greeks and the Jews.26  This includes his repeated efforts to recast the ideals of gender for 
his listeners, so that their lives may better conform to, what he understands as, the 
standards of biblical teaching.27  Complementing this is Chrysostom’s frequent practice of 
presenting biblical and Christian figures as exemplars of his ethical ideals.28  In his hands, 
these Christian saints take on a variety of pedagogical roles.  The Christian monk is a good 
example.  Hunter, for example, notes that, against the critics of monasticism, Chrysostom 
would argue that the monk, when fully trained, would be able to minister to the laity and 
                                                 
 26 For a survey of the various methods that Chrysostom employs to construct the Christian 
identity of his listeners, see Isabella Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews and 
Christians in Antioch, Greek Culture in the Roman World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 63-90, 125-53. 
 
 27 One of the earliest proponents of this view is Peter Brown.  In his Body and Society, Brown 
argues that Chrysostom’s ascetic sexual ethics is aimed at severing the Christians’ ties with the Late 
Antique city.  This is because an ascetic view of sexuality would inevitably undermine not only the 
sexual licentiousness of Late Antique culture, but also its esteem for procreation and familial 
posterity.  Having said this, Brown also highlights that Chrysostom’s sexual asceticism has a more 
charitable agenda, namely, to accentuate the Christians’ awareness of their body and, through that, 
help them recognise the importance of alleviating the sufferings of the poor in the polis.  Elsewhere, 
Hartney has also shown that an important way by which these new gender notions are defined is in 
terms of how Chrysostom associates specific types of sins to each gender and then prescribes the 
relevant remedies for such sins.  These remedies, when practised, would be able to help each 
Christian attain the desired standards for their gender.  Peter Robert Lamont Brown, The Body and 
Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, 20th anniversary ed., Columbia 
Classics in Religion. (New York ; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2008), 305-322; Aideen M. 
Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City (London: Duckworth, 2004), 85-182. 
 
 28 The range of exemplars that he appeals to is diverse, including Old Testament figures, 
like the Patriarchs, Abraham and Jacob, King David, Daniel and his three friends; New Testament 
characters, like Jesus, the Twelve Apostles, Apostle Paul, Aquila and the beggar, Lazarus; early 
Christian martyrs, like Ignatius of Antioch, Lucian and Pelegia; and bishops, like St. Meletius and 
Flavian.  hom. in Matt. 4.18 (NPNF I.10, 28-9); Ignat. mart. (PG 50:587-596); Pel. vir. mart. (PG 50.579-
84); Luc. mart. (PG 50.515-20), Mel. (PG 50.519-26); pop. Ant. 21.2 (PG 49.213); Woodill, 58-59, 65-66. 
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benefit them greatly.  Indeed, he can even become a philosopher-king, who is more than 
capable of leading his people with loving-kindness.29  Yet, as Pleasants rightly point out, 
these ascetic figures, in other less polemical contexts, are recast simply as the embodiments 
of the spiritual ideals of Christianity and worthy exemplars for the laity.30   
 
Exemplar Portraits and the Interpretation of Chrysostom 
 It is Mitchell, however, who draws attention to the significant role that such 
exemplar portraits might play in the elucidation of not only Chrysostom’s ethics, but also 
his exegesis and theology.31  In her Heavenly Trumpet, Mitchell points out that 
Chrysostom’s exegesis of the Pauline letters is often accompanied by a myriad of Pauline 
portraits, ranging from epithets to large scale portrayals of his soul, body and external 
circumstances.32  Contrary to popular opinion, argues Mitchell, these ‚are not sideshows to 
the ‘main event’ of the interpretation of the apostle's letters, but are themselves central to 
his *Chrysostom’s+ exegetical art.‛33  Indeed, when reconstructed and examined together 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of the polemical portrayals of the monk, see Hunter’s introductory 
chapters to his translations of Chrysostom’s monastic treatises, the Comaparatio and Adversus 
oppugnatores.  John Chrysostom, A Comparison between a King and a Monk/ against the Opponents of the 
Monastic Life, trans. David G. Hunter, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity, vol. 13 ( Lewiston, 
New York: Edwin Mellen 1988), 25-35, 44-52. 
  
30 Phyllis Rodgerson Pleasants, ‚Making Antioch Christian: The City in the Pastoral Vision 
of John Chrysostom‛ (Ph.D., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1991), 93. 
 
 31 Mitchell’s thesis, as Bockmuehl points out, represents one of the many recent attempts at 
pursuing an effective history of interpretation, in this case, Chrysostom’s interpretation of Paul.  
Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, Seeing the Word: Refocusing New Testament Study, Studies in Theological 
Interpretation. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2006), 67 n.55.  
 
 32 Mitchell,  69-377. 
 
 33 Ibid. 384. 
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with Chrysostom’s interpretations of Paul, these rhetorical portraits clearly operate as 
embodiments of Chrysostom’s exegetical work and are, therefore, crucial for our 
understanding of his ideological discourse.34  A good case in point is Chrysostom’s 
interpretation of Paul’s soteriology.  While Mitchell concurs with most scholars that 
Chrysostom adopts a synergistic reading of Paul’s soteriology, she also recognizes that 
Chrysostom, by consistently exalting Paul as the ‚supreme example of humanity’s 
boundless capacity for virtue,‛ has inadvertently ‚dallied on the theological boundary to 
Pelaganism.‛  In other words, she sees an implicit contradiction between Chrysostom’s 
portrayal of Paul as an ‚archetype of virtue‛ and his didactic and more synergistic 
teachings on Pauline soteriology.35   
 Mitchell’s thesis certainly sets a milestone in terms of challenging the ‚traditional 
ways of mapping the terrain of patristic exegesis.‛36  Chrysostom’s portraits of Paul, as she 
puts it: 
both illustrate the inadequacy of the traditional model, and point towards some new 
directions to be pursued further in the emerging new typologies of "figurative" 
patristic exegesis: the construction of authors and other biblical personalities as part 
of exegetical practice.37 
  
This call must be taken seriously, especially in the case of Chrysostom, since his biblical 
exegesis, be it in his monastic treatises or his homilies, is frequently conducted in tandem 
                                                 
 34 Ibid. 381-2. 
 
 35 ‚This is why,‛ suggests Mitchell, ‚Chrysostom’s laudibus sancti Pauli were so popular 
among the Pelagians, who began translating them into Latin within decades of his death.  For 
scholarly consensus on Chrysostom’s synergistic soteriology, see footnote 16 earlier.   For a criticism 
of Mitchell’s assessment of Chrysostom’s soteriology, see Chapter 3.  Ibid. 400. 
 
 36 Ibid. 385. 
 
 37 Ibid. 388. 
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with rhetorical constructions of a variety of exemplar portraits.  For this reason, this thesis 
will pursue the ‚new directions‛ that Mitchell has set out by developing a comprehensive 
hermeneutical toolkit for the reading and analysis of Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits.  
Such a hermeneutical framework should take into proper account his distinctive ethical, 
theological and pastoral ideals, in addition to the narrative and rhetorical strategies that he 
would have acquired in the course of his education.  Once this framework and its reading 
strategies are identified, they will then be applied to a variety of Chrysostom’s exemplary 
constructions and teachings so that the interpretative potential of his exemplar portraits 
may be demonstrated and better appreciated.   
 
Thesis Outline 
 This thesis is divided into two parts.  The first two chapters are devoted to the 
construction of a preliminary hermeneutics of exemplar portraits.  Here, we will examine 
the educational, ethical, biographical and rhetorical traditions of Greco-Roman exemplar 
discourse and consider how Chrysostom appropriates these traditions to construct the 
exemplar portraits found in his writings.  The primary goal of this exercise is to develop 
the analytical framework and strategies needed to explicate the ideologies implicit in 
Chrysostom’s exemplar discourse.   
 Specifically, Chapter 1 seeks to examine how enkyklios paideia, or the Greco-Roman 
system of education, institutionalizes imitatio exemplorum as the most important means of 
ideological communication and reinforcement.  This is followed by a historical overview 
of the Greco-Roman ethical traditions and an evaluation of the legacy that they bequeath 
to both Christians and pagans in Late Antiquity.  This then sets the stage for us to examine 
12 
 
Chrysostom’s appropriation of this rich ethical heritage and the implications that this 
might have for the hermeneutical role of his exemplar portraits. 
 In Chapter 2, we review the Greco-Roman biographical and rhetorical traditions, 
with the aim of identifying the narrative and rhetorical strategies relevant to Chrysostom’s 
construction of exemplar portraits.  The reading strategies developed in both chapters will 
then be applied to Chrysostom’s portrayals of David.  By doing so, we hope not only to 
elucidate the ideologies implicit in these Davidic constructs, but, more importantly, to 
explicate the interpretative approaches and strategies involved in the hermeneutical 
application of Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits. 
 The remaining three chapters that follow are essentially ‘case studies’, where the 
hermeneutical tools developed above are brought to bear upon a variety of Chrysostom’s 
exemplar portraits.  Chapter 3 is a study of his didactic conception of soteriology and how 
his exemplar portraits may reinforce and enrich his teachings on this subject.  Chapters 4 
and 5 will focus on two of Chrysostom’s favourite exemplars: the Christian ascetic and 
martyr.  In Chapter 4, our analysis will centre primarily on the diverse ideological and 
pedagogical functions that Chrysostom conceives for the Christian ascetic, as the exemplar 
is presented in Chrysostom’s monastic treatises and homilies.  A similar agenda is 
assumed in Chapter 5 for the martyr portraits.  Here, we will also highlight the key aspects 
of Chrysostom’s rhetoric of martyrdom which not only set it apart from its Greco-Roman 
counterparts but, indeed, defines the Christian character of his rhetoric. 
 By way of conclusion, we will summarize the interpretative approaches and 
reading strategies required for a hermeneutical application of Chrysostom’s exemplar 
13 
 
portraits by incorporating the hermeneutical insights gathered from Chapters 3-5 into the 
framework developed in Chapters 1-2. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1: CONSTRUCTING A HERMENEUTICS OF EXEMPLAR PORTRAITS
15 
CHAPTER 1 
PAIDEIA, ARETĒ ETHICS AND CHRYSOSTOM’S ETHICAL VISION 
Introduction 
 In a letter to his younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa (335-394), Basil (329-379) 
advises:  
the great way to the finding of our duty is the attentive practice of the God-inspired 
Scriptures, for in these [Scriptures] we find both the practical counsel and the lives of 
blessed men handed down in writing, as some living icons of life according to God, 
for the imitation of their good works. [<] And generally, just as painters, when they 
are painting other pictures, constantly look at the example [and] do their best to 
transfer its lineaments to their own work, so also it is necessary for he who desire to 
make himself perfect in all branches of virtue, to look at the lives of the saints as 
though to some living and moving statutes and to make their good his own through 
imitation. 1  
 
Basil’s advice is, of course, rooted in the rich Christian tradition of imitatio sanctorum, 
whose origins may be traced to as far back as the period of the Old Testament.2  
Nevertheless, Basil is also pre-supposing here an equally rich, if not more ancient, 
tradition, namely, Greco-Roman exemplar discourse, in which he and so many of the other 
fourth-century church fathers were brought up.  Thus, we also find Basil writing on 
another occasion to a youth and encouraging him to learn from the virtuous behaviour 
                                                 
1 Ep. 2 (c. 358) (Translation modified from NPNF2.8, 111). 
 
 2  Compared to the Greek exemplary literature, the moral vision of the Old Testament is 
more subtly expressed through its characters.  Explicit moral judgments, as Wenham notes, are 
seldom made.  More often than not, the events are left to speak for themselves.  Nevertheless, the 
authors do not leave the moral decision entirely to the readers, but frequently hint of their views 
through evaluative adjectives or verbs.  For example, the Israelites are judged as having ‚played the 
harlot‛ (ἐξεπόρνευσαν) after Baal in Judges 8.33.  If there is ‚a danger that the reader might 
misjudge the situation, an authoritative comment may be heard,‛ as is the case of the narrator’s 
remark in 2 Samuel 11:27 that David’s treatment of Uriah had ‚displeased the Lord.‛  Having said 
this, the influence of Greek exemplar discourse is clearly more pronounced in Second Temple 
Jewish literature like Sirach (Sir. 44-50) and 4 Maccabees.  As to the extent of this influence upon 
Second Temple Jewish literature and the Christian writings that follow, these will be taken up in 
Chapter 2, when we examine Chrysostom’s appropriation of the early Judeo-Christian Davidic 
traditions in his portrayals of King David.  Gordon J. Wenham, Story as Torah: Reading the Old 
Testament Ethically (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 14. 
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depicted in Greek prose and poetry, as long as he ‚pass over‛ the evil deeds that are also 
commonly found in such pagan literature.3  
 In the case of Basil’s younger contemporary, John Chrysostom, the Antiochene’s 
attitude towards the moral value of pagan literature and learning is far more ambivalent.4  
When consulted regarding the education of young children, Chrysostom would advise his 
reader not to allow his children to listen to pagan tales, but rather saturate their minds 
with the virtuous deeds of biblical exemplars like Abel, Jacob and those from the New 
Testament.5  This disdain for pagan exemplars is only heightened by his frequent criticism 
of the life and teachings of the Greek philosophers, like Plato and the Stoics, the former of 
whom he has, on at least one occasion, dismissed as one who has ‚talked a deal of 
nonsense.‛6  When he does quote these philosophers with approval, it is for the sole 
purpose of denouncing yet another aspect of paideia, that is, rhetorical education.  Hence in 
his Adversus Oppugnatores, Chrysostom would concur with the philosophers that rhetoric 
is ‚not appropriate for philosophers, or even grown men; rather, it is an ostentatious 
                                                 
 3 ad adul. 4. 
 
 4 It would not be surprising if Chrysostom is familiar with Basil’s writings, in view of the 
fact that his spiritual mentors, Diodore and Meletius, were personally acquainted with the Bishop 
of Caesarea and that his soteriological and monastic ideals are quite akin to that of Basil.  This will 
be further addressed in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively.   Basil, Ep. 57, 68, 99, 120, 135. 
 
 5 This attitude is generally maintained in his homilies, where he frequently presents both 
biblical and Christian characters as exemplary figures to his listeners and rarely praises any pagan 
characters at all.  inani glor. 39-52. 
 
 6 hom. in Acts 4 (NPNF I.11, 29). 
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display of adolescents at play.‛7  Interestingly, just as one begins to conclude that 
Chrysostom is entirely antagonistic to Greek education and rhetorical training in general, 
he qualifies himself in the same chapter, declaring that he is not seeking to eliminate 
paideia per se, but is rather concerned with the corrupting influence that such training 
often has on its students.8 
 Regardless of his actual attitude towards the moral value of paideia, it remains a 
fact that Chrysostom’s understanding of imitatio sanctorum did not arise from his writings 
de novo.  As in the case of Basil, it also owes much of its origins to Greco-Roman exemplary 
discourse.  For this reason, our study of the hermeneutical roles of Chrysostom’s exemplar 
portraits must necessarily begin with the origins, functions and expressions of imitatio 
exemplorum, as understood and practised in Late Antiquity.  These will be the primary foci 
of the first two chapters of our thesis.  In this first chapter, we will examine the system of 
paideia in which Chrysostom was trained and argue that the pedagogy of paideia, to a great 
extent, is founded upon a philosophy of imitatio exemplorum.  The consequence of this is 
that the paideia system of education would have legitimized the notion of imitation as the 
primary and plausible means of the transfer of knowledge and worldviews in Late 
Antiquity.   
 Among the ideologies propagated through imitatio exemplorum, one of the most 
important if not the most important is the ethical ideals of Late Antiquity.  In the second 
part of this chapter, we will give a brief account of the historical development of Greco-
                                                 
 7 ad. oppug. 3.11.  Translated by Hunter in John Chrysostom, A Comparison between a King 
and a Monk/ against the Opponents of the Monastic Life, trans. David G. Hunter, Studies in the Bible 
and Early Christianity (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen, 1988), 149-50. 
 
 8 ad. oppug. 3.11 (Hunter, 148). 
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Roman ethics, focusing on the ethical concerns and framework that it bequeaths to the 
Late Antique world.  Having done so, we will then consider how Chrysostom 
appropriates these ethical ideals for his own vision of Christian ethics.  It is only when 
Chrysostom’s ethical ideals are clarified that we can proceed to Chapter 2 and explore how 
he transposes imitatio exemplorum into imitatio sanctorum through a creative adoption of 
Greco-Roman rhetorical and narrative strategies.   
 
Paideia and Imitatio Exemplorum 
 Despite the Romans’ conquest of the Mediterranean world, most of the Hellenistic 
cities in this region remained Greek in character.   Chrysostom’s native city of Syrian 
Antioch, for example, continued to be ruled by a council of oligarchs, speak Greek as a 
common language and glory in their Greek ancestry.9  Within this social matrix, the 
cultivation and preservation of this Hellenic identity is imperative, not merely for the 
practical purposes of communication, trade or even career progress in the civic 
administration.10  More importantly, it was the way by which the elite can distinguish 
themselves from the non-elite or, what they perceive as, the more inferior aspects of 
human civilization, whether these are the barbarians, the household slaves or even the 
                                                 
 9 Simon Swain, "Sophists and Emperors: The Case of Libanius," in Approaching Late 
Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire, ed. Simon Swain and Mark Edwards (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 357; J. N. D. Kelly, Golden Mouth: The Story of John Chrysostom: 
Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (London: Duckworth, 1995), 2. 
 
 10 Averil Cameron, The Later Roman Empire: Ad 284-430 (London: Fontana, 1993), 152-53. 
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ordinary person on the street.11  And the means for developing this Greek identity, as they 
unanimously recognize, is paideia. 
 Literacy had been a cherished skill among the Greeks ever since the classical period.  
Isocrates and Aristotle would go so far as to insist that it was the prerequisite for the 
learning of rhetoric.   Enkyklios paideia, or ‘common education’, began to develop as a 
formal system of education from the Hellenistic period onwards and, by the first century, 
had found one of its mature and fullest expressions in Quintilian’s (c. 35-100) Institutio. 12  
For a student of enkyklios paideia, the rudiments of his education often began at home, 
where he was taught either by a family member, or an appointed pedagogue, or even an 
elementary instructor.  A few years later, the student was sent to the local grammarian, 
where he received his secondary education in the form of further grammatical training 
and studies of the classical texts. 13 
 In both forms of education, whether primary or secondary, a student learnt by 
imitating models, since ‚examples‛ (exempla), remarks Quintilian, were ‚more powerful 
than those found in the textbooks.‛14   Thus, a student would write his first letters by 
                                                 
 11 Writing with reference to paideia, Iamblichus remarks that ‚it is thanks to upbringing 
[paideia] that humans differ from beasts, Greeks from foreigners (barbarians), free men from 
household slaves, and philosophers from ordinary people.‛  Iamblichus, VP 44.  Translated by 
Whitmarsh in Tim Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 90. 
 12 The adjective enkyklios can mean ‘circular, ‘complete’ or ‘common’.  In the context of 
education, it is usually translated as ‘common’, though the other meanings are not necessary 
excluded.  Quintilian, inst. 1; Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10-34. 
 
 13 Raffaella Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt 
(Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 47-53. 
 
 14 inst. 10.1.15 (Translated by Russell, LCL127, 259).   
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imitating a model of the alphabet, before moving on to copying and memorizing selected 
passages from the Iliad that his teachers had inscribed on clay or waxed tablets.15   
 Learning by imitatio exemplorum continued into the student’s teenage years, when 
he progressed to the schools of rhetoric.16  Here, he would be constantly reminded by the 
progymnasmata, or the preliminary exercises commonly used in the schools, that 
whosoever aspired to be a good rhetorician must emulate the famed orators of the past – 
Homer, Demosthenes and so on.17  The young Chrysostom, as it seems, took this advice 
seriously and often frequented the law-courts, most likely to listen to and imitate the 
orators’ defence of their clients.18  Having said this, the most important exemplar for these 
students remained their teacher of rhetoric.  Often, these sophists saw themselves as father 
figures to their students, taking great pain to nurture them and, at the same time, 
expecting these students to reciprocate their affections.  Libanius (c.314-c.394), for example, 
was so involved with his students’ preliminary rhetorical training that he personally 
                                                 
 15 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 133-4. 
 
 16 It is to be noted that not all students advanced to the learning of rhetoric in the first place.  
Moreover, ‚the study of rhetoric,‛ as Cribiore notes, ‚did not generally take place in a single school. 
Most students gradually moved from their hometown school to one in a larger town, and often 
ended up in a third school in one of the top educational centres. This was not the traditional 
division between elementary, grammatical, and rhetorical schools, but a progression through more 
refined stages of the knowledge of rhetoric. Raffaella Cribiore, The School of Libanius in Late Antique 
Antioch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 82. 
 17 Cribiore notes that it was standard practice for schools of rhetoric to prescribe readings 
from the historians and orators.  These were to be imitated and committed to memory during the 
course of their rhetorical training.  A former student of Libanius, Aphthonius, often illustrates the 
different rhetorical techniques expounded in his progymnasmata by using excerpts from different 
classical texts (e.g. Homeric epics) or oratorical speeches of famous orators.  A translation of 
Aphthonius’s preliminary exercises, or progymnasmata, may be found in George A Kennedy’s 
Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric, Series: Writings from the Greco-
Roman World (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 95-127.  Cribiore, Gymnastics of the 
Mind ,  227.  
 
 18 sac. 1.3 (PG 48.1.4) 
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corrected his students’ rhetorical exercises – a task that many teachers, by his time, had 
delegated to their assistants.19   It was, therefore, sheer delight for Libanius when a certain 
student, Leontius, delivered a speech that was later misunderstood as one of his teacher’s.  
For the sophist, mistakes like this were far from embarrassment, but were rather 
compliments for him, in that a student had thoroughly imitated his master’s craft. 20  
 In view of the above, it is clear that enkyklios paideia, as a system of education, had 
thoroughly institutionalized its pedagogy of imitatio exemplorum, so much so that the 
notion of imitation would be taken for granted by its students, Chrysostom included, as 
the most natural and plausible way of communicating the ideologies and virtues of 
Hellenism. 21  For this reason, when Chrysostom was to adopt a similar method of 
expounding his Christian ideologies and ethics later on, it would be regarded as the most 
reasonable thing to do by his listeners. 
 
The Ethics of Aretē: A Historical Overview 
 Among the ideologies propagated by paideia, one of the most important, and 
certainly the one that the pedagogy of imitatio exemplorum is most suited for, is the ethical 
traditions of the Greco-Roman world.   It is no wonder then that Ps-Plutarch would regard 
education (μάθησις) as one of the three crucial elements for the development of moral 
                                                 
 19 Cribiore, School of Libanius , 139-44. 
 
 20 Ibid. , 142. 
 
 21 As Berger and Luckmann point out, all forms of knowledge tends to be objectified over 
time into institutional structures in order to facilitate its transmission.  This is clearly the case for the 
pedagogy of imitatio exempli, which was formalized in paideia from a very early stage and had, since 
then, legitimized the plausibility of this pedagogy in the Greco-Roman world.  Peter L. Berger and 
T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality ([s.l.]: Pelican/Penguin, 1984), 70-146. 
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excellence (ἀρετή), the other two being nature (φύσις) and habituation (ἔθος) through 
constant practice.22  Writing more than two hundred years later, Libanius would even 
declare that a student of rhetoric, by virtue of his immersion in the classical literature of 
Greece, would be influenced by its moral teachings and inevitably develop similar moral 
qualities. 23   
 As we shall see in Chapter 2, the very forms that Late Antique imitatio exemplorum 
take would be largely dictated by the concerns, proposals and framework offered by these 
Greco-Roman ethical traditions.  These Late Antique exemplar constructs, in turn, would 
play a formative role in how Chrysostom develops his own ethical ideals and 
presentations of imitatio sanctorum.  Consequently, it is pertinent for us to first survey the 
history of Greco-Roman ethics, in order to identify the relevant ethical concerns, 
framework and proposals that would be taken for granted by both pagans and Christians 
in Late Antiquity.  It is by doing so can we properly understand the literary strategies 
underlying Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits and move one step closer towards 
appreciating the hermeneutical potential of these literary constructs. 
 
 
                                                 
 22 ‚Nature without learning,‛ remarks Ps-Plutarch, ‚is a blind thing, and learning without 
nature is an imperfect thing, and practice without both is an ineffective thing."  Ps-Plutarch, lib. edu. 
4-9 [Translated by Babbitt in Plutarch's Moralia, Series: Leob Classical Library, vol. 1, trans. Frank C. 
Babbitt (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1927), 7]. 
 
 23 This moralizing value of rhetoric is best expressed by Libanius’s predecessor, Isocrates 
(436-338 B.C.).  In his Antidosis, Isocrates argues that anyone who desires to speak well must first 
familiarize himself with the virtuous traditions of the Greeks, so that he may persuade his listeners 
with such stories.  Such familiarity, in turn, will transform his moral character.  Anti. 197-206; J. H. 
W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), 11-12, 14.   
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Homeric and Archaic Periods 
 The earliest literary reflections on Greek ethics are probably found in the Homeric 
epics of Iliad and Odyssey (c.800 BC).24  Here, we encounter a warrior culture and society, 
where the highest good of every man and woman is to receive the τιμή, or honour, 
ascribed to them by their oikos (household).25  For every Homeric hero, this timē is to be 
attained through the exercise of his ἀρετή for the sake of his oikos.  Thus Achilles is said to 
have suffered αἰδώς, or shame, when his aide, Patroclus, was killed by Hector.  His timē 
can only be regained when he avenges Patroclus by exercising the aretē of his battle skills 
and slaying Hector. 26  Similarly, Penelope can speak of the gods as destroying her aretē of 
beauty and figure when her husband, Odysseus, left for the Trojan War, presumably 
because she can no longer receive the timē due to her as a wife.27 
 Understood in Homeric terms then, aretē refers essentially to the intrinsic 
excellence of its subject, whether it is one’s beauty or battle skills, and does not bear any 
moral connotations – a point that is clearly seen in the fact that Penelope’s unscrupulous 
                                                 
 24 The Homeric epics are generally assumed to be written around the eighth century B.C.  
Proponents of this dating derives it from Herodotus’ testimony that Homer and Hesiod lived no 
more than four hundred years before him.  Others disagree and even question whether Homer ever 
existed in history.  Herod. 2.53;  Barbara Graziosi, Inventing Homer: The Early Reception of Epic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16-17. 
 
 25 For the Homeric hero, oikos refers primarily to his family, dependents, followers and 
those under his protection.  Often this will include allies within his wider social groupings, e.g., the 
army or the raiding party.  Usually the timē due to him is expressed tangibly in terms of physical 
wealth, land or women.  A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1960), 30-7; idem, "Homeric Values and Homeric Society," Journal of Hellenistic 
Studies 91 (1971): 4; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (USA: University of California Press, 
1968), 17-8; Christopher J. Rowe, "The Nature of Homeric Morality," in Approaches to Homer, ed. Carl 
Rubino and Cynthia Shelmerdine (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1983 ), 260. 
 26 Il. 18.18-21. 
 
 27 Od. 18.251-52. 
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suitors are also praised as ‚by far best in aretē.‛28  Moreover, it is often the expectations of 
the hero’s oikos rather than that of his gods which determine how he would exercise his 
aretē. 29   It is along these lines that Aegisthus is criticised as having gone ‚beyond what 
was given‛ (ὑπὲρ μόρον) to him and incurred the indignation (νέμεσις) of others by 
murdering Agamemnon and marrying his wife.30  Nonetheless, Homeric literature, on 
occasions, does recognize that one’s moros, or destiny, are in the hands of the gods, who 
can influence, albeit indirectly, the extent to which one can exercise his aretē.  Thus, 
Nausikaa would regard Odysseus’ dire straits as an evil destiny (κακὸν μόρον) given by 
Zeus,31 since 
it is Zeus himself [<] who gives people good fortune (ὄλβον), to each single man, to 
the good and the bad, just as he wishes.32 
   
 The advent of the Archaic period (750-480 BC) saw the transformation of many 
Greek societies from a warrior culture that is centred on the oikos to a civic life that is based 
on the nomoi, or laws, of the polis.  Along with this was a growing recognition among 
Greeks, like Hesiod and Theognis, that aretē should be bound up with what is 
praiseworthy, e.g., striving and hard work.33  Indeed, Theognis would even assert that ‚all 
                                                 
 28 Il. 23.571; Od. 4.629, 21.187. 
 
 29 This is evident in the fact the gods never censured Achille’s thirst for revenge and slaying 
of Hector.  Instead, we find them intervening only when Achille’s excessive mutilation of Hector’s 
corpse was deemed too dishonourable to the latter.  Il. 24.1-75, 10-115; Dodds,  17-18. 
 
 30 Od. 1.34-35; Lionel Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1962), 40-41. 
 
 31 Ibid. 1.166. 
 
 32 Ibid. 6.188-90. 
 
 33 Works and Days 289-92; Theog. 464. 
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aretē is summed up in justice (dikaiosunē), and every man is agathos, *<+ when he is 
dikaios.‛34  For Theognis and many of his peers, this dikaiosunē was understood as 
grounded not only in the nomoi of the city but in the very nomoi of the gods themselves.35  
This new appeal for allegiance to the nomoi of the polis cannot be underestimated, since it 
was on these grounds that Socrates (470-399) willingly drank his hemlock, rather than to 
violate the laws of Athens by fleeing for his life.36   
 This is not to say that the Homeric notions of aretē have therefore ceased.  As 
Plato’s Euthydemus would testify, many Athenians continued to believe that eudaimonia, or 
happiness, was bound up with the possession of many external goods (ἀγαθά), or aretai, 
like riches, health, beauty and noble birth, or that greatest good of all, good fortune.37  By 
and large, this mentality would persist in Greek culture even until Chrysostom’s time.  
Hence, in fourth century Syrian Antioch, we would still find Antiochenes flaunting their 
wealth ostentatiously, much to the chagrin of Chrysostom, while his teacher, Libanius, 
continued to take pride in the fact that his students, that is, his oikos, bore much animosity 
against those of his competitors. 38   
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 34 Theog. 144-48. 
 
 35 Solon, Ep. 2.5. 
 
 36 This new ethical conception is not without contest.  The Sophists, in particular, would 
assert that all ethics are relative since they are based merely on local laws and customs rather than 
nature (phusis).  Cri. 50A-54E; William J. Prior, Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek 
Ethics (London: Routledge, 1991), 39-40. 
 
 37 Plato often uses the words, agatha and aretai, interchangeably.  For example, while he 
refers self-control, justice and courage as agatha in the Euthydemus, he would regard them as aretai 
in Meno 74A.  Euthyd. 279A-C. 
  
 38 Cribiore, School of Libanius , 140. 
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 As many of the Greeks realized, these two conceptions of virtue ethics often came 
into conflict with one another.  This tension is well-expressed in their tragedies, such as 
Sophocles’ (496-406 BC) Antigone, where the heroine, Antigone, is presented as being torn 
between her allegiance to her brother, Polynices, and to the laws of her state.39  
Nevertheless, this new understanding of virtue ethics would prove to be enduring in the 
centuries to come.  Among its many conceptions, the most important and influential, at 
least for western civilization, is that of Plato.  
 
Plato 
 For Plato and his followers, the telos of human life is to ‚be happy and do well‛ 
(εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν).40  By eudaimonia, they mean that it is to possess: 
the good (ἀγαθὸν) composed of all goods (πάντων ἀγαθῶν); an ability which suffices 
for living well; perfection in respect of aretē; resources sufficient for a living creature.41 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Greeks commonly believed that eudaimonia is bound up with 
having many goods, including external goods like health and wealth.42  While Plato does 
                                                 
 39 Polynices had led an invading army into Thebes.  After he was killed and his army 
repelled, Creon, Antigone’s uncle and the new king of Thebes, decreed that Polynices was to be left 
unburied as a punishment for his treason.  The penalty for disobeying this decree was death by 
stoning.  As a result, Antigone was torn between allegiance to her brother, that is, giving him a 
proper burial, and allegiance to the laws of the state.  Anti. 22.38. 
 
 40 While eudaimonia is usually translated as happiness, its meaning is much richer than that 
suggested by the English word, which refers predominantly to ‚feeling good,‛ or ‚a sort of 
pleasure or being pleased.‛  Euthyd. 278e, 280b; Sarah Broadie, ‚Philosophical Introduction,‛ in 
Aristotle, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 12. 
 
 41 While the Definitions were unlikely to be written by Plato, most scholars assume its 
editor(s) to be representatives from his Academy.  Thus, the definitions found here could be well-
taken as reflective of the philosophy of Plato and his successors.  Ps-Plato, Definitions 412d-e 
(Translated by D.S. Hutchinson in Plato: Complete Works, 1680). 
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not deny the relevance and usefulness of external goods, he is equally convinced that such 
goods do not necessarily lead to eudaimonia, since they are not ‚good by nature‛ (πέφυκεν 
ἀγαθὰ).43  Rather, eudaimonia is to be gained through pursuing the most important good of 
all, which is wisdom (σοφία), or the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of using one’s goods rightly:44  
 As it seems, such a unitary view of aretē is often present in Plato’s earlier dialogues, 
where his reflections on the nature of different aretai, like piety (ὅσιος), courage (ἀνδρεία) 
and moderation (σωφροσύνη) always conclude that each of these aretē are actually one 
and the same, namely, the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of good and evil.45  For Plato, such a 
position is justifiable from a hedonistic perspective.  According to the philosopher, the 
ground of all human activities is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.  When 
a person has full knowledge of what is good or evil, or what brings pleasure and pain, he 
would undoubtedly act in a way that will maximize his overall good, or pleasure. 46  In 
other words, the pursuit of pleasure is the impetus for all expressions of aretai.  Having 
                                                                                                                                                    
 42 In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is often presented as the spokesman for Plato’s teachings.   
Undoubtedly, some of these teachings find their origins in the historical Socrates.  Unfortunately, 
interpreters have frequently differed as to which of these theories should be rightly attributed the 
philosopher.  Having said this, it is more important to note that Late Antique readers generally 
regard Plato to be the more important philosopher and that the teachings found in the Dialogues are 
his, rather than Socrates.  Antiochus of Aschalon (c.130-68 BC), for example, would go so far as to 
declare that Plato is such an original thinker that he has surpassed Socrates.  This is the position 
taken in this chapter.  Varro, Acad. 1. 17–18; George E.  Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in 
Agreement?: Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
51-52, 129-30.  
 
 43 Euthyd. 279A-281D. 
 
 44 Euthyd. 279D-282A (Translated by Sprague in Plato: Complete Works, 719). 
 
 45 Eu. 6A, 7A, 8B, 9E, 10E; Lac. 199C-E, 192C, 198BC, 199C-D; Char. 159C, 160E, 174B-C. 
 
 46 Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 81; Pr. 352C, 
353C-D, 354A-C. 
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said this, Plato, in his dialogues elsewhere, also teaches a reciprocal understanding of the 
aretai, that is, the aretai are separable.  For example, he criticizes the Spartans in his Laws 
for being too obsessed with andreia to the exclusion of the other aretai, while postulates in 
Book IV of his Republic that andreia is, properly speaking the aretē of the spirited 
(θυμοειδής) part of the soul.47 
 Although Plato does not fully resolve this ambiguity, he does have much to say 
about how one can cultivate the aretai in his life.  For Plato, the human propensity for aretē 
is predicated on the gods’ gift of this ability.48  Yet at the same time, since aretē is a form of 
knowledge, it should also be teachable to others.49  Both views are brought together in his 
Republic, where he asserts that a polis should be ruled by guardians, or philosopher-kings, 
With regards to these guardians, Plato recognizes, first of all, that they must be gifted by 
the gods with a philosophic nature.  Yet this alone is insufficient since such natures are 
morally neutral and can be nurtured for either good or evil. 50  Consequently, each 
guardian must be carefully trained in a wide range of disciplines, including physical 
education, music, poetry, literature, arithmetic, astronomy and philosophical dialectics,  
                                                 
 47 Rep. 442C-D, 443C-E. 
 
 48 M. 99A-E. 
 
 49 Pr. 361B-C. 
 
 50 According to Plato, such philosophic natures are ‚good at remembering, quick to learn, 
high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage and moderation.‛  
Interestingly, he does not correlate the presence of such philosophic natures with noble birth.  
Rather, he believes that should a child of a ruler be born with such a nature, he is in greater danger 
of corrupting this nature.  Should this happen, he is unlikely to be saved except by divine 
dispensation.  Rep. 424A-B, 456A, 459D-460B, 485A, 487A, 493A, 499B, 502A (Plato: Complete Works, 
1110).   
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before he is fully equipped to transform the entire polis into a virtuous city that is, just, 
beautiful, moderate and bearing ‚both the divine form and image‛ in their humanity. 51   
 This regime, in turn, assumes a distinct psychology of the soul.  The human soul, 
explains Plato, consists of three parts.  The first is the appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν), 
which is the seat of all human desires, e.g., hunger, thirst and lust.  The second is the 
rational part (λογιστικὸν) by which the soul reasons or deduces.  The third is the spirited 
part (θυμοειδής), which is the seat of anger.  While the thumoeidēs can riot against the 
logistikon, it can also ally itself with the logistikon to subdue the appetites.  For this reason, a 
major aspect of the guardian’s moral training is to develop the aretē of andreia in his 
thumoeidēs, so that it can help the logistikon subdue the epithumētikon and develop the aretē 
of sōphrosunē.  When this happens, the logistikon will be able to lead (archomai) the soul and 
attain the aretē of dikaiosunē.52   
 Plato’s vision of the philosopher-king, however, seems to be at odds with how he 
understands the eudaimonia of a philosopher in his Theaetetus and Phaedo.  In Theaetetus, he 
suggests instead that ‚a man should make haste to escape from earth to heaven,‛ so that 
he might become ‚like god as much as he is able to‛ (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν).53  
As to how homoiōsis theō is achieved, Plato acknowledges in his Phadeo that it involves 
cultivating the aretai discussed earlier, that is, andreia, sōphrosunē and dikaiosunē.  
Nevertheless, these moral virtues are merely the means of purifying one’s soul, so that the 
                                                 
 51 Rep. 376E, 377B-396E, 406B, 500E-501B. 
 
 52 Rep. 442B-443E. 
 
53 Tht.. 176b. 
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body (σῶμα) may not hinder the soul from contemplating the ideai of Justice, Beauty and 
the Good.  Consequently, he conceives philosophical perfection as possible only at death 
when the philosopher’s soul is fully separated from his body and can, henceforth, dwell 
with the gods.54 
 The breadth and depth of Plato’s ethical reflections are remarkable and, along with 
the traditional Homeric concept of aretē, will dictate the course of subsequent ethical 
reflections right up to Late Antiquity.  This is to be said for not only his successors, but 
also those who differ significantly from him, like the Stoics or Epicureans.  For even in the 
case of the latter two, their philosophical reflections on ethics cannot be fully appreciated 
except within the ethical framework provided by Plato and Homer. 
 
The Platonic Tradition 
 Among the successors to the Platonic tradition, the greatest is most certainly 
Aristotle (384-322).55  Despite his philosophical differences from his mentor, Aristotle’s 
ethics is, by and large, a development of Plato’s ethical ideals.56  Like Plato, Aristotle 
believes that the ‚chief good‛ of humanity is eudaimonia.57  While acknowledging that ‚the 
                                                 
54 Phd. 65d-69c.  For a helpful discussion of Plato’s understanding of the moral virtues and 
their role in assisting the philosopher in contemplating true reality, see Andrew Louth, The Origins 
of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 1-17. 
 
 55 Prior goes so far as to declare Aristotle’s ethics as the culmination of ‚the history of Greek 
philosophical thought about virtue.‛  Prior,  144. 
 
 56 Karamanolis,  25, 60, 72. 
 
 57 Where Aristotle differs is his conviction that eudaimonia can only be derived from ‚what 
is knowable in relation to us‛ and not Plato’s theory of the invisible forms.  Eth. Nic. 1094a1-22, 
1095a17-22. 
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chief good will be a kind of pleasure,‛ Aristotle also asserts that the more important 
aspects of eudaimonia consist of participation in the political life and a life of contemplation 
(ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός).58 
 With regard to the politikos, Aristotle considers the Homeric view of timē as the telos 
of the political life to be inadequate and argues instead that ‚people of discernment‛ do 
not seek timē for its own sake, but rather for the sake of their aretē.59  Presumably then, the 
telos of politikos is aretē and not timē itself.  Having said this, Aristotle differs significantly 
from the Plato and his Academic successors by asserting that aretē alone is insufficient for 
eudaimonia, since no one would regard a virtuous person who is asleep, suffering or even 
ugly as being eudaimōn.  Rather, external goods are necessary for complete human 
eudaimonia.60   
 As for the contemplative life, it is essentially participation in the activity of 
intelligence (θεωρητική).  Such a work, says Aristotle, is most akin to the human nature 
and the ‚highest kind of activity‛ that has ‚no end beside itself.‛61  Through theōrētikē, a 
human being can also enjoy ‚pleasures amazing in purity and stability,‛ and the most 
enduring feature of the reflective life:  self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια).62  Indeed, theōrētikē is 
                                                 
 58 Ibid. 1095b2-4, 5-11, 17-19; 1153a14, 1153b4. 
 
 59 Ibid. 1095b29-30. 
 
 60 Ibid. 1095b13, 22-23, 29-30, 1099a7-8, 32-33. 
 
 61 Ibid. 1177a12-22,1178a9-14, 22-25, 1177b4, 16-26. 
 
 62 For Aristotle, intellectual reflection is an individualistic activity because it is the one 
activity that a person can engage in alone and be self-sufficient with.  Nonetheless, he 
acknowledges that one can benefit even more if he reflects with others.  Ibid. 1177a12-1177b1 (Rowe, 
Nichomachean Ethics, 250-51). 
 
32 
 
higher than the human plane; for it is not in so far as he is human that he will live like 
this, but in so far as there is something divine in him, and to the degree that this is 
superior to the compound, to that degree will its activity too be superior to that in 
accordance with the rest of aretē.  If, then, intelligence (νοῦς) is something divine 
(θεῖον) as compared to a human being, so too a life lived in accordance with this will 
be divine as compared to a human life.63   
 
 Thus, like Plato, Aristotle postulates two teloi for the virtuous life.  The first, 
politikos, is akin to Plato’s vision for the philosopher-king, while the second vision of the 
contemplative life parallels, in some ways, that which is depicted in Plato’s Phadeo and 
Theatetus.  Where Aristotle differs is the fact that he articulates more clearly his belief that 
the politikos is merely a means to the latter and greater end, that is, to contemplate like the 
gods, since it is in this that the ‚complete eudaimonia of man‛ consists.64 
 With regard to human psychology, Aristotle concurs with Plato that the soul is 
constituted by two aspects: the non-rational and the rational, the former of which is where 
the appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν) resides.65  Corresponding to this bipartite psychology is 
his two-fold conception of the aretai.  The first is moral aretai (ἠθικόι) like andreia, 
sophrosunē, and eleutherios (open-handedness), while the second is intellectual aretai 
(διανοητικοί), where there are two aspects: the practical, which is wisdom (φρόνησις) and 
the theoretical, which is intellectual accomplishment (σοφία).66  For Aristotle, phronēsis 
                                                 
 63 Ibid. 1177b26-31 (Rowe, Nichomachean Ethics, 250-51). 
 
 64 Ibid. 1177a24, 1177b8-9. 
 
 65 Where Aristotle differs from Plato is his exclusion of the spirited part from his 
psychological model.  Ibid. 1102b. 
 
 66 Earlier, we mentioned that Plato, in his Euthydemus, speaks of sophia as the knowledge, or 
epistēmē, of using one’s goods rightly.  In Meno 88C, he also stresses the need for phronēseōs to guide 
all the undertaking of the soul.  Clearly then, Aristotle’s present conception of phronēsis is similar to 
that of Plato.  Where they differ is the fact that Plato seems to use sophia and phronēsis 
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consists in one’s ability ‚to deliberate well about things that are good and advantageous to 
himself,‛ while sophia refers to excellence in purely theoretical knowledge, or epistēmē, and 
technical expertise (τέχνη), e.g., knowledge of astronomy.67 
 It is with these in mind that Aristotle argues that the ēthikoi are cultivated through 
a process of habituation, guided by the principle of means (μεσότης) and phronesis.68  This, 
as he puts it elsewhere, essentially calls for a mastery over one’s passions (πάθη), so that 
one might nurture a disposition for what is good and the ability to will (προαίρεσις) to act 
according to the mesotēs predicated in each character aretai.69  With regards to the 
intellectual aretai (dianoētikos), however, it is simply the development of one’s abstract 
knowledge and this is to be pursued for its own sake, with no bearing upon practical 
wisdom (phronesis).70 
 In the case of Plato’s immediate successors, Speusippus (c.348-339), Xenocrates of 
Chalcedon (339-315) and Polemo of Athens (315-269), our knowledge of their ethical 
philosophy is far more fragmentary than our knowledge of Aristotle’s ethics.  
Nevertheless, from what we can gather, it appears that their teachings, like those of 
                                                                                                                                                    
interchangeably, while Aristotle understands sophia as referring primarily to abstract knowledge, 
thus the translation of ‘intellectual accomplishment’ here.  Euthydemus 279D-282A. 
 
 67 Eth. Nic. 1139a20-25. 
 
 68 For Aristotle, ēthikoi can only be learnt through practice, since ‚we become just by doing 
just things *and+ moderate by doing moderate things.‛  Concurrently, each ēthikos, e.g., sophrosunē 
and andreia, can be destroyed by excess and deficiency.  These can only be preserved by learning 
how to do ‚what is intermediate (mesotētos) between them.‛ Ibid. 1102a27-28, 1102b23, 1103a2-10, 
18-20.1103a25, 1104b11-13. 
 
 69 Ibid. 1097a8-10, 1104a33-1104b3, 1105b19-28, 1106b14-1107a12, 1108b20-26, 1109a30, 
1109b30-1110b18. 
 
 70 Broadie, ‚Philosophical Introduction,‛ 46. 
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Aristotle, are fairly similar to that of Plato.  Like Plato and Aristotle, Speusippus, 
Xenocrates and Polemo recognize human goods like health, strength and wealth as valid 
forms of agatha, even though they regard the aretai as higher than these goods.71  Similarly, 
they conceive the human being as ‚far more pre-eminent‛ than the other creatures, since 
the human soul is ‚from the divine mind (ex mente divina)‛ and ‚can be compared with 
nothing else *<+ save God alone.‛72   
 A strong continuity with Platonic ethics is also observed among the Middle and 
Neo Platonists from the first to the third century.  To be sure, these philosophers rarely 
take on board Plato’s ethical proposals entirely.  Nonetheless, the questions that he raised 
continued to preoccupy their ethical reflections.73  Like his Platonic predecessors, 
Antiochus of Ascalon (c.130-68) would affirm that bodily goods are important for one’s 
ultimate good (summum bonum) even though the aretai of the soul must always take 
precedence.74  Yet, when it comes to the question of how one might cultivate aretai, he 
adopts the Stoic position instead by declaring that the pathē, as the non-rational part of the 
                                                 
 71 This is, of course, an interesting consensus since it runs contrary to Plato’s view of human 
goods as given in the Phaedo and Theaetetus.  Plutarch, On Common Conceptions, Against the Stoics 
1065a; John M. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-274 B.C.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 66-67; DF 4.49. 
 
 72 Cicero, TD 5.38-39; Dillon, 148. 
 
 73 Dogmatic Platonism had declined for a brief period when the Academy made a decisive 
turn towards philosophical scepticism and ethical agnosticism in the third century B.C.  It was 
subsequently revived towards the end of the first century B.C. by Middle Platonists like Antiochus 
of Ascalon.  Cicero Acad II.77; A. A. Long, "The Socratic Legacy," in The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 640; 
A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed., Classical Life and Letters. 
(London: Duckworth, 1986), 78. 
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soul, do not aid the cultivation of aretai in any way.75  Plutarch (46-122), on the other hand, 
takes a more thorough Platonic position by maintaining that the soul is divided into its 
rational and non-rational aspects, the latter of which consists of the appetitive and spirited 
parts.  Furthermore, he asserts that the pathos plays an important role in one’s cultivation 
of moral virtues (ἦθος), since ēthos is simply an acquired state of the pathos, after it has 
been properly bred by habit dictated by reason.76  Like Aristotle, he also divides the soul’s 
aretai into practical and contemplative aretai, and affirms that aretē is the mean of the 
passions.77   
 This bipartite human psychology is also observed in the teachings of the 
Neoplatonists, Atticus (c.175) and Plotinius (204-270).  Plotinus, for example, teaches that 
the human soul is divided into the outer and inner man, the former of which constitutes 
the living functions, while the latter is the human intellect and the human’s true, immortal 
and divine self.78  Consequently, eudaimonia is attained through the intellective soul’s 
contemplation of the True Being of the transcendental realm.  Moreover, as a philosopher 
is increasingly assimilated into the divine Form of the Good, he would also find himself 
transformed into an increasingly moral person.79 
 
The Cynics and Stoics 
                                                 
 75 Acad. 2.39. 
 
 76 virt. mor. 441e-f, 442b, 443d. 
 
 77 Ibid. 443e-f, 445a. 
 
 78 Enn. 1.1.4.18-25; 1.1.10.5-15; Karamanolis,  222-3. 
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 Apart from the Platonists, the most influential Greek ethical tradition remains that 
of the Stoics.  According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics are the successors of the Cynics, 
whose origins may be traced back to Socrates.80  Cynicism, as demonstrated in the lives of 
Diogenes of Sinope (c.412-323) and the later Cynics, by and large operates within an 
ethical framework similar to that of Platonism.81  Like the Platonists, they affirm that the 
goal of human life is eudaimonia.  They differ, however, by insisting that eudaimonia is 
possible only when one leads every moment of his life in according to nature (kata phusin), 
that is, a life of self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) that follows only the laws affirmed by reason, 
and not those respected by human customs.  Nevertheless, they agree with the Platonists 
that eudaimonia, or in this case, the simple and peaceful life of the gods, can only be 
reached through the discipline of askēsis.  For it is through askēsis that one can tame his 
passions and help his reason properly recognize what is essential for eudaimonia and what 
is irrelevant for it, such as the possession of human goods or fulfilling the demands of 
social or political allegiance.82 
                                                 
 80 The first Cynic, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, is Antisthenes, who inaugurated the Cynic 
lifestyle by imitating Socrates’ patient endurance (καρτερία) and disregard for the passions 
(ἀπάθεια).  Vit. Phil. 6.2. 
 
 81 Diogenes of Sinope is the most famous of the Cynics and, as tradition tells us, is the 
disciple of Antisthenes.  Although Diogenes Laertius attributes a number of writings to Diogenes, 
none of these are extant.  What we have bequeathed to us instead are a series of anecdotes about his 
life, which powerfully presents Cynicism as primarily a way of life rather than a system of 
philosophical ideals.  Donald Reynolds Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th 
Century A.D. (London: Methuen, 1937), 1-s16; Luis E. Navia, Diogenes of Sinope: The Man in the Tub, 
Contributions in Philosophy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), 33, 52, 62, 110. 
  
 82 Although a Cynic may aspire for the divine life, he is generally agnostic about the 
existence of gods and in fact dismisses the value of religion for ethical improvement.  Navia,  113-27. 
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 The Cynic tenets of kata phusin and autarkeia would be popularized by the Stoics, 
who develop these ideals by recasting them within a theological-cosmological 
framework.83  ‚There is no other or more fitting way to tackle the theory of the good and 
bad things, the aretai and eudaimonia,‛ says Chrysippus (c.281-206), ‚than on the basis of 
nature (φύσις) as a whole and the administration of the kosmos.84  As the Stoics understand 
it, kosmos is to be understood not only as an ‚orderly arrangement of heavenly bodies,‛ 
but as God himself, that is, 
a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in eudaimonia, admitting 
nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein 
is, but he is not of human shape.85 
 
Due to God’s ‚providential care for the world,‛ every creature, say the Stoics, has the 
natural tendency to pursue what is appropriate for itself.  In the case of human beings, we 
are endowed with not only a first impulse towards self-preservation, but more 
importantly with the faculty of the reason (νοῦς) that permeates the entire kosmos.  
Accordingly then, to live a life of kata phusin is to live according to reason (λόγος).  It is in 
this way that one becomes enaretos and attains eudaimonia.86  When this happens, one will 
                                                 
 83 Zeno (333-264), the founder of Stoicism, is known to be a disciple of Crates the Cynic.  It 
is Chryssipus, however, who proves to be the intellectual giant of early Stoicism.‛  Vit. Phil. 7.1-4, 
183.  Susan Sauv Meyer, Ancient Ethics: A Critical Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 134. 
 
 84 Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 1035c [Translation modified and quoted from Brian Inwood, "Stoic 
Ethics," in Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 675].  The Stoics, adds Diogenes Laertius, often liken the 
intricate and interdependent relationship between physics, ethics and logic to that of the egg yolk, 
egg white and shell of an egg.  Vit. Phil. 7.39-42. 
 
 85 Vit. Phil. 7.147 (Hicks, 251). 
 
 86 Ibid. 7.94. 
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not only refrain ‚from every action forbidden by the law common to all things,‛ but also 
find his actions in harmony with the ‚purpose of he who orders the whole *kosmos+.‛   
 There are several implications for such a conception of eudaimonia.  First of all, aretē 
is no longer regarded as the means to eudaimonia, but as the end or eudaimonia itself.  
Secondly, since true aretē is bound up with reason, only those aretai which are ‚scientific 
and based on theory,‛ e.g., phronēsis and dikaiosunē, will be regarded as valid forms of 
agatha, worthy of cultivation.  External goods, like health and wealth, are deemed as 
indifferent for eudaimonia.87  Nonetheless, the Stoics do often regard some external goods 
as worthy of pursuit.  For example, they will praise parental love, marriage and child-
bearing as entirely virtuous, since these are valid expressions of kata phusin.  Moreover, 
they also deem it appropriate for the wise to participate in politics, since this would 
restrain vice and promote aretē, which coheres with the nature of the kosmos.88     
 Thirdly, the Stoics, unlike the Platonists, situate the passions in the faculty of 
reason.89  Such passions, as understood by Zeno and Chrysippus, arise whenever a person 
exercises his judgment and assents to an irrational impression made upon him.90  Since 
eudaimonia is grounded in a life of reason, to be enaretos is essentially to live a passionless 
                                                 
 87 The only Stoic to regard external goods as agatha is Posidonius.  Ibid. 7.102-03. 
  
 88 Ibid. 7.120-21, 124. 
 
 89 As Seneca puts it, reason and passion do not ‚dwell apart, in isolation from one another.  
Reason and passion are the mind’s transformation for better or for worse.‛  Seneca, Ir. 1.8.3 
(Translation from Meyer, Ancient Ethics, 160). 
 
 90 Vit. Phil. 7.110; Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian 
Temptation (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 34. 
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life (apatheia), where one’s irrational passions are completely eradicated.91  Having said this, 
the Stoics do affirm the cultivation of three good emotional states (ευπάθεια), namely joy 
(χαρά), discretion (εὐλάβεια) and wish (βούλησις), which are the counterparts of 
pleasure, fear and desire (epithumia).92 
 Fourthly, the Stoics concur with the Platonists that a life of aretē can be cultivated 
by training, since the aretai are teachable and that moral progress (προκοπή) is possible.93  
Whosoever desires a philosophic life, as Zeno puts it, will obtain aid in ‚moderate exercise‛ 
(ἄσκησις) and instruction, and finds it easy ‚to acquire aretē in perfection.‛94  Not unlike 
Aristotle, they affirm that a person is truly enaretos when he is able to act out of a virtuous 
disposition (διαθέσις) and habit (ἕξεις).95  However, they are also convinced that one’s 
pursuit of aretē is entirely controlled by divine providence, a determinism which compels 
them to conclude that only some are fated to become sages, that is, entirely virtuous 
people.96  Nonetheless, as Cleanthes insist, each man remains morally responsible since 
‚Zeus wills everything except the actions of bad men.‛97 
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 92 Vit. Phil. 7.116. 
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Hedonism: The Cyrenaics and Epicureans 
 Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics also claim their origins from another Socratic 
associate, Aristippus of Cyrene (Aristippus Senior).98  Like many of the Greek 
philosophers, Aristippus believes that one can attain eudaimonia when he develops self-
sufficiency, or mastery (ἱκανός).  This happens when one is able to adapt himself and feel 
at ease in any circumstances in life.99  Ultimately, this ikanos should also help a person 
become free to pursue ‚a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had.‛100  These 
hedonistic ideals will be developed by Aristippus Younger, who argues that eudaimonia is 
simply the ‚sum total of all particular *short-term+ pleasures.‛  Accordingly then, all aretai, 
whether intellectual, moral or external, are to be valued not for their own sake, but for 
their ability to maximise one’s pleasures.  Like most Greek ethical traditions, he also 
affirms that such aretai can only be acquired through bodily training or askēsis.101   
 A more enduring philosophy of hedonism, however, is to be found in the teachings 
of Epicurus (341-270).  Like the Cyreniacs, Epicurus presupposes that all knowledge is 
grounded on our sensory perception.  Consequently, ‚pleasure (ἡδονὴ) is our first and 
kindred good,‛ ‚the end and aim.‛  Unlike the Cyreniacs, Epicurus believes that pleasure 
can be either mental or bodily and that true pleasure is ‚the absence of pain in the body 
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 101 It is noteworthy that Cyrenaic hedonism, like the other philosophical traditions, is 
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and of trouble in the soul.‛102  Moreover, ‚Nature’s wealth,‛ as he sees it, ‚at once has its 
bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite 
distance.‛  Hence, eudaimonia must consist only in the pursuit of pleasures that are natural 
and necessary.  This, in turn, calls for the use of one’s sober reasoning to discern ‚the 
grounds of every choice and avoidance,‛ and to accustom oneself to a simple lifestyle 
devoid of all unnatural activities, including paideia.  When this happens, a philosopher will 
lose ‚all semblance of mortality‛ and lives a divine life, ‚in the midst of immortal 
blessings.‛103  
 By postulating eudaimonia as qua pleasure, Epicurus is inadvertently led to 
conclude that the aretai should not be pursued for their own sake, but to be valued only for 
their ability to increase one’s overall pleasure, that is, they have an instrumental value.  
Thus, dikaiosunē, according to Epicurus, should be valued only as a social contract or a 
means of preventing human beings from harming one another.104 
 
The Legacy of Greco-Roman Ethics 
 In view of the above, it should be apparent that, despite their philosophical 
differences, the major Greek philosophical traditions share several similarities in their 
approach to ethics.  To begin with, they generally conceive ethics in terms of a framework 
of means and ends, which they most likely inherited from the Homeric period.  
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Specifically, aretē is to be understood as a means by which a human being attains the telos 
of his life, be it timē, hēdonē, kata phusin or whatever else they commonly regard as 
eudaimonia.  Moreover, the aretai are frequently understood as exercised for the sake of 
others, be it one’s oikos or the polis.  In their different ways, both Plato and Aristotle would 
assert that the politikos is not only a valid aspect of eudaimonia, but is necessarily bound up 
with one’s oikos and fellow citizens.105  The same can be said for the Stoics, who, despite 
their belief that external goods are indifferent for human eudaimonia, would, nonetheless, 
affirm the social and political life as a valid expression of kata phusin.  
 Having said this, Greek ethical enquiry does often gravitate towards a more 
individualised understanding of aretē.  This is already present in Plato’s Phaedo, where 
philosophical eudaimonia is presented as the soul’s departure from human life, so that it 
can enjoy the bliss of the gods.  In this context, moral virtue is understood merely as a 
means of purifying one’s soul and body, rather than exercised for the sake of the other.  
This tendency is certainly presumed in the Cynics’ stress on kata phusin, which is often 
upheld as antithetical to the politikos.  This individualism is only intensified in the 
teachings of hedonists, where pleasure is taken to be eudaimonia itself and aretē is regarded 
as useful only to the extent that it increases one’s personal pleasures, or as Epicurus puts it, 
the bliss of immortal life. 
 This brings us to the diverse ways in which the philosophers understand the role of 
the gods in aretē ethics.  By and large, the Homeric epics are ambivalent about the moral 
stance of the gods and often present them as taking a passive role in the human exercise of 
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aretē.  To be sure, the classical period saw a growing conviction that the nomoi of the polis is 
reminiscent of that of the gods.  Indeed, philosophers as different as the Platonists and 
Epicureans would unhesitatingly regard the life of the gods, or the divine life, to be the 
ideal expression of human aretē and eudaimonia.  Nevertheless, their ethical enquiry 
continued to presume, to different extents, a degree of divine passivity in the human 
development of aretē.  A weak form of this assumption is seen in Plato, who, despite his 
recognition that the philosophic nature is the gift of the gods, does not say much about the 
role that they may play in the human development of aretai.  A stronger form of divine 
passivity is to be found in the ethics of the Cynics and Epicureans, where both Diogenes of 
Sinope and Epicurus are agnostic about the existence of the gods, with Diogenes even 
dismissing the value of religion altogether.106  It is only among the Stoics that we encounter 
a more theological approach towards ethics, where human rationality and potential for 
aretē is not only attributed to divine providence, but eudaimonia is posited as existing only 
when there is harmony between God, the kosmos and humanity. 
 With regards to the nature of aretē, most Greek ethical discourse from Aristotle 
onwards tend to present the aretai as separable, though not necessarily to the exclusion of 
the unitary view.  The Platonists and Stoics, in particular, would categorize the aretai into 
those that are agathon by nature and external goods, and are convinced that the cultivation 
of the former is crucial for human eudaimonia, with the Stoics going so far as to regard a life 
of aretē as eudaimonia itself.107  They differ significantly, however, on the value of external 
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 107 Aristotle, as mentioned earlier, would sub-divide the natural agatha into moral aretai and 
intellectual aretai. 
44 
 
goods.  On the one end is Aristotle, who believes that external goods are necessary for 
eudaimonia.  On the opposite end are the Cynics and Stoics, who consider human goods as 
indifferent for eudaimonia altogether.  Taking the middle ground are the Platonists, who, 
despite their hesitation to regard human goods as necessary for eudaimonia, would, 
nevertheless, treat them as valid forms of agatha.  Opposed to these are the hedonists, who 
generally adopt an instrumental approach to the nurture of aretē, which more often than 
not, leads them to stress the value of human goods, as opposed to the intellectual aretai.    
 Interestingly, all ethical traditions would stress the importance of living one’s life 
according to reason.  As taught explicitly by the Platonists and Stoics, this presumes not 
only a body-soul duality, but also the recognition that the soul can be divided into its 
rational and irrational aspects, not withstanding the different conceptions of this division.  
Such a division can, of course, be traced as far back as the Platonic Dialogues.   More 
importantly, this stress on the use of one’s reason would compel all the ethical traditions 
to agree on the importance of askēsis for human eudaimonia.  What is emphasized here is 
the training of one’s soul and reason, so that human rationality may lead the irrational 
aspects of the soul and cultivate the aretai necessary for eudaimonia. 
 Clearly then, while there is no such thing as a homogeneous Greek ethical tradition, 
it is manifestly clear that the different Greco-Roman ethical traditions share a familial 
resemblance.  What they bequeath to Late Antiquity is not only a series of similar ethical 
categories and concerns, but also a rich number of possibilities for how these categories 
may be configured and developed.  This, in turn, provides a rich context by which we can 
discuss and nuance our understanding of Chrysostom’s reception of Greco-Roman ethics. 
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Chrysostom’s Ethical Vision 
 
Chrysostom’s Reception of Greco-Roman Ethics 
 
 While scholars generally concur that there are significant parallels between 
Chrysostom’s ethical ideals and Greco-Roman ethics, it remains debatable as to how 
Chrysostom appropriated these ethical traditions.  Whittaker, in his comparison of 
Christian and pagan morality in the Roman Empire, concludes that the early church 
fathers, including Chrysostom, generally believe that ‚the ethics prescribed by pagan 
philosophers coincide with those required for the practice of Christianity.‛  With respect to 
Chrysostom, he adds that the bishop’s moral ideals, by and large, operate within the 
framework and assumptions of Platonic ethical discourse.108  Likewise, Osborn and Baur 
affirm that Chrysostom’s ethics are often similar to that of the Platonists and Stoics.  In the 
case of Osborn, he goes even further by speculating, perhaps unfairly, that Chrysostom, 
towards the end of his life and exile, had become more Stoic-Platonic than Christian in his 
ethical outlook.109 
 Despite the above, one must resist the temptation to conclude hastily that 
Chrysostom’s ethics is largely Stoic or Platonic.  Such a conclusion is clearly problematic or, 
to say the least, unhelpful, in view of our above discussions of Greco-Roman ethics.  As we 
have argued earlier, by Chrysostom’s time, many of the ethical categories and frameworks 
propounded by the different ethical traditions have passed on into common currency for 
both pagan and Christian ethical discourse.  As a result, it is hardly illuminating for us to 
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say that Chrysostom’s ethics is Platonic and Stoic when a similar conception can be found 
in other traditions of ethical discourse.    
 This difficulty is further compounded by Glucker’s suggestion that ‚the average 
educated Greek most probably read very little Plato, just as the average educated 
Englishman reads very little Hobbes, Locke or Hume.‛  Rather, if such a person wishes to 
be acquainted with Platonic philosophy, he would read instead ‚the usual literature 
written for that purpose: the various biographies, doxographies and mixtures of the 
two.‛110  This seems to be the case for Chrysostom whose frequent references to Greek 
philosophers are mostly biographical and, indeed, strongly parallels those recorded in 
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Eminent Philosophers and, on occasions, Plutarch’s Parallel 
Lives.111  For example, he would chide Aristippus for his immorality and condemn Zeno 
and Apollonia of Tyana for introducing ‚foreign ways of living.‛  In the case of Diogenes 
of Sinope, however, he would both censure his indecency and praise him for his contempt 
of wealth and concern for ethics.112  This is not to say that Chrysostom does not discuss the 
philosophers’ doctrines at all.  Indeed, he does occasionally refer to the teachings of 
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philosophers like Anaximenes, Pythagoras and Plato.113  Yet, his references are so 
infrequent that they can hardly constitute a grasp of the philosophers’ teachings beyond 
the mere acquaintance.114 
 In view of the above, Chrysostom’s reception of Greco-Roman ethics is more likely 
mediated through Late Antique culture and the Greco-Roman literature that he was 
exposed to, rather than derived from a deliberate study of the philosophers’ writings.  
Hence, it would be a mistake for one to assert that Chrysostom’s ethics is Platonic or Stoic, 
unless he means to use these terms simply as shorthand for the ethical categories shared 
by most of the Greco-Roman ethical traditions.  Rather, a more profitable way of 
evaluating Chrysostom’s reception of Greco-Roman ethics is to examine the continuities 
and discontinuities between his ethics and the major Greco-Roman ethical categories and 
approaches that have proven to be enduring and popular.  This will be our focus for the 
remaining chapter. 
 
Chrysostom’s Aretē Ethics 
We begin first of all with Chrysostom’s understanding of the nature of aretē.  Like 
Homer, Herodotus and other pre-classical writers, Chrysostom often understands aretē as 
referring to the excellence or quality inherent to a subject.  Thus, he would speak of the 
aretē of the flesh as its subjection to the soul, while that of a wife as her wisdom, discretion 
                                                 
 113 A good example is Book II of his Adversus Oppugnatores, where Chrysostom quotes 
extensively from Plato’s Crito 45.  adv. oppug. 2.4. 
 
 114 This is quite unlike the writings of earlier Christians like Clement of Alexandria, Justin 
Martyr and Origen, who were clearly familiar with the different philosophical traditions.  Indeed, 
Clement’s voluminous Stromateis and Origen’s Contra Celsum are milestones in Christian discussion 
of Greco-Roman philosophies. 
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and care, not her riches.115  In a similar vein, a teacher’s aretē is to lead his students to 
salvation, rather to seek honour and glory.116  More often than not, however, Chrysostom 
would follow the major Greco-Roman ethical traditions by using the term to denote moral 
excellence in general. 117   
Like the Greek philosophers from Aristotle onwards, Chrysostom generally 
presumes a multiplicity of aretai.  These include not only the four cardinal virtues of 
sōphrosunē, dikaiosunē, andreia and phronēsis,118  but also what might be understood as 
distinctively Christian aretai: faith, love (ἀγάπη), hospitality (φιλοξενία), mercy or alms-
giving (ἐλεημοσύνη), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη), patient endurance (ὑπομονή), 
forbearance (μακροθυμία), persistency in prayer and even a spiritual phronēsis that is 
capable of overcoming demonic powers.119  To be sure, several of these virtues are not 
absent from Greek ethical or religious life.  Nevertheless, they would hardly be recognized 
as distinct forms of aretai in their own right, worthy of ascetic cultivation.120 
                                                 
115 hom. in Eph. 5, 20 (PG 62.41.26-27; 62.42.25-26; 62.146.51).   
 
116 Ibid. 8 (PG 62.55.23). 
 
 117 This is evident in his frequent reference to aretē as moral excellence in his twenty-four 
homilies on the Epistle to the Ephesians.  Ibid. 1, 4, 7,9 (PG 62.12.49-50, 62.24.20, 62.35.20, 62.37.29, 
62.38.2, 62.52.13, 62.75.2). 
 
118 Ibid. 24 (PG 62.174.45-46). 
 
 119 Ibid. 10, 24 (PG 62.76-32-36, 62.173.21); Papageorgiou, 211-20. 
 
 120 One of the most comprehensive Greco-Roman catalogues of aretai is that of Aristotle, as 
given in his Nicomachean Ethics: courage, open-handedness, munificence, greatness-of-soul, mild-
temperedness, friendliness, ingenuity, righteous indignation, proper sense of shame and the mean 
between imposture and self-deprecation.  As can be seen, there is very little, if any overlap between 
this traditional understanding of aretai and those expounded by Chrysostom.  Eth. Nic. 1107b1-5, 10-
31, 1108a5-b5, 1127a13-14, 1128a9-10. 
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In line with Plato and, more specifically, the Stoics, Chrysostom further assumes 
that an entirely virtuous person must necessarily possess all the aretai, rather than just a 
few.121  Just as all five senses are necessary to our body, he explains, so should we have all 
the aretai. 
Now if someone is temperate, but is merciless, or he is merciful, but greedy, or is able 
to abstain from what belongs to others, yet not sharing what belongs to him, all these 
becomes purposeless.  For one aretē alone is insufficient to present us to the judgment 
seat of Christ with confidence, but it is necessary for our [aretai to be] many and varied 
and of every sort and of every kind. 122 
 
Chrysostom’s reciprocal approach to aretai clearly parallels that of the Stoics, who would 
only regard a person as a sage when he has attained total moral perfection.  Having said 
this, Chrysostom’s conviction is grounded not so much so on the Stoic notion of kata 
phusin, that is, that one must be entirely rational before he becomes a sage, than it is on 
Jesus’ admonition in the Sermon on the Mount: ‚whosoever shall break one of these least 
commandments shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven.‛123  As we shall see, this 
reconfiguration of Greco-Roman ethical categories in the light of Christian teachings is a 
common phenomenon that runs throughout Chrysostom’s ethical reflections. 
This is evident in (what appears to be) a unitary view of aretē that he occasionally 
propounds in his homilies.  Like Plato’s earlier dialogues, Chrysostom can speak of 
dikaiosunē as the universal aretē and that the Christian’s breastplate of dikaiosunē refers, 
                                                 
121 As mentioned earlier, Plato, in his Laws would have the Athenian declare that courage 
comes fourth in the order of merit and criticise the Spartans for their obsession with courage to the 
exclusion of the other aretai.   Laws 630c-d. 
 
122 hom. in Eph. 4 (PG 62.34.28-38). 
 
123 Matthew 5.19; hom. in Eph. 4 (NPNF I.13, 68); Brennan,  36-7. 
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essentially, to ‚a life that is wholly enaretos.‛124  On other occasions, however, he can also 
declare that ‚agapē is the mother of all good things,‛ or indeed, ‚aretē [is] from love, and 
love is from aretē.‛125  Having said this, in his exposition of the motif of pilgrimage in 
Hebrews 11.13-16, he would assert instead that  
the first aretē, and the whole aretē [is] to be a stranger to this world and a pilgrim 
(παρεπίδημον), and to have nothing in common with things here, but to be detached 
from them, as strange things [to us], just like the blessed [saints]. 126 
 
 Quite obviously, Chrysostom’s presentation of the unity of aretē is largely 
determined by the Scriptural texts that he is preaching from.  Undoubtedly, there is some 
degree of rhetorical hyperbole here, which leads to, what may seem at first sight, a 
contradiction in his views.  Nevertheless, these apparent contradictions can be reconciled 
once we recognize that each of these arguments shares a common ground, or as Plato calls 
it, an epistēmē.  Specifically, it is the epistēmē of God and His agapē, that is, He has first 
loved humanity, so that humanity might love Him and His creation.  It is on this basis that 
one can speak of agapē, dikaiosunē or even parepidēmos as the whole of aretē, since each of 
these is but an expression of the epistēmē of divine agapē.   
 If aretē is essentially the epistēmē of a loving God, the corollary must be that human 
eudaimonia cannot be the self-sufficient autonomy, or autarkeia, commonly propounded by 
Aristotle or the Stoics.  Neither is it attained through the mere cultivation of human aretai 
or living a life that is kata phusin.  Rather, eudaimonia is to be found in one’s participation in 
the agapē of God, which, as Chrysostom puts it elsewhere, is also bound up with the love 
                                                 
124 hom. in Eph. 13 (PG 62.96.38) and 24 (PG 62.167.55-56).   
 
125 hom. in Rom. 7 (PG 60.447.43); hom. in Eph. 9 (PG 62.73.60-74.8). 
 
126 hom. in Heb. 24 (PG 63.165.57-60). 
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of one’s neighbour.127  For Chrysostom, such a conception of eudaimonia has three 
implications on how we should understand the role of aretai, or the agatha, in the 
attainment of eudaimonia. 
 First of all, if eudaimonia is nothing less than participation in the love of God and to 
be able to imitate His love for others, this must also mean that one must become like God 
in the first place and to acquire His moral aretai, such as love, justice and wisdom.  This is 
certainly the view of Chrysostom, who, in both his Genesis homilies and those preached 
elsewhere, would often affirm the Alexandrian-Cappadocian conception of salvation as 
the attainment of divine likeness – a formulation that is, of course, greatly indebted to 
Plato.128   
 Secondly, the same conception of eudaimonia also obliges Chrysostom to regard the 
external goods as both the expressions of the divine agapē and the means by which one can 
abide by this agapē.  Both views find their clearest expressions in his Homily 10 on 
Philippians, where he reflects extensively on Christian stewardship of external goods.  In 
this homily, Chrysostom adopts the common Platonic-Stoic assumption that external 
goods should be distinguished from moral aretai and that the former are not agatha by 
nature and are, therefore, unnecessary for eudaimonia.  It is for this reason that Chrysostom, 
towards the end of his sermon, would caution his listeners not to flee from poverty as 
though it is evil nor pursue riches as though they are agatha.  Nevertheless, he does concur 
                                                 
 127 hom. in Matt. 71.1. 
 
 128 See pp. 29 for Plato’s vision of eudaimonia as the human being attaining divine likeness 
and the human polis taking on the divine form.  For the early Christians and Chrysostom’s 
appropriation of this idea, see Chapter 3, pp. 135-36, 144-146. 
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with the Platonists that external goods are the gifts or the agatha of God, given to humanity 
for our need and enjoyment.129  Where he differs from the Platonists is his clear recognition 
that since humanity has its being from God, it should render these agatha serviceable 
(χρήσιμος) to God, whether they are ‚the strength of the body, and the abundance of 
money and all the others.‛130   
On this basis, Chrysostom lists a catalogue of agatha, which can be sub-divided into 
bodily goods – ear, mouth, hands, feet, belly, sexual desires and bodily strength; mental 
goods – understanding (νοῦς) and the arts or crafts (τέχναι); material wealth – money, a roof, 
clothing and shelter; natural resources – land and the sea, and explains how one should use 
them properly for God’s sake and not abuse these gifts.  With regards to a bodily good like 
the mouth, he advises that one can make it serviceable to God by letting it  
do nothing that is displeasing to Him, but sing psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs. ‘Let 
no corrupt speech proceed out of your mouth *<+ but such as is good for edifying as 
the need be, that it may give grace to them that hear’; for edification and not for 
subversion, for fair words and not for evil speaking and plotting against the other, but 
the very opposite.131 
 
With regards to a mental good like the nous and technai, he adds 
He gave you nous, not to make of you a blasphemer or a reviler, but that you might be 
without falsehood.  *<+  He instituted technai, that our present state of existence might 
be held together by them, not that we should separate ourselves from spiritual things, 
not that we should devote ourselves to the base technai but to the necessary ones, that 
                                                 
 129 It is on this basis that he recognizes that not everyone can lead a life of harsh asceticism.  
Instead, a Christian should be able to enjoy his baths, take care of his body, keep a household, have 
servants and make free use of his meat and drinks.  The only injunction he gives that the laity 
should be moderate in these activities, and not indulge in excessiveness.  hom. in Eph. 13 (NPNF I.13, 
115). 
 
 130 hom. in Phil. 10 (PG 62.261.39-40,42; 62.262.26). 
 
 131 Ibid. (PG 62.261.54-263.30). 
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we might minister to one another’s good, and not that we should plot one against 
another.132 
 
As for material wealth, God 
gave us a roof, that it might afford shelter from the rain, and no more, not that it should 
be decked out with gold, while the poor man perishes with hunger.  He gave clothing 
to cover us, not to make a display withal, not that things like these should have much 
gold lavished upon them, and that Christ should perish naked.  He gave you a place of 
shelter, not that you should keep it to yourself, but to offer it to others also.133 
 
Finally, for natural resources like land and the sea, he cautions 
He gave you land, not that, cutting off the chief portion of it, you should spend the 
good gifts of God upon harlots, and dancers, and actors *<+, but upon those that 
hunger and are in want.  He gave you the sea to sail on, that you might not be wearied 
with journeying, not that you should pry into its depths, and bring up precious stones 
and all the other things of the same kind, nor that you should make this your 
business.134 
 
Chrysostom’s present argument clearly presumes, in some way, that the mental 
goods of nous and technai, or what Aristotle and others would usually regard as 
intellectual aretai, are on par with the other external goods.  His point here, however, is not 
to say that these mental goods are no different from external goods like bodily goods or 
material riches.  Rather, it is to draw attention to the instrumental nature of these agatha, in 
that each of these finds its proper excellence in the sustenance of human lives and, more 
importantly, the love of God and our neighbours, such as those who need edification, the 
‘Christ who is perishing in nakedness’ or those who are homeless.  The corollary of this is, 
of course, that such goods fail in their God-intended serviceability whenever they are used 
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 134 hom. in Phil. 10 (PG 62.261.41-263.25). 
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to further human pleasure and vanity instead, be it the adornment of our clothing with 
gold, the pursuit of riches, harlotry or devotion to base technai.135 
Thirdly, with regard to anthropology, Chrysostom’s conception of eudaimonia also 
compels him to adopt a teleological understanding of human nature.  Like many of the 
Greek Fathers, Chrysostom propounds a bipartite anthropology which asserts that human 
nature is constituted by a body (σῶμα or σάρξ) and a soul (ψυχή), both of which are 
naturally good.136  For Chrysostom, even though the former is inferior to the latter, the 
body and soul are, by no means, opposed to one another.137  Rather, the body is meant to 
be governed by the soul, just like a ‚lyre to its player,‛ or a charioteer having mastery 
                                                 
 135 The instrumental conception of external goods is also evident in Chrysostom’s view of 
marriage.  According to Ford, Chrysostom conceives marriage as the God-ordained setting for the 
chaste to channel their sexual passions.  In addition, it is a safe harbour for the couple by ‚helping 
them to better negotiate the struggles and vicissitudes of life in this world, and to more fully 
develop as loving human beings.‛ Ibid. (PG 62.263.89);  Catherine P. Roth, "Introduction," in St. John 
Chrysostom: On Marriage and Family Life (Crestwood, NY: St. Valdimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 7-24; 
David C. Ford, Women and Men in the Early Church: The Full Views of St. John Chrysostom (South 
Canaan, Pennsylvania: St. Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1996), 64, 66. 
 
 136 Chrysostom often uses the terms, sarx and sōma, interchangeably.  See Chapter 3, pp. 150 
for a more detailed discussion of his use of sarx and sōma.  It is to be noted that some scholars, like 
Papageorgiou, have argued that Chrysostom’s bipartite anthropology is sure evidence of his 
adoption of Stoic psychology.  One must, however, be cautious against such a simplification of 
Chrysostom’s psychology.  In the first place, such a bipartite anthropology is common among 
Platonists, like Aristotle and Plutarch and is, by no means, restricted only to the Stoics.  Moreover, 
there seems to be a degree of fluidity in Chrysostom’s conception since he would, on occasions, 
affirm Plato’s tripartite psychology. This is certainly the case in his Address on Vainglory and his 
Homily 17 on Acts, where he would speak of θυμός, or anger, as a dog that can be trained well, so 
that it can guard one’s soul against evil thoughts.  inani glor. 65; hom. in Acts 17 (PG 60.139.46); 
Papageorgiou, 57-58; Matthew Steenberg, Of God and Man: Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to 
Athanasius (Edinburgh: T.& T.Clark Ltd, 2009), 170. 
 
 137 In Homily 13 on Romans, Chrysostom admits that the flesh is not so great as the soul and 
is weaker to it, but yet is ‚not contrary, or fighting against it, or evil.‛  hom. in Rom. 13 (PG 
60.509.43-45). 
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(κράτησις) over his horse.138  Indeed, sin occurs ‚whenever *the soul allows+ the flesh *to+ 
gain mastery (κρατήσῃ) over her charioteer and exalts itself,‛ thus producing ‚ten 
thousand mischiefs.‛139  In other words, it is the soul and not the body that is responsible 
for human sin.  Nonetheless, it is also manifestly clear that the aretē, or excellence, of the 
body is to be found in its telos, which is its subjection to the soul.140   
 Yet, as Chrysostom also recognizes, the soul does not, by necessity, tend towards 
doing good or the things divine.  Speaking on the role of the soul in helping a human 
being attain divine likeness, he notes:  
Just as on this wide and spacious earth some animals are tamer and others more savage, 
so too in the wide spaces of our soul some of our ideas (λογισμῶν) are more irrational 
(ἀλογώτεροι) and beast-like, others more savage and wilder.  It is necessary to have 
mastery (κρατεῖν) and overcome them and submit them to the rule of reason.141  
 
As Chrysostom sees it, this is not a difficult matter, especially for a Christian, since: 
in a person reason (λογισμός) is present, and the fear of God, and much aid from many 
sides. *<+ Therefore, do not say, [you are] inept and without excuse, for you have the 
power (δυνατὸν), if you are willing to be tame and meek and reasonable.142 
 
 Undoubtedly, Chrysostom is presupposing here that human logismos and boulēsis 
are unaffected by the Fall and are still able (dunatos) to lead the soul and the body.  
                                                 
 138 The first metaphor is taken from Homily 13 on Romans, while the second is from Homily 5 
on Ephesians.  In the second passage, we also find Chrysostom asserting similarly that ‚the aretē of 
the flesh is its subordination to the soul.  hom. in Rom. 13 (PG 60.509.46; 62.41.24); hom. in Eph. 5 (PG 
62.41.25-26). 
 
 139 hom. in Eph. 5 (PG 62.41.24-26). 
 
 140 Chrysostom speaks of the body as incapable of doing any ‚grievous harm without the 
soul, whereas the soul can do much *harm+ without the body.‛ hom. in Eph. 5 (PG 62.43). 
 
 141 hom. in Gen. 9 (PG 53.78b-c). 
 
 142 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, he refuses to ascribe an ethical autonomy to the soul.  Rather, as he declares 
in his Homily 5 on Ephesians, ‚neither the body (σῶμα) nor the soul (ψυχὴ) in itself, if it 
does not receive a decisive influence (ῥοπῆς) from above, is able to do anything noble or 
great.‛143  This is because they, like the eyes, have their natural limitations, or weaknesses: 
The eyes are good (καλοὶ), but without light produce countless errors; but this is their 
weakness, not due to [their] nature (φύσεως).  If their errors were natural (φυσικὰ ἦν 
τὰ κακὰ), then we should not be able to use them when there is need.  For nothing that 
is natural is evil (οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι φυσικὸν κακόν).144 
  
Hence, for the soul to become the good ‚charioteer‛ of its body, it must have the necessary 
skills, or epistēmē, lest it commits ‚greater terror itself.‛  This is why, he continues, ‚the 
Spirit must be near *to us+ in every moment,‛ so that it ‚imparts (ποιεῖ) greater strength to 
the charioteer; and beautifies (καλλωπίζει) both the body and the soul.‛145  In other words, 
the aretē of the soul, like that of the body, is teleological in that it is realized only when the 
soul becomes serviceable to God.  This aretē, in turn, is to be gained through both the 
soul’s exercise of its reason and will to gain mastery over its more irrational aspects and 
also its constant dependence on the Spirit’s guidance and strength.146 
 Thus far, we have seen how Chrysostom’s conceptions of human aretai are largely 
dictated by his view of the human telos as participation in the divine agapē, that is, the love 
                                                 
 143 hom in Eph. 5 (PG 62.41.11-12). 
 
 144 Ibid. (PG 62.41.19-21). 
 
 145 The use of the present indicatives, ποιεῖ and καλλωπίζει, is significant in that they 
clearly emphasize the continual dependence that the soul and the body has upon the Spirit of God.  
Ibid. PG 62.41.31-32. 
 
 146 As we shall see in Chapter 3, Chrysostom’s understanding of the soul’s dependency on 
the Spirit’s aid is bound up with his vision of human salvation as deification.  hom. in Gen. 9 (PG 
53.78b-c). 
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of God and one’s neighbour.  This, in turn, brings us back to the long-standing Homeric, 
or indeed, Greco-Roman ethical framework, which stresses that human aretai are always 
exercised for the sake of one’s oikos or polis.  Seen within this framework, Chrysostom’s 
ethics obviously assumes a new oikos for the Christian, namely, God and his neighbours, 
especially his fellow Christians.147  Instead of Homeric timē, what a Christian gains through 
his cultivation of aretē is the agapē of God.  But more is involved here.  Like Plato, 
Chrysostom is convinced that the human potential for aretē is a gift of God.  Unlike the 
philosopher, however, Chrysostom does not believe that this potential is limited by one’s 
nature and upbringing.  Rather, as we have argued earlier, the human potential for aretē is 
pneumatologically centred, in that every person, as long as he wills, can become enaretos 
by the gift and transforming power of the Holy Spirit.  It is in this way that one might say 
that Chrysostom’s ethics are more Stoic than Platonic, since the Stoics postulate God as 
playing the primary role in the entire process of cultivation of aretē.148 
 
Chrysostom and the Angelic Life 
 Among the many motifs that Chrysostom uses to depict the Christian telos or 
eudaimonia, his favourite is most certainly the metaphor of the Christian as living the life of 
the angels.149  The Son of God, he declares, has brought every aretē, or indeed ‚the way of 
                                                 
 147 It is on this basis that Chrysostom asserts elsewhere that a man cannot be considered 
enaretos unless he takes up the responsibility of leading his entire household towards aretē.  hom. in 
Eph. 13 (PG 62.99.27-30). 
 
 148 See pp. 38-39. 
 
 149 Chrysostom understands Christian salvation as essentially the restoration of the angelic 
life first enjoyed by Adam and Eve.  For this reason, the angelic life is to constitute a dominant 
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life of the angels‛ (τῶν ἀγγέλων τὴν πολιτείαν) to humanity.150  Indeed, every Christian, 
from their baptisms onwards, would begin to live the life of the angels on earth.151  Quite 
obviously, the motif of the angelic life, for Chrysostom, is a powerful summarizing symbol 
that encapsulates the essence of what he thinks is the ideal Christian life.  Yet at the same 
time, he also frequently presumes that there are differences between the angels and 
Christians.  For this reason, the angelic motif also operates as an elaborating symbol for 
Chrysostom to re-conceptualize and develop his understanding of Christian life.152  In 
view of these, two important questions must be addressed.  Firstly, to what extent does 
Chrysostom perceive the life of the heavenly angels to be identifiable in that of a Christian?  
Secondly, how does Chrysostom develop this angelic motif so that it becomes more suited 
for the articulation of his vision of the Christian life?  To answer these questions, we must 
first ascertain Chrysostom’s angelology. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
motif in much of his soteriological and ethical discourse.  Louis Meyer, Saint John Chrysostome: 
Maitre De Perfection Chriétienne (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Ses Fils, 1933), 192-219. 
 
 150 hom. in Eph. 23 (PG 62.167.13-17). 
 
 151 ‚Second Instruction‛ (ACW 31, 53); hom. in Rom. 23 (NPNF I.11, 516). 
 
 152 A summarizing symbol, as Ortner explains, is a symbol that sums up, expresses or 
represents a complex system of ideas that are sacred to a community.  An elaborating symbol, on 
the other hand, provides ‚vehicles for sorting out complex and undifferentiated feelings and ideas, 
making them comprehensible to oneself, communicable to others, and translatable into orderly 
action.‛  Both types of symbols, adds Ortner, are not mutually exclusive but are, practically 
speaking, a continuum.  Sherry B. Ortner, "On Key Symbols," American Anthropologist 75 (1973): 
1338-46. 
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Angelology 
Although Chrysostom did not leave behind an extensive treatment of angelology, 
his views on this subject may be readily gathered from his various writings.  First of all, he 
envisages a hierarchy of angelic orders in the heavenly realm, consisting of ‚the angels, the 
archangels, the cherubim, the seraphim, the thrones, the dominions, the principalities, the 
powers, the whole host, the royal palaces, the tabernacles.‛153  Elsewhere, he even claims 
that these myriads of heavenly beings and powers are countless and their tribes are 
beyond number.154  While both lists are probably not indicative of the order among the 
angels, Chrysostom recognizes that a ranking does exist among them, as may be seen in his 
claim elsewhere that the Cherubim is greater than the Seraphim because the former are 
higher powers and stand closer to the throne of God.155 
Unlike the rebellious devil and his fellow demons, these heavenly beings are 
regarded as good, holy and the servants of God, ever-ready to receive God’s commands.156  
Often they act as God’s messengers to address humankind on His behalf, whether it is to 
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trans. Robert C. Hill, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 74 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1985) 108-9. 
 
60 
 
declare a prophecy to Daniel (Dan. 9.21), or to proclaim glad tidings to Joseph (Matt. 
1.20).157  As the ‚angel of the Lord,‛ an angel is also ‚entrusted with the management of the 
world,‛ and instrumental, for example, in the stopping of wars or the extermination the 
firstborn of the Egyptians.158  In addition, the angels are also guardians of the faithful, ever-
present in their lives to deliver them from danger.159   In line with most early Christian 
traditions, Chrysostom also esteem the ‚choirs of angels,‛ archangels and seraphim as 
worshippers of God par excellence, who are never asleep, but ever-present before their Lord 
and singing praises to Him.160   
With respect to angelic ontology, one of Chrysostom’s most detailed expositions is 
found in his De incomprehensibili dei natura.  In Homily 1 he stresses that the heavenly beings 
have ‚nothing in common with us,‛ and that ‚the distance which separates men from 
angels is a great one.‛  A similar point is reiterated in Homilies 2 and 3, where he declares 
that a single angel is more valuable than the whole visible universe and the glory of one 
angel is so great that even a just prophet like Daniel did not have the strength to look at 
him.161  Interestingly, Chrysostom also draws attention to the wings of the angels and 
                                                 
157 hom. in Matt. 4.4, 5.8 (NPNFI.10, 21-2, 32). 
 
158 comm. Job 1. (Hill, Job, 26); Commentary on the Psalms 148.  Translated by Hill in John 
Chrysostom, Commentary on the Psalms, trans. Robert C. Hill, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Brookline, MA: Holy 
Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), 370.  
 
159 comm. Job 1 (Hill, Job, 25-6). 
 
160 hom. in John 15.2; hom. in Matt. 19.4, 54.8. 
 
 161 incomp. 2.29, 3.23. 
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archangels, explaining that these wings are important expressions of their loftiness over 
human nature.162   
Having said this, Chrysostom’s present interest in angelic ontology is aimed not so 
much at exalting the angels, but rather at discrediting the heresy of the Anomoeans.  It is 
with this mind that he would emphasize concurrently that the angels are created and, 
therefore, cannot know the essence of God.  This vast gulf between the divine and angelic 
natures is most clearly understood in the fact that God created the countless multitudes of 
powerful angels simply by an effortless act of His will.  Knowing this difference, the angels 
do what is proper to their being, which is to worship and glorify God, rather than to 
speculate on His divine essence. 163  This is true even for the most powerful of these 
heavenly beings, the Cherubim, whose ‚knowledge,‛ he claims, ‚has become abundant but 
is unable to look upon God’s accommodation of condescension without fear.‛164  This is, of 
course, entirely contrary to the Anomoeans’ behaviour who, as Chrysostom puts it, have 
the audacity to speculate on the essence of God even though they are ontologically inferior 
to the angels.165  In other words, Chrysostom’s objective for talking about angelic ontology 
is to highlight the vast ontological distance between God and man and, therefore, the 
impossibility for any human being to know the divine essence.  This, in turn, should also 
demonstrate the ludicrousness of the Anomoeans’ claims, that is, that one can know God 
perfectly.  
                                                 
 162 incomp. 3.28. 
 
 163 incomp. 1.34-35, 2.30. 
 
 164 incomp. 3.29 (SC 28.3.332). 
 
 165 incomp. 1.36. 
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For Chrysostom, discourse about angelic ontology can operate at different levels.  
In his Homily 3 on Hebrews, for example, it is deployed to clearly distinguish the Son from 
the angels.  Hence the Son is spoken of as entirely deserving of the Father’s privileges 
while the ‚office of the angels‛ is simply defined as to ‚minister to God for our 
salvation.‛166  As we shall we see in the remaining sections and also in Chapter 3, discourse 
about the angels can also become, for Chrysostom, an important means of articulating his 
vision of the Christian life.  In these cases, however, Chrysostom’s pedagogical objective is 
to not so much to emphasize the divine-human distance but to stress the new proximity 
that has been achieved between both by God through the salvation of His Son.   
 
 
The Angelic Motif: A Historical Overview  
The origins of the angelic life motif may be traced to the Second Temple period, 
when both Hellenistic and Palestinian Jews began to treat the angelic life as a symbol of the 
spiritual heights that the faithful can reach after death.167  Enoch, for example, is esteemed 
                                                 
166 As Tushling has highlighted, this sharp demarcation between Christ and the angels is 
commonly undertaken by the early Christians in their attempt to not only safeguard monotheism, 
but also to stress the uniqueness of Christ’s mediating work.  Elsewhere, in his Homily 8 on Genesis, 
Chrysostom would decry those who interpret Genesis 1.26, ‚let us make man in our image‛ as 
referring to God’s conversation with his angels.  On the contrary, he argues, the angels as servants 
of God cannot participate in the counsel of God.  Hence, the party whom God converses with must 
be Christ, the Son of God Himself.  hom. in Heb. 3.4 (NPNF I.14, 376-77), hom. in Gen. 8.7 (Hill, 
Homilies on Genesis 1-17, 108-9); Tuschling,  207-8. 
 
 167 Philo, for example, speaks of the faithful as passing on to immortality and the heavenly 
realms (sacr. 6, 8; QG 1.86), while 2 Baruch speaks quite explicitly of the justified being made ‚like 
the angels‛ (2 Bar. 51:10).  This concept of the ascent of the faithful along a heavenly continuum will 
be picked up by Origen in his prologue to the Commentary on Song of Songs.  Norman Russell, The 
Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, Oxford Early Christian Studies. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 146. 
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in 1 Enoch as having surpassed the angels, while the Qumran Community (c. 150 BCE-70) 
takes for granted that they are the covenantal people of God who participate in the angelic 
duties, such as liturgical worship and prayer, even in this present age.168 
Among Christians, the earliest conception of the angelic life is articulated by Jesus, 
who proclaims that ‚in the resurrection [the faithful] neither marry nor are given in 
marriage, but are like angels in heaven.‛169  Certainly, Jesus’ eschatological vision resonates 
well with those of his Jewish contemporaries.  Nevertheless, the question that is left open is 
the extent to which his disciples should imitate the life of the angels in the here and now.  
Over the next two centuries, a variety of answers would be proposed.  Adopting a Philonic 
approach to this question, Clement of Alexandria considers those who engage constantly 
in the contemplation of God as having become like the angels.170  A more popular answer, 
however, is to be found in the martyr literature composed in the same period.   
To be sure, the martyrs are seldom referred to as angelic beings in the Acts of the 
Martyrs.171  Nevertheless, it is also unmistakably clear that the Acta’s portrayals of the 
martyrs often resemble closely the ways in which the angels are depicted in Jewish 
                                                 
 168 1En. 14:18-25, 15:1-16:4; 4Q403; 1QS4:24, 1QH 3:5, 11Q13:10, 4Q400, 4Q403.  Tuschling,  
136; Geza Vermes, "The Religious Ideas of the Community," in The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in 
English (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 84-85. 
 
169 Matt. 22.30 (NRSV).  Luke 20.35-36 unpacks this idea further, by having Jesus say that 
‚those who are considered worthy of a place in that age and in the resurrection from the dead 
neither marry nor are given in marriage.  Indeed they cannot die anymore, because they are like 
angels and are children of God, being children of the resurrection‛ (NRSV). 
 
 170 For a more detailed discussion of Clement’s appropriation of Philo’s teachings, see 
Chapter 3, pp. 135-36.  Strom. 4.25. 
 
 171 The only exception is the Martyrdom of Polycarp, where the Smyrnaen martyrs are praised 
as ‚no longer humans but already angels.‛ mart. Poly. 2.3.   
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Apocalyptic literature.172  Like the angels, the martyrs are participants in God’s cosmic 
battle against the demonic realms, the recipients of heavenly visions and, quite often, 
workers of miracles.173  Perpetua, for instance, even dreamt of herself entering a radiant 
place where she beheld the angels praising God.174  In view of this narrative association, it 
is no wonder that the spiritual successor of the martyrs, namely, the Christian ascetic, or 
monk, would be depicted in a similar fashion and is also regarded as living the angelic life 
by the late fourth century.175  St. Antony, we are told, is found not only ministering among 
the confessors who suffered under the persecution of Maximin Daia, but also withdraws to 
a cell where he is ‚daily being martyred by his conscience, and doing battle in the contests 
of faith.‛176  Elsewhere in his Vita, Antony is frequently presented as a wonder-worker, 
endowed with heavenly visions and prophetic gifts – not unlike the earlier Jewish angelic 
and Christian martyr portraits.177 
                                                 
 172 Russell,  Doctrine of Deification, 77-78. 
 
 173 A more detailed analysis of these martyr portraits will be conducted in Chapter 5, where 
we discuss the Christian character of Chrysostom’s rhetoric of martyrdom. 
 
 174 Pass. Perpet. 4.2. 
 
 175 In its prologue, the late fourth century Historia monachorum in Aegypto speaks of the 
Egyptian monks as those ‚living the angelic life.‛  hist. monach. Prol. 4 [Translated by Russell in 
Norman Russell, The Lives of the Desert Fathers: The Historia Monachorum in Aegypto, Cistercian 
Studies Series (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1980), 49].  For a detailed study of the 
ways in which the monk was the successor of the martyr, see Edward E. Malone, The Monk and the 
Martyr: The Monk as the Successor of the Martyr, ed. Johannes Quasten, Studies in Christian Antiquity, 
vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950). 
  
 176 V. Ant. 47. 
 
 177 A similar portrayal of the Egyptian monks is also found in the Historia Monachorum in 
Aegypto (II.1, VIII.5-6, X.12-14).  V. Ant. 15, 58, 60-64, 82, 84, 86, 89.  William Harmless, Desert 
Christians: An Introduction to the Literature of Early Monasticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 66-67, 292-99. 
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A similar stance is also observed among the Cappadocian Fathers.  Certainly, 
Gregory of Nazianus maintains that the baptized are those ‚who have attained equality 
with the angels.‛178  Nonetheless, he also agrees with Basil that the ascetics participate 
uniquely in the life and duties of the angels, be it worship, prayer or even in their 
wondrous gifts and visions.   
Illuminated by the Spirit, [the ascetics] themselves become spiritual, and send forth 
their grace to others. Hence comes foreknowledge of the future, understanding of 
mysteries, apprehension of what is hidden, distribution of good gifts, the heavenly 
citizenship, a place in the chorus of angels, joy without end, abiding in God, being 
made like God, and, the highest goal of all, becoming a god.179 
 
 
 
The Angelic Life in Chrysostom’s Writings 
Like the Cappadocians, Chrysostom also constantly regards the Christian monks as 
living an angelic life on earth.180  Where he differs from them or, indeed, many of his 
theological predecessors, is his frequent insistence that all Christians in general can realize 
this angelic life to some degree.  This is certainly presumed in his Homily 23 on Ephesians, 
where he reminds his predominantly lay Antiochene congregation that  
the Son of the very God has brought all the aretē.  He has brought down to us all 
the fruits that are that place [heaven].  I tell you, [even] the heavenly hymns that 
the Cherubim sing – for he has appointed us also to say, ‚Holy, holy, holy.‛  He 
has brought the way of life of the angels (τῶν ἀγγέλων τὴν πολιτείαν).  The 
angels neither marry nor are they given in marriage – this good [plant] he has 
planted here also.  They neither love riches nor other things like that – this also he 
                                                 
 178 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 223. 
 
 179 This is similarly expressed by Gregory in his Oration 4.71.  Basil, De Sp. S. 9.23. 
 
180 hom. in Matt. 1.12; 69.3-4 (NPNF I.10.425). 
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has sown among us.  They never die – this also has been granted to us.  For death is 
no longer death, but sleep. 181 
 
What we have here is a clear attempt to delineate the aspects of the angelic life that are 
directly applicable to Christians.  A few important observations can be made here.  Firstly, 
the aretē, or ‚the way of life of the angels‛ that the Son of God brings down from heaven to 
earth is clearly understood in moral rather than ontological terms, since Christians can 
only imitate the angels and not change their phusis in this present age.  Secondly, the 
agricultural metaphors he uses to describe these gifts, that is, ‚this good plant he has 
planted here‛ and ‚this also he has sown among us‛ suggests the fact that the angelic life 
has only just taken root in humanity.  Although Chrysostom expects it to unfold and grow 
among Christians, it is yet to be fully materialized among all Christians.   
 Thirdly, when understood within the framework of Greco-Roman ethics, 
Chrysostom’s portrayal of Christians as participants in the politeia of the angels is, 
fundamentally speaking, a re-conceptualization of the Christians’ oikos to that of a 
heavenly realm, rather than his earthly oikos or polis.  There are both Platonic and 
Aristotelian allusions here.  If the telos of human life is participation in the heavenly politeia, 
the value of the earthly life is inevitably downplayed.  By doing so, Chrysostom’s 
conception of the angelic life is to some extent similar to the philosophical eudaimonia 
envisaged in Plato’s Phaedo.    Where he clearly differs is the fact that his heavenly politeia is 
constituted not only by communion with the heavenly beings, but also the fellowship of 
saints in the Church.  This, in turn, compels him to recognize the earthly dimensions of this 
heavenly oikos, in that there remains a body of Christ on earth to be loved and cared for, 
                                                 
 181 hom. in Eph. 23 (PG 62.167.12-22). 
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whether they are the poor, the homeless, one’s family members or fellow Christians.  In 
this respect then, his conception of the Christian life as angelic is quite similar to Aristotle’s 
esteem for the politikos as an essential expression of human eudaimonia. 
 The significance of these traits for Chrysostom is evident in the fact that they are 
often brought up in his discussions of the same motif elsewhere.  His Homily 9 on Hebrews 
is a good example.  Here, he similarly assumes that for Christians to ‚live like the angels,‛ 
is tantamount ‚to lack*ing+ not one of these earthly things‛ and to enjoy both an ‚eternal 
life and angelic conversation.‛182  This is not to say, however, that morality is not important 
for his conception of this motif.  On the contrary, it is presumed from the onset of this 
angelic politeia.  As he puts it in his Homily 11 on Romans: 
For he did not only set us free from our old evils, but he led us also into the angelic 
life, and he paved the road for the most excellent way of life for us, after handing 
us over to the safekeeping of righteousness, and killed our former evils, and 
deadened our old humanity, and led us to an immortal life.183   
 
Based on the above then, it should be clear that the angelic life, as a summarizing symbol 
for the Christian life, is meant to denote five main similarities between the angel and the 
Christian.  Like the angel, the Christian should not be given in marriage, not love material 
riches, should enjoy immortality, participate in the heavenly politikos and attain a morality 
reminiscent to the angels. 
 Having said this, the same motif is also a basis for Chrysostom to re-conceptualize 
and elaborate on the ideal Christian life in the present age.  Thus he would distinguish the 
Christian life from that of the angels by asserting that the Christian can ‚live the life of the 
                                                 
 182 hom. in Heb. 9 (NPNF I.14, 411). 
 
 183 hom. in Rom. 11 (PG 60.489.42-47). 
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angels‛ while still residing on earth, that is, in their bodies, and that this in no way renders 
them ‚inferior to those [heavenly beings] who inhabit the heaven.‛184  Furthermore, he also 
stresses the fact that Christian participation in the angelic life is contingent upon the 
Spirit’s aid, since He must grant every Christian the faith and the teachings to do so.185   
 Finally, for Chrysostom to speak of the Christian life as comparable to that of the 
angels is, ultimately speaking, to highlight the great heights to which every Christian has 
ascended because of Christ’s salvation.  Indeed, what he has in mind is not merely the fact 
that every Christian can become like an angel, but that they should transcend the angels 
altogether.  This point is clearly stressed in his Homily 5 on Colossians, where he speaks 
initially of Christian salvation as God exalting creatures who are ‚more senseless than 
stone,‛ that is, human beings, to the ‚dignity of the angels.‛  Having said this, Chrysostom 
adds immediately that God has even enabled Christians to   
become the body (σῶμα) of the Master of the angels and archangels, and from not 
knowing who is God, they instantly become even sharers of God’s throne.186 
 
In other words, within the context of Christian soteriology, discourses about or 
comparisons with angelic ontology are teleological, in that they are meant to highlight 
the glorious fact that the Christian life is, essentially, participation in the divine life of 
God.  As to how Chrysostom conceives Christian salvation as a deification of 
humankind, this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, when we examine 
Chrysostom’s soteriology. 
                                                 
 184 hom. in Rom. 23 (PG 60.621.30-31).  See also hom. in Eph. 1 (NPNF I.13, 55).   
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Conclusion 
 We began this chapter by assuming that Chrysostom’s exemplar discourse was 
firmly rooted in the Greco-Roman traditions of imitatio exemplorum.  On this basis, we 
looked, first of all, at enkyklios paideia in Late Antiquity and concluded that this system of 
education had thoroughly institutionalized its pedagogy of imitatio exemplorum.  The net 
effect was that the notion of imitation would have been taken for granted by most in Late 
Antiquity as the most natural way of expounding and legitimizing their ethics and 
worldviews, whether pagan or Christian.   
 Following this, we surveyed the history of Greco-Roman ethical traditions, with the 
aim of elucidating the continuities and discontinuities between these traditions and 
Chrysostom’s ethical ideals.  Here, we argued, first of all, that there is a familial 
resemblance between these Greco-Roman traditions, in that they not only share similar 
ethical categories and framework, but are also preoccupied with similar questions and 
concerns in their ethical reflections.  Among these are questions on the nature, categories 
and functions of the aretai, the role of external goods, the nature of human anthropology, 
such as whether it is bipartite or tripartite, how one might cultivate aretai, the degree of 
divine passivity or activity in the cultivation of aretai and the role of the oikos or polis in the 
human exercise of aretē.   
 Secondly, we also contended that Chrysostom’s ethical ideals were probably 
shaped by Late Antique culture in general, rather than through a direct interaction with 
philosophical ethics.  Nevertheless, it is clear that Chrysostom’s ethical vision is indebted 
to the philosophical traditions in several ways.  With regard to the nature and 
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categorization of the aretai, Chrysostom’s scheme, by and large, coheres with those of the 
Platonists and Stoics.  Where he differs is his conviction that eudaimonia is to be found in 
human participation in the agapē of God.  This, in turn, has three implications on his 
understanding of aretai.   
 First of all, it leads him to concur with the Platonists and early Christians that 
eudaimonia is to be attained through the cultivation of divine likeness and aretai, such as 
love and justice.  Secondly, apart from being expressions of God’s agapē for humanity, 
external goods are to be regarded also as instrumental in nature.  By this Chrysostom 
means that the excellence of the external goods is dependent largely on the extent to which 
they are made serviceable to God.  Thirdly, the aretē of human nature should also be 
understood teleologically.  Specifically, the body is regarded as enaretos only when it is 
subjected to the soul, while the soul is to gain its excellence only when it exercises its 
rational rule over its irrational aspects, and relies on Spirit’s aid to participate in God’s 
agapē.   
 Finally, we looked at Chrysostom’s conception of Christian eudaimonia as the life of 
the angels.  While this angelic motif is clearly intended to highlight the similarities between 
the ideal Christian life and that of the angels, Chrysostom is also convinced that there are 
stark differences between them, in that the Christian’s angelic life may be lived on earth, 
presumably, in a bodily form, is reliant on the Spirit’s aid and is even superior to that of 
the angels.  Implicit to such a teleological conception is also the recognition that a 
Christian’s oikos is no longer an earthly one, but that which is in heaven, that is, with the 
angels and his fellow saints.  Yet at the same time, since there remains a body of Christ on 
earth, there are earthly dimensions even to this heavenly oikos. 
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 Considered as a whole, the above findings provide a clear theoretical framework in 
which we can understand Chrysostom’s ethical discourse in general.  This is certainly the 
case for his exemplar portraits, which are, more often than not, embodiments of his ethical 
ideals.  Indeed, it is only when his exemplar portraits are read in the light of these ethical 
assumptions that the ideological and pedagogical functions that Chrysostom conceives for 
these portraits can be properly recognized and appreciated.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PORTRAYAL OF VIRTUE IN LATE ANTIQUITY:  
DAVID AS EXEMPLAR IN CHRYSOSTOM’S WRITINGS 
Introduction 
 In the last chapter, we drew attention to the fact that Greco-Roman ethics was not 
only the predominant ideology propounded by imitatio exemplorum discourse, but also 
played an important role in determining the literary forms and strategies that such 
discourse will take in the Late Antique world.  In this chapter, we will focus on these 
literary forms and strategies by examining the two major traditions of Greco-Roman 
exemplar discourse, namely, the biographical and rhetorical traditions and identify the 
major approaches that these traditions adopt to present their subjects.  In this process, due 
attention will also be paid to the influence that Greco-Roman ethics had on both traditions.  
Having done this, we will then look at how Chrysostom employs these traditions to 
portray one of his favourite exemplars, King David, and consider how these Davidic 
portraits might serve to elucidate his pastoral and ethical concerns.  More importantly, this 
exemplar study should also help us identify the reading strategies required for a 
hermeneutical appropriation of Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits.    
 
The Biographical Traditions 
Historical Overview 
 Since antiquity, the Greeks always had a keen biographical interest in those they 
esteemed, whether these were heroes – mythical or real, literary, political or philosophical 
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figures.1  Among these, the first to be depicted were heroes like Achilles and Odysseus, 
whose lives were not only acclaimed in the Homeric epics, but were also retold in 
subsequent centuries, such as the tragedies of Sophocles (496-406) and the novel tales of  
Philostratus (c.170-247).2  From the classical period onwards, distinct personalities began to 
take centre stage in Greek literature, one of the earliest being Homer, whose different vitae 
were narrated by the rhapsodies, presumably to satisfy the curiosity of their audiences and 
to legitimize the authority of his epics.3   
 This legitimization or, indeed, ideological character of Greek biographical writing 
reached a milestone in the fourth century with the apologies of Plato and Xenophon (431-
355).4  Despite their common objective of absolving Socrates from the charges that he had 
corrupted the young and disbelieved in the Athenian gods, both authors were to take 
rather different approaches in their defence of Socrates.5  For Xenophon, Socrates’ 
                                                 
1 Arnaldo Momigliano, The Development of Greek Biography, Expanded ed. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 24-25. 
 
 2 Graham Anderson, Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century A.D 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986), 245; Duane Reed Stuart, Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography, Sather 
Classical Lectures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928), 12-15. 
  
 3 Barbara Graziosi, Inventing Homer: The Early Reception of Epic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 50, 122. 
 
 4 Hadas is surely right to highlight the significance of Socrates’ life and death for 
subsequent exemplary literature.  Nevertheless, he exaggerates the degree of its impact, especially 
for Second Temple Jewish and Christian literature.  For example, his argument that Eleazar in 
Second and Fourth Maccabees is a Socratic figure fails to give due account to the priest’s Jewish 
faith and context.  Readers of such texts would have assumed, first of all, that Eleazar exemplifies 
the ideal Torah fearing Jew, not Plato’s Socrates.  Moses Hadas and Morton Smith, Heroes and Gods: 
Spiritual Biographies in Antiquity (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 49, 63, 90-93. 
 
 5 This apologetic aim is hinted at in both Plato’s Apology and Xenophon’s Memorabilia.  Both 
mention that Socrates was found ‚guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in 
whom the city believes.‛  While it is debatable whether this is the primary intent for both works, it 
is most likely one of the major motivations for these writings.  Mem. I.1.1.  Ap. 18b-c, 24b; Harold 
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innocence is clearly evident in his cultic practices and ascetic lifestyle. 6  In the case of Plato, 
however, Socrates’ religiosity and morality is confirmed in his earnest pursuit of 
philosophy as a faithful response to the Delphic oracle. 7  Although scholars differ on which 
is the more accurate portrait of the historical Socrates, it is manifestly clear that the Socratic 
figure encountered in each apology is nothing less than the enshrinement of the religious 
and philosophical expectations of its author.8    
 This same period also saw the development of the first paradigm for exemplar 
discourse, as found in what Isocrates (436-338) claims to be the first prose enkōmion , that is, 
his funeral eulogy of the Cyprian king, Evagoras (c. 370 B.C.).  In this and Xenophon’s 
Agesilaus (c. 360 B.C.) which follows, we see a conscious effort by both authors to not only 
exalt their subjects as the ideal and exemplary monarch, but also to organize their lives 
within the paradigmatic categories of nature, upbringing and deeds.9  Xenophon, for 
example, not only claims the mighty Heracles as Agesilaus’s ancestor, but also stresses that 
Agesilaus, as a youth, had already possessed all the virtues necessary for kingship.10  
During his reign, Agesilaus turned out to be a virtuous ruler in every way, being pious, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Tarrant, "Introduction," in The Last Days of Scorates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo (London: 
Penguin Books, 1993),  49-50. 
 
6 Mem. I.1.2-20, 2.1-11. 
 
7 Ap. 21e-22e; 38a. 
 
8 Irwin, for example, argues that the Xenophonic Socrates matches closely with Xenophon’s 
own religious and moral outlook and is therefore less trustworthy than the witness of Plato and 
Aristotle.  Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 15; Momigliano,  
46. 
 
 9 Richard A. Burridge, "Biography," in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 
330 Bc - Ad 400, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, 1997), 375. 
 
 10 Ages. I.1-2. 
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trustworthy, swift to repay his debts, indifferent to riches, unmoved by his passions, loyal 
to his fellow men and so on, and was therefore a worthy ‚pattern and example‛ for every 
monarch.11   
 The development of such a literary paradigm is not surprising in view of the 
contemporary and subsequent Greek ethical discourse.  Plato, for example, would teach in 
his Republic that the guardians of the polis should not only possess an excellent philosophic 
nature, but also receive a comprehensive training and upbringing, so that they can be well-
equipped to lead the city.12  Aristotle and the Stoics would similarly assert that one’s 
potential for aretē and, therefore, eudaimonia is both a function of his god-given nature and 
askēsis.13  As we have shown in Chapter 1, even those Greco-Roman philosophers who 
downplay the significance of phusis for one’s aretē and eudaimonia, like the Cynics and 
Epicureans, nevertheless agree on the importance of askēsis for the cultivation of aretē.  
Given this ethical context and the growing popularity of Platonism and Stoicism from the 
Hellenistic period onwards, it is hardly surprising that this enkōmion paradigm of praising 
a subject’s origins, upbringing and deeds will be readily adopted by the Greco-Roman 
world as an organizing structure for the praise of an exemplary figure.  In due course, the 
                                                 
 11 Ages. III. 
 
 12 Where Plato differs from Isocrates and Xenophon is his belief that a child with a 
philosophic nature will not fare well if he is born in nobility or royalty, since he would be in greater 
danger of corrupting his nature.  See Chapter 1, pp. 28.   
 
 13 Aristotle speaks of eudaimonia as a God-given gift or at least a most god-like good.  Eth. 
Nic. 1099b12-20, 1103a25, 1104b11-13. 
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same paradigm would be formalized by rhetors in their progymnasmata, or preliminary 
exercises, to be learnt by every aspiring orator in Late Antiquity.14 
 By the Late Antique period, this enkōmion paradigm, along with the ideological 
focus of Greek biographies, would be taken for granted by most biographers, such as 
Plutarch, Philostratus and Prophyry.15  Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana is a good 
case in point.  Structured according to the enkōmion paradigm, the biography is a clear 
attempt to articulate a new vision of the Late Antique philosopher.  Like his classical 
predecessors, Apollonius is presented as an ascetic, teacher of philosophy and an advisor 
of monarchs.  Yet, what endears him particularly to his Late Antique audience is the fact 
that he is also an advocate of paganism – a point that is powerfully put across in 
Philostratus’ claims that Apollonius was an incarnation of Proteus, the Egyptian God of 
wisdom, a reformer of pagan worship, and a miracle worker capable of exorcising demons 
and resurrecting a bride.16   
                                                 
14 See Kennedy’s Progymnasmata for translations of these texts. 
 
 15 There are, of course, exceptions to this, the most significant being Philostratus’ Lives of the 
Sophists, which, Momigliano remarks, is ‚all show and no substance,‛ written more as a Sophistic 
tabloid to satisfy the curiosity of its readers.   Anderson,  51-71, 77, 114-5; Arnaldo Momigliano, 
"Ancient Biography and the Study of Religion in the Roman Empire," in On Pagans, Jews and 
Christians, ed. Arnaldo Momigliano (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987) 
171, 174. 
 
 16 For the accounts of Apollonius’ deeds, see VA 1.8, 1.13-19, 2.4, 2.22-39, 3.1, 3.38, 4.4-10, 
4.25, 4.45, 5.28, 6.29, 8.26.  A similar conception of Pythagoras is observed in the Lives by Porphyry 
and Iamblichus.  Graham Anderson, Sage, Saint and Sophist : Holy Men and Their Associates in the 
Early Roman Empire (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994), 35-6, 54-72; Gillian Clark, "Philosophic 
Lives and the Philosophic Life," in Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, ed. Tomas Hägg 
and Philip Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 48; Patricia Cox, Biography in 
Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man, Transformation of the Classical Heritage (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 23-24, 35, 62; Christopher Jones, "Apollonius of Tyana, Hero 
and Holy Man " in Philostratus' Heroikos: Religion and Cultural Identity in the Third Century C.E., ed. 
Ellen Bradshaw Aitken and Jennifer K. Berenson Maclean (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical 
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Plutarch’s Life of Alexander 
 Among the Late Antique biographies, the most prominent are probably Plutarch’s 
voluminous Parallel Lives, many of which are composed to present the political statesman 
as an exemplary philosopher-king – an ethical motif which, as we shall see, is equally 
valued by Chrysostom and his contemporaries.17  More important for our purposes is the 
fact that Plutarch’s clear moral agenda for his Lives coheres significantly with Chrysostom’s 
aims for his exemplar discourse.  For this reason, attention must be paid to these Vitae, so 
that the insights gained here may become for us a lens to better understand Chrysostom’s 
narrative strategies for his exemplar portraits.   
 Unlike Philostratus, the primary objective of Plutarch’s Lives is not to exalt his 
subjects’ deeds (πράξεις) as public figures.  Rather, they are intended more as occasions 
for ethical reflection, that is, to bring into relief the moral character (ἦθος) of his subjects, 
so that his readers and himself can ‚both observe and imitate‛ their exemplary lifestyles.18  
For it is 
                                                                                                                                                    
Literature, 2004), 78-79; Christopher P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 9, 
14, 20, 26, 39. 
 
 17 Plutarch’s preference in political statesmen is already hinted at in an earlier declamation, 
where, he declares that ‚Athens’ glory laid in its statesmen and generals, not its poets and artists.‛  
For Chrysostom’s portrayal of King David and the Christian monk as a philosopher-king, see below 
pp. 102-7 and Chapter 4, pp. 212-14.  Jones, Plutarch and Rome , 105. 
 
18 This moral agenda of the Lives is achieved both by highlighting the virtues and the vices 
of the subjects, the latter of which is presented more as a warning to his readers.   This moral 
emphasis, however, need not be the only agenda for the Parallel Lives.  Homeyer, for example, 
suggests that there is a political dimension to these Lives, in that they are written to foster greater 
cultural respect between the Greeks and Romans.  Jones, on the other hand, argues that Plutarch’s 
admiration for Roman exemplars stems from his general admiration for the Romans whom he 
regards as having ushered in an era of peace and stability for the Greeks.  In the case of Wardman, 
he argues, quite plausibly, that the Lives should be regarded more as an affirmation of the broader 
values and ideals of the Greco-Roman intellectual circles that Plutarch is familiar with, rather than 
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by spending time on history and by practising writing we prepare ourselves to 
receive and store in our souls recollection of the best and most famous men, and to 
drive out and thrust from us whatever mean or corrupt or ignoble influence is 
exercised on us by those with whom daily life compels association, and to temper 
and discipline our thoughts and turn them towards the very best ideals of 
conduct.19 
 
 This moral interest, in turn, compels Plutarch to focus not so much so on the 
‚distinguished deeds‛ of his subjects which, as he puts it, are ‚not always a manifestation 
of virtue or vice,‛ but instead on the ‚phrase or a jest *that+ often makes a greater 
revelation of character (ἢθους),‛ that is, the ‚the signs of the soul‛ (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα) 
of his subjects.20  Such sēmeia would include ‚childhood anecdotes, education, emergence 
into public life, conflicts, responses to the challenge of circumstances,‛ and other narrative 
motifs that would best illustrate his subject’s character.21   
 Plutarch’s dual interest in political statesmen as philosopher-kings and ethics is 
well illustrated in his Life of Alexander.22  In Alexander’s life, what we encounter most 
frequently are the narrative motifs typically associated with the aretai of the philosopher-
king.  First of all, Alexander is ascribed a lofty, or indeed, divine pedigree, since he is 
identified as not only a descendant of Heracles, but also the god Ammon himself – a point 
                                                                                                                                                    
as an apology directed at both.  Rom. 12.6, Per. 1.3, 24.1, Aem. 1.3; De fort. Rom. 316F; H. Homeyer, 
"Beob- Achtungen Zu Den Hellenistischen Quellen Der Plutarch- Viten," Klio 41 (1963): 157; Jones, 
Plutarch and Rome , 69, 70, 107; Alan Wardman, Plutarch's Lives (London: Elek, 1974), 9, 12, 17. 
 
19 Tim. Pr. (Translation from Barrow, 54). 
  
20 Alex. 1 (Perrin, LCL 99, 225).  A similar assumption is made in Demosthenes 11.6, Cimon 
2.3-5, Pericles 1-2.4, Nicias 1.5 and Aemilius Paulus 1.  This moral objective, as Jones notes, also 
coheres with the biographical intentions of his earlier Lives of the Caesars. Jones, Plutarch and Rome , 
78-80.  
 
21 D. A. Russell, Plutarch, Classical Life and Letters. (London: Duckworth, 1972), 102-3. 
 
 22 Other figures that are presented as philosopher-kings by Plutarch include Solon and 
Cicero.  Wardman,  206, 212. 
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poignantly expressed in the account of Ammon impregnating Alexander’s mother by the 
form of a serpent.  As a youth, Alexander displays a great zeal and yearning for 
philosophy and enjoys the tutelage of many worthy teachers, including the eminent 
Aristotle.23  Even during the course of his military campaigns, he maintains an avid interest 
for philosophy, and shows much respect for, and even accepts advice from, its 
practitioners. 24  On occasions, Plutarch would even have Alexander philosophizing about 
the uncertainty of life, affirm the fatherhood of god for all humanity and pay tribute to 
Homer’s Iliad.25 
During his reign, Alexander also proves to be an exemplary philosopher-king, who 
is endowed with numerous kingly virtues, such as his wise and compassionate leadership, 
respect for virtues, philanthropy, esteem for friendship and munificence.  After his victory 
over the Persians, for example, he has the wisdom to send some of the spoils to the Greeks 
as recognition of their partnership in his victory.  During times of leisure, he remains a 
hardworking administrator of military affairs.26  Like his biographer, Alexander also fulfils 
the religious expectations for a Late Antique philosopher.  This is to be seen in the fact that 
                                                 
23 Alex. 5-9. 
 
24 For example, despite Diogenes of Sinope’s aloofness, Alexander respected the Cynic so 
much that he apparently claimed that ‚if I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes.‛  Alex. 14, 27, 
64-5; Tim Duff, Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 85. 
 
 25 Alex. 26-27, 69. 
 
26 Alex. 4, 11-12, 16, 21, 23-24. 
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Alexander frequently offers sacrifices to the gods, whether as part of daily ritual or before 
battles, and is a man who takes the signs (σημεῖα) and visions (ὄψιαι) seriously.27 
In many ways, Plutarch’s portrayal of Alexander the philosopher-king is both a 
reflection and a demonstration of the Delphic priest’s ethical philosophy.  This is to be seen 
from the onset, where Plutarch first draws attention to the king’s spirited (θυμοειδῆ) 
nature which, according to a dream of Alexander’s mother, had descended upon her 
womb as a thunderbolt and broke out in many flames.28  This ethical motif is further 
developed in Plutarch’s narration of Alexander’s youth, where Alexander’s thuoeidē is not 
only attributed to his bodily heat and, therefore, his nature (φύσις), but is also seen as the 
cause of his furious and exceedingly violent temper.29  Yet, presumably in line with 
Platonic psychology, this same hot-tempered nature also enables Alexander to restrain his 
body’s desire for pleasures, so much so that he develops the aretē of moderation 
(σωφροσύνη). 30  This spirited nature, along with his ambition and love of honour 
                                                 
27 Plutarch is well-known as both a Middle Platonist and priest of the Delphic oracle.  
Having said this, Plutarch disapproves of Alexander’s increasing preoccupation with signs and 
visions towards the end of his life, by succumbing to a superstitious fear of the ill omens 
proclaimed against him.  Alex. 15, 25-27, 29, 31, 37, 41, 63, 72-5.  
 
28 Judging from this narrative, it is apparent that Plutarch presumes that one’s potential for 
moral virtue and philosophy is due to a god-given phusis.  This position certainly coheres with that 
asserted in The Education of Children, which some has ascribed to him, not implausibly.  Here, we 
find a similar assertion that ‚perfect just behaviour‛ is the concurrence of nature (φυσίν), reason 
(λόγον), or learning, and habit (ἔθος).  It should be noted that this view need not negate Plutarch’s 
remarks elsewhere in Demosthenes 1.3, where he claims that aretē is dependent not so much on the 
place of one’s birth than on a usable nature and a diligent soul (φύσεώς γε χρηστῆς καὶ φιλοπόνου 
ψυχῆς).  Alex. 2.1-3.1; Ps-Plutarch, lib. edu. 2.4. 
 
 29 Alex. 4.3-4. 
 
30 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Plato asserts that the thumoeidēs is capable of helping the 
logistikon subdue the epithumētikon and, therefore, develop the aretē of sōphrosunē.  See pp. 29.  Alex. 
4.8; Rep. 442B-443E. 
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(φιλοτιμία), says Plutarch, would dispose Alexander to accomplish greater things than his 
father and to attain aretē and glory on his own.31  As a matter of fact, they not only 
characterize his leadership as an adult, but also play a vital role in both his military 
successes and subsequent follies.   
This is to be seen in his military campaign in Asia.  During his first battle with the 
Persians, many of his men were afraid to cross the rapids of the river Granicus.  Spurred by 
his thuoeidē, Alexander led a small troop and charged ahead courageously, in the face of 
many hostile projectiles and enemies.  This was to clinch the decisive victory for the 
Macedonians and to become a familiar scene that would be replayed frequently 
throughout the course of his military campaign.32  Having said this, whenever sōphrosunē 
was called for the same spirited nature was clearly able to prevent Alexander from 
compromising his war needlessly.  This is well-demonstrated in the Macedonian king’s 
ability to stop himself from engaging Darius prematurely, even though he was eager to do 
so.  Instead, he chose to train and strengthen his army, by acquiring the regions around the 
sea and their resources.  Alexander’s respect for askēsis is a sharp contrast to the Persian 
king who, in his eagerness to march out against Alexander, ignored the wise consul to 
delay his advance and was consequently defeated at the Cilician pass.33   
As it seems to Plutarch, Alexander regards such self-mastery (τὸ κρατεῖν) as a more 
kingly thing than the conquest of his enemies.  For this reason, a substantial portion of 
                                                 
31 Alex. 4.8, 5.3, 5. 
 
32 Alex. 16. 
 
33 Alexander, as Plutarch tells us, would continue to maintain a stringent training routine 
even when there is no impending battle.  These observations, of course, affirm the importance of 
training for the development of one’s character and skills.  Alex. 17.3; 20.2; 40. 
 
82 
 
Plutarch’s Vita is devoted to praising Alexander’s ability for physical self-restraint, be it 
against desires for sex, sleep or food.34  Having said this, Alexander’s life is also a platform 
for Plutarch to reflect soberly on what may happen if one does not properly habituate his 
nature or curb its potential vices.  This is clearly the case for Alexander’s spirited nature, 
whose violent outbursts led him ultimately to slay Clietus and other men.  Later, the same 
hot-temperedness was to cause his men to fear instead of admire him.35   
As we may infer from the Vita, Plutarch generally grounds the potential of his 
subjects upon their natures and the extent to which their natures are trained.  This has led 
some scholars to conclude that Plutarch, along with other Late Antique biographers, 
commonly presumes his characters to possess static natures that do not change over time.36  
This does appear to be the case for Plutarch, who is often reluctant to interpret a moral 
anomaly as a change of character, but rather considers it as a revelation of an otherwise 
veiled nature or simply as a moral lapse arising from various circumstances, like political 
exigency. 37  Having said this, we must remember that the objective of Plutarch’s Parallel 
                                                 
34 Alexander clearly expects his men to exercise a similar self-restraint since he has no 
qualms executing two soldiers for ravaging the wives of certain mercenaries.  Alex. 21-23. 
 
35 Alex. 51, 74; Duff, 85. 
 
36 A similar principle seems operative in Athanasius’s Life of Antony, where the monk is 
portrayed as one given to piety and averse to paideia and other childish things even as a young lad.  
Similarly, Eusebius, in his Life of Origen, would presume that the teenage Origen has already 
possessed a mature orthodoxy, worthy of respect even from his father.  Samuel Rubenson, 
"Philosophy and Simplicity: The Problem of Classical Education in Early Christian Biography," in 
Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, ed. Tomas Hägg and Philip Rousseau (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 118; Cox, 80-1; Russell, 102. 
 
37 This is clearly demonstrated in Plutarch’s portrait of Philip of Macedon.  Philip, as it 
appears, had degenerated from a moderate young man into a licentious king at his old age.  For 
Plutarch, however, this change is simply a revelation of Philip’s true nature of badness.  The same 
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Lives is exhortative, or, in other words, they are meant to aid readers in the development of 
their character.  This, coupled with Plutarch’s insistence that aretē is dependent not only on 
a ‚usable nature‛ (φύσεώς γε χρηστῆς) but also a ‚diligent soul,‛ should caution us 
against accepting such a claim in its entirety.38   Rather, within Plutarch’s scheme of ethics, 
there is a dynamic and amenable dimension to one’s moral character, which allows for 
significant character change whenever one undergoes the proper training and education.    
 
Chrysostom’s Reception of Biographical Traditions  
 In view of the above, it should now be clear that Late Antique biographies 
generally presume one or more ideological interests, whether it is presenting their visions 
for the ideal philosopher or political statesman, or elucidating the moral vision of their 
authors.  This ideological focus is, more often than not, expressed through the organizing 
structure of the enkōmion paradigm, which compels the biographers to focus first on the 
subject’s origins or birth, followed by his upbringing and deeds.  Within this literary 
framework, the appropriate narratives are drawn from or composed for the subject’s life, 
so as to particularize and accentuate the ideologies concerned. 
 As far as extant evidence is concerned, it is Plutarch who proves to be the most 
influential biographer for subsequent Late Antique intellectual life. 39  With regard to 
                                                                                                                                                    
may be said of Plutarch’s interpretation of Marius’ harsh character.  Wardman,  132-5; Arat. 51.4, 
54.2; Sull. 30.5. 
 
38 Dem. 1.3. 
 
39 This can be inferred from the numerous occasions in which later sophists and 
philosophers quote from Plutarch’s writings or take pride in being his supposed descendants.  For 
example, the Platonist, Apuleius of Madauros, would make the hero of his Metamorphoses a 
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Chrysostom’s familiarity with Plutarch, however, the evidence is not conclusive.  
Coleman-Norton, for example, has noted some literary parallels between the two, in terms 
of their biographical accounts and proverbial usage. 40  While this may count as evidence 
for Chrysostom’s appropriation of Plutarch, it may well be a mere indication that both 
have drawn from a similar Greek literary culture, or that Chrysostom has read biographies 
akin to those of Plutarch. 41   Despite these uncertainties, the fact remains that Chrysostom 
is evidently familiar with some sources of Greco-Roman biographies and it is, therefore, 
entirely reasonable for us to conclude that he has benefitted from the narrative framework 
and strategies highlighted above.42  Regardless of the extent to which Chrysostom might 
have imbibed these literary strategies, the fact remains that their application in 
Chrysostom’s writings would have been mediated through a more significant and 
influential aspect of his education, namely, Greco-Roman rhetoric.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
descendant of ‚the renowned Plutarch and Sextus.‛  The third century sophist, Nicagoras, and his 
fourth century counterpart, Himerius, separately claim him as one of their ancestors.  Menander 
Rhetor, in the third century, even commends Plutarch’s Lives as essential readings for aspiring 
students of rhetoric.  Jones, Plutarch and Rome , 11; Russell,  144; Duff,  3. 
 
40 For example, Chrysostom gives an account of Alexander’s encounter with Diogenes the 
Cynic that is similar to that of Plutarch (PG 67:339).  See also PG 58.606-7, 700 for the proverbial 
similarities.  P.R. Coleman-Norton, "St. John Chrysostom and the Greek Philosophers," Classical 
Philology 25 (1930), 308; P.R. Coleman-Norton, "St. John Chrysostom's Use of the Greek Poets," 
Classical Philology 27, no. 3 (1932), 215, 220. 
 
 41 The case for Chrysostom’s reading of Plutarch is strengthened by Lamberton’s suggestion 
that Plutarch had probably intended his Lives to also be a ‘textbook’ source for students of rhetoric.  
Accordingly then, it is not implausible for Chrysostom to have read some of the Lives as part of his 
rhetorical training.   Robert Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 145. 
 
 
42
 Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian 
Discourse, Sather Classical Lectures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 144-46. 
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The Rhetorical Traditions 
Progymnasmata and Rhetorical Training 
 Chrysostom, as Socrates tells us, was trained under the famous orator, Libanius.43  
Although the duration of his training is uncertain, it seems that the future bishop of 
Constantinople was regarded as the greatest protégé of the ‘official sophist’ of Antioch, so 
much so that Sozomen would have Libanius lament in his deathbed that the Christians 
had taken his successor from him.44  With regards to his rhetorical training, Chrysostom 
would have spent much time reading poetry and prose literature, the chief being ‚Homer, 
Hesiod and other poets, Demosthenes, Lysias and other orators, Herodotus, Thucydides 
and other historians.‛45  As mentioned in Chapter 1, Chrysostom was probably acquainted 
with Greek philosophy during this period, though he was unlikely to have seriously 
studied the philosophers.46 
 During the first year of his rhetorical education, Chrysostom would have learnt his 
rhetorical techniques from one of the progymnasmata, or preliminary exercises, composed 
                                                 
 43 To be sure, Chrysostom never refers to Libanius as his teacher.  Nevertheless, his 
depiction of his anonymous teacher of rhetoric coheres well with the existing sources about 
Libanius.  ad vid. 2 (PG 48.601); Socrates, hist. 6.3. 
 
 44 According to Cribiore, most students opted to have a ‚veneer of rhetoric‛ rather than 
being well-trained.  Moreover, they often did not remain with a sophist for a prolonged period of 
time.  If Chrysostom had belonged to this demographic profile, he would probably have studied 
with Libanius for no more than 2-3 years.  Sozomen, hist. 8.2; Cribiore, School of Libanius,82. 
 
 45 This catalogue of Libanius’ library, as Cribiore tells us, is largely similar to those 
prescribed to rhetorical students elsewhere.  Ep. 1036; A.F. Norman, "The Library of Libanius," 
Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 107 (1964): 159; Raffaella Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek 
Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
227, 237;  Raffaella Cribiore, The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 149  
 
 46 See Chapter 1, pp. 46-47. 
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by the Late Antique rhetors.47  Among these is that composed by Libanius’ student, 
Aphthonius.48  According to Aphthonius, a typical student would have to work through 
and master fourteen rhetorical techniques and genres.49  While most, if not all, of these 
would be deployed by rhetors, both Christian and pagan, in their exemplar discourse, 
there are some which would be particularly relevant for such epideictic oratory.50  Among 
these, the first is the diēgēma, or the ‚narrative of an action that has happened or as though 
it had happened.‛  According to Aphthonius, there are ‚six attributes‛ to the literary 
framework of narrative: ‚the person who acted, the thing done, the time at which, the 
place in which, the manner how, and the cause for which it was done.‛ 51  When well-told, 
such a narrative would obviously establish the solid ground on which an orator can 
develop his case for the exemplary conduct and virtues of his subject.   
 The second technique popular in exemplar discourse is the synkrisis, or comparison, 
which is often used to compare a good exemplar with another virtuous character.  The aim 
of such association is to allow the orator to contrast the virtues of the first with the second 
                                                 
 47 Cribiore observes that only about one sixth of Libanius’s students stayed with him for 
five to six years.  For the most part, students came under his tutelage for only one to two years.  For 
this reason, the progymnasmata would have been used in the very early stage of the student’s 
rhetorical training. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 224. 
 
 48 In practice, rhetorical studies in the fourth century Roman East were, by and large, 
homogeneous, and teachers, like Libanius, were obliged to adopt a similar curriculum.  This is why 
the progymnasmata commonly used in this period generally agreed, with minor differences, on the 
major rhetorical techniques available for the orator.  For translations of the progymnasmata of 
Aphthonius and other rhetors, see Kennedy’s Progymnasmata.  Cribiore, School of Libanius,148. 
 
 49 Aphthonius, prog. (Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 95-127). 
 
 50 The sequence of rhetorical techniques and genres presented here does not reflect the 
degree of importance that these may have for exemplary discourse.    
 
 51 The same, of course, may be done for negative exemplars.  Aphthonius, prog. 10 
(Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 114-5). 
 
87 
 
exemplar, so that he might either highlight the superiority or enhance the status of the 
exemplar discussed.  This technique is well-demonstrated in Philostrtaus’ Vita Apollonii, 
where the philosophical status of Apollonius is elevated simply through a repeated 
comparison of the sage with other renowned Greek philosophers, including the esteemed 
Pythagoras.52   
 With regards to the anaskeuē, or refutation, it is basically ‚an overturning of some 
matter at hand,‛ e.g., a false claim, and would be used frequently in situations when the 
moral integrity of an exemplary figure is called into question.  In the case of the kataskeuē, 
or confirmation, it is the opposite of the anaskeuē and is deployed to corroborate matters 
that are unclear.  When applied to epideictic oratory, it enables an orator to draw out, from 
specific narratives or incidents, the virtuous aspects of the exemplar at hand.  
Complementing this is the ēthopoiia, or the ‚imitation of the character of a proposed 
speaker,‛ which enables the orator to animate his subject with a fictitious speech.  Besides 
elucidating the motivations of the subject concerned, such dramatization also helps an 
audience better visualize the exemplary figure and therefore render his virtues more 
plausible to their ears.  Another strategy that aids audience visualization is the ekphrasis.  
Here, the orator would depict the physical features, environment, or the deeds of the 
exemplar in the most vivid ways, with the aim of not only transposing the audiences’ 
imagination into the ‘world’ of the exemplar, but ultimately enhance the ‘visual’ impact 
and therefore the plausibility of the exemplar’s deeds and virtues.   
                                                 
52 VA 1.2, 1.10, 1.13, 1.29. 
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 As we have shown in our earlier discussion of Greco-Roman biographies, the most 
important rhetorical genres for exemplar discourse remain the enkōmion and its 
counterpart, the psogos.  The enkōmion, explains Aphthonius, is basically ‚language 
expressive of the inherent excellences (τῶν προσόντων καλῶν)‛ of an exemplary figure.53  
In his progymnasmata, we find one of the most extensive discussions on how the exemplar 
paradigm of origins, upbringing and deeds may be applied.   
This is the division of the enkōmion.  You should elaborate it with the following 
headings.  You will construct a prooemion appropriate to the subject; then you will 
state the person’s origin (γένος), which you will divide into nation, homeland, 
ancestors, and parents; then upbringing (ἀνατροφήν), which you will divide into 
habits and required skill and principles of conduct; then you will compose the greatest 
heading of the enkōmion, deeds (πράξεις), which you will divide into those of mind 
and body and fortune (ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα καὶ τύχην): mind, as courage or prudence; 
body, as beauty or swiftness or strength; and fortune, as power and wealth and friends; 
after these a comparison, attributing superiority to what is being celebrated by contrast; 
then an epilogue rather fitting a prayer.54 
 
 A similar rhetorical structure, as Aphthonius explains later, is presumed for the 
psogos, or invective.  The key difference is that, in the case of the psogos, the aim is entirely 
opposite, that is, it is ‚language expressive of *the+ inherent evils‛ of the subject according 
to the categories of origins, upbringing and deeds.55  Within exemplar discourse, a psogos is 
often introduced in a synkrisis, where the ‘villain’ character is not only denounced 
systematically, but compared with a more virtuous exemplar, so that the latter’s excellence 
                                                 
 53 The subject of the enkōmion, as Aphthonius tells us, can also be things (e.g., a virtue), 
occasions or places, dumb animals or plants, or even a group of people.  Libanius, for example, 
composed an enkōmion praising his native city of Antioch.  Prog. 10.21.5 (Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 
108); Libanius, Or. 11 [Translated by A.F. Norman in Libanius, Antioch as a Centre of Hellenic Culture 
by Libanius, trans. A.F. Norman, Series: Translated Texts for Historians, vol. 34 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2000), 15-44. 
 
 54 prog. 21-22. 
 
 55 Ibid. 27-28 (Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 108, 111-2). 
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can be highlighted.  Not infrequently, another rhetorical technique, the koinos topos, or 
‚language amplifying evils that are attached to something,‛ would also be deployed 
within these invective categories to intensify the perceived vices of its subject.  
 
Epideictic Rhetoric and Paradeigmata 
 From the classical period onwards, orators have generally classified rhetoric into 
three genres, namely, deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric.56  Epideictic rhetoric, 
with its objective of praising or blaming a subject, is the most common expression of 
exemplar discourse and usually takes the form of the enkōmion.57  Yet, as orators also 
recognize, exemplars or παράδειγματα also frequently function as the pisteis or proofs for 
their rhetorical arguments, whether these are presented in epideictic, deliberative or 
judicial speech.58   
 One of the earliest reflections of the role of paradeigmata as pisteis is that given in 
Anaximenes’ (c.380-320) Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.  According to Anaximenes,  
some proofs are drawn from words and actions and persons themselves, others are 
supplementary to what the persons say and do.  Probabilities (εἰκὸς), examples 
(παράδειγμα), tokens, enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refutations are proofs drawn 
from actual words and persons and actions; the opinion of the speaker, the evidence of 
witnesses, evidence given under torture, [and] oaths are supplementary.59 
 
                                                 
 56 Aristotle, Rh. 1.3.1 (1358b3). 
 
 57 Chrysostom’s appropriation of epideictic rhetoric will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5, when we analyse his martyr panegyrics.  Rh. 1.9 (1366a). 
 
 58 Aristotle, Rh. 3.13, 17. 
 
59 Rh. Al. 7.2.  Translated by Rackham in Aristotle, Aristotle: Problems 2: Books 22-38 
and Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, trans. W. S. Hett and H. Rackham (London: Heinemann, 1936), 
319-21. 
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Among the primary pisteis, the first to be presented as evidence for one’s case should 
always be an eikos, that is, ‚a statement supported by examples present [or self-evident] in 
the minds of an audience.‛  It is only when such arguments from eikota are unconvincing 
(ἄπιστον) that paradeigmata are deployed to either illustrate or substantiate the eikota, so 
that ‚your audience may be more ready to believe in your statements when they realize 
that another action resembling the one you allege has been committed in the way in which 
you say that it occurred.‛60 
Writing in the same period, Aristotle similarly asserts that the primary role of 
paradeigmata is to be supplementary proofs for one’s enthymemes.61  Nonetheless, he does 
allow for their usage as demonstrative proofs in the rare cases when enthymemes are 
entirely unavailable.   
If one does not have a supply of enthymemes, one should use paradeigmata as 
demonstration; for persuasion [then] depends on them.  But if there are enthymemes, 
paradeigmata should be used as witnesses, [as] a supplement to enthymemes.  When the 
paradeigmata are placed first, there is the appearance of induction, but induction is not 
suitable to rhetorical discourses except in a few cases; when they are put at the end 
they become witnesses, and a witness is everywhere persuasive.  Thus, too, when they 
are first, it is necessary to supply many of them [but] when they are mentioned at the 
end one is sufficient; for even a single trustworthy witness is useful (italics mine).62 
  
                                                 
60 Rh. Al. 7.4 (Rackham, 321). 
 
 61 An enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism or deduction constructed based on probable 
premises (that is, eikota) and leading to probable conclusions.  Both the premises and conclusions, 
however, are ‚not necessarily logically valid‛ to the audiences.  Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of 
Civil Discourse, trans. George Alexander Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 315; 
Pamela Michelle Eisenbaum, The Jewish Heroes of Christian History: Hebrews 11 in Literary Context, ed. 
Michael V. Fox and Pheme. Perkins, Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series (Atlanta, 
Georgia: Scholars Press, 1997), 60. 
 
62 Rh. 2.20.9 (1394a).  Translated by Kennedy in Aristotle, On Rhetoric  181.  Later, Quintilian 
would teach similarly that the paradeigma is essentially utilized in rhetorical induction, where it 
constitutes an analogy for the argument introduced.  Insti. Ort. 5.11.3. 
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According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of paradeigmata: the historical paradeigma 
and the fabricated paradeigma, the latter of which may be sub-divided as παραβολή 
(illustrative analogy or comparison) and λόγος (fable).63  Like Anaximenes, Aristotle’s 
historical paradeigma are examples based on historical events, either past or present.  The 
parabolē, on the other hand, differs from the historical paradeigma in that it ‚describes the 
activities of types of people rather than specific individuals,‛ e.g., the athletes and sailors 
in Aristotle’s examples, and it could be a hypothetical invention of the orator. As for the 
logoi, or fables, a good example would be those composed by Aesop. 64 
As it seems, Anaximenes and Aristotle’s theories of paradeigmata would be taken on 
board by most Greco-Roman orators by the first century A.D.  This is clearly the case for 
Quintilian who develops the subject in great detail in Book V of his Institutio Oratoria.  
Here, he introduces the exemplum as "the third kind of Technical Proof, one which is based 
on matters introduced into a Cause from outside‛ and categorises the exempla into five 
types, namely, the similar, the dissimilar, the contrary, ‚from greater to lesser,‛ and ‚from 
lesser to greater.‛ 65   A similar example would be ‚Saturninus was rightly killed, as were 
the Gracchi,‛ while a dissimilar example is ‚Brutus killed his sons when they were 
plotting treachery; Manlius punished his son’s valour with death.‛  A contrary example is 
given in the case where ‚Marcellus restored works of art to the Syracusans when they 
were the enemy; Verres took them from them though they were our allies.‛   
                                                 
63 Rh. 2.20.2 (1393a29-30).  Bennett Price, ‚Paradeigma and Exemplum in Ancient Rhetorical 
Theory‛ (University of California, 1975), 39. 
 
64 Price, ‚Paradeigma and Exemplum,‛ 42-44; Rh. 2.20.5-6 (93b8-94a1). 
65 insti. 5.11.1. Translated by Russell in Quintilian, The Orator's Education, trans. D. A. 
Russell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 431. 
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As for ‚from the greater to the lesser,‛ it is operative when one argues ‚if whole 
cities have been overthrown because of violated marriages, what should be done to an 
adulterer?‛  In the case of ‚from the lesser to the greater,‛ it is demonstrated when one 
argues that ‚the pipers, having left the city, were recalled by the authority of the people; 
how much more should leading citizens who have deserved well of the state, but have 
been victims of envy, be recalled from exile!‛66  An interesting variant of ‚from the greater 
to lesser,‛ adds Quintilian, is the use of ‚unequal parallels,‛ which are ‚particularly useful 
for exhortations.‛  ‚Courage,‛ for example, ‚is more to be admired in a woman than in a 
man.  Therefore, if someone is to be fired to do brave deeds, [<] Cato and Scipio will be 
less persuasive than Lucretia.‛ 67 
Like his Greek predecessors, Quintilian similarly stresses the importance of 
historical examples in paradeigma argumentations.  Implicit to this is the conviction that, 
whenever possible, a more recent exemplum should be used rather than an ancient one, 
since the latter can be easily dismissed as legendary and, therefore, invalid.68  The corollary 
here, of course, is that poetic fables (poetics fabulis), that is, mythology or fiction, possess 
‚less probative force,‛ even though they might offer acceptable forms of exempla.69 
                                                 
66 insti. 5.11.7 (Russell, 433-35).  Quintilian’s similar and dissimilar examples clearly 
parallels that taught in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which asserts that ‚most *historical] actions are 
partly like [similar] and partly unlike one another [dissimilar], so that for this reason we shall be 
well supplied with examples.‛  Rh. Al.8.14 (1430a7-11). 
 
67 insti. 5.11.10-11 (Russell, 433-35).   
 
68 insti. 5.13.24 (Russell, 479);  Eisenbaum,  63. 
 
69 Having said this, Quintilian acknowledges that fables can be particularly effective with 
the ‚uneducated rustics, who listen to fiction in a simpler spirit and, in their delight, readily assent 
to things that they enjoy hearing.‛ insti. 5.11.18 (Russell, 439). 
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Chrysostom’s Exemplar Discourse: A Davidic Case Study 
Chrysostom’s Rhetorical Portrayal of David: An Overview 
 Despite the reservations of earlier scholars, recent scholarship generally concur that 
Greco-Roman rhetoric had a pervasive influence upon Chrysostom’s writings.70  More 
importantly, the work of Wilken, Hunter, Mitchell and others have demonstrated, quite 
convincingly, that a good grasp of this rhetorical tradition is absolutely crucial for a proper 
understanding of the teachings and ideologies implicit in Chrysostom’s writings.71   
 This is certainly the case for the wide range of exemplar discourse dispersed 
throughout Chrysostom’s eight hundred plus homilies, treatises and letters. 72  Often, these 
exemplar portraits are presented in the form of full scale enkōmia, like his De laudibus sancti 
Pauli or panegyrics on the martyrs.  More commonly, however, they are found simply as 
episodic expositions of an exemplar’s deeds or even casual references to the exemplar’s 
                                                 
 70 Writing in the late nineteenth century, Aimé Puech insists that Chrysostom is entirely 
hostile to pagan culture and, therefore, also to pagan learning and rhetoric.  Similar sentiments are 
expressed by Simonetti, Piédagnel and Kennedy, though they do allow a limited degree of pagan 
influence.  These claims, however, have been disproved by Ameringer, Burns, Delehaye and 
Hubbell’s studies of Chrysostom’s use of Greco-Roman rhetorical techniques and genres.  See 
Introduction, pp. 3-4. 
 
 71 Wilken’s John Chrysostom and the Jews is a brilliant attempt to analyse John’s Homilies 
Against the Judaizing Christians as a rhetoric of psogos, whereby the Jews are portrayed negatively to 
his audience, in order to head off any possible temptation, on their part, for Judaizing behaviour.  
Mitchell’s Heavenly Trumpet, as mentioned in our Introduction, is the first concerted effort to deploy 
exemplar rhetoric, whether it is the enkōmion or ekphrasis, as a means of clarifying the ideologies 
implicit in Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits.  Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 95-127; Mitchell, 
95-104. 
 
 72 Wendy Mayer, The Homilies of St John Chrysostom-Provenance: Reshaping the Foundations, 
Orientalia Christiana Analecta vol. 273 (Roma: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 2005), 26. 
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virtues.73  These ‚encomiastic material*s+,‛ as Hubbell explains, are usually ‚worked up in 
shorter speeches with great freedom of arrangement‛ and shows the closest resemblance to 
the λαλιαί, or ‚talks,‛ that have been classified by Menander.74  For the most part, they are 
summoned up as pisteis for an ethical or theological point that Chrysostom is making.   
 The variety of exemplary figures exalted by Chrysostom is also very diverse.  They 
include biblical characters, such as Abraham, Elijah, and the Roman centurion in the Book 
of Acts; lay figures like David, Hannah and Mary; martyrs, such as Lucian, Babylas and the 
Maccabean martyrs; ecclesiastical figures, like Ignatius, Flavian and Meletius; the monks 
and virgins that his audiences regularly encounter in the polis and Syrian mountains.  In 
this thesis, we will focus on four of Chrysostom’s favourite exemplars, namely, the apostle 
Paul, Christian ascetics, martyrs and biblical laity.  The first three will be examined in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.  The fourth will be taken up in the rest of this chapter 
through our study of Chrysostom’s favourite lay exemplar: King David.   
 Apart from the usual affirmations of David as the author of the Psalms and the 
ancestor of Christ,  Chrysostom’s writings regularly present the Israelite king as a versatile 
exemplar.75   The range of aretai that David exemplifies is diverse and includes faith, 
                                                 
 73 This is well demonstrated in Mitchell’s analysis of Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits, where 
we encounter not only extensive enkōmia to the apostle, but also what she calls, ‚Pauline miniatures,‛ 
or cursory references to his virtues.  Mitchell, 69-93  
 
 74 Hubbell, 267-68. 
 
 75 Both Davidic motifs trace their origins to the post-exilic Jewish literature.  References to 
the Davidic covenant are found in Ezekiel 34.24, 37.24; Zechariah 12-13 and Sirach 45.25.  Esteem 
for David the Psalmist and reformer of worship is seen in 1 Chronicles 16, 1 Esdras 1.15 and Sirach 
47.9-10.  Where Chrysostom and his Christian predecessors differ from the Jews is their convictions 
that David the Psalmist should be revered more as a prophet of Christ than a teacher of the law – 
though the latter is still mentioned occasionally, and their insistence that the Davidic covenant is 
now realized in Jesus the Messiah.  For Chrysostom’s regard for David the Psalmist, see Homily 7 
95 
 
repentance (μετάνοια), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη), gentleness (πρᾱότης) and clemency 
(ἐπιείκεια).76  The contexts in which David is praised are equally varied, ranging from 
causal references to him as one of the many biblical characters who mourn for the sins of 
others, to the many rhetorical comparisons between David and Saul, and also the more 
extensive reflections on David’s life and virtues, as is the case in his De Davide et Saule.77   
 Given their kaleidoscopic nature and frequent occurrence, these Davidic portraits 
are a rich source of exemplar pericopes whose analysis should yield valuable insights into 
Chrysostom’s objectives for his exemplar discourse in general and his vision for the lay 
exemplar in particular.  The aim of our present analysis of Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits 
is thus three fold.  The first is to explore how Chrysostom appropriates the different 
narrative and literary strategies that he inherits from the Greco-Roman biographical and 
rhetorical traditions for his exemplar constructs.  The second is to ascertain how these 
exemplar portraits might support or elucidate his pastoral and ethical vision, including the 
spiritual ideals that he conceives for the laity.  These lead us to our third and final 
objective, which is to formalize a hermeneutical approach that can be applied to the 
analysis of the ideals and worldviews underlying the exemplar portraits found elsewhere 
in his writings.  
                                                                                                                                                    
and 28 on Romans.  His conception of David as a prophet of Christ may be found in Homily 36 on 
Matthew.  For Christian interpretations of the motif of God’s covenant with David, as given in the 
New Testament, see Matthew 1 and 12.23, Mark 10.48, Luke 1.32 and 3.31, Romans 1.3, Hebrews 4.7 
and Revelation 5.5.  Christ’s Davidic ancestry is discussed in Homilies 1.7 and 2.2-3 of Chrysostom’s 
Homilies on Matthew.  Louis H. Feldman, Josephus' Interpretation of the Bible (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 537; hom. in Rom. 7, 28 (NPNF I.11, 375-76, 539-40); hom. in Matt. 36 (NPNF 
I.10, 240). 
  
 76 hom. in 2 Cor. 26.3; Dav. et Sau. 1 (PG 54.677.32) 
 
 77 hom. in Matt. 15.4. 
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The Figure of David in Chrysostom’s Pastoral Context 
 By the time Chrysostom became a priest in 386, the world of Christianity had 
changed tremendously, as compared to that inhabited by his spiritual forefathers.  The 
Arian controversy that was raging throughout much of the fourth century was finally 
subsiding – a result of Theodosius I’s calling and endorsement of the Council of 
Constantinople (381).  For the ordinary Christians, however, the more significant imperial 
decree remained that initiated by Constantine and continued by most of his successors, 
namely, their official support for Christianity.78   
Christianity, by the end of the fourth century, was no longer a religion of the 
minority or persecuted.  Rather, it was becoming an increasingly popular religion, 
favoured not only by those who were attracted to its tenets, but also those who saw it as a 
means of enhancing their social status, or even acquiring political privileges.79  The 
cosmopolitan city of Syrian Antioch is a good case in point, having seen its Christian 
population grow to about 100,000, or one-third of the city, by Chrysostom’s day.80  As so 
often happens, such conversion en masse inevitably leads to a wide spectrum of spiritual 
commitments among the Antiochene Christians.  No doubt, there must have been many, 
like Chrysostom and his childhood friend, Basil, who remained fervent for Christ and the 
                                                 
78 John Curran, Pagan City and Christian Capital : Rome in the Fourth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2000), 197-9, 210; Averil Cameron, The Later Roman Empire: Ad 284-430 (London: Fontana, 
1993), 75.  
 
79 Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400) (New Haven: Yale 
Univ. P., 1984), 57-58.   
80 J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch : City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman 
Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 76-77, 95.  
 
97 
 
Church.81  Yet, there would also be others who were more lukewarm towards the faith that 
they, or their fathers, had just embraced – a point attested not only in their continued 
engagement in pagan customs and superstition, but also the Judaizing behaviour evident 
among some.82 
Alongside this development is a second and equally dramatic sociological change 
within the Church, that is, the rapid growth of monasticism in the region of Syria.  
Asceticism has always been an enduring aspect of Antiochene Christianity, whose roots 
may be traced to as far back as the second century order of the ‘Sons and Daughters of the 
Covenant’, established in Syria and Mesopotamia. 83  In the fourth century, however, the 
Syrian monastic movement experienced such an unprecedented growth in the region of 
Antioch that its presence could actually irritate the cultured sentiments of Libanius, or 
even challenge the religious conceptions of some Antiochene Christians.84  More 
importantly, the pervasive presence of Syrian monks devoting themselves to the pursuit of 
the angelic life would inadvertently redefine the traditional categories of spirituality for 
the Antiochene Christians.  For most Antiochene Christians, the monks now constituted 
the spiritual elite, and represented a spiritual maturity and excellence that lay Christians 
                                                 
81 sac. 1.1-4. 
 
82 Chrysostom, adv. Iud. 1.3 (FC 68, 10-4); Downey, Antioch: In the Age of Theodosius the Great, 
115; Ramsay MacMullen, Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries (New Haven ; 
London: Yale University Press, 1997), 150-4; Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 17-19. 
 
83 R.M. Price, "Introduction," in Theodoret of Cyrrhus, a History of the Monks of Syria.  , 
Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1985), xxi-xxii. 
 
84 David G. Hunter, "Introduction," in John Chrysostom: A Comparison between a King and a 
Monk/ against the Opponents of the Monastic Life, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity (New 
York: Edwin Mellen, 1988), 62-63; Chrysostom, oppug. 2-3. 
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could never dream of attaining.85   The result of this development, quite obviously, was a 
greater degree of uncertainty or ambiguity in the laity’s perception of the nature of their 
Christian calling and spiritual maturity.   
This is the ecclesiastical context in which Chrysostom served during the two 
decades of his ministry:  an environment where Christians, as compared to the previous 
centuries, were no longer as clear about their spiritual commitments, and thus found 
themselves in a greater variety of compromising situations.86  It is also within this socio-
pastoral matrix, I suggest, that Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits can be properly 
appreciated.   
 
David: Paradeigma of Virtue 
 Among the different Davidic stories re-told by Chrysostom, five narratives are 
clearly his favourite.  They are, in the order of our discussion, David’s adultery with 
Bathsheba (2 Sam. 11-12), Absalom’s rebellion (2 Sam. 15-18), David’s duel with Goliath (1 
Sam. 17-18), the punishment of the plague (2 Sam. 24) and his twice sparing of Saul’s life (1 
Sam. 24, 26).  The first story is probably the most popular among the early Christians, 
including Chrysostom, and is often held by them as the paradeigma of Christian humility 
(ταπεινοφροσύνη) and repentance (μετάνοια).  Clement clearly presumes this in his letter 
                                                 
85 This sentiment is well-expressed in Chrysostom’s Homily 72 on the Gospel of Matthew, 
where he pre-empts his audiences’ excuse that they could never attain the monks’ spirit of humility 
by exalting David and other biblical exemplars as lay believers who had similarly attained this 
virtue. 
 
86 This is not to say that all Christians in the previous centuries were more moral and 
spiritually attuned to the demands of their faith.  Apostasy and sexual immorality had appeared 
even as early as the apostolic period (1 Cor. 5; 2 Tim. 1.15).   
  
99 
 
to the Corinthians, where the entire Psalm 51 is cited as an illustration of David’s humility 
and repentance, and part of his call for the Corinthians to do likewise.87  Elsewhere in 
Irenaeus’ Against Heresies, the story is expounded extensively as a paradeigma of the truth 
that God is ‚no respecter of persons‛ and will punish each person’s sin accordingly.88   
 Likewise Chrysostom, over the course of his two decade ministry, would often 
refer to this narrative as a paradeigma for humility and repentance. 89  Like many of his 
Christian predecessors, he also recognizes the iconic potential of this story.  Thus, he 
would occasionally present it as a demonstration of the severity of divine judgment and 
the divine mercy that remains available for the repentant, and, on other occasions, recast 
the story as a warning against similar moral lapses or the harbouring of secret sins.90   This 
iconic approach to David’s life is well-illustrated in his Homily 26 on Matthew where 
Chrysostom constructs a synkrisis between David and his listeners and presents the former 
as a paradeigma of how divine judgment can fall upon sinners.  Deploying a sub-category 
of paradeigmatic rhetoric, that is, to argue from the ‚lesser to the greater,‛ Chrysostom then 
cautions his listeners against a careless morality by reminding them that if ‚that righteous 
                                                 
 87 1 Clem. 16-18. 
 
 88 AH 4.27 
 
89 For references to David’s repentance, see hom. in Matt. 2.11 (NPNF I.10, 14); hom. in 1 Cor. 
16.3 (NPNF I.12, 90); hom. in 2 Cor. 15.2 (NPNF I.12, 351); hom. in Heb. 31.4-5 (NPNF I.14, 507).  For 
the use of this story as an example of humility, see hom. in Matt 3.8-9 (NPNF I.11, 18-19). 
 
 90 Basil, in his Epistle 42, would speak of the story as highlighting the importance of ending 
one’s life well.  hom. in Matt. 26.8, 75.5; hom. in 2 Cor. 4.9; hom. in Heb. 31.7. 
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man [David] through a little remissness received such wounds, what shall we have to 
suffer, who are every day negligent?‛91 
On several occasions, the same affair also becomes a platform for Chrysostom to 
reflect on the nature of Christian ethical development.  As discussed in Chapter 1 and our 
earlier section on Late Antique biographies, Greco-Roman philosophers generally 
presume that a virtuous life is a direct result of both nature and nurture.  Within this 
ethical scheme, each person is expected to act in accordance to his habituated nature, or 
the lack of it.  The story of David’s adultery, however, presents obvious difficulties to this 
ethical conception.  For the early Jewish and Christian interpreters, David is the Israelite 
par excellence who is pious in his worship, entirely obedient to God and habituated in every 
virtue.  Consequently, it is unthinkable that such a virtuous man can lapse into such a 
grievous sin as this.  Yet, the fact remains that he did and an explanation for this apparent 
contradiction is called for. 92  This is certainly the case for Josephus who, in his account of 
the affair, would begin by qualifying that David was ‚by nature a righteous and god-
fearing man, and one who strictly observed the laws of his fathers,‛ before suggesting or, 
indeed, downplaying David’s lapse as a mere error, or false step.93  Chrysostom, as it 
seems, adopts a similar approach in his Homily 16 on Romans, where he maintains, in 
                                                 
91 hom. in Matt. 26.10. 
 
92 A mentioned earlier, Plutarch’s biographies often seem reluctant to interpret a moral 
anomaly as a change of character, but rather consider it as a revelation of a veiled nature, or just a 
lapse arising from various circumstances.  Wardman,  132-35. 
 
93 Anti. 7.130 [Translated by Thackeray in Flavius Josephus, Josephus, 8 vols., The Loeb 
Classical Library, vol. 5 (London: Heinemann, 1926), 431]. 
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accordance with Late Antique ethical ideals, that David’s sin did not arise from a ‚habitual 
practice of wickedness.‛  Instead, the king was simply ‚carried away by circumstances.‛94   
Elsewhere, however, Chrysostom appears to allow for a more dynamic view of 
David’s character and nature.  Commenting on Jesus’ remark that ‚every good tree bears 
good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit‛ (Matt 7.17), he argues that Christ is not 
teaching here that ‚there is no way for the wicked to change or that the good cannot fall 
away.‛ Rather, the axiom should be taken to mean that ‚so long as he *a sinner+ is living in 
wickedness, he will not be able to bear good fruit.  For he may indeed change to virtue, 
being evil; but while continuing in wickedness, he will not bear good fruit.‛ 95  It is at this 
point that Chrysostom reflects upon the story of David’s adultery: 
What then?  Did not David, being good, bear evil fruit? Not continuing good, but 
being changed; since, undoubtedly, had he remained always what he was, he 
would not have brought forth such fruit. For not surely while abiding in the habit 
of virtue (ἕξει τῆς ἀρετῆς), did he commit what he committed. 
 
 Quite obviously, even though Chrysostom agrees with the Greco-Roman notion 
that one’s actions are bound up with one’s habitual nature, he does not subscribe to a 
static view of human character.  Instead, as he puts it elsewhere, human nature 
(ἀνθρώπων γένος) is so inherently unstable (ἀστατον) that David’s fall should not be 
surprising in the first place.96  Accordingly then, David’s moral failure in this instance can 
be attributed to the fact that he allowed his sexual desire (ἐπιθυμία) to hold down ‚all his 
                                                 
94 PG 60.557. 66-558.3. Chrysostom would similarly presume elsewhere that David’s sin was 
due to his ‚slight negligence‛ (μικρὸν ὀλιγωρήσας).  hom. in Matt. 26.8. 
 
95 hom. in Matt. 23.8 (NPNF I.10, 230, modified). 
 
96 hom. in 1 Cor. 1.1 (PG 61.14.33-4). 
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reasoning powers.‛97  The consequence of this was that his intelligence (συνετός) was 
dulled to the extent that he could even murder a faithful subject like Uriah.98  
 What Chrysostom conceives here is clearly in line with his understanding of 
human psychology, as outlined in Chapter 1.  For Chrysostom, human nature is never 
ethically autonomous.  Rather, an innate contingency exists in human psychology, so 
much so that there is always a potential for the soul to mislead the body into all sorts of 
mischief.  The only guarantee for an entirely and enduring virtuous life, as he puts it, is 
through the decisive help and guidance of the Holy Spirit.99    
 Related to the above story is the rebellion of Absalom (2 Sam. 15-18) which the 
prophet Nathan predicts to be the direct consequence of David’s sin (2 Sam. 12.11).  Like 
the antecedent narrative, David is taken here as an exemplar of a cluster of aretai, namely, 
guilelessness (ἄπλαστος), love (ἀγάπη), submission to divine judgment and humility 
(τᾰπεινοφροσύνη).100  Among these, it is the aretē of humility that predominates so much 
that the story may well be regarded by Chrysostom as the locus classicus of David the 
humble.  Here, two motifs are central to Chrysostom’s retelling of this story.  The first is 
                                                 
97 hom. in Matt. 60.1 (PG 58.585.41-42). 
 
98 It is noted that Chrysostom does not directly associate this loss of sunetos with David’s 
murder of Uriah.  Nonetheless, this conclusion may be assumed in view that Chrysostom portrays 
David as having lost so much sunetos that ‚he stood in need of others to correct him, and did not 
even perceive amidst what evils he was,‛ that is, a direct reference to Nathan’s rebuke of his 
adultery and murder.‛  hom. in 1Cor. 44.5. 
 
 99 See Chapter 1, pp. 56-57. 
 
 100 In Homily 33 on 1Corinthians, David is praised for his strong love for Absalom, despite 
the latter’s rebellion against him.  In Homily 15 on Ephesians, he is compared to Absalom again and 
emerges, this time, as a guileless (ἄπλαστος) person.  hom. in 1 Cor. 33.4 (NPNF I.12, 198; PG 
61.281.43); hom. in Eph. 15 (NPNF I.13, 122-23, PG 62.108.1); hom. in Matt. 3.9 (PG 57.39.7-8). 
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David’s express willingness to ‚let him *God+ do to me whatever seems good to him‛ with 
regards to Absalom’s rebellion (2 Sam. 15.25-26) and the second is his humble response to 
Shimei’s curse (2 Sam. 16.9-12).101  While the tradition for this dual emphasis may be traced 
as far back as Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities, the latter motif’s association with the virtue of 
humility is already established in the Septuagint, where David’s prayerful response to 
Shimei’s curse, ‚the Lord will look on my distress ( ),‛ as given in the Masoretic text, is 
rendered as the Lord will look upon his ‚humiliation‛ (ταπείνωσις) instead.102 
 In Chrysostom’s homilies, these two motifs are not simply convenient references to 
the virtue of humility.  When the situation calls for it, they can also be deployed creatively 
to enrich his audiences’ conception of the aretē and their understanding of how they might 
cultivate it in their lives.  A good example is given in his Homily 3 on the Gospel of 
Matthew.  In the concluding section of this homily, Chrysostom, as he so often does, urges 
his audience to cultivate the virtue of humility which he declares to be ‚the first principle 
of all philosophy.‛  This is because he who is ‚humbled and bruised *in heart+ will not be 
vainglorious, wrathful, jealous for riches or harbour any passion.103   
 To substantiate his case, Chrysostom turns immediately to the two stories by 
highlighting the fact that David, despite being a doer of ‚ten thousand good works,‛ had 
                                                 
 101 See also Homily 5 on Philippians, where David is once again compared to Absalom and 
exalted as a humble (ταπεινόφρων) person and Homily 7, where both motifs are introduced as 
proofs for David’s humility.  hom. in Phil 5, 7 (NPNF I.13, 205, 216; PG 62.216.49-50). 
 
 102 This interpretation of David’s magnanimity towards Shimei is clearly an idealized 
portrayal of David, since it does not account for the fact that David, at his deathbed, would hold 
Shimei guilty and ask Solomon to ‚bring his *Shimei’s+ gray head down to the grave in blood‛ (1 
Kgs 2.8-9, TNIV).  Josephus, Anti. 7.199, 209, 264-66. 
 
103 hom. in Matt. 3.8 (PG 57.38.29-31). 
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ended up as a refugee from his home, reviled by a ‚vile and outcast common soldier 
*Shimei+.‛104  Yet, despite such difficulties, David continued to trust and to be content with 
God’s will and judgment which, as Chrysostom further explains, was due to the king’s 
single-minded desire to obey God and His laws in everything.  To reinforce this 
conception of humility as contentment with divine judgement, Chrysostom then 
introduces a synkrisis between David and Absalom, where he not only has David 
encountering his son, but also making the fictitious pronouncement, that is, an ēthopoiia, 
that ‚if this pleased God *<+ that I should be chased and wander, and flee, and that he 
should be in honour, I acquiesce, and accept it, and do thank God for His many 
afflictions.‛105  
 Two important pedagogical results are achieved through this conflation of 
Chrysostom’s rhetorical exposition of the two motifs with his earlier didactic teachings on 
humility.  Firstly, by introducing the two motifs as paradeigmata for his arguments, along 
with the synkrisis and ēthopoiia that follow, Chrysostom is able to drive home the point that 
David’s humility, or to his being humble and bruised, is essentially to be content with 
God’s judgment.  Secondly, by conflating this Davidic portrait with his earlier didactic 
material, he inadvertently enriches the motif of David the humble by conveying the sense 
that Davidic contentment is necessarily bound up with the lack of vainglory, wrath, 
jealousy and the harbouring of any other passion.  Such a varied understanding of David’s 
humility has, of course, much practical value for his listeners.  Realistically speaking, few, 
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 105 hom. in Matt. 3.9 (NPNF I.10, 19). 
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if any, would experience the afflictions and persecutions that David had suffered.  Yet, 
most of them would struggle, in different degrees, with envy, vainglory or wrath – all 
signs of a lack of contentment.  Hence, by equating Davidic humility and contentment 
with the eradication of these passions, Chrysostom would have effectively rendered the 
aretē more practicable for his listeners. 
 
David as Greco-Roman Philosopher-King 
Thus far, we have seen how specific Davidic narratives can, in the hands of 
Chrysostom, turn out to be excellent vehicles for communicating his ethical ideals, 
whether it is his understanding of repentance and humility as important Christian virtues 
or his conviction that Christian askēsis must be grounded in pneumatology.  Apart from 
these, the figure of David is also frequently exalted by Chrysostom as a type of a Greco-
Roman philosopher king or leader and also a lay Christian exemplar par excellence.  In the 
rest of this chapter, both Davidic motifs will be discussed separately before they are jointly 
examined in Chrysostom’s De Davide et Saule. 
David the archetypal king is probably the most important and prevalent motif in 
Second Temple Jewish and early Christian writings.  Ben Sira, for example, praises David 
as a victorious king who was ‚set apart from the Israelites,‛ ‚played with lions as though 
they were young goats,‛ killed the boasting Goliath, conquered tens of thousands, enjoyed 
‚the blessings bestowed by the Lord,‛ reformed worship and so on (Sir. 47.2-11).106  
Josephus similarly exalts David as a Greco-Roman philosopher king who can not only 
                                                 
 106 In contrast, his adultery with Bathsheba and presumptuous census (2 Sam. 11-12, 24) are 
merely alluded to in the single phrase – ‚the Lord took away his sins‛ (Sir. 47.11). 
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boast of his ‚distinguished ancestry,‛ that is, Ruth, but can also claim to be a successful 
warrior.  Not unlike the typical philosopher-kings, he is a Psalmist and therefore poet in 
his own right, possesses great wealth, the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, a 
philanthropic love for people, and great piety, or fear of God.107 
Generally speaking, this motif of David the Greco-Roman philosopher-king and 
archetypal leader continued to be popular among the early Christians.  Writing to the 
schismatic Church of Corinth, Clement of Rome would exhort the Corinthians to imitate 
the humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη) of Christ and a long string of leaders, including David, by 
ceasing their rebellion against their leaders.108  Two centuries later, Athanasius would urge 
the Roman emperor to imitate David’s leadership by persuading his subordinates through 
reasoning, rather than sheer political authority.109  Gregory of Nazianzus, in his panegyric 
for Athanasius, even favourably compares the Alexandrian bishop with other biblical 
leaders, like David, and regards him as another Davidic leader, capable of combining both 
the ‚most active and most solitary life‛ in his career.110  Elsewhere, in an Oration in 
memory of his father, Gregory also praises David as a gentle (πρ᾵ος) leader, a point that is 
later affirmed by his namesake, Gregory of Nyssa.111 
                                                 
 107 Ant. 6.310-318, 7.101, 7.184, 7.291, 7.391; Feldman,  541-52, 562. 
 108 1 Clem. 16-18. 
 
 109 Athanasius refers specifically to 1 Samuel 26.8, where Abishai tried to convince David to 
strike the sleeping Saul.  David, however, reasoned otherwise.  hist. Arian. (NPNF 4, 246). 
 
 110 Gregory probably had in mind David’s dual vocation as warrior-king and the author of 
the Psalms.  Or. 21.3, 20 (PG 35.1104.36-38). 
 
111 Gregory of Nyssa, in his Funeral Oration on Meletius similarly praises David for his 
gentleness (πραότητα).  Or. 18.24 (Funebris oratio in patrem, PG 35.1013.16-25); Funeral Oration on 
Meletius (Gregorii Nysseni opera 9.1.449.15-450.1).  The roots of this motif of David the gentle is 
clearly Psalm 131.1 (LXX). 
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Likewise, Chrysostom’s homilies generally present David as an archetypal leader, 
whose life, in many ways, conformed to the expectations for the Greco-Roman 
philosopher king.  This is readily observed in his narration of one of the earliest and most 
popular Davidic story, that is, his duel with Goliath.  Unlike Ben Sira and Josephus, who 
takes this as an opportunity to exalt David as a warrior-king or the courage of the Jews, 
Chrysostom generally interprets this battle as a reflection of David’s ‚divine zeal and love 
of country‛ and his ‚regard of men as sheep.‛112  As he puts it in his Homily 29 on Romans, 
this regard, or indeed, ‚parental affection‛ (φιλοστοργία) for his people was already 
present in David even before he became king.113  Such a conception of David’s philostorgia, 
of course, bears much resemblance to the Greco-Roman monarchical portraits, where a 
monarch, whether he is Agesilaus or Alexander, is presumed to have developed similar 
kingly aretē, before he took up his role as a ruler over his people.   
For Chrysostom, this notion of David’s kingly philostorgia is confirmed in another 
important narrative, that is, David’s intercessory prayer for the plague (2 Sam. 24).114   In 
his Homily 29 on Romans, he likens David to an exemplary Shepherd, who, like Christ, is 
                                                 
 112 This is not to say that Chrysostom does not recognize this story as expressive of David’s 
courage.  He clearly does so, as in the case of his Homily 26 on 2Corinthians.  Yet, even in this homily, 
the reference to David’s valour is secondary.  As Chrysostom understands it, David only gave proof 
of his valour, that is, he had previously fought with the lion and the bear, because he was seeking to 
bring about a greater end – the salvation of the Jews, rather than to win the praise of others.  In 
other words, David’s courage is once again subsumed under the greater virtue of parental affection 
for his people.  Dav. et Sau. 1 (PG 54.678.44-46); hom. in 2 Cor. 26.3. 
 
113 hom. in Rom. 29 (PG 60.658.20-37).  See hom. in 2 Cor. 15.4 (PG 61.506.4-19) for a similar 
assertion that David possessed such philostorgia before his reign. 
 
 114 hom. in 1 Cor.25.4 (PG 61.506.4-19). 
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willing to ‚lay down his life for his sheep‛ (John 10.11).115  This is to be seen in David’s 
choice of the plague which Chrysostom interprets, like Josephus, as David’s attempt to 
ensure that the punishment is inflicted upon himself rather than his people.116  Here, he 
draws attention to David’s pleading with God, ‚let your hand fall on me and my family,‛ 
for ‚I, the shepherd, have sinned,‛ which the king prays after realizing that the plague is 
killing his people instead of himself (2 Sam. 24.17).  As an interpretation of this prayer, 
Chrysostom introduces an ēthopoiia and has David add,  
‚if they [my people] also sinned, I was the person who should suffer the vengeance, as 
I corrected them not.  But since the sin is mine also, it is I who deserve to suffer the 
vengeance.‛117  
  
By this rhetorical move, two central features of David the Shepherd, or indeed, the pastor 
(ποιμένος), are clearly explicated: his humble recognition and confession of his personal 
sins, and his deep concern and sympathy for his people.118  
David’s concern and sympathy for his people, particularly his ritualistic 
intercession on their behalf, certainly coheres with Late Antique expectations for a 
philosopher or philosopher-king.119  Apollonius of Tyana, for example, is esteemed by 
                                                 
 115 hom, in Rom. 29.24 (NPNF I.11, 729). 
 
116 While it is impossible to ascertain whether Chrysostom appropriated Josephus’ 
justification for David’s choice of the punishment of the plague (Anti. 7.322-23), our present 
assertion is quite plausible in view of Chrysostom’s clear knowledge of Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities.   
117 hom. in Rom. 29.24 (NPNF I.11, 729). 
 
 118 hom. in Rom. 29.24 (PG 60.659.5-7).  The word, ποιμένος, literally means shepherd, but in 
the Christian context is often understood as referring to a teacher or pastor.   
 
 119 Elsewhere in Homily 25.4 on 1Corinthians, Chrysostom speaks of David as an exemplary 
prayer intercessor, just like Abraham and Moses.  This tradition dates back to 4 Esdras 7.108, which 
similarly presents David, along with Abraham, Moses and others as prayer intercessors.  Having 
said this, Justin Martyr, in his Dialogue with Trypho, would regard the story as simply a warning 
against boasting instead.  Dial. 141. 
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Philostratus as a philosopher who revitalized several pagan temples in the Empire.  
Plutarch, in his Life of Alexander, similarly praises Alexander for taking seriously the 
importance of ritual sacrifice.  Where David differs from these Greco-Roman figures, 
however, is the fact that he concurrently exemplifies a highly-esteemed Christian aretē 
which is unheard of in most biographies of Greco-Roman philosopher-kings, namely, the 
willingness to confess (ἐξομολόγησις) one’s sin. 
There is yet a second and more significance difference between Chrysostom’s 
David and the typical Greco-Roman philosopher king.  This is to be seen in how 
Chrysostom presents David’s origins.  Generally speaking, Greco-Roman accounts of 
philosopher-kings tend to emphasize the lofty or even divine origins of their subjects.120  
Yet in his homilies, Chrysostom would consistently stress David’s lowly origins instead.  
A case in point is his Homily 48 on Matthew, where Chrysostom defends Jesus’ humble 
origins as a ‚carpenter’s son‛ (Matt. 15.55) by deploying the rhetoric of paradeigmata.  Here, 
he reminds his listeners that David was a king of Israel, despite the fact that he was merely 
the ‚son of a certain husbandman (γεωργός).‛  To strengthen his rhetorical induction, he 
introduces two further paradeigmata.  Amos, he notes, was also ‚the child of a goatherd, 
and himself a goatherd,‛ while Moses’s father was far inferior (ἀποδέοντα) to himself.  
Yet in spite of such lowly origins, these men had gone on to become excellent prophets 
and leaders of Israel.121   
                                                 
 120 Examples include Isocrates’ Evagoras and Plutarch’s Parallel Lives.   
  
 121 hom. in Matt. 48.1 (PG 58.487. 23-34). 
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To be sure, it is not uncommon for Greco-Roman epideictic rhetoric to stress, as 
Mitchell puts it, ‚the lowly origins of one who was later to earn great fame.‛122  I believe, 
however, that this is not Chrysostom’s rationale here.  The hint is given in his refusal to 
follow the precedence set by Josephus, whom he most probably read, and Philo (20 BCE – 
50), both of whom unreservedly give Moses a lofty origin in their biographies.123  This 
contrast is only accentuated by the fact that Philo elsewhere clearly recognizes that one’s 
aretai is not dependent on his noble birth (εὐγενεία), but rather on the ‚mercy and loving-
kindness‛ of God – a principle that, interestingly, he does not apply to his account of 
Moses’ ancestry.124   Clearly then, Chrysostom’s demeaning of Moses’ origins, along with 
that of David and Amos, cannot be understood as mere rhetorical exigency.  Instead, it is 
meant to convey the important theological point that David, Amos and Moses’ lowly 
origins are not hindrances to their future success, but opportunities for magnifying the 
                                                 
 122 Menander Rhetor, for example, would advise that if a subject ‚is humble or without 
prestige, omit it.  [<] Alternatively, you can say something about the family along these lines [<] 
‘many seem to be of human stock, but in truth are sent down from God, and are verily an 
emanation of the higher power’.‛  Mitchell, 235; Men. Rhet. 2.370. 
 
 123 Philo, in his De Vita Mosis, exalts Moses’ origins by asserting that his parents were ‚the 
best of their contemporaries‛ (Mos. I.7.1-4) and that, even as a babe, he was the designated 
successor of the Pharaoh (Mos. 1.13).  For Josephus, he claims that Moses was the son of ‚Amaram, 
a Hebrew of noble birth‛ (Ant. 2.210).  For Chrysostom’s familiarity with Josephus, see Heinz 
Schreckenberg, "Jospehus in Early Christian Literature and Medieval Christian Art," in Jewish 
Historiography and Iconography in Early and Medieval Christianity, ed. David. Flusser, Compendia 
Rerum Iudaicarum Ad Novum Testamentum Section 3 Jewish Traditions in Early Christian 
Literature (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1992), 75. 
 
 124 For Philo, this point is clearly attested in the biblical narratives, whether it is in Adam, 
who fell despite a ‚most noble birth‛ or Abraham’s faithfulness to God despite his idolatrous 
upbringing.  virt. 187-88, 206, 212-16. 
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divine grace that has helped them overcome their natural difficulties and attain the 
pinnacle of leadership. 125    
As we shall see in Chapter 3, this demeaning of the exemplar’s origins would 
prove to be an important narrative strategy for Chrysostom’s exemplar discourse.  The 
underlying rationale, as we will argue, is soteriological, since it is in this way that the glory 
and power that God had invested in each Christian through Christ’s salvation will be 
clearly demonstrated. 
 
David the Lay Exemplar 
To be sure, the aretai of parental affection and humble confession that characterize 
David’s kingship are in no way unique to Christian leaders.  Indeed, they are equally 
relevant for Chrysostom’s lay audiences, as can be seen in the fact that Chrysostom’s 
expositions of these Davidic narratives frequently conclude with exhortations for his lay 
listeners to imitate likewise.  His above portrayal of David the Shepherd is a good example, 
since it terminates with a clear call for Christian fathers to imitate David by becoming 
similar shepherds to their families and children.126  This leads us to what I think is the 
second major focus of Chrysostom’s homiletical portrayal of David, namely, the Israelite 
king is more often than not presented as an exemplary lay person par excellence.   
                                                 
 125 By stressing David’s lowly origins, Chrysostom is clearly following the precedence of 
early Christians, such as Gregory of Nazianzus, who similar argues that one’s poor pedigree or 
upbringing in no way hinders him from becoming a shepherd of Israel (that is, David), a prophet of 
God or even an apostle of Christ.  Or. 32.10. 
 
 126 hom. in Rom. 29.24 (NPNF I.11, 547). 
 
112 
 
Once again, this conception has a rich Jewish and early Christian lineage.  Ben Sira 
and Josephus, for example, separately affirm David as an exemplary practitioner of the 
Torah, while the author of the Fourth Maccabees praises him for his temperate mind 
(σώφρων νοῦς) and ability to resist his passions.127  Writing to his brother Gregory, Basil 
of Caesarea presents David as an excellent paradeigma of one who is ‚at once gentle (πρ᾵ος) 
and great-hearted, passionate (θυμῷ ) against sin, [and] gentle (πραότητι) towards men, 
since he was ‚noble in warlike exploits, yet gentle (πρ᾵ον) and unruffled with regards 
revenge on enemies.‛128  This spiritualization of David’s feats would be taken seriously by 
Gregory of Nyssa who, later on, likens the Arian, Eunomius, to Goliath and urges his 
readers to imitate David’s courage in their resistance against this foe of orthodox faith.129   
 Generally speaking, five major features characterize Chrysostom’s homiletical 
portrayal of David the exemplary lay person.  First and foremost, David is presented as a 
Christian exemplar whose life thoroughly exemplifies the virtues that ought to be 
cultivated among every Christian.  This is clearly evident in his discussion of David’s self-
restraint, where he remarks that David had ‚transcended (ὑπερέβη) even the old law and 
came near to the apostolic commands.‛130  The point is only made more explicit in Homily 3 
of his De Davide et Saule, where he declares: 
                                                 
 127 Sir. 49.4; Ant. 6.165, 4Macc. 3.7-17. 
  
 128 The latter part of Basil’s praise alludes, most certainly, to David’s twice sparing of Saul’s 
life.  Ep. 2.3.20-25 (NPNF II.8, 111).  
 
129 C. Eunom. 2.1.6.5. 
 
 130 This notion of transcendence or ὑπερβάθμιος would prove to be an important category 
for Chrysostom and will feature prominently in his soteriological discourse.  Indeed, it will 
fundamentally alter the literary form of his rhetoric of exemplary figures.  This will be addressed in 
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It is impossible [<] for someone in the Old dispensation to show such sound values, 
[<] David had not heard the parable of the ten thousand talents and the hundred 
denarii; David had not heard the prayer that says, "Forgive people their debts as your 
heavenly Father also does;" he had not seen Christ crucified. [<] Instead he was raised 
on imperfect laws that made no such requirements, yet he attained to the very summit 
of sound values of the age of grace.131 
 
 Secondly, as we have mentioned above, David is frequently regarded as an 
excellent paradeigma for a whole host of aretai that Chrysostom deems worthy of 
cultivation by the laity.  These include not only the excellences of repentance and humility 
that were mentioned earlier, but also others like gentleness, faith, forbearance and the 
mourning for others’ sins.132  More importantly, David, along with other ‘lay’ biblical 
saints like Abraham and Paul, is also praised as a paradeigma of how one can maintain a 
secular lifestyle and yet remain entirely virtuous – a point that is clearly aimed at his 
audiences’ excuse that their lives in the polis have made it impossible for them to cultivate 
saintly virtues.  Against such claims, Chrysostom reminds his listeners that just as 
Abraham among the Canaanites can say, ‚I am but dust and ashes,‛ and David in the 
midst of the army camps can utter ‚I am a worm and no man,‛ so also do they have no 
excuse for cultivating the aretē of moderation (μετρητός) in their present lifestyles.133  A 
similar point is made in Homily 61, where Chrysostom insists that it is ‚not crafts (τέχνας) 
                                                                                                                                                    
greater detail in Chapters 3 and 5, where we will discuss his soteriology and rhetoric of martyrdom.  
hom. in Matt. 3.9 (PG 57.39.5-6). 
 
 131 Dav. et Sau. 3 (PG 54.698).  Translated by Robert Hill in John Chrysostom, Old Testament 
Homilies, trans. Robert C. Hill (Brookline, Massachusetts: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2003), 43-44.  
See also hom. in Heb. 19.4 for a similar portrayal of David as an exemplar of Christian virtue, in this 
case the love for one’s enemies. 
 
 132 Surprisingly, the motif of David the exemplar of faith is rarely discussed by the early 
Christians.  The only explicit reference to this is that given in Athanasius’ To the Bishops of Egypt 21 
(NPNF 4, 234); hom. in Matt. 3.9, 15.4; Dav. et Sau. 1-2 (PG 54.677.32, 39-40). 
 
 133 hom. in Matt. 72.4 (NPNF I.10, 439; PG 58.672.33). 
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or farming or military service or working in the fields‛ that prevents a Christian from 
cultivating aretē.  Rather, the fault lies with the Christian, not the vocation.  To substantiate 
his argument, Chrysostom produces another similar catalogue of lay saints, such as David 
the king, Cornelius the centurion, Paul the worker of leather and Job the landowner, as 
paradeigmata for how one can remain untainted despite having to practise a secular 
vocation.134   
 Next, against those who claim that they cannot perform miracles, or signs, like the 
apostles and therefore should not be expected to transform the world like the apostles did, 
Chrysostom summons yet another catalogue of saints.  This time, paradeigmata like David, 
Job, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, along with prophets, like John the Baptist and Isaiah, are 
highlighted to demonstrate the fact that these saints, in spite of their inability to perform 
miracles, can nevertheless bring much glory to God through their aretai and good works.135 
 As to the final feature of David the lay exemplar, it is to be seen in the many ways 
in which he is presented as not only an embodiment or icon of the Christian life, with all 
its challenges and struggles, but also a proof of how one might continue to walk with God 
despite such troubles.  In one instance, David’s life is compared with that of Solomon, the 
one being in toil all his life, while the other enjoyed forty years of ‚profound peace, glory 
and honour.‛ Together, they serve, for Chrysostom, as an apt reminder for Christians that 
God did not ‚exercise‛ all men alike, though each was ‚great and wonderful‛ before 
                                                 
 134 hom. in Matt. 61.3 (NPNF I.10, 378; PG 58.592.16-21).  See also hom. in Phil. 12 for a similar 
assertion that David, despite being a king, ‚shone forth in his kingdom, the purple and the diadem 
rendered him not at all remiss.‛  The same is to be said of Abraham and Job, who remained 
virtuous despite being rich and married. 
 
 135 hom. in Matt. 46.3. 
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Him.136  In another homily, David’s life is conceived as a clear demonstration that ‚life 
cannot be without pain.‛  This, in turn, allows Chrysostom to argue from ‚greater to the 
lesser‛ that ‚if the king *David+ is burdened with so many misfortunes,‛ how much more 
it would be true of the ‘private life’ of the laity?‛137   
Indeed, the extent to which Chrysostom is eager to identify David’s experiences 
with those of his audiences may be seen in his narration of David’s mourning for his dead 
infant (2 Sam. 12.15-23).  David, he remarks, clearly loved his infant son and had, indeed, 
‚sat in sackcloth and ashes‛ to intercede for the child’s sake.  Yet unlike his predecessor, 
Saul, David did not seek recourse to soothsayers or enchanters, but relied solely on his 
supplications to God.  When the child finally died, David accepted it with thanksgiving to 
God.  Praising this as a true expression of wisdom and affection, Chrysostom then 
encourages those who are experiencing a similar situation to imitate David’s grief and 
faith in God.138 
 
De Davide et Saule 
 Having considered Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits extensively, we will conclude 
our present study by considering how the Davidic narratives may be appropriated as 
rhetorical vehicles for communicating Chrysostom’s dual vision of David the philosopher-
king and lay exemplar par excellence.  For this, we must turn to the story of David’s twice 
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sparing of Saul’s life (1 Sam. 24, 26).  Among the early Christians, this episode was 
interpreted frequently as an example of how one might be devoured by his own jealousy 
(ζῆλος), or envy (φθόνος).139  Interestingly, it is also used by Athanasius as a justification 
for his fleeing from persecution.140  A more enduring interpretation, however, has been the 
recognition that David’s unwillingness to slay Saul is expressive of his patient endurance 
during persecution.141  In his retelling of this story, Chrysostom, by and large, concurs with 
these traditions, that the story not only epitomizes the ills of envy and jealousy but also 
illustrates how one might submit patiently to divine judgment during persecution.142  
Among the many rhetorical motifs he develops from this narrative, his favourite is most 
probably the synkrisis of David and Saul, the most extensive of which is that given in his 
De Davide et Saule. 143   
In his introduction to the first English translation of these three homilies, Hill 
argues that these sermons were probably preached in the year 387, shortly after the 
defacing of the Emperor’s statute during Antiochenes’ riot, while the city was still waiting 
                                                 
139 1 Clem. 4.13; See also Basil’s Homilia de individia, where Saul is depicted as persecuting 
David because of envy (PG 31.376.14-40).  Translated by Wagner in Basil and M. Monica Wagner, 
Ascetical Works, Fathers of the Church (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1962), 
466. 
 
 140 Defence of His Flight 25. 
 
141 Josephus, for example, would have David surmize that ‚it is not right to murder one's 
own master or one whom God has accounted worthy of kingship.  And even though he treats me ill, 
yet I must not do the like to him." Ant. 6.284 (Translated by Thackeray in Josephus,  309).  See also 
Ap. Fuga 10-12, 16, 21; AH  4.27. 
 
142 hom. in Matt. 42.2. 
 
143 Similar synkriseis between Saul and David may also be found in hom. in Matt. 42.2 and 
62.5-6.   
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anxiously for Thedosius’ decision on its appeal for clemency.  Hill’s thesis is certainly 
plausible and, in fact, introduces an additional perspective on Chrysostom’s conception of 
David as an archetypal leader.  Unfortunately, Hill does not seem to do much with the 
provenance he establishes but simply relegates the sermons as additional expressions of 
Chrysostom’s esteem for the Scriptures as a ‚moral and hagiographical treasury.‛144  This, 
I think, is short-changing the ideological richness of the texts, which can be better 
appreciated when attention is paid to the various Davidic portraits constructed during the 
course of these sermons. 
We begin with Homily 1, where David is introduced as ‚a kind of archetypal image‛ 
for the aretai of clemency and gentleness.145  This is because David is, essentially, an 
exemplary Christian, who, during the days of the Old Dispensation, had already 
‚surpass*ed+ the norm of the commandments and attain*ed+ to New Testament values.‛146  
The ‚precise knowledge of his virtue‛ is to be seen in the repeated kindness that David 
showed to Saul, despite the great evil that the latter did to him.   
To prove this thesis, Chrysostom summons a series of six narratives, beginning 
with David’s duel with Goliath.  Here, Chrysostom introduces a synkrisis between David 
                                                 
 144 According to Hill, Homily 1’s introductory reference to the Matthean parable of the 
Merciful Master by the phrase, ‚the other day,‛ is most probably alluding to Chrysostom’s 
exposition of the parable in the last sermon of his Homilies on the Statutes.  This allusion does not 
only determine the provenance of the homilies, but more importantly, clarifies Chrysostom’s 
rationale for the sermons, that is, he is likening the emperor to another Davidic King, who would 
also exercise a similar Davidic gentleness to the Antiochenes – an encouragement that would surely 
be welcomed by them.  See Hill’s introduction in St. John Chrysostom Old Testament Homilies Volume 
one: Homilies on Hannah, David and Saul, trans. Robert Charles Hill (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross 
Orthodox Press, 2003), 6-8.  For more details about the riot see J. N. D. Kelly, Golden Mouth: The 
Story of John Chrysostom: Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (London: Duckworth, 1995), 72-75. 
 
 145 Dav. et Sau. 1 (PG 54.677.32, 39-40). 
 
 146 PG 57.678 (Hill, 11). 
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and the Israelite soldiers, including Saul.  The latter, as he puts it, ‚were cowering and 
terrified‛ before the giant, while David courageously ‚emerged from the sheep to enter 
the battle line,‛ even though he had no apparent battle experience.  It is noteworthy that 
Chrysostom does not mention David’s claims to have fought with the lion and the bear 
previously (1 Sam. 17.34-37).  Instead, all he declares is that the shepherd boy ‚was stirred 
up by divine zeal and love of country, regarded men as sheep and was [therefore] bent on 
driving off this mighty army like dogs.‛147   Clearly, he is not following the enkōmion 
convention for Greco-Roman monarchs here, since he does not emphasize the fact that 
David had already developed the kingly aretē of battle skills before his reign.  Instead, 
what he focuses on is the spiritual aspect of David’s future leadership, in that David, even 
as a shepherd boy, had already nurtured a zeal for God and pastoral love for his people.    
By and large, these spiritual qualities of David would continue to characterize 
Chrysostom’s account of the remaining Davidic narratives.  After his victory over Goliath, 
David was praised by the women as being superior to Saul.  The future king, however, 
was not ‚carried away with that eulogy, and had become envious‛ of Saul, but 
‚maintained the simplicity befitting him.‛  In stark contrast, Saul would become 
unjustifiably jealous against David.148  During his subsequent service of Saul, David 
proved to be ‚wiser than Saul’s servants‛ so much so that he won over ‚all the populace 
and the king’s household.‛  Nevertheless, he did not become puffed up, aspire to the 
kingship or take vengeance on Saul.  Saul, on the other hand, would attempt to spear 
                                                 
 147 PG 57.678 (Hill, 12). 
 
 148 PG 57.679-680 (Hill, 13-15). 
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David to death three times (1 Sam. 18.10-11, 19.9), even though David, on those occasions, 
was playing the harp to soothe Saul’s ‚disturbed spirits.‛149  Indeed, David would 
continue to put himself in danger for Saul’s sake,   
taking his place in the battle line in all the wars and preserving his own assailant at 
personal risk.  [<] Though not receiving the prize due for his victory, and instead 
deprived of the reward for dangers undergone, he still did not ever utter reproaches to 
the soldiers or to the king; after all he was doing this not for human reward, but in the 
hope of recompense from on high.150 
 
 Furthermore, David was to maintain a similar humility when Saul sought to give 
him Michal’s hand in marriage.  In his gentleness, David declined the marriage, even 
though it was his proper due, and instead considered himself ‚unworthy of relationship‛ 
with Saul.151  Later on, he even chose voluntary exile rather than to oppose the king.  ‚The 
reason for withdrawing himself from his enemy’s sight,‛ explains Chrysostom, ‚was to 
bring down the swelling, check the inflammation and allay the malice‛ in Saul’s soul – a 
point that is powerfully conveyed in the ēthopoiia – ‚it is better for me [<] to be in a 
wretched state and suffer countless wrongs than be convicted by God of this unlawful 
killing.‛  In other words, David the exile is recast as David the spiritual physician (ἰατρός) 
or indeed a Christ figure who not only loved his enemies, but was also even willing to 
sacrifice his well-being for their sake.152 
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 This brings us to the climatic encounter between David and Saul at the cave (1 Sam. 
24).  Here, the urging of David’s men to kill Saul is spoken of as a temptation and what is 
at stake here is ‚the struggle, the victory, the crown.‛  In fact, 
That cave was an arena (στάδιον), and a kind of remarkable and surprising contest 
(πάλη ) took place. [<] David entered the lists, resentment struck a blow, Saul was the 
prize, and God acted as a referee – or, rather, the battle was not against himself, and his 
desires but also against the soldiers present [who might slay him if he spares Saul].153 
 
The motifs of arena, contest, victory and crown, of course, echo the martyr contests that 
Chrysostom’s four-century audiences would be familiar with.  For Chrysostom to evoke 
these motifs in his Davidic portrait must surely mean that David is also regarded as a 
martyr figure.154  Yet, David is no mere martyr from the era of persecutions.  Rather, he is 
the exemplary spiritual martyr who does not die physically but only to his epithumia.  The 
victory that he wins here is the overcoming of his resentment and fear of his revengeful 
soldiers, and the crown that he gains is not glory in heaven, but the ‚crown of 
forbearance.‛155   
 Against those who doubt that David’s struggle was real, Chrysostom adds that 
‚billows of resentment‛ had buffeted him and ‚a great tempest of thoughts was stirred up.‛  
Yet, David ‚held the storm in check with the fear of God and subdued his thinking."  By 
saying this, Chrysostom is also counting David as one of those ascetic saints, who ‚before 
falling they get up, before proceeding to sin they get a grip on themselves since they are 
                                                 
 153 PG 57.682.41, 45 (Hill, 18). 
 
 154 Chrysostom’s rhetoric of martyrdom will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
 155 PG 57.683 (Hill, 19-20). 
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watching and always on the alert."156  Nonetheless, Chrysostom’s ascetic David is far 
removed from the Late Antique philosopher, who perfects himself autonomously.  This is 
to be seen in the ēthopoiia that he introduces as an exegesis of David’s prayer, ‘The Lord 
forbid’ (1 Sam. 24.6): ‚may the Lord be merciful to me, and if I actually had the  intention, 
may God not allow me to act on it nor permit me to proceed to the sin.‛  This, as 
Chrysostom explains, is due to David’s clear recognition that ‚sound values of this kind 
are almost beyond human nature and require grace from on high.‛  In other words, David 
is likened to a Christian figure who is entirely dependent on the aid of divine grace, so that 
he is able to ‚keep his hand unstained.‛157  It is on the same basis that Chrysostom would 
immediately praise David as one who ‚while still belonging to the human nature is giving 
evidence of the angelic way of life.‛158 
 Homily 1 concludes at the point where Saul awakens to David’s call, with the latter 
addressing Saul as the ‚Lord’s anointed.‛  Chrysostom takes this as an excellent example 
of how one should treat his enemy respectfully and commends it to his listeners: 
imitate this man, and learn this lesson first, never should your mouth be in the habit of 
calling your aggressor by names that are respectful and betoken service, the soul on 
hearing this will learn from the tongue, become accustomed and undergo a change of 
heart towards him.  The words themselves will be the best remedy for the heart's 
choler.159 
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By using David’s example as a basis for introducing this spiritual advice, Chrysostom  is 
clearly reinforcing the earlier notion of David the ascetic, since the future king both 
understood and practised such a spiritual discipline.    
Homilies 2 and 3 basically dwell on the conversation between Saul and David 
outside the cave.  Here, we encounter a cluster of Davidic motifs similar to those 
introduced in Homily 1.  In Homily 2, David is again portrayed as the spiritual contestant 
cum martyr who offers as a sacrifice ‚resentment mortified and rage unnerved‛ and wins 
his ultimate victory not against Saul, but ‚the real enemy, the devil.‛  This martyrdom 
motif is only reinforced by Chrysostom’s comparison of David’s triumph with those of the 
three young men in the furnace and Daniel in the lion’s pit – stories which, by 
Chrysostom’s time, are taken for granted as proto-martyr acts.160   
David’s triumph, continues Chrysostom, is wholly dependent upon the grace of 
God, since it is only by this divine aid that he is able to dissuade his men from their 
murderous thoughts and, therefore, play the role of the priest (ἱερεύς) or even the bishop 
(ἐπισκοπή) preaching a homily to them, rather than that of the commander of the troops 
(στρατηγὸς).161  Further on, the motif of David the spiritual physician is reiterated when 
David’s claim that Saul’s jealousy was due to the misleading of others rather than his own 
malice is being taken by Chrysostom as a sign of David’s parental wisdom and ability as a 
spiritual healer, in that he sought to restore Saul without embarrassing the king.162 
                                                 
 160 See Chapter 5, pp. 238-39 for a short discussion on proto-martyr acts in Old Testament 
narratives.  Dav. et Sau. 2 (PG 57.688, Hill, 28-30). 
 
 161 PG 57.688.25-29 (Hill, 27-28). 
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In Homily 3, David is once again introduced as an exemplary Christian who has 
attained the ‚sound values of the age of grace,‛ despite living in the Old Dispensation.  
Through another synkrisis with Saul, he is also praised as a man of forbearance, who is 
willing to forgive and care for his enemy.163  Here, the motif of David the spiritual martyr 
is repeated again.  This time Chrysostom would regard the sparing of Saul’s life as David 
subjecting himself anew to further threats from his enemy.  Effectively speaking, this 
amounts to David ‚being slain countless times,‛ and therefore becoming the winner of 
‚many crowns for martyrdom.‛164   
Another Davidic motif that is reinforced in Homily 3 is David the spiritual 
physician.  In this case, it is demonstrated through the healing power of David’s gentle 
voice, which so penetrates Saul’s heart that the king regains his sound ability to recognize 
David as holy and being in the right.165  As Chrysostom puts it, David’s present feat is no 
different from that of Joshua and Moses, who similarly overcome the elements of nature 
by their own voices.  Indeed, David should be regarded as superior to Moses since what 
he overcomes is not mere nature, but Saul’s ‚frenzy‛ and ‚inflamed heart.‛166  As a 
conclusion to his sermon, Chrysostom draws attention to the kindness that David would 
show to Saul’s posterity.  Noting the great hospitality and care that David shows to Saul’s 
grandson, the lame Mephibosheth, Chrysostom exalts David with yet another favourite 
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motif of his, that is, to regard David’s feats as that of an angel rather than a human being. 
167   
Taken as a whole, these three homilies clearly affirm Hill’s suggestion that David is 
some form of archetypal leader, or indeed, bears a strong resemblance to the typical 
Greco-Roman philosopher-king.  This is to be seen not merely from Hill’s argument from 
the homilies’ historical context, but more importantly through the series of Davidic motifs 
that Chrysostom develops from the Davidic narratives.  The Late Antique philosopher-
king, as we have gathered from our discussions of Plutarch’s Alexander, is not only a man 
endowed with kingly virtues, but is also a lover of philosophy, an ascetic and a religious 
figure.  By and large, this stereotype corroborates Chrysostom’s motifs of David the man 
who fights with divine zeal and love for his people, and the ascetic who triumphs over his 
passions.  Where David differs from this Greco-Roman archetype is the fact that he is 
presented predominantly as a Christian exemplar and therefore embodies in his life 
distinctive Christian aretai, like gentleness, the love for his enemies and a willing 
submission to divine judgment, rather than a monarchical aretē, such as battle skills.   
Furthermore, Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits, generally speaking, seem to 
emphasize his philosophical rather than military excellences.  This is clearly evident in his 
portrayals of David as a bishop teaching a group of murderous subordinates, or even the 
spiritual physician, ministering to others and healing moral ailments.  Indeed, 
                                                 
 167 Hill considers Chrysostom’s present interpretation as an idealization of the story since 2 
Samuel 9:1 clearly states that David was doing this ‚for Jonathan’s sake.‛  Nevertheless, one must 
remember that 2 Samuel 9:3 also stresses that David’s intention was to show kindness to the ‚house 
of Saul.‛  Bearing in mind that ancient Israelite culture is more collective than individualistic, 
Chrysostom is probably correct to regard David’s favour to Mephibosheth as, essentially, a 
kindness shown to Saul.  PG 57.707 (Hill, 7, 58). 
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Chrysostom’s emphasis on the healing power of David’s gentle voice is surely reminiscent 
of the miracles performed by a philosopher like that of Apollonius.  Having said this, the 
model that Chrysostom has in mind here is not the Late Antique philosopher, but that of 
the Christian ascetic-bishop – a point this is powerfully put across not only through his 
association of David with the roles of the priest and bishop and other biblical leaders, but 
also through his repeated insistence that David is a spiritual martyr who has in fact 
transcended his humanity and attained the ways of the angels.  Judging from these, we 
may reasonably conclude that the ideal Christian, for Chrysostom, is the ascetic-priest/ 
bishop, since he is the only Christian figure that embodies in his life all the spiritual 
attributes conveyed by these Davidic motifs.  More importantly, by commending this 
Christian archetype as the ideal paradeigma for his lay audiences, Chrysostom is also 
setting here a new conception and standard for lay spirituality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Based on the above study, it is clear that Chrysostom’s exemplary discourse, as 
given in his various portrayals of David, is greatly indebted to the rhetorical tradition that 
he was trained in.  With regard to his more encomiastic material, like the De Davide et Saule, 
he, generally speaking, conforms to the literary requirements of Greco-Roman epideictic 
oratory.  In most cases, however, his Davidic portraits tend to be more episodic in nature 
and are presented, more often than not, as proofs, or pisteis, for a theological or ethical 
point that he is making.  Although the brevity of these Davidic portraits does not permit 
him to abide entirely by the enkōmion paradigm, this organizing scheme, nonetheless, is 
presumed in the background of his exemplary discourse, such as his frequent assumptions 
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that David had developed the virtues reminiscent of a king even before his reign.  
Interestingly, the most significant expression of this paradigm is his conscious effort to 
subvert the ethical ideal implicit to the paradigm, that is, his constant demeaning of the 
origins or even the upbringing of David and other exemplars, so that he might exalt the 
efficacy of God’s grace. 
 Among the rhetorical techniques that he was trained in, two of his favourite, at 
least in his Davidic portraits, appears to be the ēthopoiia and the synkrisis.  The former is 
usually deployed as a means of clarifying the motivations of the exemplar and therefore 
reinforcing the aretai that he exemplifies, while the latter is often practised both as a means 
of exalting the exemplary figure and exhorting his lay audiences.  In the case of the latter, 
this often involves a comparison of the exemplar with the laity so that the latter might not 
only be ashamed of their spiritual stupor, but are also motivated towards greater spiritual 
progress. 
 Although Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits are not strictly speaking biographical, 
they, nevertheless, abide by the literary assumptions of Greco-Roman biography.  Among 
these assumptions is his clear affirmation of the ideological function of exemplar portraits.  
This is readily demonstrated in how he presents David as exemplifying specific Christian 
aretai that he deems appropriate for cultivation by the laity.  It is also evident in how he 
uses David’s deeds as a basis for deepening his audience’s understanding of how a 
particular virtue may be practised, or even the kind of psychology that should 
presupposed in this practice, as is the case with his rationalization of David’s lapse into 
adultery.   
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 With regards to the many ideologies conveyed by Chrysostom’s David, the most 
explicit is the ideal of David the Greco-Roman philosopher king, which he regularly 
emphasizes through narrative motifs such as David’s parental love for his people or his 
ascetic triumph over his epithumia.  Having said this, David is not so much so a Greco-
Roman king than he is truly an archetype of Christian leadership.  This is powerfully put 
across by the way Chrysostom supplements the Greco-Roman leadership ideal with what 
he takes to be the traits of Christian leadership, e.g., the ability to heal the morally afflicted, 
the pastoral love that a leader should have for his people or the identification of leader as a 
kind of spiritual martyr. 
 More importantly, Chrysostom also keenly recognizes that these spiritual traits are 
not unique to Christian leaders, but are traits to be commended to the laity, including the 
uneducated non-elite, for their imitation.  This is because every single lay person, whether 
leader or servant, is called by God to the same spiritual perfection that is embodied by a 
Christian archetypal leader like David, that is, to live a life that transcends his origins by 
depending on divine grace and attaining, ultimately, the angelic way of life.  Clearly then, 
the figure of the Christian priest or bishop has become, for Chrysostom, the archetypal 
Christian that should be emulated by his listeners, whether lay or ascetic. 
 This brings us, finally, to our third objective for this chapter, that is, the 
formalization of a hermeneutics of exemplar portraits.  In view of our findings in these 
two chapters, it should be clear that a hermeneutics of exemplar portraits must begin with 
an a priori conception of Chrysostom’s didactic teachings – in this case, his ethical ideals.  It 
is only when a model of his didactic teachings, preliminary though it may be, is 
established that we can conduct a rhetorical and narrative analysis of Chrysostom’s 
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exemplar portraits and determine the degree to which these portraits validate, reinforce or 
supplement this model.   
 In the case of Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits, these portrayals are often intended 
as straightforward affirmations and, therefore, reinforcements of the particular Christian 
aretai, such as humility, repentance and a dependence on divine grace, which he believes 
should be cultivated in every Christian.  Frequently, they also function as validations of the 
many ethical ideals that Chrysostom expounds in his didactic material, such as his belief 
that human goodness is dependent upon the aid of the Holy Spirit.   In some instances, 
these Davidic portraits also provide opportunities for Chrysostom to enrich or supplement 
his ethical teachings.  Such is the case for his exposition of David’s humble response to 
Absalom’s rebellion in his Homily 3 on Matthew.168  Here, what we gain is not merely the 
idea of humility as a willingness to suffer under persecutions, but a much deeper 
understanding of the virtue’s essence, namely, to be contented and devoid of the passions 
of vainglory, wrath and jealousy. 
 These hermeneutical functions of validation, reinforcement and supplementation 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, when we consider the interpretative 
role of Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits in his soteriology.  At that juncture, we will also 
examine the meta-narratives frequently found in his exemplar portraits and consider the 
roles that they may play in establishing the correlation between Chrysostom’s soteriology 
and his exemplar portraits.   
 
 
                                                 
 168 hom. in Matt. 3.8. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMAGE OF SALVATION:  
EXEMPLAR PORTRAITS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CHRYSOSTOM’S 
SOTERIOLOGY 
Exemplar Portraits and Chrysostom’s Soteriology 
 Among the teachings of Chrysostom, one of the most controversial subjects, 
particularly among Protestant theologians, is his doctrine of salvation.   This is well-
exemplified in the magisterial reformer, John Calvin’s, attitude towards the bishop.  
Despite his admiration for Chrysostom’s writings, Calvin, nevertheless, faults the 
Antiochene for what he perceives to be an over-emphasis on the role of the free will in 
human salvation.1  By and large, this sentiment would hold sway in Protestant quarters 
right until the present age, though there are some, like Frances Young, who would criticize 
this tendency to ‚enquire how far *Chrysostom’s+ thought was Pelagian‛ as an 
‚unjustifiable question.‛2  
 With regard to the hermeneutical role that exemplar portraits might play in this 
soteriological debate, it is Mitchell who first introduces Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits as 
a means of overcoming this scholarly deadlock.  In her Heavenly Trumpet, Mitchell 
examines the Pauline portraits that Chrysostom constructs in his De laudibus sancti Pauli 
                                                 
 1 Praefatio in Chrysostomi Homilias.  For an English translation of the Preface, see McIndoe, 
‚Preface to the Homilies of Chrysostom,‛ 19-26.  A helpful discussion of the preface may be found 
in John Robert Walchenbach, ‚John Calvin as Biblical Commentator: An Investigation into Calvin's 
Use of John Chrysostom as an Exegetical Tutor‛ (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1974), 31.   
 
 2 For contemporary Protestant criticism of Chrysostom’s soteriology, see Hoffmann-Aleith 
and Wiles.  Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon, 150; Hoffman-Aleith, ‚Das Paulusverständnis,‛ 181-88; 
Maurice Wiles, The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles in the Early Church (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), 94-131, 137-39. 
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and concludes that Chrysostom’s Paul is, essentially, ‚the Christian version of the classical 
virtue theory – that one can attain even angelic virtue if one sets one’s προαίρεσις 
*deliberate choice+ correctly.‛  Such a portrayal, she remarks, stands in sharp contrast to 
that conceived by the mature Augustine, that is, Paul the ‚man in valiant struggle against 
the concupiscence of the flesh.‛3  On this basis, she suggests that Chrysostom has actually 
‚dallied on the theological boundary to Pelagianism by promoting Paul as the supreme 
example of humanity’s boundless capacity for virtue.‛4  In other words, the role of 
Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits in the interpretation of his soteriology is one of 
supplementation, in that it demonstrates, at least to Mitchell, that Chrysostom’s doctrine is 
far more Pelagian than what his didactic teachings tell us. 
 Although Mitchell’s analysis confirms for us the synergistic emphasis of 
Chrysostom’s salvation doctrine, her conclusions are, nevertheless, problematic.  This is 
because her assessment of Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits is conducted primarily through 
the lens of Protestant soteriology, with its preoccupation with a proper conceptualization 
of the relationship between divine grace and free will.5   The net result of this is that 
Mitchell inevitably ignores or misunderstands several narrative motifs that are commonly 
                                                 
 3 Mitchell, 416, 421. 
 
 4 Mitchell, 400, 416. 
 
 5 This approach is well-exemplified by Kelly who remarks that the Eastern Fathers, 
including Chrysostom, fell short in their understanding of original sin when compared to 
Augustine.  This, unfortunately, leads them to develop a synergistic soteriology rather than the 
monergistic model proposed by Augustine.  Nevertheless, Kelly recognizes that the Eastern Fathers 
were theologizing from a different starting point, namely, the concept of deification.  J. N. D. Kelly, 
Early Christian Doctrines, 5th revised ed. (London: A. and C. Black, 1977), 352. 
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found in Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits, but, according to the Protestant framework, are 
insignificant for soteriology.   
 Take Chrysostom’s portrayal of Paul as an ascetic figure or ‚super-monk,‛ for 
example.  Despite its frequent occurrence in Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits, Mitchell does 
not see its relevance for Chrysostom’s soteriology, apart from the fact that it functions well 
as a model of imitation and legitimization of his ascetic ideals.6  The same can be said 
about Chrysostom’s frequent exaltation of Paul’s human achievements.  The possible 
relationships that Paul’s achievements may have with Christ’s work of recapitulation as a 
human being simply do not appear on her interpretative horizons.  Likewise, 
Chrysostom’s portrayal of Paul as the ‚archetype of virtue‛ and a figure greater than the 
angels only solicits her criticism of Pelagianism.7  This is because within the scheme of 
Protestant soteriology, where the divide between the human and the divine, or more 
specifically, the human and the angels, is wide and insurmountable, it is entirely 
inappropriate, let alone relevant, to speak of human salvation as having any form of 
angelic association.   
 Underlying these difficulties in Mitchell’s analysis, I believe, is the problem of 
anachronism.   Despite its close parallels with Chrysostom’s teachings, the structure and 
emphasis of Protestant soteriology is significantly influenced by the theological and 
pastoral concerns of the Reformation, with its interest in securing the certainty of salvation 
for Christians and fending off any human confidence in one’s self-righteousness through a 
                                                 
 6 Mitchell, 308-26. 
 
 7 laud. Paul 1.15, 2.8, 3.1; Mitchell, 400. 
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re-appropriation of Augustinian soteriology.  Within such a theological framework, many 
of the narrative motifs commonly found in Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits simply do not 
have a soteriological relevance.  Yet, if we are to read these narrative motifs in the context 
of patristic deification discourse, it would be immediately clear that they are important for 
deepening our understanding of Chrysostom’s soteriology.  In other words, there is an 
apparent incoherence between Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits and the soteriological 
model that Mitchell presupposes for her analysis, an incoherence that ultimately calls into 
question the validity of her model of Chrysostom’s didactic teachings in the first place.   
 Indeed, I will argue that Chrysostom’s soteriology, when understood within its 
historical and theological context, is nothing less than a doctrine of deification and that his 
doctrine is both well-illustrated and enriched by the numerous Pauline and non-Pauline 
portraits presented in his writings.  To demonstrate this thesis, we will first survey the 
deification discourse prior and contemporary to Chrysostom before considering how he 
appropriates these rich traditions for his soteriology.  Having established the didactic 
contours of Chrysostom’s deification doctrine, we will then examine his portrayals of Paul, 
as given in his De laudibus sancti Pauli, to ascertain the different ways in which his Pauline 
portraits may reinforce or supplement our understanding of Chrysostom’s soteriology.  
 
Deification Discourse: A Historical Overview 
 The origins of deification discourse may be traced to as early as the exilic or even 
pre-exilic period of Israelite faith.8   A more concerted reflection on this subject, however, 
                                                 
 8 The earliest conception of the resurrection of the faithful, for example, may be found in the 
exilic and post-exilic texts of Ezekiel 37.14 and Daniel 12.1-3.  Yet, as Levenson has convincingly 
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occurs only during the Second Temple period, where the faithful are frequently conceived 
as participants in the life and duties of the angels, even in the present age, as it is the case 
with the Qumran community.  This motif of the angelic life would be readily appropriated 
by both Greek and Syriac Christians and used interchangeably with the divine title as a 
reference to Christians.9  As for the notion that the angelic life can be realized in the present 
age, at least to some degree, it would also gain popularity in the early centuries, first in the 
Christians’ martyr literature and, later, in their ascetic writings.10  
 With regard to the use of divine titles to describe the faithful, it is Philo of 
Alexandria who sets a precedent by referring to Moses as ‚a god to Pharaoh‛ (Exod. 7:1) 
and taking this not only in the titular sense, but also as an analogy of the spiritual heights 
to which Moses had ascended, namely, that which is higher than the angels and beside 
God.11  By the late second century, such practice would become commonplace among the 
Christians, with Justin Martyr (d. 165) and Irenaeus of Lyons (c.180) interpreting the ‚gods‛ 
                                                                                                                                                    
argued, the roots of this belief runs deeper and echoes of it may be found in the earlier biblical texts, 
such as Isaiah 26 and 52:13-53.12.  Jon Douglas Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: 
The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven, Connecticut; London: Yale University Press, 
2006), 200-1. 
 
 9 Didymus the Blind, for example, regards both angels and human beings as gods – the 
former because of their immortality and the latter because of their participation in the Word.  
Ephrem the Syrian similarly regards Adam as an angelic being, whose disobedience was motivated 
by his desire to become a god.  This desire, he adds, was ultimately fulfilled by God through 
Christ’s salvation.  Didymus the Blind, In Zach. 94.25, 28; 95.2; Ephrem, Comm. Gen. 2:14; Virginity 
16:9; Nisibene Hymns 69.12; Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 132-33, 156; Sebastian P. Brock, The 
Luminous Eye: The Spiritual World Vision of Saint Ephrem, Rev. ed., Cistercian Studies Series 
(Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1992), 86-87, 152. 
 
 10 See Chapter 1, pp. 63-65 for a more detailed discussion of Christian appropriation of the 
angelic life motif. 
 
 11 sacr. 6, 8; QG 1.86; Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 62. 
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of Psalm 82:6 as referring to Christians and the Epistle of Diogentus regarding those who 
imitate God’s goodness as to have become a god (θεὸς γίνεται) to their beneficiaries.12 
 A more thorough conception of Christian deification in the late second century is to 
be found in the writings of Clement of Alexandria (150-211).  Earlier, in his Questions on 
Genesis, Philo had interpreted the Logos as the mediator between God and creation and the 
image of God itself.  More importantly, he also regarded the Logos as the invisible image 
in which all rational human souls are created.13  It is Clement, however, who brings these 
Philonic insights to bear upon Christian exegesis, by relating Christ’s salvation work 
directly with Genesis 1:26 and Plato’s understanding of divine likeness in Theaetetus.14  On 
this basis, he affirms that only the devout Christian is ‚the image together with the likeness 
of God‛ (Gen. 1:26), since Christ Jesus has made him ‚righteous and holy with the help of 
practical wisdom.‛15   
 This Platonic theme is picked up again in Book II of Clement’s Stromateis.  This time 
around, Philo’s ascetic conception of the soul’s ascent to divine likeness is incorporated 
                                                 
 12 This phenomena, as Schnurr suggests, is due largely to the secularization of the divine 
motif from the Hellenistic period onwards, which, in turn, opens the way for early Christians to 
adopt the divine title as ‚a descriptive shorthand for the end and goal of Christian life.‛ Russell, 
Doctrine of  Deification, 16-27; G.M. Schnurr, "On the Logic of the Ante-Nicene Affirmations of the 
Deification of the Christian," Anglican Theological Review 51 (1969): 103; Justin Martyr, Dial. 124; 
Irenaeus, AH. 3.6.1; Epis. Diog. 10.   
 
 13 Philo does not consider the human body to be part of the image of God and suggests that 
it was created by the powers instead.  Op. 137; Fug. 69; Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 59. 
 
 14 David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, Compendia Rerum 
Iudaicarum Ad Novum Testamentum Section 3 Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993), 156; Russell, Doctrine of  Deification, 129. 
 
 15 This is a direct quotation from Theaetetus 176b, where Plato asserts that ‚a man should 
make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming like God as far as 
possible (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν); and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and 
pious, with the help of practical wisdom (δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως).‛  Pr. 12.122.4-123.1. 
 
136 
 
into Clement’s interpretation of the ‚gods‛ of Psalm 82:6.16  Within this framework, 
Christians are taken as those ‚who are superior to pleasure, who rise above the passions, 
*<+ who have detached themselves as far as possible (ὡς οἷόν τε) from everything human‛ 
– another clear allusion to Plato’s ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.17  By the fourth century, 
Clement’s distinction between the image and likeness of God, and his ascetic interpretation 
of the soul’s journey to divine likeness would be assumed by many Christians, most 
notably Basil of Caesarea (329-379) and Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389).  Basil, for example, 
takes for granted that every Christian should be ‚made like God, as far as it is possible for 
human nature‛ (ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπου φύσει) through the 
cultivation of apatheia.18  He also develops this idea further by emphasizing the importance 
of the Holy Spirit’s aid in renewing a Christian and enabling him to imitate Christ’s life 
and virtues, such as gentleness and humility. 19   
 These early centuries also witnessed the development of a parallel and equally 
important deification concept, namely, the formula of divine and human exchange 
introduced by Irenaeus of Lyons.  Like his second century contemporaries, Irenaeus 
                                                 
 16 Philo conceives the soul’s telos as a four stage ascent to God.  This includes an ethical 
stage where one’s journey to divine likeness must involve both the eradication of his passions, that 
is, to attain apatheia, and the cultivation of divine aretai.  Mig. 9; LA. 1.108, 3.132; Abr. 52-54. 
 
 17 Strom. 2.125.4–5. 
 
 18 De Sp. S. I.2. 
 
 19 A similar stance is taken by Gregory of Nazianus in his Oration 4.71.  Basil, De Sp. S 15.35-
36; hom. Ps. 33.3; 44.2 (PG 29.357C, 389C); Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 212. 
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readily affirms the possibility of Christians becoming like gods.  Where he differs is his 
conception of this idea in terms of an exchange formula between God and man:20 
He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that man, having been taken into 
the Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God.21   
 
For Irenaeus, the Incarnation means much more than the exaltation of human beings to 
divine sonship.  More importantly, the Son has also assumed human nature, so that He can 
become the representative of all humanity and recapitulate, on their behalf, every aspect of 
human life perfectly. 
He therefore passed through every age, becoming an infant for infants, thus sanctifying 
infants; a child for children, thus sanctifying those who are of this age, being at the 
same time made to them an example of piety, righteousness, and submission; a youth 
for youths, becoming an example to youths, thus sanctifying them for the Lord.  So 
likewise he was an old man for old men, that he might be a perfect master for all, not 
merely as respects the setting forth of the truth, but also as regards age, sanctifying at 
the same time the ages also, and becoming an example to them likewise.  Then, at last, 
he came even to death itself, that he might be ‘the first-born’ from the dead, that in all 
things he might have the pre-eminence’, the prince of life, existing before all, and going 
before all.22 
 
 It is Athanasius (293-373) who develops this concept of communicatio idiomatum 
more fully in his debates with the Arians.23   Like Irenaeus, Athanasius affirms that the Son  
                                                 
 20 This exchange formula finds its origins in 2 Corinthians 8:9 and Philippians 2:15, where 
Paul regards Christ as being rich, ‚yet for your sake became poor, so that by his poverty you might 
become rich.‛  This idea would be picked up in the Epistle to Diogentus, where it is praised as ‚the 
sweet exchange.‛  Interestingly, the concept is also prevalent among the Syriac Christians.  Ephrem, 
for example, can assert that ‚Divinity flew down to draw humanity up, for the Son had made 
beautiful the deformities of the servant and so he has become a god, just as he desired.‛  Ephrem, 
Hymns on Virginity 48:15-18.  (Translated by Brock, Luminous Eye, 152-53). 
 
 21 AH 3.19.1. 
 
 22 AH 2.22.4 (ANF 1, 391). 
 
 23 Clement is one of the earliest Alexandrian fathers to appropriate this exchange formula, 
by teaching that the ‚Logos of God had become a man (ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος), in order that you 
too may learn from a man how it is even possible for a man to become a god (ἄνθρωπος γένηται 
θεός) (Prot. 1.8.4.).  For circulation of Against Heresies in Alexandria, see C.H. Robert, Manuscript, 
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was made man, that we might be deified (ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν); 
and he manifested himself by a body (σώματος), that we might receive the idea of the 
unseen Father; and he endured the insolence of men, that we might inherit 
immortality.24 
 
This he takes to mean that by the Incarnation of the Word, ‚what is naturally human is 
united to what is naturally of the Godhead.‛  Henceforth, humankind is able to assume the 
properties of divine through the flesh (σάρξ) of the Word and attain the deification and 
immortality of the human body (σῶμα), or indeed, the human nature.25  For every 
individual, this is to be realized when he willingly cooperates with the Holy Spirit’s help.26 
 Like Justin and Irenaeus, Athanasius believes that every aspect of human life is 
contingent upon divine aid.27  All creation, he asserts, has its ‚being out of nothing, so also, 
*< it+ might look for corruption into nothing in the course of time.‛28  This is certainly the 
case for the human soul, which has an inherent mobility (εὐκῑνησία), or instability, that 
                                                                                                                                                    
Society and Belief in Early Christian Egypt.  The Schweich Lectures 1977.  (London: Oxford University 
Press for the British Academy, 1979), 23. 
 
 24 Following Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170-c. 236) and Clement, Athanasius would frequently 
use the verb, θεοποιέω, to denote God’s deifying work with human beings.  Nevertheless, the verb 
is used more sparingly by his theological successors, Basil and Gregory of Nazianus.  Basil, for 
example, prefers to call human beings θεοί on a number of occasions, while Gregory adopts 
another similar term in its place, namely, θεόω (divinize) and its noun, θέωσις.  De Inc. 54.3; Russell, 
Doctrine of Deification, 208, 215. 
 
 25 Athanasius often uses the words, sōma, anthrōpos and sarx interchangeably.  CA 1.42, 2.70 
(PG 26.296.24-26), 3.34 (PG 26.297.20-21). 
 
 26 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 172-73. 
 
 27 Justin, his Dialogue with Trypho 4, argues that the human intellect cannot see God unless 
adorned by the Holy Spirit and illuminated by Christ and His Scriptures.  Likewise, Irenaeus 
teaches that although the body is animated by the soul, ‚the soul herself is not life, but partakes in 
the life bestowed on her by God‛ (AH 2.34.4).  As mentioned in Chapter 1, pp. 56-57, Chrysostom 
adopts a similar position by asserting that the human soul cannot become good without the 
decisive help of the Holy Spirit. 
 
 28 De Inc. 4.4 (NPNF II.4, 38). 
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compels it to move either towards divine or debased things.29  Consequently, it is 
necessary for a human being to participate (μετέχω) in the Holy Spirit before he can be 
knitted into the Godhead and become deified.30   
 Among the Cappadocian Fathers, it is Gregory of Nazianus who shows the 
greatest affinity to Athanasius’ formulation of the exchange formula. 31  In Epistle 101, for 
example, he clearly reaffirms Athanasius’ emphases on the co-existence of the Son’s divine 
and human natures and the soteriological significance of this co-existence.   
For we do not sever the Man from the Godhead, but instruct that [the former] belongs 
also to Him.  In former times, He was not Man but God and the only Son and before 
the ages, unmingled with the body (σώματος) or anything corporeal.  In the fullness of 
time [He] took on humanity (ἄνθρωπον) for our salvation, passible in the flesh (σαρκί), 
impassible in the Godhead, circumscribed in the body, uncircumscribed in the spirit, 
[<] perfect man and also perfect God, in order that the humanity that had fallen under 
sin might be renewed.32 
As to how this renewal is to be understood, Gregory appropriates yet another Athanasian 
formulation by asserting that the Son was able to deify humanity through His Godhead 
(θεωθεῖσα διὰ τῆς θεότητος) because of His Incarnation.  Indeed, it is in this way that the 
                                                 
 29 CG 4.1-3.  Steenberg, 172-73. 
 
 30 This language of participation, as Russell points out, finds its roots in Origen, and is 
appropriated by Athanasius to not only denote a Christian’s participation in the Spirit but also his 
participation in the deified flesh of Christ. CA 3.24 (NPNF II.4, 407, PG 26.373.30-35); Russell, 
Doctrine of Deification, 147-52, 180-82. 
 
 31 Basil, in comparison, does not say much about the deifying work of the Incarnation, 
though he does assert the deifying work of the Holy Spirit.  Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 212-13. 
 
 32 Like Athanasius, Gregory clearly uses the words, sōma, sarx and anthrōpos 
interchangeably to denote the human nature.  His indebtedness to Athanasius is also well 
demonstrated in his appropriation of the Athanasian exchange formula in Oration 1. 5.  Ep. 101.13-
15.   
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image, or humanity, can become leavened (ζῡμόω) and mingled (ἀνακεράννυμι) with 
God.33   
 This language of mingling (κεράννυμι), it seems, would prove to be popular in the 
fourth century, not only among the Cappadocians, but even with the Syriacs. 34  Ephrem, 
for example, can present the idea of the divine exchange by declaring that ‚Christ’s Body 
has newly been mingled with our bodies.  [<] In His compassion the whole of Him has 
been mingled in with the whole of us.‛35  Among the Cappadocians, it is Basil who 
conceives this motif of kerannumi in terms of the Spirit’s deification work.  Speaking of the 
human mind or nous, Basil remarks that it must incline itself towards God and become 
‚mingled (ἀνακραθεὶς) with the Godhead of the Spirit,‛ in order that it can ‚behold the 
divine beauty [<] so far as grace imparts and its constitution receives.‛36   
 In the case of Gregory of Nyssa, however, the same motif, along with the 
communicatio idiomatum, is appropriated sacramentally.  Baptism, as Gregory declares in 
his Oratio Catechetica Magna, is the very means by which a Christian can attain an ‚affinity 
                                                 
 33 In his In laudem Athanasii, Gregory similar praises Athanasius for having ‚mingled 
(κραθῆναι) himself with the purest light,‛ or God.  Ep. 101.46; Or. 21.2. 
 
 34 Irenaeus is one of the earliest to adopt the language of mingling to articulate the intimacy 
that humanity might share with the Son.  Those who are enslaved in disobedience, as he puts it, 
have not yet been ‚mingled with the Word of God or participated in the freedom of the Son.‛  
AH .3.19.1. 
 
 35 Likewise in his Hymn on Faith, Ephrem praises the Lord for coming down to earth to 
mortal beings in order to recreate them to become ‚like the angels‛ by ‚mingling within them Fire 
and Spirit.‛  Virginity 37:2 (Brock, 106); Faith 10:9 (Brock, 105). 
 
 36 Basil is, of course, concurring with Athanasius and others here that spiritual potential of 
the soul is contingent upon the grace and aid of the Spirit.  Ep. 233.1.9-11, 32-36. 
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and likeness‛ with the Incarnate Son and the sarx that He deified.37  By God’s grace, this 
mingling (καταμείγνυμι) between the divine and the human continues whenever the 
Eucharist is celebrated.  The sarx of the Son, says Gregory, now ‚derives its subsistence 
from both wine and bread.‛  Consequently, when one partakes of the mysteries, the Son 
mingles (κατακιρνάμενος) with his body anew and enables him to participate (μέτοχος) 
in incorruption.38   
 
Salvation as Deification in Chrysostom’s Writings 
Overview 
 When examined in the context of these theological traditions, Chrysostom’s 
soteriology, as we shall see, is clearly indebted and, in many ways, similar to the Irenaean, 
Alexandrian and Cappadocian conceptions of salvation as deification. The fact that this is 
not often observed in contemporary scholarship is due mainly to two reasons.  The first we 
have already mentioned, namely, the Western preoccupation with the so-called Pelagian 
tendencies in Chrysostom’s soteriology.39  The second is the misconceived paradigm that 
scholars often bring to their analysis of patristic exegesis and theology, that is, the sharp 
distinction postulated between the Alexandrian and so-called Antiochene schools.40  The 
                                                 
 37 Or. Cat. 35 (NPNF 2.5, 502). 
 
 38 Or. Cat. 37.122-24. 
 
 39 A healthy departure from this is Pierson’s recent thesis on Chrysostom’s theory of 
Christ’s redemption in the Pauline Letters, which seeks to examine Chrysostom’s soteriology in its 
own historical and theological context and on its own merits.  Pierson, ‚An Analysis of John 
Chrysostom’s Underlying Theory of Christ’s Redemption in the Letters of Paul,‛ 245-58. 
 
 40 To be sure, there is a familial resemblance in the exegetical approaches adopted by all the 
Antiochenes.  Nevertheless, the theologies that they actually develop are remarkably different, as is 
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effect of this distinction upon scholarly assessment of Antiochene and, therefore, of 
Chrysostom’s interest in deification is exemplified in Gross’s remark: 
The intellectual mysticism and allegorization of the Alexandrians greatly favoured the 
development of the doctrine of divinization.  [<] the moralism and literalism of the 
Antiochenes hardly inclined them to share these views. 41  
 
 On first glance, Chrysostom’s writings seem to support Gross’s assertion, since 
they generally lack the use of explicit deification vocabulary, such as θεοποιέω and 
θεόω.42  This is perhaps why Gross would follow Meyer and conclude that Chrysostom’s 
soteriology is centred on the motif of the angelic life instead.43  Having said this, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the case for Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopseustia.  As we shall see, there is much theological 
continuity between Chrysostom’s soteriology and that of the Cappadocians and Alexandrians.  It is 
only in the theology of Theodore do we find a clearer departure from Alexandrian theology.  
Consequently, the contrast is not so much between Alexandrian and Antiochene schools, but 
between the former and Theodore.  Manlio Simonetti, Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church: An 
Historical Introduction to Patristic Exegesis, trans. John A. Hughes (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994, 2001), 
59, 67.  For a study of Chrysostom’s exegetical method and the ways he differ from Theodore, see 
Bradley Louis Nassif, ‚Antiochene 'Theoria' in John Chrysostom's Exegesis‛ (Ph.D., Fordham 
University, 1991).  For the historical grounds against the Alexandrian versus Antiochene School 
paradigm, see Andrew Louth, "Why Did the Syrians Reject the Council of Chalcedon?," in Chalcedon 
in Context: Church Councils, 400-700, ed. R.M. Price and Mary Whitby (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2009), 108-9.  
 
 41 For Gross, this lack of interest seems evident in the general lack of explicit deification 
language in the Antiochenes’ writings.  Nonetheless, he acknowledges the presence of deification 
themes in Chrysostom’s writings, especially in his teachings on divine filiation.  Russell, in his 
breath-taking survey of Greek Patristic doctrine of deification, takes a similar stance.  Like Gross, he 
draws attention to the absence of deification vocabulary among the Antiochenes.  Nevertheless, he 
recognizes the presence of deification themes in Chrysostom’s teachings, such as Chrysostom’s 
emphasis on the ‚Irenaean themes of divine sonship by grace and recapitulation in Christ‛ and his 
interpretation of the ‚gods‛ of Psalm 82:6 as referring to the baptized, though this is to be taken 
only in the titular sense.  On the whole, Russell leaves us with the clear impression that the 
Antiochenes were disinterested in this subject, since he devotes less than half a page to these 
theologians.  Jules Gross, The Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers, trans. Paul A. 
Onica (Anaheim, CA: A & C Press, 2002), 200, 206; Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 237. 
 
 42 For example, Chrysostom rarely uses θεοποιέω.  When he does so, it is used exclusively 
in a pagan context to depict the idolatrous acts of making creatures gods (PG 57.19.37, 53.29.12; 
61.163.43).   
 
 43 Gross,  205; Meyer, Saint John Chrysostome, 192-206. 
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paucity of explicit deification language need not be tantamount to a lack of interest in this 
subject.  On the contrary, we will argue below that Christian salvation, for Chrysostom, is 
understood primarily in terms of deification, that is, the attainment of divine likeness, as 
circumscribed by the image of Christ.  This telos, in turn, is founded upon the Son’s 
recapitulation and deification work as both God and Man.  Having established the main 
contours of Chrysostom’s deification doctrine, we will then consider how his exemplar 
portraits may reinforce and supplement our understanding of this doctrine.  
 
Chrysostom’s Deification Doctrine 
 We begin with Chrysostom’s teachings on the imago dei.  Generally speaking, 
scholars have turned to his Homilies on Genesis for Chrysostom’s understanding of this 
subject.44  The locus classicus, it seems, is Homily 8.9-10, where Chrysostom interprets 
‚image‛ (εἰκών) (Gen. 1.26) as referring to man’s (ἀνήρ) authority over everything on 
earth.  Here, as many have noted, Chrysostom follows his fellow Antiochenes, Diodore 
and Theodore, by not only delimiting the meaning of eikōn to the idea of rule (ἀρχή) and 
authority (ἐξουσία), but also by ascribing it exclusively to the anēr, or male.45  Having said 
this, Chrysostom also recognizes that the woman, in some way, appropriates Adam’s rule 
                                                 
 44Papageorgiou, ‚Theological Analysis of Selected Themes,‛ 23-26; Nonna Verna.  Harrison, 
"Women and the Image of God According to St. John Chrysostom," in In Dominico Eloquio: Essays on 
Patristic Exegesis in Honour of Robert Louis Wilken, ed. A.R. Christman P. M. Blowers, D.G. Hunter 
and R.D. Young. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2002), 261-64. 
 
 45 Interpreting Genesis 1:26 in the light of 1 Corinthians 11:7-12, Chrysostom argues that the 
woman is always subordinated to the man and, therefore, cannot be seen as having authority over 
all creation.  Consequently, the woman cannot be the eikōn of God, which refers exclusively to rule 
and authority.  hom. in Gen. 8.9-10 (PG 53.72); Diodore, PG 80:107-10; Ibid. 260-62; Frederick G. 
McLeod, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1999), 59-61. 
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over all creation and hints at this by rebuking Eve for not being satisfied with having ‚all 
the visible things under your *Eve’s+ own authority and to exercise control over them 
all.‛46   
 If eikōn delineates human similitude to divine authority, it is ‚likeness‛ (ὁμοίωσις), 
as Chrysostom clarifies later in Homily 9, that fully describes the human potential to 
become like God, according to its human power (κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην ὁμοίους 
ἡμ᾵ς γίνεσθαι Θεῷ), that is: 
to become like (ἐξομοιοῦσθαι) him according to gentleness and mildness (κατὰ τὸ 
ἥμερον *<+ καὶ πρᾶον) and according to the principle of aretē.47 
 
To be sure, Chrysostom’s earlier interpretation of the imago dei clearly differs from the 
Philonic tradition on this subject.  Yet, by distinguishing between a human being as an 
eikōn of God and his potential for being homoios with God, it would appear that 
Chrysostom’s understanding is much closer to that of the Alexandrians and Irenaeus.48  
This suspicion, I think, can be confirmed on the following grounds.   
 The first is Chrysostom’s use of the formulation, κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην, as a 
way of describing the human potential for divine likeness.  Such terminology clearly 
echoes that of Clement of Alexandria and, more particularly, Basil’s formulation in his De 
Spiritu Sancto.49  The second is his affirmation of the invisibility of the imago dei in his 
                                                 
 46 hom. in Gen. 16.12 (PG 53.130c).  For A more extensive treatment of the relationship 
between the female and the imago dei, see McLeod, Image of God, 198-211. 
 
 47 hom. in Gen. 9.7 (PG 53.78b). 
 
 48 See our above discussion of Clement of Alexandria’s distinction between these two 
concepts in pp. 135-36. 
 
 49 Basil similarly speaks of a Christian as ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπου 
φύσει.  De Sp. S. I.2. 
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Homily 3 on Colossians and his corresponding conclusion that the human soul, being made 
in the imago dei, is also invisible.50  This is a clear departure from his fellow Antiochene, 
Theodore, whose understanding of Christ as the homo assumptus assumed by the Word 
leads him to affirm that Christ and his type, Adam, must be visible and bodily images of 
God. 51  As for the third, it is evident in his apparent disregard of the imago dei distinctions 
that he develops in his Genesis homilies, in favour of the more common position of 
regarding both male and female as images of God.  For example, when speaking of the 
training of children, Chrysostom not only regards the task as the adorning of the ‚image 
of the King of kings, for a human being is the image of God (εἰκὼν γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος),‛ but also conceives it as ‚rendering *the children+ according to the *divine+ 
likeness (τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ἀποδιδόντες).‛52  A similar stance is observed elsewhere, 
where a human being is depicted straightforwardly as an ‚image of God‛ even though the 
referent can be either male or female.53   
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 50 In Homily 3, Chrysostom argues that the Son, as the Image of the Invisible God, must also 
be invisible.  He recognizes, however, that the attribute of invisibility alone does not make one an 
image of God.  If this is the case, angels would also be counted as images of god.  Nevertheless, in 
the case of the human soul, he believes that its invisible attribute is due to it being the image of God.  
It should be noted that McLeod has interpreted this passage incorrectly by taking it as an indication 
that Chrysostom is excluding ‚the possibility that image is spiritual in nature.‛  This, in turn, 
misleads him to conclude later that Theodore’s conception of the imago dei as bodily is not only 
similar to that of Chrysostom, but may be understood as a ‚fuller explanation than that put forward 
by the other Antiochenes.‛  hom. in Col. 3 (NPNF I.13, 270); McLeod, Image of God, 61, 82. 
 
 51 Commentary on Colossians 1:15 [Translated by McLeod in Frederick G. McLeod, Theodore of 
Mopseustia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 123-24]. 
 
 52 hom. in Eph. 21 (PG 62.154.43-50). 
 
 53 In both Homily 7 and 9 on Colossians, he unhesitatingly speaks of the poor as ‚the image 
of God.‛  Later, in Homily 12, he takes for granted that the child born out of marriage is ‚not a 
lifeless image, nor yet the image of anything upon earth, but of God Himself, and after his likeness.‛  
When speaking of the use of gold in Homily 7 on 1 Timothy, he criticizes those who hoard it up or 
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 More importantly, Chrysostom also grounds his understanding of the imago dei on 
a robust Christology by interpreting the first person plural of Genesis 1:26, ‚let us make‛ 
(ποιήσωμεν), as referring to the deliberation between the Father and the Son.  By doing so, 
the Son is not only affirmed as the Creator of humanity but also conceived as the imago dei 
in which the first human being is made.54  This assumption is made explicit in his Homily 3 
on Colossians, where he takes Colossians 1:15-16 as asserting that Christ is the exact image 
of God (Θεοῦ δὲ εἰκὼν τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον) and it is this image alone which is fully 
divine:55  
While discussing about the worthiness of the Son, Paul says these [words], even as we 
proclaimed, "Who is the image of the invisible God?"  Therefore, whose image do you 
say he is?  If of God, good - for the Son of God is also God; and he reveals the exact 
(ἀπαράλλακτον) image of God.  Surely, he is exact according to this.  *<+ For an 
image, so far as it is an image, must necessarily be exact.56 
 
 If Christ the imago dei is the basis of human creation, then human salvation can 
only be understood as the renewal of humanity into this imago dei, that is, the image of 
Christ.  This is expounded in detail in Chrysostom’s exegesis of Colossians 3:9-10.57   With 
                                                                                                                                                    
‚form it into a chain for the image of God‛ and advise his listeners to use the gold to free him who 
is bound and not to bind her who is free.  Here, the image of God is clearly associated with the 
female who wears golden jewellery.  hom. in Col. 7, 9 (PG 62.361.29-30); hom. in 1 Tim. 7 (PG 62.539.1-
4). 
   
 54 This is, of course, a clear appropriation of the Philonic-Clementine conception of the 
imago dei. 
 
 55 For a detailed exposition of Chrysostom’s teachings on Christ’s divinity, see Melvin 
Edward Lawrenz, III, ‚The Christology of John Chrysostom‛ (Ph.D., Marquette University, 1987), 
41-79. 
 
 56 hom. in Col. 3 (PG 62.317.50-60, 62.318.44). 
 
 57 ‚Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have put off the old man with its practices and 
have put on the new man, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator.‛ (Col. 
3:9-10). 
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regard to the ‚old man‛ (παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον) in verse 9, he explains that it refers not to a 
different human nature but rather the human being who has exercised his deliberate 
choice (προαίρεσις) for evil and has therefore degenerated into deformity and 
hideousness.  Clearly then, Chrysostom is attempting to distinguish between the 
actualized human nature and the human nature in itself, in order that the goodness of the 
latter may be safeguarded. 58  This anthropological assumption, in turn, informs his 
subsequent discourse about the new man or youth (νέος) that a Christian can become.  
Such a neos  
hastens (ἐπείγεται) not to old age (γῆρας), but [advances] to a youthfulness (νεότητα) 
greater than the former.  For when he has received a fuller knowledge, he is both 
counted worthy (ἀξιοῦται) of greater things, and is flourishing (ἀκμάζει) exceedingly, 
is strengthening (ἰσχύει) exceedingly; and this, not from youthfulness alone, but from 
that ‚likeness‛ also, ‚after‛ which he is.  Behold!  The best way of life is a creation after 
the image of Christ: for this is the meaning of ‚after the image of Him that created him,‛ 
since Christ also did not arrive at an old age (οὐ πρὸς γῆρας ἐτελεύτησεν), but was so 
beautiful as it is not even possible to tell. 59 
 
 Two motifs of human progression are mentioned in this passage.  The latter and 
more important one is about Christ, who is spoken as οὐ πρὸς γῆρας ἐτελεύτησεν, a term 
that is not unlike the neos used to describe the Christian.  More importantly, the spiritual 
progression of the Christian neos is presented here as an attainment of the ‚likeness‛ of 
Christ the neos, or as Chrysostom puts it, to become a ‚creation after the image of Christ.‛  
There is, however, a noticeable difference between the two.  The verb used to denote 
                                                 
 58 A similar distinction is made in his Homily 13 on Romans, where Chrysostom asserts that 
the ousia of the soul and the body are not the same as that of the deliberate choice (προαιρέσεως).  
The former two are the ‚works of God‛ while the latter is ‚a movement (κίνησις) arising from 
ourselves and directed to whatever object we may wish to bring it.‛  hom. in Rom. 13.19 (PG 
60.510.25-29). 
 
 59 hom. in Col. 8 (PG 62.352.45-353.21; NPNF I.13, 294-95, modified). 
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Christ, ἐτελεύτησεν, is not only rich in recapitulative overtones, but, being in the aorist, 
also alludes to Christ’s completion of his recapitulative work as a human being.  This 
sharply contrasts the series of present tenses used to depict the Christian neos – ‚ hastens‛ 
(ἐπείγεται),‚is counted worthy‛ (ἀξιοῦται), ‚is flourishing‛ (ἀκμάζει) and ‚is 
strengthening‛ (ἰσχύει) – all of which serve to stress the on-going character of the 
Christian’s spiritual progress.  Thus, by setting the two side by side, Chrysostom is clearly 
implying that the Christian’s journey towards spiritual progress is nothing less than a 
participation in Christ’s work of recapitulation. 
 This brings us to what I think is the heart of Chrysostom’s soteriology: 
Through this name [of Christ], in fact, death was dissolved, demons imprisoned in 
bonds, heaven opened, gates of paradise thrown wide, the Spirit sent down, slaves 
made free, enemies become sons, strangers become heirs, human beings become angels.  
Why speak of angels?  God became man, and man became God (Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γέγονε, 
καὶ ἄνθρωπος Θεός); heaven accepted the nature from earth, earth accepted the one 
seated on the Cherubim along with the angelic host (italics mine).60 
   
By speaking of Christian salvation in terms of the divine exchange - Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος 
γέγονε, καὶ ἄνθρωπος Θεός, Chrysostom is clearly indebted to not only the Irenaean-
Athanasian traditions, but also that of the Syriac Christians, as exemplified by Ephrem.61  
Like Irenaeus, Chrysostom believes that this divine exchange has taken place in order for 
                                                 
 60 exp. Ps. 8 [Translated by Hill in John Chrysostom, Commentary on the Psalms, trans. Robert 
C. Hill, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), 155].  See also hom. in John 
12 (PG 59.83.52-59.84.18; FC 33, 115-16), where Chrysostom magnifies the salvation of Christ by 
asserting that He ‚did not merely rid souls of the worst evil, but also brought them to very pinnacle 
of virtue.  [Thus,] the tax-collector became Apostle; the persecutor *<+ was transformed into the 
world's herald *<+ a thief was proclaimed a citizen of Paradise‛ and whoever abides by His Laws 
‚immediately become angels and like to God (ὁμοίους Θεῷ), as far as is in our power, even if they 
happened to be the worst of men.‛ 
 
 61 Chrysostom does not adopt the familiar Athanasian term, θεοποιέω, here, but prefers 
instead the verb, γίγνομαι.  By doing so, he might be following Gregory of Nazianus, who uses the 
same verb in Oration 1.5. 
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Christ to complete His work of recapitulation.62  As to the aims of this recapitulative work, 
this is spelt out clearly in Chrysostom’s Homily 13 on Romans, where he discusses the 
relationship between the Law, sin and Christ’s incarnation.63 
 According to Chrysostom, there are three aspects to Christ’s work of recapitulation.  
The first is the fact that Christ has come to fulfil the decrees of the Law (νόμος) so that He 
may ‚lend it *the Law+ a helping hand by condemning sin in *his+ flesh (σάρξ).‛  In other 
words, Christ’s fulfilment of the nomos vindicates its God-intended purpose, which is to 
become a guide for humanity.  No longer is it derailed by human sin and compelled to 
oppose humanity instead.  Second, Chrysostom believes that the ‚Only-Begotten‛ came 
not only to teach but, more importantly, to show, or make known (δεῖξαι), how the Law 
may be performed easily. What is involved here, however, is no mere exemplification of 
the Law.  More importantly, Christ’s achievement is also understood as delivering 
(ἀπαλλάσσω) humanity from ‚this difficulty‛ of obeying the Law or, as Chrysostom puts 
it elsewhere, ‚to free us in our sinful bondage from the curse.‛64   
 This brings us to the third and, for Chrysostom, the most wonderful aspect of the 
Son’s recapitulative work: Christ won His victory by taking on ‚no other sarx, but this 
same one which was subdued.‛  By leading a sinless life, the ‚Son of Man‛ is said to have 
stood by the sarx, condemned sin by smiting it greatly by ‚the blow of His death‛ and 
                                                 
 62 Despite his different approach to Christology, Theodore similarly stresses the importance 
of Christ’s recapitulative work for soteriology. According to Theodore, the disharmony that was 
caused by Adam’s disobedience was made right by the obedient life of Christ the homo assumptus.  
Gross,  210; Rowan A. Greer, Theodore of Mopsuestia: Exegete and Theologian (London: The Faith Press, 
1961), 22.   
 
 63 hom. in Rom. 13 (PG 60.514.1-45). 
 
 64 hom. in Gen. 3 (FC 74, 46-47). 
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rendered sin unable to smite the sarx thereafter.  In this way, ‚sin did not conquer the sarx‛ 
but the contrary happened – sin was now ‚chastised‛ by the sarx.  Chrysostom is 
presuming here, of course, that the sarx shared by Christ and the rest of humanity is a 
good creation of God. 65  More importantly, by living out his life sinlessly, Christ is also 
revealing the true potential of the sarx, which is to live a life of obedience to God, rather 
than being subdued by sin.  When this is seen in conjunction with the two earlier points, 
Christ’s recapitulation work, as a whole, must surely be understood as a restoration of the 
true order of humanity, that is, the human sarx and the Law should cooperate to subdue sin, 
not vice-versa, in order that human life may be lived for the sake of God.  
 In view of the above, the soteriological significance of Christ’s sarx becomes clear.  
If Christ had assumed a sarx that is, in any way, different from the rest of humanity, His 
conquest over sin cannot be valid.  This is because His victory must be gained through the 
human sarx, for the sake of human sarx.  As Chrysostom puts it in his exegesis of Romans 8.3: 
For Christ did not have sinful sarx, but [was] like indeed to our sinful [sarx], yet sinless, 
and in nature (φύσει) the same with us.  So also it is clear, therefore, that the nature of 
the sarx is not evil.  For Christ did not take the other in the place of the former, nor did 
he exchange this same one in true essence (οὐσίαν), when he prepared it to renew the 
                                                 
 65 It is noteworthy that Chrysostom uses the titles, ‚Christ,‛ ‚Only-Begotten‛ and ‚Son of 
Man‛ interchangeably in this passage, thereby indicating that the three share the same referent.  
Moreover, both here and elsewhere, he also uses the words, sarx and sōma interchangeably as a 
short-hand for the human nature.  Clearly then, the Incarnation is understood by Chrysostom as the 
Word’s assumption of human nature, rather than the theory of homo assumptus propounded 
apparently by Diodore and more explicitly by Theodore, his fellow Antiochenes.  For a discussion 
of Chrysostom’s use of sarx, see J. H. Juzek, Die Christologie Des Hi. Johannes Chrysostomus: Zugleich 
Ein Beitrag Zur Dogmatik Der Antiochener (Bresau: 1912), 31; Camillus Hays, "St. John Chrysostom 
and the Integrity of the Human Nature of Christ," Franciscan Studies 19 (1959), 298-317 and Lawrenz, 
114.  For a discussion of Diodore and Theodore’s Word-Man Christology, see Francis Aloysius 
Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Analecta Gregoriana (Romae, Apud Aedes Pont: 
Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956), 182-84 and Greer,  , 48-65.  A more extensive treatment of 
Theodore’s understanding of Christ’s humanity is given in Frederick G. McLeod, The Roles of 
Christ's Humanity in Salvation: Insights from Theodore of Mopseustia (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2005). 
 
151 
 
fight.  Rather, he let it remain in its own nature [and] he made it bind on the crown 
over sin, and then after the victory, he raised it up and made it immortal.66 
 
 Having said this, it is crucial for us to recognize that Christ’s Incarnation and 
victory over sin does not amount merely to the vindication of the human sarx.  Rather, it is 
meant to transfigure human nature altogether.  This is because Christian salvation is, 
ultimately speaking, a union with the Son who is now both divine and human. 
For it was not as much as we must have to do away the sin only, that we received of 
His grace, but even far more. For we were at once freed from punishment, and put off 
all iniquity, and were also born again from above and rose again with the old man 
buried, and were redeemed, justified, led up to adoption, sanctified, made brothers of the 
Only-begotten, and joint heirs and of one Body with Him, and counted for His Flesh, and even 
as a Body with the Head, so were we united to Him! All these things then Paul calls a 
superabundance of grace, showing that what we received was not a medicine only to 
countervail the wound, but even health, and comeliness, and honour, and glory and 
dignities far transcending our nature (ὑπερβαίνοντα φύσιν) (italics mine).67  
 
 By conceiving union with Christ as the very means by which a Christian transcends 
his human nature, Chrysostom is, quite obviously, appropriating Athanasius’ idea that the 
Incarnation has united what is naturally human with what is naturally of the Godhead and, 
thereby, enabled the former to attain the trans-human qualities of the latter.  Elsewhere, in 
his Homily 6 on Colossians, he will conceptualize this union in a typically Basilian manner, 
by regarding it as a second creation by the Holy Spirit, not unlike Christ’s Incarnation in 
the Virgin’s womb by the same Spirit.   
God takes up your soul above, He harmonizes it anew above, He places you near to 
the Kingly Throne. He [the Christian] is formed in the water, he receives Spirit 
instead of a soul. And after he is formed, He brings to him, not beasts, but demons, 
                                                 
 66 To be sure, Chrysostom’s insistence that Christ’s humanity is exactly like ours need not 
imply that he has grasped its entire significance for the exegesis of Jesus’ humanity, as given in the 
Gospels.  This is clearly seen in his tendency to stress the pre-dominance of Christ’s divinity, even 
as he ‚depicts the operations of *Christ’s+ emotion and will as genuinely human.‛  hom. in Rom. 13 
(PG 60.515.1-8); Lawrenz, 130. 
 
 67 hom. in Rom. 10. (PG 60.477.5; NPNF I.11, 403). 
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and their prince, and says, ‚Tread upon serpents and scorpions.‛  He says not, ‚Let 
Us make man in our image, and after our likeness,‛ but what? ‚He gives them to 
become the sons of God; but of God,‛ he says, ‚they were born.‛  *<+ He has set him 
no more to keep Paradise, but to have his citizenship in heaven.  *<+ The plain falls 
not on your sight, you see not tree, nor fountain, but straightway you are taken to the 
Lord Himself, you are mingled (ἀνακεράννυσαι) with His Body, you are intermixed 
(ἀναφύρῃ) with that Body that lies above, where the devil cannot approach.68 
  
What Chrysostom does here is not merely appropriating Basil’s conception of the Spirit’s 
deifying work.  By situating his discussion in the context of Christian baptism and 
adopting the language of mingling (ἀνακεράννυσαι), he has in mind also Gregory of 
Nyssa’s sacramental formulation of the Christian’s union with Christ.69 
 Yet, this is not where his similarity with the Cappadocians and the Alexandrians 
ends.  In his homilies elsewhere, he also frequently stresses the need for Christians to 
cultivate apatheia and aretai in their lives, so that they may attain the life of the angels or 
divine likeness.70  Moreover, he also readily agrees with Athanasius, Basil and Gregory that 
this angelic or divine lifestyle can be realized, at least to some extent, in this present age.   
This shall be made clear in our discussion of his Pauline portraits below and his monastic 
portraits in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
 68 Chrysostom is alluding to the rite of baptism here, where the soul is washed anew by the 
coming of the Holy Spirit into one’s life.  As he puts it in Homily 12 on Matthew, this baptism was 
made possible by Jesus’ baptism because it was only upon His baptism that ‚the heavens were 
opened‛ and that ‚the Spirit make His approach‛ to humanity.  Henceforth, Christ ‚leads us away 
from the old to the new polity, both opening to us the gates on high, and sending down His Spirit‛ 
and make us not angels but ‚sons of God.‛  hom. in Col. 6 (NPNFI.13, 286-7, PG 62.342.52); hom. in 
Matt. 12 (NPNF I.10, 78). 
 
 69 Elsewhere in Homily 82.5 on Matthew, Chrysostom also follows Gregory by speaking of 
the Eucharist as a means by which Christ mingles Himself with Christians.  For further details on 
the restorative work of the Spirit during baptism, see his ‚Ninth Instruction‛ and ‚Eleventh 
Instruction‛ (ACW 31, 139, 164).   
 
 70 hom. in Rom. 23, 24 (NPNF I.11, 516, 518); hom. in 1 Tim.13 (NPNF I.13, 452); hom. in Heb. 
24 (NPNF I.14, 477).  
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Chrysostom’s Pauline Portraits and His Soteriology  
Exemplar Portraits and Meta-Narratives 
 Thus far, our discussions of Chrysostom’s Davidic portraits and Mitchell’s analysis 
of Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits have led us to conclude that a hermeneutical application 
of exemplar portraits must assume a correspondence between one’s model of 
Chrysostom’s didactic teachings and the exemplar portraits that supposedly embody these 
teachings.  Essentially, the relationship here is one of theoria and praxis and the extent to 
which the two correlate is also the degree to which the praxis validates and reinforces the 
theoria.  In the cases where the exemplar portraits yield more insights into the subject 
concerned than what is expounded in the didactic model, the praxis is, quite obviously, 
playing a supplementary role to the theoria.   
 With regard to Chrysostom’s deification doctrine, its correspondence with his 
exemplar portraits, I believe, can be located in the meta-narratives that often occur in these 
portrayals.  A meta-narrative, or masterplot, as Abbott puts it, is a narrative skeleton that 
governs the construction of particular stories.  Although the use of such masterplots may 
not always be a conscious decision on the part of an author, it is, more often than not, 
ideologically nuanced.71  It is my contention that if sufficient attention is paid to 
Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits, two important meta-narratives will be readily 
identifiable in many of these portrayals.  To verify this proposal, the rest of this chapter 
                                                 
 71 Such masterplots, as Abbott explains, could be universal, e.g., the quest, the story of 
revenge, or seasonal myths of deaths and regeneration.  More importantly, they often embody a 
moral force or ideology that is quite identifiable.  H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to 
Narrative, 2nd ed., Cambridge Introductions to Literature. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 47-48.  
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will be devoted to the analysis of the meta-narratives intrinsic to Chrysostom’s Pauline 
portraits, as given in his De laudibus sancti Pauli.  The insights gathered here will then be 
supplemented by his non-Pauline portraits composed elsewhere. As we shall see, these 
meta-narratives will not only cohere remarkably well with Chrysostom’s deification 
doctrine, but also enrich our understanding of his teachings on this subject.72   
 The first of these is the meta-narrative of transcendence, or hyperbathmios, where an 
exemplary figure is, generally speaking, presented as a human being who has transcended 
the limits of his human nature through the grace and power of God.  Ultimately, this 
language of hyperbathmios is eschatological, since it seeks to accentuate the teleological 
possibilities that every Christian can have in God.  The second meta-narrative is that of 
imago Christi, where the exemplar is exalted not merely as a faithful imitator of Christ’s 
virtues, but more importantly, as one who demonstrates in his very life what it means to be 
deified, that is, to be created in the image of Christ who is both human and divine by the 
power of the Holy Spirit.  For Chrysostom, one of the sure signs of this new creation must 
be a Christian’s participation in Christ’ victorious work of recapitulation.  
 
 
Paul and the Meta-Narrative of Transcendence 
                                                 
 
72
 This is not to say that meta-narratives or ideologies are lingering behind every exemplar 
portrait constructed by Chrysostom.  Often, Chrysostom’s portrayals can be so brief or ad-hoc in 
nature that one should not hazard an ideological interpretation of these portraitures.  As such, 
Mitchell’s remarks about Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits remain largely applicable to his exemplar 
discourse in general: ‚although several emphases do emerge *in Chrysostom’s portraits+, both by 
volume and extent – such as Paul the prisoner for the gospel, Paul the teacher of the world, or Paul 
the man of sufferings, [<] Chrysostom’s portraits of Paul do not constitute a single composite 
portrait, nor a search for the single most accurate portrait, but rather an extensive portrait series.‛  
Mitchell, 383. 
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 Among the apostles, St. Paul is most certainly Chrysostom’s favourite apostle and 
exemplar.73  In his writings, Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits are both varied and extensive, 
appearing most often in his voluminous homilies – whether commentary or panegyric, 
and also frequently in his ascetic treatises or letters.  Of these, some of the most detailed 
portrayals of Paul are found in his De laudibus sancti Pauli.74   Consisting of seven 
panegyrics, the De laudibus were most probably preached between the years 387-390 
during the Antiochene period of Chrysostom’s ministry.75   
 We begin with Homily 1, which is an encomium of Paul’s soul and a declaration 
that the apostle is a human being par excellence, since his soul has brought together ‚all the 
virtues in humanity, and all of them to the highest degree – not only the human virtues, 
but even those of the angels.‛76  Here, the apostle is presented, quite unmistakably, as an 
exemplar of Chrysostom’s synergistic soteriology, since he had, on his own accord, 
prepared himself for the gift of the Spirit: 
For he flowered forth in grace so abundantly that he gave proof that the philosophy 
of his soul was worthy of that grace.  For when he became a vessel of election and 
cleansed himself so thoroughly, the gift of the spirit was plentifully poured into 
him.77  
                                                 
 73 As Chrysostom puts it, ‚I love all the saints, but I love most the blessed Paul.‛  hom. in 2 
Cor. 11.1. 
 
 74 Mitchell clearly recognizes this and relies heavily on these Pauline panegyrics for her 
analysis of Chrysostom’s Paul.  Mitchell, 137-72. 69-380. 
 
 75  According to Piédagnel, at least the first sermon is preached before 388, while the last 
was probably composed around 390.  Auguste Piédagnel, "Circonstances historiques," in SC 300, 9-
20. 
 76 lau. Paul. 1.1 (Translated by Mitchell, 442). 
 
 77 Ibid. (Mitchell, 442). 
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 It is on this basis that Chrysostom asserts that Paul has not only attained all the 
virtues of the prophets, patriarchs, righteous ones, apostles and martyrs, but has indeed 
‚possessed all these things together to a superlative degree that none of them attained.‛78  
This is certainly a bold claim, to suppose that Paul has surpassed every single human 
being in virtue, presumably apart from Christ.  Yet, it is interesting to observe how 
Chrysostom goes about justifying his case.  Specifically, he compares Paul, not with the 
apostles, or any figure of the New Dispensation, that is, of Christ, but only with the saints 
of the Old Dispensation, that is, from Abel to John the Baptist.  This is a surprising move, 
since one would expect Chrysostom to compare Paul with both the heroes of the Old and 
New Dispensation, in accordance to his earlier claims.  Yet, the fact that the Christian 
saints are entirely absent in the rest of this homily is a strong hint of the panegyric’s 
rhetorical intent.   
 For Chrysostom, Paul is not simply an excellent example of a virtuous Christian.  
He is this and more.  Specifically, Paul embodies what every Christian can and ought to be 
through the gift of the Holy Spirit.  This makes him not only an exemplar of the ideal 
Christian life, but also an icon of the riches and glory of the New Dispensation, that is, the 
economy of Christ.79    This is why, I think, whenever comparisons are made between Paul 
and the heroes of the Old Dispensation, the apostle always emerges as the superior party, 
                                                 
 78 Ibid. 1.2 (Mitchell, 442). 
 
 79 This conception of Paul as the icon of Christ and the New Dispensation is well-expressed 
in the conclusion of Homily 3.  Chrysostom’s objective for Homily 3 is to portray Paul as the 
embodiment of Christ’s instruction in Matthew 5:44-45, that is, to love one’s enemies.  To this end, 
he summons numerous examples of how Paul excelled in this agapē, be they in spiritual or material 
matters.  Having done so, he concludes by urging his listeners to walk Paul’s ‚walk of love,‛ since 
it is in this way that Christians would be able to ‚see Paul – or, rather, Paul’s master – and attain the 
undefiled crown.‛  Ibid. 3.10 (Mitchell, 457)   
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since the saints of the Old Dispensation, unlike him, did not have the gift of the Holy Spirit.  
This is most clearly hinted at in his synkrisis of Paul and Noah.  Noah’s ark, as he explains, 
took on beasts but did not change their beastly nature.  Paul’s ark or ministry, on the other 
hand, took on board wolves and made them sheep, ‚casting out *completely+ all the 
irrationality and beastliness that belongs to human nature, in its stead he introduced the 
gentleness of the Spirit."80  Being glued together by the Holy Spirit, Paul’s ark also proved 
to be far better than Noah’s in withstanding the ‚storm of wickedness.‛81  Once this 
narrative intent is grasped, it should not surprise us then that Chrysostom, despite his 
earlier claim in Homily 1.2, does not compare Paul with any Christian saints.  This is 
because these saints, like Paul, are also partakers of the Spirit. 
 A similar narrative strategy is observed when we turn to the last synkrisis in the 
homily, where Paul is now compared with the angels.  The angels, says Chrysostom, are 
entirely obedient to God and do not transgress.  Yet, even when compared with these 
heavenly beings, Paul emerges as the better of the two, since he ‚carried out not only 
God’s word, but obeyed both the commands and things beyond the commands.‛  Indeed, 
he even imitated the angels, by running ‚through the whole world just as though he were 
wind and fire, and purified the earth,‛ despite the fact that he was a mere mortal.82   
 In the light of Chrysostom’s deification doctrine, this synkrisis between Paul and 
the angels can no longer be construed as an indication of his so called Pelagian tendency.  
                                                 
 80 Ibid.1.5 (Mitchell, 443). 
 
 81  Ibid. 1.5 (Mitchell, 443-44). 
  
 82 Ibid. 1.15 (Mitchell, 447). 
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Rather, this rhetorical device is clearly deployed by Chrysostom as a means for delimiting 
the spiritual heights that every Christian, like Paul, might attain through Christ by His 
Holy Spirit.  This is because to speak of a Christian as not only superior to the Old 
Testament saints but indeed, greater than the angels is, at the end of the day, tantamount 
to saying that the Christian can attain the heights of divinity. 83  What we have here then is 
a clear meta-narrative of transcendence, or hyperbathmios, where a Christian exemplar is 
held up as an example of God’s deifying work by laying stress on the ways in which he 
has transcended human nature or even the heavenly realms.84  This, however, is only the 
first element in Chrysostom’s meta-narrative of transcendence.   
 The second element is to be found in Chrysostom’s frequent attempts to demean 
Paul’s human background in Homily 4.  Unlike the first three panegyrics, which are 
focused primarily on the apostles’ virtues and achievements, the present Pauline portrait 
takes its place as part of Chrysostom’s overall argument that God, from the past until the 
present time, has given humanity numerous marvels (θαύματα) and signs (σημεῖα) to 
persuade us to salvation.  According to Chrysostom, these sēmeia are evident not only in 
the biblical stories, but also in recent days – as it is the case with the temple of Apollo 
being struck by lightning after Emperor Julian’s attempt to disinter St. Babylas’ body from 
                                                 
 83 This same principle should inform our interpretation of Chrysostom’s comparisons 
between the Paul and the angels in homilies 2 and 3.  In Homily 2.8, Paul is spoken of as exhibiting 
‚the purity of the angels‛ even though he was ‚bound up in the mortal body.‛  Then, the apostle is 
quickly declared as the superior of the two, since ‚quite often angels are given charge of different 
nations, not a single one of them so managed the nation with which he was entrusted as Paul did 
the whole world.‛  Likewise in Homily 3.1, Paul is portrayed as a man who, by his will to act 
(προθυμία), has by-passed the angels and archangels.  Ibid. 2.8, 3.1 (Mitchell, 451, 453). 
 
 84 Ibid. 2.1, 3.8. 
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the temple vicinity.85  Having said this, the greatest sēmeion of all remains the fact that 
Christ’s Gospel has triumphed over all its enemies, both human and demonic, and 
prevailed over the whole world.86  It is in this context that Paul is introduced: as one upon 
whom Christ has breathed ‚a large measure of power.‛87 
 Chrysostom’s Pauline portrait here clearly conforms to the enkōmion paradigm, 
with its emphasis on the exemplar’s origins, upbringing and deeds.  Where Chrysostom 
departs from the Greco-Roman tradition is the fact that he does not highlight the apostle’s 
impeccable background but rather his humble origins and upbringing.  Paul, as 
Chrysostom puts it, is mere ‚tentmaker,‛ a ‚man standing in the marketplace,‛ one who 
was not only ineloquent, but also ‚unlearned, to the lowest degree of poor learning.‛88  
Such attempts to demean Paul’s human background and talents, as Mitchell points out, 
are not unique to this panegyric, but are frequently found in Chrysostom’s Pauline 
portraits elsewhere.89  Mitchell is certainly correct to suggest that such an emphasis, that is, 
‚to present the lowly origins of the one who was later to earn great fame,‛ is a 
‚commonplace of the epideictic genre.‛  Nonetheless, it is unlikely that this is the sole 
explanation for Chrysostom’s rhetorical move.  Instead, I would argue that Chrysostom’s 
                                                 
 85 This lightning strike, as Chrysostom puts it elsewhere, was clearly understood by the 
Antiochenes as a sign of God’s vindication of the martyr and judgment against Julian and his 
temple of Apollo.  Ibid. 4.1-2, 6; hier. Bab. 8. 
 
 86 lau. Paul. 4.7, 9 (Mitchell, 460-61). 
 
 87 Ibid. 4.10 (Mitchell, 462). 
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 89 For example, in Homily 15.5 on 1Corinthians, Chrysostom would unhesitatingly remark 
that Paul’s father was an undistinguished and unknown man.  Mitchell, 234-48. 
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rhetorical strategy is theologically motivated.  Specifically, by stressing the lowliness of 
Paul’s human stature and background, Chrysostom would be able to accentuate the 
spiritual heights to which Paul ascended.  In other words, the human nature is demeaned, 
in order that grace might be magnified.  Or, even as Mitchell puts it, the juxtaposition of 
the portrayals of Paul as lowly and exalted ‚forces the spectator to contemplate the 
causality that links the two *<+: direct divine intervention.‛90   
 This brings us to the third element of Chrysostom’s meta-narrative of 
transcendence.  Seen within the apologetic framework of Homily 4, Chrysostom’s 
demeaning of Paul’s human nature clearly allows him to reconceive the apostle as a 
sēmeion of God’s ‚divine and ineffable power,‛ which triumphs despite the weaknesses of 
its human agents.91   It is with this in mind that Chrysostom, in the remaining homily, 
would declare that Paul, despite all his human weaknesses, was not only able to ‚teach 
and practice such a great philosophy,‛ but also able to ‚persuade nations, both cities and 
countryside,‛ and to lead ‚the entire human race – Romans, Persians, Indians, Scythians, 
Ethiopians, Sauromatians, Parthians, Medes and Saracenes - singly to the truth; and in less 
than thirty years.‛92  Indeed, the wonder of this divine power is accentuated by the fact 
that, by conventional wisdom, the apostle’s message and the challenging circumstances of 
his ministry should have made it impossible for him to win any disciples at all.  Yet, the 
contrary happened and the most remarkable thing of all is the fact that his converts were 
                                                 
 90 Mitchell, 226. 
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mostly the ‚poor, unskilled, uneducated, living in famine, [and] undistinguished folk born 
of undistinguished stock,‛ that is, unlikely candidates for philosophy.93   
 There is yet a final element in Chrysostom’s meta-narrative of transcendence.  
Ultimately speaking, Paul, the lowly apostle who has triumphed by God’s power, is not 
merely understood by Chrysostom as a sēmeion of divine power.  More importantly, 
Chrysostom is also convinced that this portrayal of Paul as both lowly and exalted is iconic 
in nature, in that it holds out God’s promise of empowerment by the Spirit to every 
Christian, namely,  
God does not show partiality.  *<+ he who formed Paul < [is also] he who created you; 
just as he is Paul’s Lord, so also is he yours; just as he proclaimed Paul, thus also he 
wishes to crown you.  Therefore, let us submit ourselves and purify ourselves, so that 
having received the grace which is so abundant, we might attain the same goods [as 
Paul].94 
 
 When all these elements of Chrysostom’s meta-narrative of hyperbathmios are 
considered together, the eschatological dimensions of Chrysostom’s soteriology becomes 
clear.  Essentially, Christian salvation is a transcendence of one’s human nature, where a 
person surpasses the limits of his humanity, be it his natural talents, weaknesses or sins, by 
the grace and power of God’s Spirit, so that he might ascend to spiritual levels higher than 
that of the angels, namely, deification. 
 At this juncture, it is important to note that the plausibility of this meta-narrative is 
grounded not only on the present Pauline portraits.  As a matter of fact, similar portrayals 
                                                 
 93 To emphasize this marvel, Chrysostom immediately compares Paul’s accomplishments 
with those of the renowned Greek philosophers like Plato and Anaxagoras.  Despite the fact that 
‚there was nothing to impede them, no danger, no lack of training, but indeed they were proficient 
speakers, and they were rich in possessions, and had the fortune to belong to a universally 
celebrated native land,‛ they achieved very little in their lives.  The reason for this, as he puts it, is 
simple: ‚they had no power at all.‛  Ibid. 4.11-13, 19 (Mitchell, 465-66). 
 
 94 Ibid. 4.21 (Mitchell, 467). 
162 
 
are also plentiful in his voluminous homilies elsewhere, whether it is his depictions of the 
primitive Christian communities, the twelve apostles, converted prostitutes or even Jewish 
Maccabean martyrs.  His Homilies on Acts, for example, clearly presents the apostles in a 
similar fashion.  In Homily 1, these disciples of Christ are spoken of as a people who were 
once timid and devoid of understanding.  Yet, suddenly, they became ‚quite other than 
they were *<+ and *were+ raised above glory and passion and concupiscence‛ – a 
transformation which Chrysostom directly attributes to their receipt of the gift of the Holy 
Spirit.95  In Homily 13, he, once again, glories in the fact that the apostles were once people 
of lowly stature, e.g., fishermen and publican.  Nevertheless, these men have not only 
overcome their limitations by performing numerous miracles and converting countless 
people within a short span of time, but have also established a heavenly community on 
earth:  
 for in a little moment, at a single turn of the scale, such have been the effects produced 
by the fisherman and by the publican!  Earth was become a heaven, for manner of life, 
for boldness of speech, for wonders, for all besides; like angels were they looked upon 
with wonder: all unconcerned for ridicule, for threats, for perils: they were 
compassionate, and beneficent; some of them they succoured with money, and some 
with words, and some with healing of their bodies and of their souls; no kind of 
healing, but they accomplished.96 
 
 The same meta-narrative of transcendence is observed when we turn to 
Chrysostom’s portrayal of the apostle Peter in the same homiletical series.  Commenting on 
Peter’s Pentecostal speech in Homily 4, Chrysostom begins by noting that the apostle had 
previously been a timid man, who could not even withstand ‚the questioning of a poor 
girl.‛  However, he now stands confidently preaching before an audience of antagonistic 
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men, because he has been empowered by the Holy Spirit, who is capable of making ‛men 
of gold out of men of clay.‛  To develop this point, Chrysostom employs the rhetorical 
device of the ekphrasis to highlight the challenges that Peter and his fellow apostles were up 
against.  His emphasis here, once again, is the weaknesses of Peter and the apostles.   These 
apostles, explains Chrysostom, had to struggle against much poverty, hunger, infamy, 
mockery, persecutions and countless other forms of animosity.  Despite these obstacles, 
they triumphed entirely over their more fearsome, powerful and talented opponents.   
With bare body, they [the apostles] took the field against all the armed, *<+ the terrors 
of rulers, force of arms, in cities and strong walls:  without experience, without skill of the 
tongue, and in the condition of quite ordinary men, matched against juggling conjurors, 
against impostors, against the whole throng of sophists, of rhetoricians, of philosophers 
grown mouldy in the Academy and the walks of the Peripatetics, against all these they 
fought the battle out. And the man [Peter] whose occupation had been about lakes, so 
mastered them, as if it cost him not so much ado as even a contest with dumb fishes: for just as if 
the opponents he had to outwit were indeed more mute than fishes, so easily did he get the better 
of them! (italics mine)97  
 
 To drive home his message, Chrysostom immediately introduces a synkrisis 
between Peter and Plato.  Both parties are compared in terms of their origins and training.  
Although Plato is supposedly superior in both aspects, he has been outshone entirely by 
Peter, since the apostle’s message has now reached the entire world.   
And Plato, that talked a deal of nonsense in his day, is silent now, while this man [Peter] 
utters his voice everywhere; not among his own countrymen alone, but also among 
Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and in India, and in every part of the earth, and to 
the extremities of the world. Where now is Greece, with her big pretentions? Where the 
name of Athens? Where the ravings of the philosophers? He of Galilee, he of Bethsaida, 
he, the uncouth rustic, has overcome them all. Are you not ashamed—confess it—at the 
very name of the country of him who has defeated you? But if you hear his own name 
too, and learn that he was called Cephas, much more will you hide your faces. This, 
this has undone you quite; because you esteem this a reproach, and account glibness of 
tongue a praise, and want of glibness a disgrace. You have not followed the road you 
ought to have chosen, but leaving the royal road, so easy, so smooth, you have trodden 
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one rough, and steep, and laborious. And therefore you have not attained unto the 
kingdom of heaven.98 
   
 The normality of this meta-narrative of transcendence in Chrysostom’s exemplars is 
further demonstrated by the fact that it is also pervasive in his portrayals of other 
categories of saints.  Take his praise of the former Phoenician prostitute turned ascetic, for 
example.99  Prior to her conversion, she was one of the most notorious harlots in the region.  
Compared to his audiences, says Chrysostom, her ancestry, nature and upbringing could 
not be worse.  Yet, after her conversion, this same vile woman transcended her human 
weaknesses and embraced asceticism to such an extent that she ‚mounted up to heaven‛ 
and was ‚counted worthy *by God+ of the unutterable mysteries.‛100 
 Interestingly, the same meta-narrative also operates in Chrysostom’s depiction of 
the Jewish Maccabean mother-martyr.  The mother-martyr, says Chrysostom, had much 
that was naturally against her: ‚the weakness of her gender,‛ ‚the maturity of her years,‛ 
and the ‚fragile state of her compassion *for her children+.‛  This is only worsened by the 
fact that the devil had sought to weaken her further by first having her seven children 
tortured and executed before her. 101  Yet, despite all these trials, she courageously entered 
the contest of martyrdom and resisted her persecutors, before she was finally martyred.  
                                                 
 98 Ibid. 
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For this reason, Chrysostom counts her as one of those who enjoyed ‚the generosity and 
ineffable power of the one who set up the contest.‛  Indeed, ‚whenever children and old 
people [the mother included] exhibit unnatural strength, the grace of God who works 
through them is brilliantly revealed in every respect.‛102 
 
Meta-narrative of Imago Christi 
 As an embodiment of Chrysostom’s soteriology, the meta-narrative of hyperbathmios 
clearly validates his conviction that the deifying work of Christ by the Holy Spirit is 
efficacious in helping a human being transcend the limitations of his nature and become 
like God as far as it is possible.  Having said that, the question remains, not only for us, but 
certainly for Chrysostom’s audiences also, is to what extent does Chrysostom’s Paul 
exemplify his ideals for a deified human being? 
 To begin, it is beyond contest that Chrysostom regards Paul as an exemplary role 
model, worthy of Christian imitation.  Ample examples for this can be found in both his De 
laudibus and other homilies elsewhere.103  Undoubtedly, such a conception of Paul as an 
example of imitatio Christi also coheres entirely with the Greco-Roman ideals for exemplary 
figures.  As we have shown in our survey of the history of deification discourse, the same 
idea was readily adopted by Christians, almost from the onset, as a valid expression of 
their faith and practice, and a means of deification.  
                                                 
 102 To be sure, Chrysostom does not mention the presence of the Spirit’s aid for the mother, 
since this would be anachronistic.  As a substitution, he highlights the fact that God, through his 
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 Having said this, this understanding does not exhaust what Chrysostom has in 
mind for the role of Christian exemplar.  This is because to regard Paul as an example of 
imitatio Christi remains vastly different from regarding him as a paradeigma of the imago 
Christi.   Earlier, in our analysis of Chrysostom’s deification doctrine, we concluded that 
the deifying work of the Holy Spirit is aimed at renewing humanity into the image of 
Christ.  For Chrysostom, Christ denotes two realities.  The first is the humanity that the 
Word has assumed in the Incarnation, a human nature that, as Chrysostom repeatedly 
points out, is exactly the same as ours.104  The second is the fact that the Word, as the ‚the 
exact Image of God,‛ is entirely divine, like the Father.  Consequently, to speak of a 
Christian as becoming a ‚creation after the image of Christ,‛ as he puts it in his Homily 8 on 
Colossians, must imply that the Christian must be concurrently human and also a 
participant in the divine nature.105   
 Furthermore, as Chrysostom argues in the same homily, this renewal into the 
image of Christ is to be understood as a participation in Christ’s recapitulative work as a 
perfect human being.  If this is true, an exemplar portrait that validates such a 
soteriological ideal must surely embody these concepts, that is, a Christian as being fully 
human and yet possessing divine qualities in his life, which is evidenced in the way that 
his life parallels Christ’s victorious recapitulation.  This is exactly what we find depicted in 
Chrysostom’s portrayal of Paul in Homily 2 of his De laudibus.    
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 Homily 2 begins by not only exalting the human nature but also identifying Paul as 
the best example of this humanity. 
What a human being is, and how great is the noble birthright of our nature and what 
degree of virtue this creature is capable of showing – these things were demonstrated 
more by Paul than all others.106 
 
In view of Paul’s spiritual and moral achievements, there may be some who contest that 
Paul has a different, or indeed, superior nature than the rest of humanity – a claim which 
Philostratus and Iamblichus have made for Apollonius and Pythagoras respectively.107  It is 
with this in mind, I think, that Chrysostom asserts a few lines later that 
Paul did not obtain another nature, nor share a different soul, nor inhabit another 
world, but, having been reared on the same earth, and land, and laws, and customs, 
he exceeded all human beings who have existed from the time there have been 
human beings.108 
 
Having said this, it is interesting to note that sandwiched between these two discussions of 
Paul’s humanity is also Chrysostom’s insistence that Paul has demonstrated in his life that 
‚the gap between angels and humans is not so great‛ – a depiction that is clearly aimed at 
denoting the trans-human quality of the apostle.109  When these claims are considered in 
tandem with Chrysostom’s conception of the imago Christi, stark similarities emerge.  Just 
as in the case of Christ, Paul’s humanity is staunchly safeguarded here.  Yet, by presenting 
Paul as possessing a trans-human angelic quality, Chrysostom is obviously attempting to 
denote the divine like qualities that are found in the apostle.  This, in turn, strongly 
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parallels the divine nature that is intrinsic to the Incarnate Word.110  In other words, by 
emphasizing Paul’s angelic quality, the common humanity that he shares with us and the 
clear distinction that exists between both the two, Chrysostom clearly has in mind Paul as 
an exemplar of the imago Christi.   
 This is to be confirmed by the recapitulation themes implicit in the rest of his 
narration of Paul’s life in this homily.  In Homily 2.2, Chrysostom continues by asserting 
that Paul had pursued virtue out of his love for this good, rather than the prizes that are 
entailed in it.  Moreover, the apostle accomplished this with ‚complete ease over the things 
supposed to be an obstacle to it.‛  He 
did not offer as an excuse weakness of body, or the crisis of circumstances, or the 
tyranny of nature, or anything else. Although he had been entrusted with a greater 
object of care the generals and kings on the earth, nonetheless he flourished in virtue 
every day.  And when the dangers to him grew more intense, he acquired fresh will to 
act (προθυμίαν).  *<+  When dangers and abuses and all dishonour were at hand, 
again he leapt for joy.111 
 
What we have here is a clear assertion of how Paul lives out his life as a perfect human 
being – by not succumbing to bodily weaknesses or passions and by growing in virtue 
through a proper exercise of the unimpaired human faculty of prothumia.  Yet, what is 
important for Chrysostom here is not Paul, the example of imitatio Christi, but Paul the 
imago Christi and therefore the participant in Christ’s victorious recapitulation.   
 Thus, when Chrysostom speaks of Paul as taking pride in his sufferings, and 
pursuing ‚the discredit and insult suffered for the gospel more than we do honour; death 
more than we do life; poverty more than we do wealth,‛ he takes this as Paul having 
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‚overturned the order of things,‛ which, besides being a direct contrast to the ways of 
sinful humanity, is also a clear allusion to Christ’s victorious recapitulation.112  It is 
we who have overturned it [the cosmic order], whereas he was the one who kept to the 
order just as God had legislated it. For all the latter actions [that is, Paul's] are in accord 
[with nature], whereas the former [that is, "ours"] are the opposite.  What is the proof of 
this? Paul, as a human being, ran after these afflictions more than he did those 
pleasures.113 
 
This ability to conform to the true order of human life, as Chrysostom recognizes, is not 
motivated by a moralistic love for virtue or divine laws but rather by the love of God, or 
indeed, the love of Christ.   
There was only one thing that was fearful and to be avoided- offending God, *<+ just 
as there was no other thing to be desired than to please God. *<+ This *love+ is life, this 
is creation, this an angel, this present things, this things to come, this a kingdom, this a 
promise, this the goods beyond counting.114 
 
 For Chrysostom, such obedience to the true order of humanity for the sake of 
Christ is nothing less than living an angelic life ‚while walking on the earth.‛   
Although bound up with a mortal body he exhibited the purity of the angels, and even 
when subject to such great constraints, he made it his fervent ambition to appear in no 
way inferior to the powers above. For he ran around the world like a bird, and like an 
incorporeal being disdained sufferings and dangers. He had contempt for earthly 
things as though he had already attained heaven; he was as continually vigilant as if he 
were dwelling with the incorporeal powers themselves. Indeed, quite often angels are 
given charge of different nations, not a single one of them so managed the nation with 
which he was entrusted as Paul did the whole world.115 
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 In line with his conceptions of salvation as ‚creation in the image of Christ,‛ 
Chrysostom concludes his panegyric by insisting that Paul did not attain this trans-human 
life through his human nature alone.  On the contrary, the apostle’s ability to recapitulate 
the true order of humanity and, therefore, participate in Christ’s victory is grounded in the 
abundant grace and power that God has bestowed on him through the Holy Spirit.116 
Therefore, I am astonished by the power of God, [and] because of these things I marvel 
at Paul’s will to act (προθυμίαν), since he had received so great a share of grace, *and 
also] because he had prepared himself so well.117 
 
It is on this note that he concludes his panegyric by urging his listeners to imitate ‚this 
archetype of virtue,‛ or indeed to participate likewise in the imago Christi.118 
 Having established the presence of the meta-narratives of transcendence and imago 
Christi in Chrysostom’s portrayals of Paul, and that these narrative structures clearly 
validate Chrysostom’s conception of salvation as deification, a final question remains, 
namely, whether Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits reinforce or even supplement our 
understanding of his deification ideals.  Considered as a whole, Chrysostom’s portrayals of 
Paul in his De laudibus, I believe, both reinforce and supplement his didactic teachings on 
                                                 
 116 The Spirit’s role is not mentioned here in the concluding section of this homily.  
Nevertheless, we can presume this to be so as Chrysostom often speaks of Paul or a Christian’s 
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deification by particularizing the ways in which we can understand the deified Christian 
life.  For example, his repeated insistence that Paul has overcome his bodily passions and 
was thus able to attain the angelic virtues clearly reinforce his similar views of asceticism 
found elsewhere in his homilies and monastic treatises.119  With regard to supplementation, 
this is to be seen in Chrysostom’s frequent declarations that Paul had evangelized the most 
barbaric tribes, endured the worst persecutions and attained other achievements, in spite 
of his ineloquence, his poor education and other human limitations.120  By doing so, 
Chrysostom does not only widen the breadth of what is conceivable as a deified life in the 
eyes of his audiences but also create a rich pool of analogies that his audiences can identify 
with and, hopefully, can appropriate for their lives.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have demonstrated that Chrysostom’s soteriology is firmly 
grounded upon, and to a large extent appropriates, the deification discourse of the 
Irenaean, Alexandrian and Cappadocian traditions.  Specifically, Chrysostom conceives 
salvation as the re-creation of a Christian into the image of Christ who is both divine and 
human.  Two primary ideas are involved here.  The first is the recognition that a Christian, 
through his union with Christ, can transcend the limitations of his human nature.  It is on 
this account that a Christian is called angelic or even a god.   The second is the insistence 
that the Christian, while attaining divine like qualities, nevertheless, remains resolutely 
                                                 
 119 His emphasis on the ascetic cultivation of aretai as a means of attaining divine likeness is, 
of course, in line with the Alexandrian and Cappadocian ideals of deification.   
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human.  At the same time, his spiritual progress also consists in his participation in 
Christ’s victorious recapitulation of the human life.   
 When we examined Chrysostom’s Pauline and non-Pauline portraits, we found 
that these two ideas are clearly present in his exemplar portraits in the forms of the meta-
narratives of transcendence and imago Christi.  Such coherence between his deification 
theoria and praxis clearly demonstrates the validity of the former.  In addition, it confirms 
for us the important role that meta-narratives play in a proper hermeneutical application 
of exemplar portraits.   
 By way of conclusion, we considered the different ways in which Chrysostom’s 
exemplar portraits may reinforce or supplement his deification ideals.   Here, we argued 
that Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits not only reinforce but also supplement his theoria.  
By particularizing the tenets of his deification doctrine, Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits 
effectively widen the breadth of what is conceivable as a deified life and therefore facilitate 
his listeners’ appropriation of this doctrine for their lives.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ASCETIC PORTRAITS AND THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF CHRISTIAN IDENTITY 
Introduction 
 
 By the time Chrysostom succeeded to the see of Constantinople (397), the Christian 
ascetic was already recognized by many as the successor of the Christian martyr and the 
embodiment of all the traits that are entailed with this identification, such as the belief that 
both were participants in the angelic life.  Henceforth, the Christian monk would take his 
place beside his spiritual predecessor and, along with the biblical saints, be exalted as one 
of the shining lights of the Church.1   
 Like his pagan counterpart, the Christian ascetic’s ascent to the pedestal of the 
spiritual elite was not without contest.2  Just a few decades earlier, Chrysostom’s teacher, 
Libanius, had decried that the lives of Christian ascetics were entirely ‚opposed to 
Hellenism‛ while the Emperor Julian went so far as to label them as being ‚given over to 
evil demons.‛3  Even in the Christian quarters, there were some, as Chrysostom tells us, 
who were so enraged by the fact that ‚the free and well-born‛ were embracing ‚this harsh 
life‛ that they threatened to apostatize.4   
                                                 
 1 When used in a Christian context, the terms, ascetic and monk, would be used here 
interchangeably.   
 
 2 James A. Francis, Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and Authority in the Second-Century Pagan 
World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 128-29. 
 
 3 Libanius, Or. 62.9-10l Julian, Ep. 89b.288b. 
 
 4 oppug. 1.2. 
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 It is in the midst of these debates about the role of Christian monasticism in Late 
Antique society and religion that the first literary portraits of the Christian ascetics 
emerged.  Apart from defending monasticism, these portraits also constitute powerful 
vehicles by which a variety of Christian ideals may be communicated to the community at 
large.  This is certainly the case for Chrysostom’s monastic portraits, which are recognized 
as some of the most ardent defences of this lifestyle and, as we shall argue, also play an 
important role in elucidating his teachings on a variety of subjects.  This interpretive role, 
in particular, will be the focus of this chapter, as we apply the hermeneutics of exemplar 
portraits that we have developed to a spectrum of Chrysostom’s ascetic portraits.  Prior to 
this, however, we must first set our discussion within the context of contemporary ascetic 
portraiture.  
 
Monastic Narratives in the First Five Centuries 
 The roots of Christian asceticism are both Jewish and Greek, and its beginnings 
may be traced to as far back as the advent of the Christian community itself.5  With regard 
to Christian ascetic literature, the first to be counted as such would be the attempts by 
Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and others to re-conceptualize martyrdom spiritually, 
                                                 
 5 Scholars generally agree that the Qumran community is one of the earliest Jewish ascetic 
communities.  Jewish asceticism, as it seems, was to continue among the early Christians, as may be 
seen in their high esteem for figures such as John the Baptist and the prophetess, Anna (Matt. 3:4, 
Luke2:36-37).  It is Philo’s re-conception of Hellenistic askēsis as the means of obeying the Torah and 
attaining divine likeness, however, which will prove to be the most influential among Christian 
ascetic circles from the late second century onwards – thanks to its appropriation by Clement of 
Alexandria.  Philo, LA 1.108, 3.132; Abr. 52-54; Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation: Asceticism 
and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 19-20. 
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along the lines of ascetic practice.6  Such interest in the ascetic lifestyle would gain 
momentum by the fourth century, giving rise to a variety of ascetic literary genres, such as 
apologies for monasticism, rules for communal living and epistolary exchanges about the 
ascetic practice.  In the case of narratives and portrayals of ascetic figures, these remain 
generally terse right up to the end of the third century, though stories of ascetic figures or 
groups are not unheard of, such as the seven virgins martyred at Ancyra.7   
 It is to Athanasius that we are indebted for the first narrative portrait of the ascetic.  
Written initially for the edification of a certain community of Egyptian monks, the Vita 
Antonii (c. 357) has far exceeded the Alexandrian bishop’s expectations, having been 
translated into Latin twice and read by like-minded ascetics in the far corners of the 
Roman Empire in less than half a century.8  Modelled after Late Antique biographies, the 
Vita Antonii, by and large, relates the life of Antony in terms of the enkōmion paradigm.9  
As a child, we are told, Antony was already ascetic, having loved the Scriptures and 
refrained from childish games and pagan learning.  When he was eighteen, he became a 
monk and was soon excelling in every ascetic discipline and virtue.  When Antony moved 
into a deserted fortress later on, he was to maintain a harsh ascetic regime and continue 
                                                 
 6 Edward E. Malone, The Monk and the Martyr: The Monk as the Successor of the Martyr, ed. 
Johannes Quasten, Studies in Christian Antiquity, vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1950), 5-40. 
 
 7 Susanna Elm, 'Virgins of God': The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 53-56. 
 
 8 In Milan, the biography was to play an important role in Augustine’s conversion, while in 
Antioch it would be praised by John Chrysostom in a sermon on the Gospel of Matthew.  V. Ant. 
proem; Owen Chadwick, John Cassian, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 3; 
Conf. 8.6.15; hom. in Matt. 8.7 (NPNF I.10, 54). 
 
 9 Harmless, 71-73. 
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his battles with countless demonic temptations with God’s aid.  Twenty years later, he 
emerged victorious, looking as youthful as ever and being entirely virtuous.10  Thereafter, 
Antony became well-known as a wonder-worker, capable of prophecy, healing the ill, 
exorcising demons and even prevailing over nature and its animals.11  As a pastoral figure 
and teacher, he also reconciled the hostile, counselled the mourning and taught the Word 
of God.12  In his later years, he became so famous that even the Roman emperors sought 
his counsel.13  Furthermore, he also proved himself to be a martyr figure, having 
ministered to the confessors relentlessly during the Maximian persecution and, more 
importantly, regarded his ascetic practice as yet another form of martyrdom.14  Having 
said this, it appears that Antony was never at ease with his public ministry and fame.  In 
fact, his preference for the anchoritic life was to drive him frequently into the wilderness 
and away from human contact.15   
 When compared with the Lives of Late Antique philosophers like Philostratus’ 
Apollonius and Iamblichus’ Pythagoras, the Vita Antonii clearly shares several similarities 
with these biographies.  Like his pagan counterparts, Antony is marked out as holy by his 
ascetic practice, preference for solitude, ability to perform wondrous works of healing and 
                                                 
 10 As Athanasius reminds us later, Antony’s contest with demonic temptations was to be a 
life-long affair.  V. Ant. 1-15, 51-53. 
 
 11 Ibid. 48, 50, 54, 57-65, 84, 86, 88-89. 
 
 12 In fact, chapters 15-44 are essentially an extended ascetic discourse by Antony.  Ibid. 14, 
16-44, 55-56. 
 
 13 Ibid. 81. 
 
 14 Ibid. 46-47. 
 
 15 Ibid. 45, 49. 
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miracles, prophecies, philosophical teaching, spiritual guidance and the esteem that rulers 
show him.  Nevertheless, there are also stark differences between the two since Antony is 
also recognizably Christian in his reliance on divine aid, his imitation of Christian 
martyrdom, the Christian content of his teachings and his clear disdain for pagan 
philosophy and religions.16   
 In the hands of a skilful biographer like Athanasius, the above narrative motifs are 
also amenable to a variety of pastoral and political aims.  This is clearly the case for 
Athanasius’ Antony, who is presented not merely as a teacher of Christian philosophy, but 
more importantly as a champion for Nicene orthodoxy.  Thus on two occasions, we find 
Antony’s prophetic gifts mustered against Arians, the first of which is his prophecy of an 
impending Arian persecution and the second is his judgment of Balacius, an Arian 
persecutor of ascetics. 17  Another ecclesiastical agenda is also apparent in the account of 
Antony’s death, where the monk is said to have given Athanasius his sheepskin.  Implicit 
to this allusion to Elijah’s gift of his mantle to Elisha is clearly Athanasius’ assertion that all 
monks, like Antony, should give proper deference to the clergy.18  
 In the decades to come, the above literary topoi would become stock-in-trade 
motifs for the different genres of monastic narratives that followed, such as Jerome’s Lives 
(c.370s) and the pilgrimage histories composed at the end of the fourth and in the early 
fifth centuries: the anonymous History of the Monks (c.400) and Palladius’ Lausiac History 
                                                 
 16 Ibid. 74-80. 
  
 17 Ibid. 82, 86. 
 
 18 Ibid., 91-92; David Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, Oxford Early Christian 
Studies. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 245-47. 
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(420). 19  Generally speaking, the monastic figures that we encounter in these works are 
remarkably similar to that of Athanasius’ Antony.  Nevertheless, it is also obvious that the 
monastic motifs deployed in these portraits have been readapted as means of articulating 
the distinct ideals of their authors.  This is clearly evident when we compare the two 
histories mentioned above.  Despite the similarity of their subjects, Palladius’ historia, 
explains Harmless, is intended to illustrate a Christian’s spiritual journey and progress.   
One begins the journey to holiness through conversion and renunciation [<]; then 
one enters, through disciplined asceticism and discipleship, into an ever-deepening 
purgation of habit *<+ and opens oneself to a life of contemplation; and this in turn 
leads one to a life of selfless charity.20 
 
For this reason, the narrative topoi that Palladius highlights are primarily those that depict 
the monks’ ascetic struggle, prayer, monastic virtues and lapses into sin.21  
 In the case of the History of the Monks, however, it is the miraculous acts of these 
ascetics that predominate.22  Like the Vita Antonii, the monk’s miracles define him 
primarily as a mediator of divine power and presence, and attest to his Christ-like 
virtues.23  Yet, by setting each miracle within a specific historical and social context, each 
miracle is reconceived frequently as an occasion for moral instruction.  Such is the case for 
                                                 
 19 As Leclercq points out, the Vita will become the archetypal hagiography by the Middle 
Ages.  Carolinne White, Early Christian Lives (London: Penguin, 1998), 73, 87; Palladius, Hist. Lau. 
8.6; Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, trans. C. Misranhi (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1974), 125; Benedicta Ward, "Introduction," in Lives of the Desert Fathers, Cistercian 
Studies Series (Kalamzaoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1981), 4. 
 20 Harmless, 286. 
 
 21 William Harmless, Desert Christians: An Introduction to the Literature of Early Monasticism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)286-89. 
 
 22 Ward,  39. 
 
 23 Lawrence S. Cunningham, The Meaning of Saints (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980), 
65, 73. 
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the miraculous bread that several monks received from God.  For one of them, the bread 
was to become a sign of his spiritual health by becoming increasingly stale and mouldy as 
the monk deteriorated in his spiritual conceit.24   
 
Chrysostom’s Ascetic Portraits 
Chrysostom’s Ascetic Background: An Overview  
 Like its Egyptian counterpart, Syrian asceticism had its coenobitic and anchoritic 
strands.25  Both of these would have been familiar to Chrysostom, since he had spent the 
first decade of his adulthood living with an urban ascetic community and later as an 
anchorite in the Syrian mountains (c.368-378).26  Although Chrysostom was to return from 
the mountains only after a two year stint, his enthusiasm for asceticism clearly did not 
diminish.27  Over the next two decades of his ecclesiastical career, first, as a deacon (378-
386) and a priest (386-397) of the Antiochene Church and, later on, as the Bishop of 
Constantinople (397-404), he would defend asceticism frequently and commend it 
                                                 
 24 hist. mon. Aeg. 1.45-51, 8.5-6, 10.8; Ward,  39-45. 
 
 25 The former is well-illustrated in Theodoret’s Religious History while the latter is frequently 
described in Chrysostom’s homilies.  Cf. hom. in Matt. 55.8, 68.3-4, 69.4, 72.3-4. 
 
 26 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 14–30. 
 
 27 According to Palladius, Chrysostom’s health was impaired so badly by his severe ascetic 
regime that he was compelled to return to Antioch.  Pleasants, however, has drawn attention to the 
fact that Chrysostom’s anchoritic life and return to Antioch coincided with both Meletius’s exile 
and reinstatement to his see.  Hence she suggests, not implausibly, that Chrysostom’s anchoritic 
period was due probably to his disillusionment with ecclesiastical politics rather than a desire for a 
more severe asceticism, and his return to Antioch was motivated primarily by Meletius’ 
reinstatement.  Palladius, dial. 5; Phyllis Rodgerson Pleasants, ‚Making Antioch Christian: The City 
in the Pastoral Vision of John Chrysostom‛ (Ph.D., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
1991), 104. 
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earnestly to both ascetics and laity alike.  Indeed, his ascetic fervency was probably one of 
the factors that contributed to his eventual downfall and exile in 404.28  This same ascetic 
vision, however, would also have informed his numerous portraits of the ascetic figure, as 
given in his monastic treatises and the several hundred homilies that he preached in 
Antioch and Constantinople.  It is to these writings that we turn now for a better 
understanding of his ascetic portraits and the role that they played in communicating his 
teachings to his audience. 
 
Homilies on Genesis: Adam and Eve 
 Seen from the point of view of sacred history, the first Christian ascetics, for 
Chrysostom, are clearly Adam and Eve.  For this reason, our study of Chrysostom’s ascetic 
portraiture must begin with his expositions of their story, the most comprehensive of 
which are found in his Homilies on Genesis.  Preached from 385 – 387,29  this homiletical 
series devotes a total of eleven sermons to the primal couple and, in this process, presents 
a very elaborate and comprehensive paradigm of their ascetic life in Paradise.30  
                                                 
 28 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 191-227. 
 
29 The dates for these homilies are tentative.  Although Quasten confidently dates the homilies 
to the Lent of 386, De Montfaucon argues for the contrary and, in fact, leaves open the question of 
dating.  Nevertheless, De Montfaucon is certain that the provenance is Antioch, which, in turn, 
limits the date to no later than 397.  Hill, on the other hand, proposes that the date could be as early 
as 385, when Chrysostom was still a deacon.  John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 1-17, trans. 
Robert C. Hill, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 74 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1985) 5-6;  Johannes Quasten, Patrology, 4 vols., vol. 3 (Notre Dame, IN: Christian 
Classics, 2000), 434. 
 
 30 Chrysostom’s conception of Adam and Eve as a paradigm of the ideal Christian life is a 
sentiment that is shared by many fourth century church fathers, such as Ephrem and Augustine. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Chrysostom introduces the story of Adam and Eve in 
his eighth homily by declaring that only Adam was created in the ‚image‛ of God (Gen. 
1:26) and that he and his male successors alone, not the female, would have authority over 
all the creation.31  Nonetheless, what is more important for Chrysostom is the fact that 
Christ has called all humanity, both male and female, to ‚be like your father in heaven.‛  
The corollary of this, of course, is that Adam and Eve were originally created in the 
‚likeness‛ (ὁμοίωσις) of God and, therefore, had the potential to become virtuous like 
God according to their human ability.32   
  For Chrysostom, this human potential for divine likeness resides entirely in the 
soul, a point that he clearly makes in his interpretation of the second account of human 
creation in Genesis 2:7.  Here, he notes that the first man was created from dust, a 
substance ‚more lowly‛ than even the earth, and was therefore no different from ‚the 
plants and the irrational beings.‛33  Yet, out of His loving-kindness, God had also decreed 
that this same creature would be ‚a rational being by reason of a soul, by means of which 
this living thing emerged complete and perfect.‛  This was accomplished by God 
breathing ‚a vital force,‛ or the human soul, into this ‚lifeless shell‛ so that the body can 
‚respond to this vital force and obey its will.‛34  It is for this reason that  
                                                 
 31 hom. in Gen. 8.9-10 (PG 53.72). 
 
 32 Chrysostom is interpreting Genesis 1:26 in the light of Matthew 5:43-48 and Luke 6.27-36.  
A similar notion is affirmed in Homily 15.1, where the woman is spoken of as ‚like man in every 
detail – rational, capable of rendering him what would be of assistance in times of need and the 
pressing necessities of life.‛  hom. in Gen. 9.7. 
 
 33 hom. in Gen. 12.12-14. 
 
 34 Ibid. 12.15 (PG 53.103.49-51; Hill, FC 74, 166). 
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because of the soul's being, we who are intertwined with a body can, if we wish and 
under the influence of God's grace, strive against disembodied powers, can walk on 
earth as though coursing across heaven, and pass our lives in this manner, suffering 
no inferiority. *< This happens] when people prove, despite entanglement with a 
mortal body, to live the same life as those supernal powers, how will they not be 
deemed worthy of grace from God for keeping untarnished the soul's nobility, 
though subject to the body's necessities.35 
  
 For Chrysostom, the fact that the creation of humanity was a two stage process 
speaks much regarding human ontology and telos.  As a creature of the earth, a human 
being is like an animal and, therefore, shares its lowly stature.  Yet, unlike the animal, an 
anthrōpos does not obtain his life directly from the body.  Rather, he is animated by a 
divine breath, or the ‚incorporeal and immortal‛ soul.  Thus from the onset, a human 
being is never meant to be beast-like and live a mere bodily existence.  Rather, his telos is 
always transcendental, that is, to surpass the desires of the body so as to attain his 
potential of becoming like God.36   
 It is with this in mind that Chrysostom likens the relationship between the human 
soul and body to that of a musician and his lyre.  
This  body created in the Lord’s design was *meant to be+ like an instrument needing 
someone to activate it, rather like a lyre that needs someone who can by his own skill 
and artistry raise a fitting hymn to the Lord through his own limbs, as though by the 
strings of the lyre.37 
 
This psychosomatic framework would significantly nuance Chrysostom’s appropriation of 
the ascetic conception of deification adopted by many of his contemporaries.38  Gregory of 
                                                 
 35 Ibid. 12.17 (Hill, FC 74, 167). 
 
 36 Ibid. 13.10. 
 
 37 Ibid. 13.9-10 (Hill, FC 74, 173). 
 
 38 Like Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom believes that the practice of asceticism, 
with the aid of the Spirit, is the sure way by which one develops the divine virtues and becomes 
like God.   Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 211-13, 216; hom. in Gen. 12.16. 
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Nazianzus, for example, would understand deification in terms of the Christian ascetic’s 
union with Christ through self-mortification and, ultimately, a release from his body.39  
Chrysostom, on the other hand, does not see a conflict between the Christian’s need to 
have mastery over his flesh’s desires and the goodness of his human flesh.  Rather, in the 
human journey towards deification, the body has an enduring feature, albeit an 
instrumental one.  By God’s design, it is to be the lyre played by the soul and the very 
means by which the soul can exercise virtue and live a life like ‚those supernal powers.‛  
Human perfection, therefore, is the soul and body operating in tandem in the likeness of 
God and not the negation of the body. 
 Such a conception of the role of the body in human deification, I believe, is derived 
from a Christological and soteriological reading of Adam’s creation.  As we mentioned in 
Chapter 3, a major aspect of Chrysostom’s soteriology is his emphasis on Christ’s 
victorious recapitulation of human life in the body.40  The incarnate Word’s recapitulation 
as the second Adam, in turn, must mean that the first Adam should have lived out his 
perfect life in the flesh in the first place.  In other words, the incarnation confirms the 
necessity of the flesh in the human attainment of divine likeness.  Moreover, a human 
being is never passive in his salvation.  Instead, each human person must also, by the 
power of the Holy Spirit, participate in the imago Christi through a recapitulation of 
Christ’s victory.  When this is read in conjunction with Chrysostom’s portrayal of Adam’s 
life in Paradise as ‚complete and perfect,‛ it should also be clear that any portrayal of 
                                                 
 39 Or. 4.71. 
 
 40 See Chapter 3, pp. 149-51. 
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Adam’s life by Chrysostom cannot be understood as a mere attempt in historical re-
enactment. 41  Rather, to speak of Adam’s perfect life in Paradise is to speak of Christian 
eschatology.  This is because the perfect Adam is also the archetypal Christian and a 
representation of what a Christian ought to attain and enjoy at the eschaton.  As we shall 
see in homilies 13-15, this somatic emphasis in his soteriology would be played out in his 
portraits of Adam and Eve through his conception of the primal couple as angelic beings 
in human bodies who thoroughly enjoy the bodily pleasures that God has given them in 
Paradise. 
 After creating Adam, observes Chrysostom, God placed him immediately in the 
garden (παράδεισος) and ordered him to live there,  
in order that what he saw and his way of life should give him much pleasure 
(πολλὴν < τὴν ἡδονὴν) and should awaken him to an expression of thanks in 
consideration of all the kindness he had received without ever doing anything to 
deserve it.42  
 
A similar stance is observed in Homily 14.  Here, this paradeisos is conceived in the words of 
Genesis 2.15 as ‚the garden of delight (τῷ παραδείσῳ τῆς τρυφῆς), where humankind is 
meant to enjoy a life of ‚exceeding pleasure‛ (ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἡδονὴν), one that is filled 
with every delight, a pleasure to behold and a thrill to enjoy.43  Indeed, the significance of 
                                                 
 41 hom. in Gen. 12.15 (PG 53.103.49-51; Hill, FC 74, 166). 
 
 42 hom. in Gen. 13.14 (Hill, FC 74, 176). 
 
 43 While the word, Eden, clearly denotes the name of a place in Scripture (e.g., Gen. 2:8, 2 
Kgs 19:12, Ezek. 27:23), Kugel notes that it also seems ‚to some ancient readers to derive from the 
Hebrew root ‘dn, ‘delight’.‛  Hence, although the Septuagint treats ‚Eden‛ as a proper name in 
Genesis 2:8, 10 and 4:16, it translates the word as ‚delight‛ (τρυφή) in Genesis 3:23-24.  hom. in 
Gen.14.7-8 (PG 53.113.23-5; Hill, FC 74, 184); James L. Kugel, Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the 
Bible as It Was at the Start of the Common Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
110-11. 
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this hedonistic conception of life in Paradise cannot be understated, since it is a theme that 
runs through virtually all of Chrysostom’s expositions of Adam’s idyllic life – a point well 
demonstrated in his ekphrasis of God’s plan for humanity.44   
Provision had been made for his spending life in the garden, for enjoying the beauty 
of visible things, for gladdening the eye from that experience, and gaining much 
pleasure from that enjoyment.  Consider, after all, how great a thrill it was to see the 
trees groaning under the weight of their fruit, to see the variety of the flowers, the 
different kinds of plants, the leaves on the branches, and all the other things you 
would be likely to chance upon in a garden, especially a garden planted by God. [<] 
passing his time in that garden like a king, he [Adam] could revel in its enjoyment, 
and like a master he had no occasion to mix with those ministering to him but had a 
life all to himself.45 
 
 Interestingly, it is in this hedonistic conception of Adam and Eve’s life in Paradise 
that we also find one of the most detailed expositions of the primal couple’s angelic life.46   
God, says Chrysostom, had intended the first man to ‚pass his days on earth like some 
terrestrial angel,‛ to live ‚an angelic way of life in a human body.‛47  Like the angels, the 
primal couple did not have any ‚need of shelter or habitation, clothing or anything of that 
kind.48  ‚Created incorruptible and immortal, *<+ they had no need to wear clothes.‛  
                                                 
 44 The importance of hedonism as a mark of the ascetic life will be elaborated later on.  
What is noteworthy, however, is the fact that Chrysostom’s affirmation of hedonism as a distinctive 
mark of the angelic life, or Christian eudaimonia, resonates well with the Aristotelian, Cyrenaic and 
Epicurean conceptions of the role of pleasure in eudaimonia. 
 
 45 hom. in Gen. 14.12 (Hill, FC 74, 186-87). 
 
 46 Ibid. 13.14 (Hill, FC 74, 177). 
 
 47 Ibid. 15.15 (PG 53.124a; Hill, FC 74, 204). 
 
48 Ibid. 16.2 (Hill, FC 74, 207). 
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Instead, ‚they were clad in that glory from above,‛ and thus felt no shame about their 
nakedness.49  
 Like the angels, they were virgins who ‚were not burning with desire (ἐπιθυμίας), 
not assaulted by other passions (παθῶν), not subject to the needs of nature.‛50  
Consequently, they had no need of marriage and sexual intercourse, both of which as he 
explains in Homily 18, were instituted after the Fall: 
From the beginning the practice of virginity was in force; but when through their 
indifference disobedience came on the scene and the ways of sin were opened, 
virginity took its leave for the reason that they had proved unworthy of such a 
degree of good things, and in its place the practice of intercourse took over for the 
future.51 
 
Chrysostom’s presumption that Adam and Eve were similar to the angels in their 
apatheia towards sexual intercourse obviously runs into difficulties with Genesis 2:24, 
which speaks of a future sexual union between the primal couple immediately after the 
account of Eve’s creation.  This problem he overcomes by conceiving verse 24 as Adam’s 
prophecy of God’s institution of marriage after the Fall.  In fact, this actually becomes for 
Chrysostom a leverage to further argue that Adam ‚had a share in prophetic grace and 
saw everything through the eyes of the Spirit.‛52   
                                                 
 49 This notion of Adam and Eve as being clad in glory is common among early Jewish and 
Christian interpreters.  The Apocalypse of Moses 20.2, whose sources date back to first century A.D, 
speaks of Adam as lamenting the loss of the glory which he was clothed with.  3 Baruch 4.16 
similarly attests that Adam was stripped of the glory of God.  Ephrem’s hymns also regularly speak 
of the pre-lapsarian Adam as having a robe of glory.  hom. in Gen. 15.14 (Hill, FC 74, 202-3); Kugel,   
115-7, 920, 924; Brock, Luminous Eye, 85-97. 
 
 50 Ibid. 15.14 (Hill, FC 74, 202-3; PG 53.123.31-33). 
 
 51 Ibid. 18.12.  (Hill, FC 82, 10-11). 
 
 52 Ibid. 15.14 (Hill, FC 74, 203). 
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Despite the similarities between the lives of the primal couple and that of the angels, 
the fact that Adam and Eve are meant to be terrestrial angels, or angelic beings in a human 
body, also means that there are distinctive ways in which they differ from their heavenly 
counterpart.  The first is already mentioned, which is the hedonistic and carefree character 
of their life in Paradise.  The second is a derivative of the first, namely, that Adam and 
Eve’s carefree life is grounded upon their utter dependence on God’s providential care for 
their needs.   As for the third difference, it is the natural outworking of Adam’s status as 
the image of God, namely, he too must reign as a king in Paradise.  As Chrysostom puts it: 
Like some angel, in fact, man lived this way on earth, wearing a body, yet being 
fortunately rid of any bodily needs; like a king adorned with sceptre and crown and 
wearing his purple robe, he revelled in this life of freedom and great affluence in the 
garden.53 
 
As to the final difference, it is to be found in the work that God has instituted for 
Adam.  According to Chrysostom, a life of ‚exceeding indulgence‛ that is relieved of all 
work is a formula for disaster, since Adam ‚would immediately slip into negligence 
(ῥᾳθυμία).‛54  Consequently, God also decreed  
the task of tilling and guarding for Adam so that along with all those delights, 
relaxation and freedom from care he might have, by way of a stabilizing influence, 
those two tasks to prevent him from overstepping the limit.55 
 
                                                 
 53 Presumably, it is in the context of Eve’s participation in Adam’s position as an image of 
God that she would also reign as a queen.  Ibid. 15.14 (Hill, FC 74, 203). 
 
 54 As Chrysostom explains in Homily 14, it is Adam’s ‚great lack of self-control and 
negligence‛ (πολλὴν ἀκρασίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν) that, ultimately, caused Adam to trample underfoot 
the instruction given him [by God].  In other words, these were the causes of his Fall.  Ibid. 14.8 (PG 
53.113.39), 14.12 (Hill, FC 74, 186-7, modified). 
 
 55 Ibid. 14.10 (Hill, FC 74, 185).  See also Ibid. 14.8, 14.12. 
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 Despite God’s generous love and favour, laments Chrysostom, Adam and Eve 
were to heed the serpent’s advice, disobey God’s command and eat from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil.56  For Chrysostom, this disobedience was due entirely to their 
‚negligent will and contempt (ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ῥᾴθυμος καὶ ἡ καταφρόνησις) displayed 
for God's command.‛57  For Eve, in particular, it began with her discontentment with her 
present enjoyment and unwillingness ‚to remain within her own proper limits,‛ and 
ended with her trusting the serpent, not God.58  In the case of Adam, it arose from his 
rathumia, or his negligent disobedience of God, for the sake of a ‚brief pleasure.‛59  As a 
punishment for their disobedience, the couple was exiled from Paradise, condemned to a 
life of suffering and death and became partakers of marriage, rather than virginity.  
Moreover, they were also ‚stripped of grace from above‛ and disrobed of their garment of 
glory, which previously hid their nakedness.60  
 For a better understanding of the state of the human soul after the Fall, we must 
return to an analogy that Chrysostom drew earlier between the physical world and the 
human soul.   
Just as on this wide and spacious earth some animals are tamer and others more 
ferocious, so too in the wide spaces of our soul some of our ideas are more irrational 
and resemble brute beasts, others more ferocious and savage.  So there is a need to 
have mastery over and tame them and submit them to the rule of reason.61   
                                                 
 56 Ibid. 13.15. 
  
 57 Ibid. 16.20 (PG 53.134.5; Hill, FC 74, 220). 
 
 58 Ibid. 16.10 (Hill, FC 74, 213-4). 
 
 59 Ibid. 16.13 (PG 53.130.57). 
 
 60 Ibid. 16.12-14 (Hill, FC 74, 215-17). 
 
 61 Ibid. (PG 53.78.26-32; Hill, FC 74, 120-121, modified). 
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By likening the irrational aspects of the soul to the savage beasts of the world, Chrysostom 
is clearly appropriating the Stoic view of the physical world as a macrocosm of the human 
soul.62  For Chrysostom, this same analogy remains operative even after the Fall.  This is in 
view of the strong parallels between his description of post-lapsarian humanity’s rule over 
the animals a few homilies later, and his discussions of humankind’s control over its own 
epithumia in his homilies elsewhere.   
 Unlike Adam in Paradise, humankind has now lost control of the beasts for the 
most part.  With Adam’s disobedience, ‚we now have fear and dread of the wild animals 
and have lost control of them.‛  For ‚once sin came on the scene, there was evidently loss 
of esteem and of authority.‛ All that is left is our authority over the ‚most necessary and 
useful creatures which perform great service to our living.‛  These things have occurred, 
explains Chrysostom, out of God’s ‚providential care,‛ since the loss of control over most 
animals should remind humanity to ‚recover from *our+ evil,‛ while the retention of our 
authority over the remaining beasts enables us to preserve our lives.63   
 This human loss of control over the animals is analogous to the present state of 
affairs for the soul.  Just as Adam’s disobedience has led to the wild beasts running 
rampage in the land, so also has it given rise to ‚throngs of passion‛ in humanity, so much 
so that these irrational aspects of soul now ever threaten to overcome their rational 
                                                 
 62 Chrysostom’s fellow Antiochene, Theodore, would take this analogy much further by 
teaching that God has willed Adam to be a constitution of both the invisible soul and mortal body 
so that ‚creation might be gathered into this one bond.‛  Quotation from McLeod, Theodore of 
Mopseustia, 27. 
 
 63 Ibid. 9.8-10 (Hill, FC 74, 121-23). 
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counterpart.64  Just as God has allowed humanity to retain control of only some useful 
animals, so also has He enabled humanity to retain the soul’s ability for reason.  As is in 
the case with the rampaging beasts, God’s introduction of ‚throngs of passion‛ into the 
soul is also an act of providence, intended to instruct human beings in their reliance on 
God and to discourage them from further evil.  It is for these reasons then that Chrysostom 
can insist, on the one hand, that it is ‚quite within your capabilities to be meek and mild 
and gentle, if you are willing (θέλῃς),‛ while emphasizing, on the other, the need for 
human reliance on ‚the fear of God, and many other advantages from other sources.‛65   
 The ascetic overtones and narrative motifs used to depict Chrysostom’s Adam and 
Eve clearly find a strong correspondence in the monastic narratives contemporary to 
Chrysostom.  Like the monks of the Vita Antonii and the histories, Chrysostom’s Adam is 
angelic, celibate, dependent on divine providence, a ruler over animals, able to prophesy, 
rational, dispassionate and engages in the askēsis as a means of subjugating rathumia.  Like 
Antony, he even takes delight in the wonders of God’s creation. 66   
 Nevertheless, there are also clear differences between the two.  To be sure, 
Chrysostom concurs with many of his ascetic contemporaries that the telos of humanity is 
                                                 
 64 hom. in Rom. 13 (PG 60.507.54; NPNF I.11, 427). 
 
 65 This conception of post-lapsarian anthropology coheres remarkably well with his 
anthropological assumptions elsewhere, such as his discussions of the relationship between the soul 
and the Holy Spirit (see Chapter 1), and his portrayal of Paul’s humanity (see Chapter 3).  hom. in 
Gen. 9.7 (PG 53.78b-d). 
 
 66 In Vita Antonii 50, Antony, we are told, was led by God to a secluded hill watered by a 
pleasant river and surrounded by the plains, which he immediately ‚fell in love‛ and chose as his 
hermitage. 
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to transcend the desires of the body so that one may attain the life of the angels.67  
Nevertheless, this transcendence is to be understood within the framework of his 
Christology and soteriology, with their high regard for the sōma.  Consequently, this 
angelic life is to be lived out through that lyre of the soul, that is, the sarx and not in denial 
of it.  It is for this reason that Chrysostom can speak of Adam’s life in Paradise as not only 
utterly dependent upon God’s provision but more importantly as one that thoroughly 
delights in the hēdonai that these provisions yield.  Within this hedonistic context, work is 
to be understood not merely as a means of combating the passions but also as a way of 
moderating the potential indulgence that may arise from such hēdonai.   
 This portrayal of the ascetic Adam, or the eschatological Christian, as a virgin, a 
practitioner of work or askēsis, a dispassionate person, a dependent on God’s providence, a 
hedonist who is contented with and thoroughly enjoys this providence, and a participant 
in angelic and divine fellowship, would be a paradigm that Chrysostom generally adopts 
for the ascetic portraits composed elsewhere in his writings.  For example, in Book III of 
his Adversus Oppugnatores, his ekphrasis of the idyllic monastic life similar presents the 
monks as living 
in tranquility, in the harbor, in great security, observing the shipwrecks of others [in 
the city], as if from heaven.  For they have chosen a way of life which befits heaven, 
and they have attained a state inferior in no way to that of angels.  Just as among the 
angels there is no inequality, nor do some enjoy prosperity while others experience 
misery, but all of them share one peace, one joy, one glory, so it is likewise in the 
monasteries. *<+ All things are held in common-food, housing, clothing. [<] All are 
noble with the same nobility, all are servants with the same servanthood, all are free 
with the same freedom. There you find one wealth for all, the true wealth-one glory, 
the true glory.  For in that life the goods are present, not in name, but in reality.  One 
pleasure, one desire, one hope for all; indeed everything is perfectly regulated as if 
by a norm and rule. There is no inequality, but order, proportion, harmony, deep 
                                                 
67 hom. in Gen. 16.1, 17.1 (Hill, FC 74, 222). 
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and exact agreement, and constant grounds for contentment. Thus everything that 
they do and suffer is a source of joy and contentment.68 
 
 In his Homilies on Matthew, which are preached to a predominantly lay Antiochene 
audience, Chrysostom even explicitly likens the lives of the Syrian monks to that of Adam 
in Paradise before his Fall.  In Homily 68, he remarks that the monks have chosen the life of 
tranquillity in the mountains and are now leading a life of apatheia, with ‚none of the ills of 
man, no worldly sorrows, no grief, no care so great, no dangers, no plots, no envy, no 
jealousy, no lawless lusts, nor any other thing of this kind.‛  ‚Here,‛ he adds,  
they meditate upon the things of the kingdom, holding converse with groves, and 
mountains, and springs, and with great quietness, and solitude, and before all these, 
with God.  And their cell is pure from all turmoil, and their soul is free from every 
passion and disease.69  
 
On this basis, Chrysostom concludes that 
their work is what was Adam’s also at the beginning and before his sin, when he was 
clothed with the glory, and conversed freely with God, and dwelt in that place that was 
full of great blessedness. For in what respect are they in a worse state than he, when 
before his disobedience he was set to till the garden? Had he no worldly care?  But 
neither have these.  Did he talk to God with a pure conscience?  These also do these; or 
rather they have a greater confidence than he, inasmuch as they enjoy even greater 
grace by the supply of the Spirit.70 
 
Later in Homily 72, he further observes that this similarity between Adam and the 
monks extends even to the nature of their work.  Just as work was instituted in Paradise as 
a means of preventing Adam from lapsing into indulgence and rathumia, so also is the 
monks’ work of ‚digging in the earth, and watering, and planting, or making baskets, or 
                                                 
68 oppug. 3.11 (Hunter, 147). 
 
69 hom. in Matt. 68.3 (NPNF I.10, 417). 
 
 70 Ibid. 
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weaving sackcloth, or practising any other handy works,‛ meant to help them cultivate the 
virtues of humility and moderation.71 
 Having said this, this vision of the eschatological Christian as an ascetic who is not 
only dispassionate, but also celibate clearly presents problems of appropriation for 
Chrysostom’s lay audience, since most of them would be married and, presumably, cannot 
practise celibacy.  This being the case, how does Chrysostom envisage the Christian ascetic 
to be an exemplar figure for his lay audiences?  This question will be taken up later when 
we discuss Chrysostom’s ascetic portraits in his Homilies on Matthew.  Prior to this, a more 
pertinent question must be addressed, namely, how does Chrysostom understand the role 
of celibacy in the life of Christians?  To answer this, we must turn to his most systematic 
and comprehensive exposition of virginity, namely, his De Virginitate.  What we shall 
discover here is a conception of virginity that is both rich and varied.  
 
De Virginitate 
 
 Composed about a decade earlier than the Genesis homilies and not long after 
Chrysostom’s return from the Syrian mountains, the De Virginitate is addressed to the 
Antiochene virgins and composed with a clear objective: to defend the virtues of 
celibacy.72  The treatise begins by distancing itself from ascetics who denounce marriage as 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 72.3-4 (NPNF I.10, 438-9). 
 
72 Scholars have differed on the dating of this treatise.  Following Bernard Grillet, Shore 
dates this treatise to 382-86, even though Musurillo suggests a much later date of 392.  The 
argument for the earlier dating is based on the premise that it could only be written by a more 
youthful Chrysostom who was still enthusiastic about monasticism.  Sally Ann Shore, ‚St. John 
Chrysostom's De Virginitate and De Non Iterando Coniugio: Translation and Commentary‛ (Ph.D., 
The Catholic University of America, 1980) 25, 28; John Chrysostom, La virginité, ed. Bernard Grillet 
and Herbert Musurillo, SC, vol. 125 (Paris: Cerf, 1966), 21-25. 
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impure, most likely the Marcionites, and arguing instead that marriage is a good 
ordinance of God and ‚the harbour of chastity for those who desire to use it well,‛ that is, 
marriage has an instrumental value.73  Having done so, Chrysostom then asserts that 
‚virginity is much more honourable than marriage‛ and whoever embraces it out of her 
own deliberate choice (προαιρέσεως) is worthy of greater praise.74  This is because ‚that 
which is better than what is acknowledged as good *marriage+ is exceedingly good.‛75   
 By doing so, Chrysostom is clearly deploying here the common Platonic distinction 
between an external good and what is truly good and regards marriage as the former.  As 
he sees it, this deduction is corroborated by both Jesus and Paul’s teachings on virginity in 
Matthew 19:10 and 1 Corinthians 7 respectively.76  In the case of Paul, Chrysostom believes 
that the apostle did not teach the virtue initially because Paul recognizes that celibacy 
demands ‚much effort and a great struggle‛ and can only be prescribed to the Corinthians 
when they have demonstrated their readiness for it, as it is the case with their enquiry 
about the subject.77   
                                                                                                                                                    
 
73 virg. 8.1, 9.1. 
 
74 Ibid. 8.3, 9.1. 
 
75 Ibid. 10.1 (Shore, 75). 
 
 76 Chrysostom takes Christ’s remark in Matthew 19:12, ‚there are eunuchs who have made 
themselves eunuchs (εὐνούχισαν) for the sake of the kingdom of heaven‛ as a straight forward 
endorsement of the superiority of virginity over marriage.  With regard to Paul’s admonition that 
‚a man is better off having no relations with a woman‛ (1Cor. 7:1), Chrysostom similarly interprets 
it as a divine command and a clear indication of Paul’s esteem of virginity over marriage (1Cor. 7:6-
8). virg. 12.1-4, 6. 
 
 77 Ibid. 13.1. 
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 To be sure, Chrysostom’s interpretations of these passages are highly contestable, 
especially in an age like ours, where historians generally ‚have no experience of, or 
sympathy with, Christian (and other) traditions of spiritual analysis and ascetic effort.‛78  
Nevertheless, they confirm for us that virginity, in Chrysostom’s view, is a greater good 
than marriage and also a sure sign of a Christian’s spiritual progress.  What is left open, 
however, is the question of whether Chrysostom regards virginity as a good and an end in 
itself.  To answer this question, we must turn to the first ascetic portrait that he constructs 
in this treatise, namely, his series of rhetorical synkriseis between the angel and the virgin. 
 ‚Virginity,‛ declares Chrysostom, ‚is as much superior to marriage as heaven is to 
earth, as the angels are to men.‛79  The vast gulf that exists between heaven and earth, and 
angels and men is, of course, familiar to his readers.  The difference between virginity and 
marriage, however, is by no means self-evident.  Yet, by juxtaposing these three polar 
opposites, Chrysostom’s synkrisis effectively transposes the vast distance evident in the 
latter two to the first and thus secures for virginity its superiority over marriage.  A more 
important rhetorical move, however, is also at work in these comparative analogies.  By 
associating virginity with heaven and the angels, and marriage with earth and humanity, 
Chrysostom is inadvertently conceptualizing two distinct sets of sociological markers here.  
Accordingly, the life of virginity is a mark of life in heaven and that of the angels, while 
marriage is to be associated with life on earth and one that is merely human.  In other 
                                                 
 78 Gillian Clark, Christianity and Roman Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 68. 
 
 79 Ibid. 10.3 (Shore, 75-76). 
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words, virginity is set up here as a sign of the eschaton while marriage as the sign of the 
present life. 
 A more elaborate conception of virginity as a mark of the eschatological Christian 
life follows immediately, with Chrysostom’s portrayal of the angelic life and his 
subsequent synkrisis of this angelic life with that of the virgin.  ‚For the angels,‛ says 
Chrysostom, 
if they do not marry and are not given in marriage, [they] are not a mixture of flesh 
and blood.  They do not pass time on earth and endure trouble from the desires 
(ἐπιθυμιῶν).  They require neither food nor drink.  Sweet song cannot appease them, 
nor can a radiant face win them over, nor any other such thing.  Their natures of 
necessity remain transparent and brilliant, with no desire (ἐπιθυμίας) troubling 
them, like the heavens at high noon clear and undisturbed by any cloud.80 
 
 Here, Chrysostom takes as a starting point Matthew 22:30 and deduces from the 
angels’ non-marital status that they are spiritual beings.81  This then leads him to conclude 
that the angels are not troubled by the epithumia of the flesh, since this is an exclusively 
somatic phenomenon.  Thus far, Chrysostom’s deductions are not far-fetched and do 
plausibly demonstrate angelic apatheia and celibacy as proper marks of the Christian’s 
eschatological participation in the angelic life.  This, of course, should also caution us 
against the popular opinion that the early Christians’ asceticizing of biblical figures is the 
mere result of Hellenistic ascetic influence.  On the contrary, it is more accurate for us to 
say that these angelic conceptions are Christian beliefs that cohere with the Hellenistic 
ascetic tradition. 
                                                 
80 Whenever relevant, changes are made to Shore’s translation to alter her translations of 
ἐπιθυμια and πάθη to ‚desires‛ and ‚passions‛ respectively.  virg. 10.3 (Shore, 76, modified).  
 
 81 In Matthew 22:30, Jesus declares that ‚at the resurrection people will neither marry nor be 
given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven‛ (TNIV).  See also Luke 20:35-36. 
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 For Chrysostom, the compatibility between these two traditions also convinces him 
that these angelic traits are not only realizable at the eschaton, but are also qualities that can 
be enjoyed in the here and now, despite the inferiority of our human nature.82  This is 
achievable, or shall we say, imitable whenever one willingly embraces a life of virginity 
and ascetic practice:   
Angels neither marry nor are given in marriage; this is true of the virgin.  The angels 
have stood continuously by God and serve him; so does the virgin.  [<]  If they are 
unable for a time to ascend to heaven as the angels can because their flesh holds them 
back, even in this world they have much consolation since they receive the Master of 
the heavens, if they are holy in body and spirit.  Do you grasp the value of virginity?  
That it makes those who spend time on earth live like the angels dwelling in heaven?  
It does not allow those endowed with bodies to be inferior to the incorporeal powers 
and spurs all men to rival the angels. 83 
 
 When this synkrisis between the angel and the virgin and the earlier angelic portrait 
are compared, it is remarkable that among the many characteristics mentioned in the 
angelic portrait, only one is reiterated in the synkrisis, namely, the trait of celibacy.  
Furthermore, while much is made here about the virgin’s participation in the angel’s 
service and fellowship with God, nothing is mentioned about the apatheia that the virgin 
obviously shares with the angel.  What can we make of these then?  First of all, although it 
is unclear whether the absence of reference to the shared apatheia is accidental or 
intentional, one can safely presume that celibacy, for Chrysostom, is a already focal point 
of a virgin’s struggle against her passions and is therefore a sufficient summarizing 
symbol for the apatheia that she shares with the angel.   This, along with Chrysostom’s 
emphasis on virginity in both portraits, most certainly lends weight to our earlier 
                                                 
82 virg. 11.1. 
83 Ibid., 11.1-2 (Shore, 76-77, modified). 
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argument that Chrysostom regards virginity as a unique sociological marker for the 
eschatological life.   
 A more important observation, however, is to be found in his concluding remarks 
on this synkrisis.  Here, virginity is clearly understood by Chrysostom as playing an 
instrumental role in ‚making those who spend time on earth live like the angels dwelling 
in heaven.‛  As he sees it, virginity has within itself a transcendental power that allows a 
person to surpass his inferiority to these ‚incorporeal powers.‛ 
 Considered as a whole, the above synkrisis evidently portrays virginity as a 
multivalent motif.  Sociologically speaking, virginity is not only a powerful sign of the 
eschatological Christian life, but is also a summarizing symbol, a focal point, for the 
ascetic’s combat with her passions in general.  Moreover, virginity also plays an 
instrumental role by helping the virgin surpass her humanity and attain the life of the 
angel.  As we shall see, these multi-faceted notions of virginity will be validated and 
further clarified by the ascetic portraits that Chrysostom constructs in the rest of this 
treatise. 
 With regard to virginity as a sign of the eschatological life, this is best expressed in 
Chrysostom’s story of Adam and Eve, which he reiterates to rebut those who claim that 
virginity contradicts the divine institution of marriage (Gen. 2:24).  As in the case of his 
Homilies on Genesis, Chrysostom contends that the primal couple were virgins to begin 
with and entirely devoid of ‚desire for sexual intercourse, conception, childbirth and 
every form of corruption.‛84  Indeed, if they had continued in their obedience, their 
                                                 
 84 Chrysostom’s conception of the primal couple as virgins is, of course, popularly held by 
many of the fathers, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Jerome.  Despite their agreement on this point, 
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propagation would have followed the way of the angels, that is, without the need of 
childbirth.85   Unfortunately, they disobeyed God and ‚this kingly robe *of virginity+‛ was 
stripped of them.  In its stead, marriage, ‚a garment befitting mortals and slaves,‛ was 
introduced, along with ‚the decay of death, ruin, pain and a toilsome life.‛86  Once again, 
by positing Adam and Eve as exemplary figures for Christians, Chrysostom’s present 
portrait is not so much so a reiteration of history, but another exercise in eschatology, that 
is, the representation of the archetypal Christian.  Within this eschatological framework, 
his emphasis on Adam and Eve’s virginity is most certainly aimed at confirming celibacy 
as the defining mark of the Christian eschaton. 
 This conception of virginity as a sociological symbol is, by and large, corroborated 
in the rest of the treatise by Chrysostom’s repeated comparisons of the celibate lifestyle not 
with sexual intercourse in general or sexual promiscuity in particular, but with the 
institution of marriage itself – a sociological edifice that is sacrosanct in Greco-Roman 
society.87  Furthermore, it is noteworthy that what Chrysostom repeatedly highlights in 
                                                                                                                                                    
Chrysostom’s treatise, as Shores notes, differs from that of Gregory (c.371), which contains more 
‚Platonic overtones.‛  virg. 14.3 (Shore, 85); Gregory of Nyssa, virg. 12; Shore, 8-9; Clark, Reading 
Renunciation , 164; Robert Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition 
(London ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 304-6.   
 
 85 virg. 14.5-6. 
 
 86 Ibid. 14.5 (Shore, 85-86, modified). 
 
 87 Peter Robert Lamont Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in 
Early Christianity, 20th anniversary ed., Columbia Classics in Religion. (New York ; Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 307. 
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these juxtapositions is not the benefit of continence vis-à-vis the ill of sexual intercourse.88  
Rather, the point that he frequently emphasizes is the fact that virginity, or the ascetic life 
that it represents, releases the virgin from the burden of marital responsibilities and civic 
life in general, such as the troubles arising from an uncouth spouse, the pains of childbirth 
and the tremendous care involved in the management of one’s household or business.89  In 
short, virginity plays an instrumental role in a virgin’s spiritual progress because it 
releases the virgin from her otherwise marital responsibilities and offers her the freedom 
to participate in the apatheia and heavenly life of the angels. 
 As Chrysostom recognizes, however, this freedom that virginity offers is far from 
within easy reach.  Rather, it can be gained only through much ascetic struggle – a point 
that is well-illustrated in his attempt to empathize with the virgin’s combat with sexual 
passion through his disclosure of what appears to be his own struggles with the same 
epithumia. 
I know the strength of the deed, I know the intensity of these feats, I know the 
burden of the battle.  It is necessary to have a soul fond of strife, one that is both 
strong and desperate against the desires.  You must walk over coals without being 
burned, and walk over swords without being slashed.  The power of desire is as 
great as that of fire and sword.  If the soul happens not to have been prepared in this 
way to be indifferent to its suffering, it will quickly destroy itself.  We need iron will, 
eyes always open, much patience, strong defenses, external walls and barriers, 
watchful and high-minded guards, and in addition to all of these, divine help.  For 
‚unless the Lord guard the city, in vain does the guard keep vigil.‛90 
 
                                                 
 88 As we have already mentioned earlier, sexual intercourse, as Chrysostom envisages it 
within the sanctity of marriage, is an instrumental good, capable of cultivating the virtue of chastity 
in a couple.  Clark, Reading Renunciation , 158. 
 
 89 virg. 37, 40, 44, 52, 57.   
90 Ibid. 27.1 (Shore, 103-4, modified). 
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 The intensity of this struggle, as he puts it a few chapters later, can be readily 
appreciated when one remembers how sexual passion is dealt with by the married and the 
celibate.  In the case of the married, ‚if at times the flames of passion struggle in them to 
reach a climax, sexual intercourse follows and swiftly represses it.‛  For the virgin, 
however, she has 
no remedy to extinguish the fire.  She sees it rising to a crescendo and coming to a 
peak, but she lacks the power to put it out.  Her only chance is to fight the fire so that 
she is not burnt.  Is there, then, anything more extraordinary than carrying within 
one all of this fire and not being burnt?91 
 
 Generally speaking, the elaborate descriptions that Chrysostom uses in his first 
ekphrasis of the virgin’s struggle with her sexual desires can well be applied to the 
description of the virgin’s struggle with every foreseeable passion.  Through this rhetorical 
move then, Chrysostom is most probably recasting virginity as a summarizing symbol and 
focal point for Christian askēsis in general and thus confirms for us its unique importance 
as a symbol of the eschatological life. 
 These three fold conceptions of virginity as a mark of the eschatological life, a 
summarizing symbol of apatheia and possessing an instrumental value would find their 
fullest expressions in the biblical exemplars of Elijah, Elisha, John the Baptist and 
Abraham, whom Chrysostom introduces in the concluding sections of his treatise.  With 
regard to the first three, Chrysostom declares that these ‚genuine lovers of virginity‛ do 
not differ from the angels at all ‚except in so far as they had been bound to a mortal nature‛ 
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and still ‚inhabited the earth.‛92  For Chrysostom, this is due entirely to the instrumental 
function of virginity:   
if they had wives and children, they would not have lived in the desert so easily or 
despised houses and the other conveniences of life.  As it was, released from all these 
ties, they passed their lives on earth as if they were in heaven.  
 
 In his ekphrasis of the prophets’ angelic life that follows, what we have is an 
ingenious recasting of the prophets’ stories in terms of his paradigm of Adam’s life in 
Paradise.  
They had heaven for a ceiling , the ground for a bed, the desert for a table.  And the 
very thing that seems to others to be the cause for hunger, the barrenness of the 
desert, was for those holy men a place of plenty.  They had no need for vines or 
wine-vats or cornfields or harvests.  Plentiful and sweet drink was supplied them 
from streams.  [<] An angel laid out for one of them a wondrous and fabulous table 
grander than men are accustomed to.  [<] The grace of the Spirit often nourished 
another of them who performed miracles, and not only him but others through him.  
And John, who was more than a prophet.  *<+ required no human nourishment.  
Neither food nor wine nor olive oil sustained his physical being, but grasshoppers 
and wild honey did.93 
 
 The Edenic themes of dependence upon divine providence and the enjoyment of 
the pleasures that this providence offers are unmistakably clear in this ekphrasis.  Like the 
Adamic portraits, this vivid picture of the prophets’ angelic life is also iconic, in that it is 
aimed at evoking the imagination of Chrysostom’s virgin readers and stirring in them a 
sense of awe, so that they too may be inspired to persevere in their ascetic vocation.  
Besides, the ekphrasis also enables Chrysostom to draw attention to another important 
aspect of his view of virginity, namely, virginity as the promotion of ‚decorum and 
                                                 
 92 Ibid. 79.1 (Shore, 211). 
 
93 To be sure, Chrysostom’s ascetic re-enactment of the prophets’ stories does not cohere 
entirely with the biblical account of these prophets.  This is especially the case for Elisha, who most 
likely conducted his prophetic ministry among the Israelites in the city (2 Kgs. 5:9).  Ibid. 79.1-2 
(Shore, 211-12). 
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devotion‛ – a clear allusion to 1 Corinthians 7:35.  As a reference to the prophets, 
‚decorum and devotion,‛ explains Chrysostom, should be taken to mean that  
everything was superfluous to them, not only what truly is more sufficient, such as 
luxury, riches, power, reputation and all the other objects of our dreams, but also 
what is ostensibly essential such as houses, cities and crafts.94 
  
 By interpreting ‚decorum and devotion‛ as not merely non-attachment to the 
world, but also to regard necessities as superfluous or redundant, it would seem that 
Chrysostom has gone beyond the apostle’s injunction in 1 Corinthians 7:25-34 here.95  Yet, 
as a message to his implied reader, namely, the virgins, this is perfectly understandable 
and, indeed, even appropriate, since it aptly affirms their ascetic vocation and all that is 
entailed with it, that is, their forsaking of luxuries and necessities for the sake of apatheia.  
Furthermore, this equation of ‚decorum and devotion‛ to apatheia in general also allows 
Chrysostom to nuance his view of virginity. ‚The virtue of virginity,‛ explains 
Chrysostom, lies not merely in one’s ability to ‚prevail over raging lust and curb a 
frenzied nature.‛  As a matter of fact, ‚virginity is weak and insufficient to save those 
possessing it.‛  What is more important about the celibate life is the practice of ‚decorum 
and devotion,‛ that is, apatheia.  Indeed ‚if you take away ‘decorum and devotion’,‛ that is, 
a life of apatheia, ‚you cut out the very heart of virginity.‛96   
                                                 
94 Ibid. 80.1 (Shore, 213). 
 
 95 In 1 Corinthians 7:25-34, we have Paul exhorting both the married and celibate to lead a 
life that is unattached to the world.  ‚Let even those who have wives be as though they had none, 
and those who mourn as though they were not mourning, and those who rejoice as though they 
were not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they had no possessions, and those who deal with 
the world as though they had no dealings with it. For the present form of this world is passing 
away‛ (1 Cor. 7.29-31, NRSV). 
   
 96 virg. 80.1-2. 
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 This brings us back to our earlier question on whether Chrysostom regards 
virginity as merely an instrumental good or a good in itself.  As we have demonstrated by 
now, virginity plays two instrumental roles in the life of the virgin.  The first is its ability 
to release the virgin from the obligations of married and civic life, which, in turn, grants 
her the freedom to pursue a life of apatheia.  As for the second, it is celibacy’s potential for 
cultivating the virgin’s ability to overcome her passions in general through the training 
that she receives from her struggles with her sexual desires, such as learning how to rely 
on God’s aid.97  This second function is clearly what Chrysostom has in mind in his 
conception of ‚decorum and devotion‛ as apatheia above.  If the virgin’s struggle with her 
sexual desires does not yield any benefits in terms of her ascetic ability and reliance on 
God in general, it would bring her no closer to the life of apatheia, or indeed, the angelic life.  
 With regard to whether virginity is a good in itself, the question can be approached 
on two levels.  As a predicate of the eschatological angelic life, celibacy is clearly a 
necessary good in itself and therefore a valid sociological symbol of a Christian’s 
participation in this heavenly life in the here and now.  Having said this, virginity alone is 
an insufficient representation of the angelic life.  As Chrysostom puts it, if the ‚heart of 
virginity,‛ or apatheia, is cut out from the virgin’s life, the value of celibacy would cease 
immediately.  This being the case, virginity, as a proper symbol of the eschaton, is 
meaningful only to the extent that it summarizes within itself all the aspects of the angelic 
life, that is, apatheia.   
                                                 
 97 This ascetic principle is corroborated by Chrysostom’s discussion of fasting in his Homily 
10 on Genesis.  Here, fasting is regarded as a means by which God heals human indulgence.  hom. in 
Gen. 10.2. 
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 Having grasped these multi-faceted aspects of virginity’s nature and symbolism, 
we are now poised to examine the last major ascetic narrative in the treatise, that is, 
Chrysostom’s portrayal of Abraham.   As in the case of the three prophets above, 
Chrysostom’s Abraham is, essentially, a virgin-like figure.   
Abraham, though married was eager to achieve the virtues of virginity, by which I 
mean ‘decorum and devotion’. [<] More than those practising poverty, he spurned 
wealth and possessions even with a wife, and he triumphed over pleasure more than 
those observing virginity.  For they burn with sexual desires each day but he had so 
extinguished this flame and had been so free of any passionate inclination that he not 
only abstained from having a concubine but also banned her from his house to 
remove every reason for quarrelling and discord.  It is not easy to find such 
behaviour today.98 
 
As a start, it is hard to deny that this Abrahamic portrait borders on the 
implausible, especially when we take into account the entire Genesis story of the 
patriarch.99  Moreover, it is also an obvious attempt to asceticize Abraham or to render him 
according to the expectations of fourth century monastic ideals.  Having said this, more is 
involved here than simply a reconception of Abraham as another exemplary figure for the 
present day Christian ascetic.100  Once we bring to bear the significance of virginity as a 
summarizing symbol of ‚decorum and devotion‛ and the angelic life in general, it should 
be obvious that Chrysostom is effectively Christianizing the figure of Abraham here by 
applying to the patriarch what he understands to be the unique symbols of the angelic life: 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 82.3-4 (Shore, 216-17). 
 
 99 For instance, the book of Genesis, generally speaking, does not present Abraham as a 
figure who spurns wealth and possessions.   Rather, wealth and riches are often presented in this 
account as indications of God’s favour towards Abraham and his descendants.  Moreover, there is 
also little evidence for Abraham living a quasi-celibate life.  Instead, what we are told is that 
Abraham, even as an old man, married a second wife after Sarah’s death, and begot several 
children through her (Gen. 25.1-4), a deed which hardly reflects well on Chrysostom’s ascetic 
Abraham.     
 
 100 Clark, Reading Renunciation , 156. 
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celibacy and apatheia.  For it is only when Abraham is reconceived as a proto-Christian, or 
more accurately, as an archetype of the eschatological angelic life, that he can become, for 
Chrysostom’s readers, a valid and relevant Christian exemplar. 
 
Adhortationes ad Thedorum Lapsum 
Thus far, our analysis has demonstrated that Chrysostom’s ascetic portraits 
generally conform to a paradigm that is well-exemplified by his portrayal of the Edenic 
Adam in his Genesis homilies.  This Adamic paradigm, as we have also seen, does not 
only reinforce the unique attributes of Chrysostom’s Christology and soteriology, with 
their emphases on the role of the sōma in human salvation, but more importantly, also 
establishes for us the main contours of Chrysostom’s vision for the eschatological 
Christian.  Within this ethical framework, virginity, as it turns out, is a very important 
symbol of a Christian’s participation in the eschaton.   
With regard to the origins of this ascetic paradigm, its earliest notions are most 
certainly those presented in the two letters (368-372) that Chrysostom wrote to his fellow 
ascetic and future bishop of Mopsuestia, Theodore (c.350-428).101  For our purposes, what 
is interesting about these letters is the fact that they reveal to us three further insights into 
Chrysostom’s monastic ideals, two of which are less often emphasized in his ascetic 
portraits elsewhere.  
                                                 
101 Scholars generally agree that the two letters constituting the adhortationes were both 
addressed to Theodore.  Internal evidence for an early dating of the treatise is based on the 
rationale that Chrysostom could not plausibly persuade Theodore to return to the asketerion if he 
himself had left it, which was what he did later on.  For this reason, the two letters are dated to 368-
372, when he was still practising a monastic lifestyle.  Kelly, Golden Mouth, 18; Quasten,  463. 
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Theodore, it seems, had changed his mind about his ascetic vow and returned to 
the world instead.  In fact, he was even contemplating marriage with a certain Hermione, 
with whom he had fallen in love.102  Hence, when Chrysostom composed his adhortationes, 
he had two clear objectives in mind.  The first was to convince Theodore not to continue 
with this worldly life, especially with his plans to marry Hermione, since the latter not 
only violates his vow of celibacy, but is also tantamount to adultery against Theodore’s 
heavenly Bridegroom, Christ.103  The second and more important objective was to 
persuade Theodore to repent of his lapse and return to his former ascetic lifestyle.  
To substantiate his appeal, Chrysostom begins, first of all, by highlighting the 
immense ‚loving-kindness‛ (φιλανθρωπία) of God, and reminding Theodore that this is 
always available for the sinner who repents sincerely and desires to return towards the 
path of virtue, even if he is the most depraved of all humanity.104  ‚If we so order our 
conscience as to hate our former wickedness, and choose the contrary path with as much 
energy as God desires and commands,‛ assures Chrysostom, ‚we shall not have anything 
less on account of the short space of time.‛ The corollary here is, of course, ‚to have fallen 
is not a grievous thing, but to remain prostrate after falling, and not to get up again.‛105   
The rest of the treatise is then devoted to the demonstration of this point.  Among 
the arguments that he summons are three ascetic portraits, which shed much light upon 
his ascetical ideals at this stage of his life.  The first is his portrayal of the monastic life, 
                                                 
102 Thdr. 1.4-6, 14. 
 
103 Ibid. 2.3 (NPNF I.9, 113-4). 
 
104 Ibid. 1.4; 1.6.22. 
 
105 Ibid. 1.6 (NPNF I.9, 95) 
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which is presented as a synkrisis with the worldly life.  After denouncing the worldly life 
as perishable and futile, Chrysostom goes on to praise the blessedness of the ascetic 
lifestyle.   
Pain and sorrow and sighing [<] have fled away [<] It is not possible there to fear 
poverty and disease: it is not possible to see any one injuring, or being injured, 
provoking, or being provoked, or angry, or envious, or burning with any outrageous 
lust, or anxious concerning the supply of the necessaries of life, or bemoaning himself 
over the loss of some dignity and power: for all the tempest of passion in us is quelled 
and brought to nought.106 
 
When this happens, ‚all will be (ἔσται) in a condition of peace, and gladness and joy, all 
things serene and tranquil, all will be daylight and brightness, and light.‛   ‚Greater than 
all these things is the perpetual enjoyment of intercourse with Christ in the company of 
angels, and archangels, and the higher powers,‛ along with participation in the ‚the 
transfiguration of the whole creation‛ that is to come, with all its brilliance, beauty and 
incorruptibility.107   
 Like his Adamic paradigm, the present portrait clearly stresses the absence of 
passion as a defining characteristic of the ideal ascetic lifestyle.  What is unclear, however, 
is whether Chrysostom has, by now, perceived asceticism in terms of his mature 
Christology and soteriology, with its emphasis on the salvific significance of the body.  
Notwithstanding this, the present ascetic portrait is unique in terms of its clear 
eschatological focus.  This is evident in Chrysostom’s gradual shift from an initial account 
of the ideal ascetic morality to a description of the ascetic as dwelling in the splendour of 
heavenly light and tranquillity, communing with Christ and the angels, and participating 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 1.11 (NPNF I.9, 99-100). 
 
 107 Ibid. 1.11.21; 25-34. 
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in a future transfiguration and incorruption.108  Undoubtedly, what Chrysostom has in 
mind here is the post-resurrection bliss that would be enjoyed by the Christian ascetic – a 
fact that is confirmed by his use of the future tense, ἔσται , in his discussion of ‚the 
transfiguration of the whole creation.‛109  Nevertheless, the ease with which Chrysostom’s 
presentation moves from the ascetic’s apatheia to him being bathed in a heavenly glory 
and later to his participation in a heavenly communion with Christ and His angels, 
strongly suggests that, for Chrysostom, some aspects of this eschatological vision are 
already realizable in the present lives of the ascetics.   
 Such a conception of the monk as realizing the angelic life in the present life is, of 
course, not unique to Chrysostom.  A similar emphasis can also be found among the 
Cappadocian Fathers, whose teachings, as we have argued in Chapter 3, play a formative 
role in Chrysostom’s theology.110  As we shall see, Chrysostom will continue to allude to 
this narrative motif or use it explicitly in his writings elsewhere, though less often than 
the motifs found in his Adamic paradigm.111  Indeed, as is the case with his Pauline 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 1.11.12-14, 21. 
 
109 This is also evidenced in Chrysostom’s use of the future tense, ἐπιδείξεται, to speak of 
the future beauty and incorruptibility of the transfigured creation (1.11.34).  Ibid. 1.11.25-30. 
  
 110 In his De Spiritu Sancto, Basil similarly speaks of the Christian who has been illuminated 
by the Spirit as having ‚foreknowledge of the future, understanding of the mysteries, [<] the 
heavenly citizenship, *and+ a place in the chorus of angels.‛ In his Oration 4, Gregory of Nazianzus 
likewise declares that Christian ascetics are those ‚to whom belongs the fountain of light and who 
enjoy even now its radiance; to whom belong the angelic psalmodies [<] and the departure of the 
intellect to God.‛  De Sp. S. 9.23; Or. 4.71. 
 
 111 His De Virginitate’s portrayal of the three prophets, with its emphasis on the angelic 
provision of food to Elijah, clearly alludes to this motif.  A more explicit reference to it, however, 
can be found in his Homily 69 on Matthew. hom. in Matt. 69.4. 
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portraits, this motif of realized eschatology will become for Chrysostom an important 
means of articulating a Christian’s recapitulation of Christ’s victory in his very life. 
 With regard to the second ascetic portrait, it is presented towards the end of the 
first letter as a cycle of three stories.  Here, we encounter three separate ascetics who, after 
departing from their ascetic lifestyle, were to later repent and attain a more excellent life 
subsequently.112  The first ascetic is a young Phoenician who, after abandoning his rich 
inheritance, had embraced a life of asceticism in the mountains.  Thereafter, he exhibited 
so much philosophy and virtue that he was even counted worthy of initiation into the 
sacred mysteries.113  Later on, the young man was dragged back to his luxurious lifestyle 
by his guardians.  Certain holy men, however, did not give up on him but continued to 
keep watch over and meet up with him.  Ultimately, the lad was not only convinced to 
return to his ‚former solitude and philosophy‛ but was to attain an even higher level of 
virtue.114 
The second story follows a similar narrative structure.  This time, the main 
character is an aged ascetic, who had already endured ‚great toils during his sojourn 
in the deserts, with only a single companion,‛ and was ‚leading an angelic life.‛  He 
too fell into lust and eventually visited a brothel.  When he emerged, however, he 
found his companion receiving him warmly and exhorting him to return to his 
ascetic life.  Shamed by this ‚great clemency,‛ the old man returned to the mountain 
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113 Ibid. 1.18.14-26 (NPNF I.9, 107-8). 
 
114 Ibid. 1.18.63-71 (NPNF I.9, 108, modified). 
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immediately and shut himself in a hut continually ‚with fasting and prayers and 
tears, wiping off from his soul the defilement of his sin.‛  Later, when requested by 
others to intervene for a drought, the monk discovered, to his surprise, that his 
prayers were efficacious for ending the drought.  The third narrative is the traditional 
story of how a disciple of the apostle John had lapsed and became a robber chief for a 
long time, only to be won back by his master’s love.115  Like the previous two 
characters, the disciple also returned to his former condition. 116 
By starting with the Phoenician ascetic and ending with apostle John’s 
disciple, Chrysostom is clearly abiding by the principles of paradeigmata rhetoric here, 
where the recent and, therefore, more plausible example is first summoned to 
reinforce his argument, before examples from a more distant past are appealed to.  
The argument to be made here is simply this: just as the philanthrōpia of God and the 
love of fellow Christians have enabled the three ascetics to repent and, later on, attain 
a higher level of virtue, so also is the same divine philanthrōpia always available to 
restore Theodore to greater spiritual heights, as long as he heeds Chrysostom’s 
advice to repent from his lapse.117 
These two themes of Christian repentance and divine philanthrōpia are 
reinforced in the beginning of the second letter, where Chrysostom narrates the story 
                                                 
115 This story is first found in Clement of Alexandria’s Who is the Rich Man that is Saved and 
later re-told by Eusebius in his historia ecclesiastica 3.23. 
 
116 Thdr. 1.19 (NPNF I.9, 119-120). 
 
 117 Of the three stories, the one that best illustrates the efficacy of God’s philanthrōpia and 
restoration is probably the second, where the monk discovers that he was not only forgiven but has 
become, once again, an agent of God’s power.  Thus, on this occasion, the miracle motif is recast as 
a sign of divine philanthrōpia and forgiveness. 
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of David’s repentance.  In this third and final ascetic portrait, the Psalmist is clearly 
presented as an exemplar of repentance, who, having repented from his adultery and 
murder, ‚immediately hastened to the physician, and applied the remedies, fasting, 
tears, lamentation, constant prayer, frequent confession of sin; and so by these means 
he propitiated God.‛  Indeed, the efficacy of David’s repentance was so great that 
even ‚after adultery and murder, the memory of the father was able to shield the 
idolatry of *his+ son,‛ Solomon.118  Like the previous cycle of stories, the point to be 
made here is not the efficacy of David’s repentance per se, but what it demonstrates to 
all repenting sinners, namely, God’s positive response to the sinner, whether it is 
towards the sinner’s prayers or children, is sure evidence of His promised 
forgiveness and philanthrōpia. 
To summarize, the adhortationes clearly suggest that Chrysostom, from the 
beginning of his ascetic journey, was already convinced of the possibility of realizing 
the angelic life, at least to some degree, in the present life.  This belief, as we have 
already pointed out, may well be due to the influence of the Cappadocian Fathers.  
Interestingly, even though Chrysostom was to maintain this conviction in his later 
years, he would differ from Gregory of Nazianzus by reinterpreting the motif in 
terms of his own Christology and deification ideals, with their somatic emphasis.   
With regard to the latter two ascetic portraits discussed above, they clearly 
draw attention to two aspects of Chrysostom’s monastic ideals that are, generally 
speaking, less emphasized in his ascetic portraits elsewhere, namely, the monk as a 
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model of repentance and one who restores sinners lovingly.119  The life of a monk, as 
Chrysostom recognizes, is never simply a story of ascetic triumph over the human 
passions and the enjoyment of divine bliss.  In reality, it is often plagued by spiritual 
dangers and moral lapses, such as that of Theodore or those described in the stories 
above.  Consequently, an attitude of repentance and willingness to restore fellow 
monks must always be close at hand, in order for every monk to successfully 
complete his ascetic journey to heaven.  More importantly, it is in the midst of this 
willing repentance and loving restoration that the monk also becomes for his readers 
an icon for God’s philanthrōpia for humankind. 
 
 
Homilies on Matthew 
 Having considered the different ways in which the Christian ascetic embodies 
Chrysostom’s ethical ideals, or his vision of the eschatological Christian, we return to the 
question that we asked earlier, namely, how does Chrysostom assist the laity’s 
appropriation of the monastic exemplar?  To answer this question, we turn now to 
Chrysostom’s ascetic portraits, as given in his Homilies on Matthew.   
 On the whole, the ascetic figures depicted in these ninety homilies are very similar 
to those we have discussed thus far.   Homily 1, for example, speaks of the monks as those 
who live ‚in the summits of the mountains‛ and esteemed as ‚choirs of angels shining 
                                                 
 119 Among the ascetic portraits discussed, the only account that explicitly mentions 
Christian repentance is Comparatio 4. 
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forth in a human body, and the way of life of heaven manifested here on earth.‛120  In 
Homily 2, we are reminded again that these ascetics are also fervent readers of 
Scriptures.121  Later, in Homily 55, the monks and virgins are praised as ‚citizens of heaven‛ 
who engage constantly in the singing of hymns and psalms, tearful compunction, self-
denial and the ‚overcoming [of] the weakness of their nature by the abundance of their 
zeal.‛122  In Homilies 68 and 72, as we mentioned earlier, the monks are even regarded as 
Christians who have recapitulated Adam’s idyllic life in Paradise. 
 Often, the ascetic exemplar, as portrayed in these Matthean homilies, is held up by 
Chrysostom as an exemplar of particular Christian aretai.  Homily 72, for example, draws 
attention to the fact that many of the monks were formerly ‚illustrious from their rank in 
the world‛ or even people with great wealth.  Nevertheless, they forsook these worldly 
riches and chose, instead, to serve one another, without regard for their former status or 
wealth.  As such, they exemplify, in a concrete manner, the virtue of humility.123  More 
frequently, however, the monk is conceived by Chrysostom as an iconic figure, who 
embodies, in his very life, the eschatological hopes of the Christian.  This is well illustrated 
in Homily 69, where Chrysostom employs the ekphrasis to describe the monks living in the 
nearby Syrian mountains.  
 ‚Let us go away,‛ invites Chrysostom, ‚to the tents of those men.‛  There, we see 
that nothing in their dwellings is inferior to the heavens.  Indeed, both the angels and the 
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Lord of the angels lodge with them.  These, continues Chrysostom, are men who have 
been ‚delivered from the body, and in the flesh disregarding the flesh,‛ being ‚pure from 
all covetousness, and full of self-denial.‛124 
If any time they should be minded to feast more sumptuously, their sumptuousness 
consists of fruits, and greater is the pleasure there than at royal tables. There is no 
fear there, or trembling; no ruler accuses, no wife provokes, no child casts into 
sadness, no disorderly mirth dissipates, no multitude of flatterers puffs up; but the 
table is an angel’s table free from all such turmoil.   
 
 And for a couch they have grass only beneath them, like as Christ did when making 
a dinner in the wilderness. And many of them do this, not being even under shelter, 
but for a roof they have heaven, and the moon instead of the light of a candle, not 
wanting oil, nor one to attend to it; on them alone does it shine worthily from on 
high.125 
 
Among the monks, adds Chrysostom, there is no distinction between master and slave. 
‚All are slaves, all are free men.‛  Moreover,  
They have no occasion to be in sadness when evening has overtaken them, [...] they 
have no occasion after their supper to be careful about robbers, [<] neither to dread 
the other ills. *<+  And their conversation again is full of the same calm. [<] [They 
speak] always about the things to come and seek wisdom; and [<] as though they 
had migrated unto heaven itself, as living there, even so all their conversation is 
about the things there.126 
 
 What we have here then is an idealized picture of the monastic lifestyle, where, in 
the company of angels, the monks enjoy much pleasure, despite the simplicity of their 
lives, and where the malice, social rivalry and worries that usually accompany life in the 
polis are entirely absent.  Clearly, this ekphrasis is iconic in the sense that it particularizes, in 
the imagination of his listeners, the idyllic heavenly life that every Christian is meant to 
attain. Chrysostom, however, takes the ekphrasis further by recasting it immediately as a 
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synkrisis between the monks and his listeners.  Compared to these angelic men, his 
audience are ‘worse than the brutes’, since much of their time is spent in covetousness and 
the pursuit of things superfluous to their lives.127  In other words, the iconic function of the 
monk here is primarily cathartic, in that, it deconstructs or, indeed, purifies the laity of 
their spiritual delusions, so that they may be awakened, on the one hand, to repentance 
from their spiritual lethargy and indulgence, and on the other to a deeper desire to imitate 
the monks’ angelic virtues and lifestyle.128    
 
Comparatio and Adversus Oppugnatores 
 When we turn to Chrysostom’s monastic apologies, that is, his Comparatio regis et 
monachi and Adversus oppugnatores vitae monastic, a similar view of the monk as the 
embodiment of Chrysostom’s eschatological ideals is also clearly present.  Yet as we shall 
see, these rhetorical defences of the emerging monastic movement in Syrian Antioch 
would also become, for Chrysostom, some of his earliest articulations of his vision for 
Christian leadership. 
 Taken usually as the earlier of the two works, the Comparatio deploys the rhetorical 
genre of the synkrisis to exalt the monastic vocation by comparing it favourably to that of a 
king.129  Like De Virginitate, Chrysostom begins his treatise by appropriating the Platonic 
                                                 
 127 Ibid. 
 128 A similar cathartic effect is observed In Homily 68.4, where Chrysostom compares the 
monastic lifestyle with the theatres and concludes that while the latter yields nothing but 
temptations and sins, the sight of the former is efficacious in transforming the heart of a lay person 
and making him a more sober, meek and gentle person to his family.  Ibid. 68.4 (NPNF I.10, 419). 
 
 129 The dating of the Comparatio is contestable with some scholars putting it at 363-371, 
while others preferring a later date of 378-379.  Scholars, however, generally agree that the Adversus 
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distinction between external goods and those ‚which are by nature beneficial and truly 
good.‛  On this basis, he relegates the vocation of a king to the former while exalts ‚the life 
of philosophers and of those who have chosen the solitary way of life‛ as the latter.130  
How he goes about justifying his case, however, is through an innovative adaptation of 
the literary motifs used traditionally to characterize the monastic vocation.  Instead of 
demarcating the solitary life of the monk, these narrative devices have now become, for 
Chrysostom, a way of highlighting the strengths of Christian asceticism and, more 
importantly, a means of articulating the rudiments of a new concept of leadership. 
 Chrysostom commences by drawing attention to the primary objective of 
monasticism, which is to cultivate the fear of God and a proper use of reason (λογισμός) 
so that a monk is able to gain mastery over his passions, as anger, envy and pleasure, and 
to ‚command all things under the law.‛  As he sees it, these same traits also make for a 
better leader and a monk endowed with these virtues is definitely more suitable than a 
king to rule over cities and men.131 
 A similar approach is observed in how he uses the stereotypical motifs of the 
monk’s battle with the demons and reading of Scriptures.  Seen from Chrysostom’s 
apologetic perspective, the monk’s spiritual battle has become a compelling evidence for 
his superiority, since the monk’s battle is for the sake of a greater cause (God’s) and 
                                                                                                                                                    
oppugnatores, with its stylistic sophistication, is a later work than the Comparatio, and that both 
works were composed during the period of Chrysostom’s deaconship.  See Hunter’s introduction in 
John Chrysostom, A Comparison between a King and a Monk/ against the Opponents of the Monastic Life, 
trans. David G. Hunter, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity (Lewiston, New York: Edwin 
Mellen, 1988), 17, 25-29, 38-41. 
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assisted by greater powers, namely, ‚divine help‛ and the ‚heavenly arms.‛ 132  
Furthermore, his foes are no longer mere flesh and blood but the very demons 
themselves.133    As for the motif of Scripture reading, its present significance, for 
Chrysostom, is not so much so a reflection of the monk’s grasp of divine knowledge.  
Instead, it now brings into relief the role models that the monk associates himself with and 
presumably imitates, namely, the exemplary characters of the Scriptures.134   
 The same can be said for the monk’s angelic life.  Not unlike the Edenic Adam and 
virgin prophets that we discussed earlier, the monk is also presented here as one who 
engages in an intimate fellowship with God and the angels, and is moderate in his 
appetites for food and sleep, so much so that he can enjoy his ‚drinking water with greater 
pleasure than others drink marvellous wine.‛  Such an angelic life serves only to contrast 
the inferior character of the king, whose nocturnal habits consists, more often than not, in 
indulgence, debauchery and ill companionship. 135   
 Against those who argue that a king is equally capable of monastic philosophy, 
Chrysostom argues that the king, practically speaking, is always a huge burden to his 
people, since he can trouble them by simply dwelling in the city, waging war from it or 
                                                 
132 The word ῥοπῆς, which is translated as ‚help‛ here, essentially refers to God’s 
intervention during critical moments by ‘tipping the scales’ for the monk.   As mentioned in 
Chapter 1’s discussion of Homily 5 on Ephesians, the same word is used to describe the Spirit’s aid 
for the soul’s battle against its passions (See Chapter 1, pp. 56-57).  hom. in Eph. 5 (PG 62.41.11-12). 
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imposing taxes that privilege the rich while despoiling the poor.136  This, however, is not 
the case for a monk.  Whenever he appears in the polis, the monk benefits both the rich and 
the poor, by ‚freeing the former from sins through a good warning, [while] relieving the 
latter's poverty.‛  Endowed by ‚the grace of the Spirit,‛ the monk’s prayers also ‚set free 
souls who are tyrannized by demons.‛137  Moreover, if one should see a monk ‚walking 
alone, meek and humble and tranquil and gentle,‛ he would also gain much by imitating 
his philosophy and justice.138  In other words, the monk is set up here as not only a 
mediator of divine power, but essentially an icon of divine presence and rule, and a stark 
contrast to the rule and presence of the earthly king.  Unlike the king who becomes only a 
burden for the polis, what the monk offers is sheer benefit to the people.   
 Should both a monk and a king ever fall, the former, declares Chrysostom, would 
remain the better of the two, since he can erase his sins ‚through prayer and tears and 
grief and care for the poor,‛ and, therefore, ‚will have his salvation immediately 
consequent upon his own will, zeal and conversion of heart.‛139  Moreover, when it is time 
for both to die, the monk, with his despise for wealth, pleasure and luxury, would ‚bear 
more easily the departure.‛  Indeed, if the monk should die for the sake of piety, his death 
becomes even more efficacious since it will motivate his admirers to imitate his virtues.  
                                                 
 136 The allusion to Emperor Julian’s stay in Antioch is unmistakable here.  During the course 
of his short reign and war with the Persians, Julian lived in Antioch for more than a year and 
proved to be more than a resource drain for the Antiochenes.  J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch: City 
and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 3-4. 
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The same cannot be said for the king, who must necessarily depend on the aid of others 
for his restoration and face his death with perpetual fear.140 
 Chrysostom’s Comparatio, as Hunter demonstrates, is clearly composed to refute 
Libanius’s claims that a pagan education is essential for the cultivation of character and 
leadership, as shown in Socrates or, more recently, in the Emperor Julian.141  The way 
Chrysostom rejects the claims of his former teacher is to take the traditional traits 
associated with the solitary monk, such as his ascetic cultivation of virtues and his role as a 
mediator between God and men, and to reconceive them as the characteristics of a figure 
that is more familiar to Greco-Roman society, namely, the philosopher-king, who is both 
the archetype and superior of the ordinary king.  On its own, the Comparatio’s conception 
of the monk as a philosopher-king might well be taken as simply the result of apologetic 
exigency.  However, once we take into account the ideals of the asketerion where 
Chrysostom first received his training, it would be evident that this cannot be the case. 
 Led by Diodore and Carterius, the Antiochene asketerion was characterized by a 
moderate ascetic regime, the study of Scriptures and its intimate links with the Church.142  
The latter feature is not only attested by Diodore’s influential status in the Antiochene 
Church – the ascetic was a close advisor to bishop Meletius, a staunch advocate for Nicene 
orthodoxy and a subsequent bishop of Tarsus, but also the number of bishops that the 
asketerion was to produce in the future, such as Chrysostom, Theodore, Maximus and 
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Basil.143  In all likelihood, the asketerion was probably the model or indeed modeled after a 
parallel form of Syriac asceticism known as the bnay qyama or ‚sons of the covenant.‛  Like 
the bnay qyama, the Antiochene ascetics were ‚expected to assist the clergy in liturgical, 
administrative and pastoral functions,‛ and constitute ‚a pool to which local bishops 
readily turned when they needed new clergy for their churches.‛144    
 For Chrysostom, the formative influence of this asketerion upon his future ministry 
cannot be understated.  This is evident, first of all, in the similar exegetical approach that 
he presumably learnt from Diodore and shared with his fellow student, Theodore, which 
tends to stress a literal interpretation of Scriptures and avoids the allegorical excesses of 
many Alexandrians.145  The same, I believe, is to be said about his understanding of the 
relationship between the ascetic communities and the Church, namely, the ascetics are 
uniquely poised to provide both ecclesiastical and spiritual leadership to the Church.146  
                                                 
 143 Stephen K. Black, ‚Paideia, Power and Episcopacy: John Chrysostom and the Formation 
of the Late Antique Bishop‛ (Ph.D., Graduate Theological Union, 2005), 48-50. 
 
 144 The asketerion’s intimate links with the Church is by no means unique in the Roman 
Empire.  Similar ascetic communities also exist in Caesarea and Sebaste, led by Basil and his mentor, 
Eustathius, respectively.  Brock, Luminous Eye, 134-135; Augustine Holmes, A Life Pleasing to God: 
The Spirituality of the Rules of St Basil (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 2000), 28-39; 
Kelly, Golden Mouth, 18-20. 
 
 145 Bradley Louis Nassif, ‚Antiochene 'Theoria' in John Chrysostom's Exegesis‛ (Ph.D., 
Fordham University, 1991), 54-62. 
  
 146 With regard to how Chrysostom conceives the relationship between the ascetics and the 
Church, there are three dominant hypotheses.  The first is what I call the Disillusionment 
hypothesis.  Furthered by Meyer, Hartney and others, this theory posits Chrysostom as an ascetic 
enthusiast, who began his priestly ministry by advocating monasticism as the ideal way of life for 
all Christians.  Over the years, however, he was to compromise these ascetic ideals in face of an 
indulgent lay congregation.  The second and complementary hypothesis is that of Chrysostom the 
inept bishop.  Accordingly, Chrysostom is regarded as a priest whose ascetic enthusiasm made him 
politically naïve, harsh in his treatment with his fellow clergymen and laity, and ultimately a less 
than suitable candidate for ecclesiastical leadership.  A more moderate version of these theories is 
to be found in Hunter, who suggests that Chrysostom was, after all, a realist in his expectations for 
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Seen from this perspective then, the Comparatio cannot simply be a polemical tract against 
pagan critics but should be recognized also as one of Chrysostom’s earliest articulations of 
his vision for Christian leadership.147  This will be made clear when we examine his ascetic 
portraits in his Adversus Oppugnatores.  
 The Adversus Oppugnatores is divided into three books, the first of which is a 
general defence of monasticism against its critics, including those who ‚pretend to be 
pious and call themselves Christians,‛ while the second and third are aimed at the 
concerns of the hypothetical pagan and Christian parent respectively.  In Book I, the 
overarching assumption is clearly the instrumental value of monasticism for cultivating 
virtue in a Christian.  Since the advent of Constantine, says Chrysostom, life in the cities 
and especially the churches has deteriorated greatly.  ‚A wicked demon,‛ he laments,  
                                                                                                                                                    
the monk.  Chrysostom, says, Hunter, ‚was aware of the limitations of monastic life, particularly 
the failure of monks to undertake an active ministry in the church.‛  Nonetheless, he maintained 
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has seized the entire world like a savage tyrant and with his entire phalanx has 
invaded human souls.  From there, [<] each day he sends forth his polluted and 
accurst commands to all, not only tearing apart marriages, *<+ but also much worse 
deeds than these.  He snatches souls which were once betrothed to God away from 
their union with Him and hands them over to his impure minions, forcing them to 
share in wicked intercourse.148 
 
 Consequently, those who seek to cultivate a virtuous life have no recourse but to 
retreat into the refuge of the wilderness.  Yet, as Chrysostom understands it, such a retreat 
to the solitary life is intended only as a means to an end.  Indeed, what he wishes and 
prays for is that, one day, the city ‚would enjoy such peace and freedom from the tyranny 
of these evils that no only would the city dwellers have no need to flee to the mountains, 
but also that those who inhabit the mountains, like fugitives returning from a long exile, 
would return to their native cities.‛  Unfortunately, since such a day has not yet arrived, 
one must refrain from calling the monks back, lest they lapse and ‚fall from philosophy 
and tranquillity."149    
 Book II is addressed to the hypothetical pagan parent, who is tormented by the fact 
that his son has become a monk and has gone on to: 
put on a rough cloak, flee to the mountains, and there to plant and irrigate and carry 
water and do all the other things which monks do which appear to be both low and 
shameful.  [<] he also goes barefoot and sleeps on the ground, and that this beautiful 
young man becomes thin and pale.150 
 
 Despite his apparent poverty, argues Chrysostom, this young monk is actually 
richer than the wealthy.  Aided by divine grace, the monk experiences apatheia and is 
endowed with the wealth of virtues.  Living in the wilderness, he also enjoys ‚the pure air 
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and healthy streams and flowers and groves and pure, sweet smells‛ and thus develops a 
healthy and vigorous body which, in turn, enables him to enjoy ‚superior pleasure as well.‛ 
151  Such pleasure, adds Chrysostom,  
keeps the soul completely free of disturbance; it produces no tumult or confusion, 
but rather a kind of happiness, pure, chaste, honorable, endless, and much more 
powerful and robust than the pleasure which you [the pagan parent] have. [<] even 
if someone could inflict a thousand deaths, he would not persuade us to despise this 
pleasure, but we would laugh all the more.152  
 
 More importantly, the monk’s ascetic lifestyle also prepares him to be a benefactor 
to others, whether it is by speaking words of comfort to those suffering from ‚a terrible 
calamity,‛ or praying for the good of his pagan father.153  Indeed, whenever he returns 
from the mountain to the city, he would amaze everyone with his glory so much so that 
they would regard him as having surpassed human nature and to have become an 
angel.154 
 Once again, Chrysostom’s portrayal of this young monk, with its emphasis on his 
angelic lifestyle, ascetic cultivation of virtue and enjoyment of the pleasures of nature, 
coheres remarkably well with ascetic paradigm discussed earlier.  His present polemical 
concern, however, compels him to trace the lines of similarities between the Christian 
monk or, philosopher, and those esteemed by the pagans, such as Socrates and Diogenes 
of Sinope, so that he may prove the former to be equally illustrious as the latter.155  As in 
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the case of the Comparatio, a major claim that Chrysostom summons to justify the solitary 
life is the fact that such training will ultimately yield a greater good to others by enabling 
the monk to become a benefactor to those in the polis. 
 Book III is directed at the hypothetical Christian parent who is similarly 
traumatized by his son’s decision to become a monk.156  First of all, it is important to 
recognize that what Chrysostom is attempting here is not to narrow the road to salvation 
to only monasticism.  As he puts it, "there is not one way of salvation, but there are many 
and varied ways."157  Rather, his present aim is to encourage the Christian parent to 
support his son’s decision instead. 
 Chrysostom begins by establishing a common point of agreement, that is, a 
Christian parent’s responsibility of nurturing his children in the way of the Lord.  Having 
done so, he then introduces a series of arguments that essentially juxtaposes life in the polis 
to the life of a monk, so as to demonstrate the superiority of the latter in cultivating 
Christian character.  The first aspect that Chrysostom addresses is the esteem that parents 
have for rhetorical studies over ascetic training.  Contrary to their belief, he argues that 
rhetorical training without the guide of Christian philosophy leads only to the corruption 
of the youths and ultimately to the detriment of the city, the community and even the 
Church – a point that he powerfully puts across through a synkrisis between the supposed 
vices of rhetorical training and the virtues of the monks living in the monastery.158  
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Consequently, philosophical training, he argues, should commence at one’s youth, rather 
than when one is an adult or much older.159 
 Having heard Chrysostom’s repeated criticisms of rhetorical studies, his readers 
might, at this point, conclude that he is guilty of anti-intellectualism.  To forestall such 
accusations, Chrysostom immediately introduces the story of a young urban ascetic, 
where we encounter a youth who, having been influenced by his ascetic pedagogue, began 
to adopt a philosophic life even though he continued to live in the city and studied 
rhetoric.  Unlike the monks, the youth ‚had no wild and rough demeanour, nor did he 
wear an unusual cloak, but he was like the rest in clothing, expression, voice, and all other 
respects.‛  At home, however, he practised a discipline that is very much like ‚those who 
live in the mountains‛: 160 
His house was arranged according to the discipline of every monastery, where there 
is nothing but the essentials. All his time was spent in reading the holy books; 
although he was quite sharp in his studies, he spent only a brief part of his day in 
pagan learning and devoted the rest to frequent prayer and the sacred scriptures.  He 
spent the entire day without food-and not only one or two days, but many days. His 
nights were spent in the same way: in tears, prayers, and such reading.  [<] he had 
made for himself a garment out of hair and that he slept in it at night, having found 
that this was a clever way to [ensure that] he arose quickly.161 
 
More importantly, it is in this very context that he proved to be an influential person with 
his fellow students, many of whom ‚profited so much from his company that they came to 
share his zeal.‛162 
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 Having said this, Chrysostom is doubtful whether such pedagogical arrangements 
can ever work out en masse in reality: 
So, then, if someone even now should show me such a soul, if he should provide such 
a pedagogue, if he should promise that everything else will be taken care of in the 
same way, I would pray a thousand times that this might happen, even more than the 
parents themselves. An even greater booty would be ours, since through their life, 
their age, and their constant company such youth would be able to capture their 
companions. But there is no one who can promise this, no one who will do it. Since 
there is no one, it would be the ultimate cruelty to allow someone who is unable to 
defend himself [<] to be cut down in the midst of the battle, when he should have 
been allowed to retreat.163 
 
 Given their apologetic intentions, these reservations are understandably 
hyperbolical and should not be taken straightforwardly as Chrysostom’s rejection of the 
possibility of urban ascetics living among the people and influencing them positively.  On 
the contrary, in view of his earlier experience as an urban ascetic who continued to live 
with his mother and the strong links that his asketerion had with the Church of Antioch, 
this same story can well be taken as his implicit recognition of the possibility of this ascetic 
model and its potential for future adoption by others.164 
 We now move on to Chrysostom’s comparison of monasticism and that second and 
more important aspect of polis life, namely, marriage.  Both married and ascetic Christians, 
says Chrysostom, are called by God to imitate Christ and to attain the same standards of 
perfection.  Contrary to popular expectations, both must also face the same divine 
judgment.165  For this reason, one should expect the life of the married to be no different 
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from that of the monk, apart from the fact that the former is in a better position to nurture 
chastity since he has recourse to his wife.  Having said this, Chrysostom believes that 
married life, with its household responsibilities and troubles, ultimately poses a greater 
burden on the Christian.  This stands in sharp contrast to the monastic life, which, because 
of its freedom from such responsibilities, enables the monk to attain a higher degree of 
apatheia.166  Indeed, those who pursue the heavenly life earlier must inevitably attain 
greater crowns from God in the end.167 
 For these reasons then, Christian parents ought to support their children’s desire 
for the monastic life and not compel them to return to the polis until this philosophy has 
taken root in their lives.  Once this has happened, they ‚will *then+ be a profit shared by 
father, mother, home, city and nation."  Returning to the polis, they will be able to ‚render 
service to others‛ by ‚heal*ing+ people suffering with incurable diseases‛ and becoming 
‚benefactors, patrons and saviours to all.‛  Everyone who turns to look at them will see 
them as living ‚like angels among people on earth.‛168   
 To underscore the importance of this public ministry of the monk and the role that 
a parent may play here, Chrysostom concludes his treatise by summoning two biblical 
exemplars: Anna and Abraham.  In the case of Anna, her willingness to give up Samuel to 
the service of the temple led ultimately to the salvation of her people, since Samuel was to 
win back God’s favour for the Hebrews through his virtue.  Similarly, it was only when 
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Abraham was willing to sacrifice Isaac that he ‚received his son back with greater glory.‛  
Likewise, a parent who encourages his child’s pursuit of monasticism will ultimately find 
himself nourishing an angel and participating in his glory.169   
 Generally speaking, the ascetic portraits presented in the Comparatio and Adversus 
Oppugnatores concur with Chrysostom’s ascetic paradigm that the central goal of Christian 
asceticism is the development of angelic apatheia, so that a monk can participate in the 
heavenly pleasures of fellowship with God and the angels.  Having said this, this angelic 
lifestyle, as Chrysostom emphasizes time and again, is not necessarily a total rejection of 
life in the polis.  Rather, it represents an opportunity for rejuvenating or transforming the 
polis, since the monk, when fully trained, is expected to engage in an active life of ministry 
in the polis, whether it is in the capacity of a healer, exorcist, spiritual guide, teacher or 
benefactor.   
 Interestingly, these early notions of the monk as a spiritual leader strongly parallel 
Chrysostom’s later conception of the priesthood in his De Sacerdotio.170  Here, we find 
Chrysostom describing the ideal priesthood in terms of the traditional ascetic motifs found 
in the above apologies.  The Christian priest, says Chrysostom, ‚needs great wisdom and, 
even before wisdom, the grace of God in good measure, and an upright character and a 
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pure life, and more than human goodness.‛171  As Chrysostom sees it, what is demanded 
of the priest is far greater than that of a solitary monk.  Such a priest must not only be a 
practitioner of the ascetic lifestyle and a master over his passions, but must do so while 
participating in the life of the polis and away from the refuge of solitude.  Moreover, he 
must have the wisdom to teach and apply such Christian philosophy to the care of his 
flocks and exemplify its angelic virtues in his very life.172  Seen from this angle, his 
criticism of monks in the same treatise and elsewhere should not be regarded as his 
disillusionment with monasticism per se.  Rather it is his rebuke of a certain strand of 
monasticism that privileges the solitary life to the neglect of the other and equally 
important aspect of the monastic vocation, which is the service of others.173 
 
The Ascetic Figure and Christian Identity  
 By now, it should be clear that even though Chrysostom’s portrayals of Christian 
ascetics are both numerous and diverse, they, nevertheless, adhere closely to the paradigm 
that is exemplified in his portraits of the Edenic Adam, as given in his Genesis homilies.  
What we encounter in this paradigm is an ascetic figure that, in many ways, is remarkably 
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similar to the Christian monks presented in the hagiographies and histories contemporary 
to Chrysostom’s time, that is, a Christian who is in fellowship with God and the angels, 
celibate, dispassionate, a practitioner of asceticism and quite often a wonder-worker.  By 
and large, these narrative traits also conform to Chrysostom’s ethical vision, as articulated 
in Chapter 1, and therefore serve well as reinforcements of his didactic ethical teachings.   
 Interestingly, most of these narrative motifs are the same traits that Chrysostom 
emphasizes whenever he upholds the ascetic figure as an exemplar for both his ascetic and 
lay listeners alike.  Clearly then, by calling all Christians to abide by a similar exemplar 
paradigm, Chrysostom is taking seriously his expressed conviction in Book III of the 
Adversus Oppugnatores, that is, God expects the same spiritual standards for both the monk 
and the lay person.174   
 Having said this, the pedagogical function that Chrysostom envisages for the 
Christian ascetic can vary quite significantly, depending on his implied audience.  When 
presented to an implied audience of virgins and monks, an ekphrasis of the monk’s ascetic 
lifestyle is intended more as an icon that affirms his readers’ vocation, reinforces their 
spiritual convictions and inspires them to persevere in their ascetic struggle.  When 
presented before a lay audience, however, the same ekphrasis takes on an additional role.  
Here, the monastic icon is clearly meant to challenge or, indeed, deconstruct the worldly 
assumptions of the laity.  It is only when this cathartic effect has taken place can such 
ascetic ekphrasis play the positive role of inspiring the laity towards greater spiritual 
progress.   
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 Despite his similarities with his hagiographical counterparts, Chrysostom’s 
Christian ascetic also differs from these contemporaries in a few distinct ways.  First of all, 
Chrysostom’s ascetic exemplar, like its Pauline counterpart, is often illustrative of how a 
Christian may realize, at least to some degree, his eschatological life in this present age.  
For this reason, Chrysostom’s Christian ascetic is uniquely poised as a reinforcement of his 
deification doctrine, by embodying in his very life the Christian’s recapitulation of Christ’s 
somatic victory.  Secondly, one may even say that Chrysostom’s soteriology, with its 
somatic emphasis, may be said to be fully summed up in his Adamic portraits, since his 
Edenic Adam is not only fully dependent on God’s providence for his bodily needs but 
also takes great pleasure in these provisions.  As a matter of fact, apart from these Adamic 
portraits, the hedonistic implications of Chrysostom’s soteriology may well have remained 
implicit in his didactic teachings. 
 A similar supplementary role is observed in the variety of ascetic portraits that 
Chrysostom constructs in his De Virginitate.  When read in conjunction with one another, 
these portraits helpfully elucidate Chrysostom’s multi-faceted understanding of virginity’s 
role in the Christian life, whether it is its symbolic functions or instrumental value.  The 
same can also be said for the ascetic portraits found in his adhortationes.  Here, what is 
drawn to our attention is not so much so the idyllic life of the ascetic but aspects of this 
paradigm that are less often emphasized, namely, the Christian monk as a model of 
repentance and restorer of sinners, and, ultimately, the icon of divine philanthrōpia. 
 Although Chrysostom’ ascetic portraits are intended primarily for the 
reinforcement and supplementations of his ethical vision, they also frequently become for 
him occasions for deliberating on the relationship between Christian asceticism and 
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leadership.175  As Chrysostom emphasizes time and again in his Comparatio and Adversus 
Oppugnatores, even though the solitary life is a necessary aspect of the ascetic calling, the 
vocation in itself is only complete when the monk, as he frequently puts it, returns from 
the mountains after his training and participates actively in the life of the polis.  Indeed, the 
ideal ascetic, as his De sacerdotio tells us, is not the solitary monk hiding in the safety of the 
mountains, but the ascetic who is able to practice his vocation in the midst of and for the 
sake of the people. 
  To bring our reflections to a close, we turn now to a final question, that is, whether 
Chrysostom regards the monk to be the ideal Christian exemplar who is superior to his 
married counterpart, whether it is a biblical saint like David or Abraham, or a lay person 
in fourth century Antioch and Constantinople?  Judging from his discussions about 
virginity and apatheia in general in his De Virginitate, it should be clear that Chrysostom 
takes seriously these traits as the necessary sociological and ontological traits of the 
Christian life in the eschaton.  For this reason, whosoever imitates both traits in the here and 
now, as it is the case with the ascetic, is in a unique position to exemplify this transfigured 
humanity before his fellow Christians.  Seen from this angle then, married exemplars, be 
they biblical or contemporary saints, can never fully embody these eschatological 
expectations.   
 Having said this, Chrysostom’s ideal ascetic exemplar is not the solitary monk in 
the desert, despite their usefulness as icons of Christian simplicity and apatheia.  Rather, 
the ideal ascetic-Christian exemplar is the ascetic-priest serving in the polis and playing the 
                                                 
 175 This is, of course, not surprising in view of the fact that Late Antique leadership 
discourse is founded primarily on the Greco-Roman ethical framework.   
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crucial role of transforming life in the city.  It should not, therefore, surprise us then that 
some of the most favoured exemplars of Chrysostom are the apostles, especially St. Paul.  
It is for the same reason that some of Chrysostom’s portrayals of David, as we have 
examined in Chapter 2, are no less than portraits of the ascetic-priest writ large and 
glorified.  Considered from this perspective then, whosoever practises a similar ascetic life 
and service among the people, even if he or she is married, would prove to be no less 
inferior as an exemplary figure for the present day Church.
235 
CHAPTER 5 
CHRYSOSTOM’S RHETORIC OF MARTYRDOM  
Introduction 
 In the summer of 362, Julian (361-63) relocated to Syrian Antioch to prepare for his 
war against the Persians.  It was here, in this predominantly Christian city, that the 
emperor composed his Against the Galilaeans, where he attempted to refute the chief tenets 
of Christian faith and practice.1  Among these are his scathing criticisms of the growing 
popularity of the Christians’ veneration of the saints:  
You have filled the whole world with tombs and sepulchres, and yet in your 
scriptures it is nowhere said that you must grovel among tombs and pay them 
honour.  But you have gone so far in iniquity that you think you need not listen even 
to the words of Jesus of Nazareth on this matter.2 
  
Despite his disdain for this apparent ‘perversion’ of Jesus’ teachings, Julian, nonetheless, 
took the challenges posed by this growing cult seriously.  When he visited Antioch’s 
famous oracle of Apollo at Daphne, he discovered, to his dismay, that the oracle had been 
silenced, due apparently to the presence of corpses in the vicinity.3  To restore the oracle, 
Julian immediately ordered the Christians to disinter the body of their local martyr, St. 
Babylas, whom they had buried in a martyrium nearby.   
For Chrysostom, this was only the beginning of the Apostate’s encounter with the 
martyr.  Not long after this, a conflagration consumed the sanctuary of Apollo and the 
                                                 
1Robert Louis Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), 177-79 
 
2 Against the Galileans 335C.  Translated by Wright in Julian, The Works of the Emperor Julian, 
ed. E Capps, T. E. Page, and W. H. D. Rouse, trans. Wilmer Cave France Wright, The Loeb Classical 
Library, vol. 3 (London: Heinemann, 1923), 415-17. 
 
3 hier. Bab. 5. 
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incident was immediately taken by the local Christians as a sign of divine judgment.  This 
conviction is poignantly expressed by Chrysostom when he recalls these events during a 
festival for the martyr:  
And so the martyr was moved, but the demon didn’t in this fashion enjoy indemnity.  
Instead he immediately learnt that while it’s possible to move a martyr’s bones 
around, it’s impossible to escape a martyr’s hands.  For at the same moment that the 
coffin was being dragged toward the city a bolt of lighting flew from heaven onto the 
head of the wooden cult statue and incinerated the lot.  [...] Indeed the walls [of the 
temple] now stand in place of a trophy, uttering a sound clearer than a trumpet, [<] 
the contest, the struggle, the martyr’s victory (τὴν πάλην, τὴν συμπλοκὴν, τὴν 
νίκην τοῦ μάρτυροςs).4 
 
 By describing the encounter in terms of ‚the contest, the struggle and the martyr’s 
victory,‛ Chrysostom is clearly conceiving it as a martyrdom narrative not unlike the Acta 
composed in the previous centuries.  Yet, what he gives us in this homily is a rather 
different sort of martyr story.  To be sure, the antagonist remains the same, that is, the 
demonic forces – this time represented by Julian. 5  Nonetheless, there are a few narrative 
features in this homily that set it apart clearly from the traditional Acta Martyrorum.   
 To begin, what Chrysostom draws attention to is not the original account of 
Babylas’ victorious death and triumph over his enemies.  In fact, almost nothing can be 
learnt here about the story itself.  Rather, what we are told is an entirely new martyr act.6    
                                                 
4 Ibid. Translated by Mayer in Johan Leemans, 'Let Us Die That We May Live': Greek Homilies 
on Christian Martyrs from Asia Minor, Palestine, and Syria (C. Ad 350-Ad 450) (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 146-47. 
 
5 Ibid. 8 (PG 50.532.18). 
 
 6 One obvious reason why he does not narrate the original story of Babylas’ martyrdom is 
given by Chrysostom himself, namely, it will be retold by the ‚more senior preachers and our 
common father [probably Flavian+.‛  Nonetheless, he also seems to presume a certain degree of 
audience familiarity with the martyr’s story since he alludes to ‚how he *Babylas+ led the church in 
out community, then, and saved this holy ship in storm and choppy sea [<] and how bold the 
speech was that he exhibited towards an emperor.‛  Ibid. 2 (Mayer, Let us Die, 142). 
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This time round, the combatant is not so much so the martyr himself, but his relics, which 
are resting before Chrysostom and his audience in the martyrium even as he speaks.7   
Furthermore, interweaved with this first martyr act is a second martyrdom narrative, 
where the martyr and the spiritual palē that he is engaged in is altogether different.   This 
second martyr, as Chrysostom declares, is none other than their former bishop (most likely, 
Meletius).  As to the nature of his contest, it is to be found in his love of Babylas, as 
expressed through his construction of a martyrium for the saint, and his imitation of the 
martyr’s many virtues in his life.  It is in this way then that Meletius proves himself to be a 
shepherd ‚worthy of the martyrs.‛ 8 
 Clearly, what we have here is no mere retelling of Babylas’ story.  Instead, it is a 
series of rhetorical attempts by Chrysostom to render the figure of the martyr, whether it is 
perceived through Babylas’ relics or Meletius, a real and present persona to his listeners, so 
that they too may identify with the saint and appropriate his virtues for their lives.  In this 
thesis, we will argue that this rhetorical approach is not unique to this homily, but is a 
prevalent strategy that Chrysostom adopts for his martyr homilies in general.9  As we shall 
see, Chrysostom’s attempts to appropriate the stories of the martyrs for his audience are 
                                                 
 7 Chrysostom alludes to the fact that he is preaching in the Church of St Babylas in the 
conclusion of his homily.  See Mayer’s introduction to the homily in Mayer, Let us Die, 141. 
  
8 Ibid. 10-11 (Mayer, Let us Die, 141, 147-8). 
  
9 There are two main sources for Chrysostom’s teachings on the martyrs.  The first are his 
24 homilies, or panegyrics, on the lives of the martyrs.  The second are his references to these saints 
in his homilies or treatises elsewhere.  These have been identified by Christos in his thesis on this 
subject.  Gus George Christo, ‚The Notions of Martyrdom According to St. John Chrysostom‛ 
(Thesis (M A ) - University of Durham 1984, 1984), 25-28.  Our present study will focus primarily on 
the martyr panegyrics.  English translations of Chrysostom’s martyr homilies may be found in 
Wendy Mayer and John Chrysostom, The Cult of the Saints, trans. Wendy Mayer, Popular Patristics 
Series (Crestwood, New York: St Valdimir's Seminary Press, 2006) and Leemans,   115-57. 
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greatly indebted to both Greco-Roman epideictic oratory and the rich Christian traditions 
of the martyrs.  Nonetheless, what emerges from his martyr homilies is a rhetorical 
approach that is, in many ways, different from both traditions but is well-suited for his 
objective of re-conceptualizing the Christian martyr as an exemplary figure capable of 
reinforcing and enriching his unique vision of Christian life and identity.   
 
Christian Martyrdom Narratives: A Historical Overview 
Biblical Precedents 
We begin, first of all, with the Christian martyrdom traditions that Chrysostom is 
indebted to.  While scholars differ on the roots of ‘Christian’ martyrdom discourse,10 or 
                                                 
 10 As Boyarin observes, there are two major theses to the question of origins.  The first is 
represented by Frend, who argues that the roots of Christian martyrdom are unmistakably Jewish.  
In direct opposition to this is Bowersock, who contends that Christian martyrdom ‚had nothing to 
do with Judaism or Palestine and everything to do with the Greco-Roman world, its tradition, its 
language, and its cultural tastes.‛  Although Frend occasionally overstates his case, his overall 
argument, I think, remains valid, especially in view of the significant parallels between the post-
exilic Jewish literature and the Christian martyr texts that follow (cf. Lampe and van Henten).  The 
main weakness of Bowersock’s thesis is its failure to account for the significant influence that 
Second Temple Judaism has for Christianity.  Having said this, his thesis does helpfully illuminate 
the important role that Late Antique culture plays in Christian martyrdom discourse.  Other 
prominent hypotheses that supplement this debate are those of Droge and Tabor and 
Dehandschutter and van Henten.  These draw attention to the formative role that Greco-Roman 
notions of noble death has in Christian martyrdom reflections and the New Testament’s conception 
of μαρτύς as referring to the idea of witnessing as an important starting point for understanding 
Christian martyrdom.  Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and 
Judaism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 93-7; W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and 
Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Baker Book House, 1981), 31; G. W. Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 28; G. W. H. Lampe, "Martyrdom and Inspiration," in Suffering and 
Martyrdom in the New Testament, ed. William Horbury and Brian McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 118; Jan Willem van Henten, "The Martyrs as Heroes of the Christian 
People: Some Remarks on the Continuity between Jewish and Christian Martyrology, with Pagan 
Analogies," in Martyrium in Multidisciplnary Perspective: Memorial Louis Reekmans, ed. M. Lamberigts 
and P. Van. Deun, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1995), 322; Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and 
Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), 17-45; 
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even what constitutes a martyr text, few would disagree that some of its ideological strands 
can be traced, at least, back to the Jewish post-exilic literature.11  Among these strands is 
the notion of a witness being tried and persecuted because of his faithfulness to God, a 
meta-narrative that clearly emerges in Daniel 3 and 6, but receives its most elaborate 
treatment in the court trial scene of 2 Maccabees 6-7, where we encounter a graphic 
depiction of the tortures suffered by the martyrs, along with a detailed emphasis on each 
martyr’s triumphant confession of God and, in one case, his expectation of a future 
resurrection (2 Macc. 7.14).12   
In the New Testament, this court trial scene will raise to greater prominence in the 
form of Christ’s Passion narratives and the Lucan account of Stephen’s martyrdom (Acts 
6.8-7.60).  The latter, in particular, evokes several narrative themes and motifs developed in 
the Passion story: a discussion of circumstances leading to Stephen’s arrest (6.8-12), the 
postulation of a binary opposition between Stephen the faithful witness of God and his 
                                                                                                                                                    
Carole  Straw, "'a Very Special Death': Christian Martyrdom in Its Classical Context " in Sacrificing 
the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion, ed. Margaret Cormack, American Academy of 
Religion Religions Series (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 39-50; B.A.G.M. 
Dehandschutter and J.W.  van Henten, "Einleitung," in Die Entstenhung Der Jüdischen Martyrologie, 
ed. B.A.G.M. Dehandschutter, J.W.   van Henten, and H.J.W. van der Klaauw (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1989), 5-8. 
 
 11 Attempts to define the martyr text (e.g., Droge and Tabor, van Henten), as Middleton 
points out, have not been entirely successful, since definitions derived from a selected corpus of 
martyr texts often cannot be satisfactorily applied to other acknowledged martyr texts, especially 
those composed in a different era and cultural setting.  Droge and Tabor,  ; J. W. van Henten, The 
Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People : A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees, Supplements to the 
Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 7.74-75; Paul Middleton, Radical Martyrdom 
and Cosmic Conflict in Early Christianity, Library of New Testament Studies (London ; New York: T & 
T Clark, 2008), 6-12. 
 
 12 An alternative account of Daniel 6 is Bel and the Dragon 1.31-42.  Composed after the 
book of Daniel, 2 Maccabees’s story of the martyrs would, in turn, inspire 4 Maccabees’ 
philosophical treatment of the narrative.  David A. deSilva, Introducing the Apocrypha (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: BakerAcademic, 2002), 269.   
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prosecutors, that is, those who resist God (6.13-7.54), a sign of divine presence and 
approval in the form of Stephen’s theophany (7.55-57), and Stephen’s appropriation of 
Christ’s prayers just before his death (7.59-60; Luke 23.34, 46).13  Where it differs is its clear 
Christological emphasis, with Jesus now being clearly portrayed as the Lord who stands 
beside God in approval of Stephen and in judgment of the Jews (7.56).14  Indeed, it is this 
version of the court trial scene and martyrdom, that is, Christ’s Passion recast within a 
Christological framework, that would prove to be the most influential and enduring in the 
centuries to come. 15   
Alongside these narrative developments is the reconception of suffering and death in 
the Pauline epistles.  Here, suffering is regarded not merely as an instrument of divine 
punishment, but more so as an important means of spiritual development for the Christian 
(Rom. 5.3.-5; Phil. 1.14).  Similarly, death, in the light of the resurrection promise, is no 
longer a thing to be feared (1 Thess. 4.13-14), but a state to be longed for (Phil 1.21-5).  In 
his letter to the Philippians, Paul would go so far as to declare that suffering is a vital way 
by which a Christian can participate in Christ’s humanity (Phil. 2.5-11) – a point that is 
emphasized, yet again, in the synoptic Gospels’ call for disciples to carry their crosses and 
                                                 
 13 This, of course, strongly parallels the Gospels’ Passion narratives, where the 
circumstances of Jesus’ betrayal and arrest are presented, followed by his trials by the God-resisting 
Jewish and Roman leaders.  Like the Stephen account, Jesus’ execution is accompanied by signs of 
divine presence and concluded with Jesus’ prayer of petition for his persecutors.   
 
 14 It is on this basis then that one must disagree with C.K. Barrett’s hasty dismissal of the 
Christological significance of this passage.  C.K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Acts of the Apostles, International Critical Commentary, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 383 
 
 15 For a more detailed discussion of the popularity of court trial scene and other literary 
forms in the Acts of the Martyrs, see H. Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs ([s.l.]: Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1972), li-lii and Lucy Grig, Making Martyrs in Late Antiquity (London: Duckworth, 
2004), 60. 
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follow Christ (Mark 8.34; Matt. 10.38; Luke. 14.27)16  and Ignatius’ later assertion that his 
martyrdom is a participatio Christo par excellence and an act ‚in accordance to the mind of 
God.‛17   
With respect to the Maccabean martyrs’ expectation of a future resurrection, or 
indeed, divine vindication, this is developed most extensively in the Apocalypse.  Here, 
this eschatological hope is recast within the framework of a cosmic conflict between the 
Christian and the principalities and powers of darkness, where the Christian’s suffering 
and faithful witnessing until death plays an active role in God’s war and final victory 
against the demonic forces, and every Christian who overcomes this trial will be richly 
rewarded by God.18    
 
Acta Martyrorum 
The close of the apostolic age also witnessed an increased incidence of Christian 
persecutions.19  These trials would, in turn, etch a deep impression in the religious 
                                                 
 16  Despite the reservations of some scholars, like Derrett, this Gospel injunction, in the light 
of Jesus’ Passion, is undoubtedly understood by its earliest listeners as nothing less than a demand 
for obedience to Christ unto death.  J.D.M.. Derrett, "Taking up Cross and Turning the Other 
Cheek," in Alternative Approaches to New Testament Study, ed. A. Harvey (London: SPCK, 1985), 61-78. 
 
 17 Rom. 8.3.  Ignatius even regards his discipleship as having begun only with his 
imprisonment and to be perfected upon his death (Eph. 3.1; Rom. 3.2; Phil. 5.1).  As he understands it, 
martyrdom, as participatio Christo, inextricably binds the disciple with his Master, so much so that 
he will be able to experience the empowerment of Christ through this very deed (Rom. 4.2, 5.2; Sym. 
4.2).  
 
 18 Rev. 2.10, 20.4, 12-14.  This eschatological expectation of a cosmic battle between the 
forces of good and evil is also present in several of the Pauline epistles (Eph. 6.12, 1 Thess. 5.3-7; 2 
Thess. 1.7-10, 2.10-12). 
 
 19 Up until mid-third century, Christian persecutions were more localized affairs, emerging 
sporadically in different parts of the Empire.  Systematic persecutions of Christians were to occur 
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consciousness of the early Christian communities and call forth their literary response to 
grapple with the violence, chaos and apparent meaninglessness of their martyrs’ deaths.  
Indeed, to talk and write about their martyrs was, for these early Christians, a ‚practise of 
dying for God.‛20  Yet, much more was involved here.  Through their discourse about 
martyrdom, the early Christians were, ultimately, seeking to reassert ‚the priority and 
superiority of an imagined or longed-for order and a privileged and idealized system of 
meaning.‛21  By this same telling and proliferation of their martyrs’ stories, communal 
beliefs were reinforced and their martyrs’ virtues celebrated.  Most importantly, these 
martyr narratives, that is, the Acta Martyrorum, would also become, for the early Christians, 
a vital platform from which they can wage their ideological battles against contrary 
ideals.22   
 This is well-demonstrated in the Martyrdom of Polycarp (c.156), the pioneer of the 
Acta Martyrorum genre and an excellent example of how an Act can bring the preceding 
Christian martyrdom traditions into the service of the above motivations.23  Like the Acta 
                                                                                                                                                    
only from 250 onwards, with the persecutions of Decius (250-51), Valerius (257-59) and Diocletian 
and his successors (303-13).  G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?," in 
Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy, ed. Michael Whitby and Joseph Streeter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 106-7. 
 
 20 Boyarin,  94. 
 
 21 Elizabeth A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making, Gender, 
Theory, and Religion. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 34. 
 
 22 By treating a martyrdom account as essentially a story, rather than a historical source for 
the martyrdom, our primary focus is therefore the ideological and persuasive power of the martyr 
text itself, rather than its historical veracity.  Eugene Weiner and Anita Weiner, The Martyr's 
Conviction: A Sociological Analysis, Brown Judaic Studies (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), 12. 
 
 23 Scholars in the earlier part of the 20th century, most notably Campenhausen, often 
regarded the Martyrdom of Polycarp, as we have it, to be the result of several generations of 
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that follow, the Martyrium Polycarpi is, essentially, a communal and paranetic document, 
composed by one Christian community for the exhortation of another.24  Typical of its 
genre, it probably took on a liturgical function from a very early stage and was read during 
the annual martyr feasts celebrated by the local Christian communities.25  When compared 
to the later Acta, it is surprisingly more self-conscious in its appropriation of the earlier 
martyrdom traditions.  This is seen from the onset, when the author declares Polycarp’s 
martyrdom as being ‚in accord with the gospel,‛ and exemplifies how Christians may 
become imitators (μιμηταὶ) of Christ.26  This conception of martyrdom as imitatio Christi, or 
shall we say, participatio Christo, is then developed in the rest of the Act according to the 
literary structure given in the Passion narratives.27  The first half basically relates the 
                                                                                                                                                    
redaction.  Recent scholars, however, have argued quite convincingly that the extant martyr text 
was largely authored in the 150s.  Parvis, for example, suggests that the Act was most likely 
composed just before the first anniversary of Polycarp’s death, around c.156.  Musurillo,  xviii; Sara 
Parvis, "Martyrdom of Polycarp," in The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers, ed. Paul Foster (London: 
T&T Clark, 2007), 127; Michael William Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English 
Translation, trans. Michael William Holmes, J.R. Harmer, and J.B. Lightfoot, 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: BakerAcademic, 2007), 298; Hans von Campenhausen, "Bearbeitungen Und 
Interpolationen Des Polykarpmartyriums," in Aus Der Frühzeit Des Christentums (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1963); Paul Hartog, Polycarp and the New Testament: The Occasion, Rhetoric, Theme, and Unity 
of the Epistle to the Philippians and Its Allusions to New Testament Literature, Wissunt Zum Neun 
Testament Ser. Ii, vol. 134 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 18-21. 
 
 24 mart. Poly. 1. 
 
 25 By the persecution of Decius (250-51), the anniversary of Polycarp, it seems, was already 
an annual event commemorated by the local Christians, such as the presbyter and martyr, Pionius.  
mart. Pion. 2. 
 
 26 mart. Poly. 1.2. 
 
 27 Despite the narrator’s depiction of Polycarp as an imitator (μιμητής) of Christ, it is more 
accurate for us to regard Polycarp and the other martyrs as participators in Christ’s Passion.  This is 
because the authors of the Acta generally conceives Polycarp and the other martyrs as not mere 
imitators of Christ’s suffering in general, but essentially participants in His Passion.  This is 
particularly the case for Polycarp, whose martyrdom is characterized by several Passion narrative 
motifs. 
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circumstances leading to Polycarp’s arrest, with great attention paid to the different ways 
in which his arrest mimics that of Christ’s Passion.28  The highlight of the story is the court 
trial scene, where Polycarp proves to be steadfast in his faith, despite his persecutors’ 
numerous persuasions and threats.  Like Christ, he is ultimately executed, but not before 
his prayer to God and the appearance of divine signs, most notably, the pyre fires taking 
on the shape of a sail.29 
Besides these similarities with the Passion narratives, the Martyrdom of Polycarp also 
adopts several themes developed in the earlier martyrdom discourse.  Among these are the 
series of binary oppositions set up in these earlier texts and also the Acta that are to follow.  
The first and foremost is the conflict between Polycarp and his persecutors.  While the 
martyr’s immediate persecutors are the Roman officials and the heathens or Jews accusing 
him, the true enemy that he is up against is always the devil and his demonic realm.30  It is 
this ‚Evil One, the adversary of the race of the righteous,‛ who is, ultimately, responsible 
for all the persuasive words, threats and extreme tortures that the persecutors will amass 
against the martyr. 31  Indeed, the frequent appearance of the persecutors’ persuasion and 
threats, both here and in the other Acta, strongly suggests that they are to be taken as 
powerful means of demonic temptation.  It is also not surprising then that, in the other Acta, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 28 mart. Poly. 6.2. 
 
 29 Ibid. 14-15. 
 
 30 Castelli,  36.  
  
 31 mart. Poly. 17.1.  A similar notion may be found in The Martyrs of Lyons 1 (Eusebius, hist. 
5.1) and Acts of Euplus 2.2. 
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the martyrs would sometimes be presented as Christ’s soldiers engaged in battle with 
these demonic forces and, finally, triumphing over these enemies.32   
 Bound up with this cosmic battle between the martyr and the demonic realm are 
the questions of divine kingship, soteriology and eschatology.  For Polycarp, this is played 
out in his prosecutors’ demands that he reviles Christ, while in the case of the other Acta, 
the martyrs are often coerced to sacrifice to the idols.  More importantly, in each case the 
martyr’s dissent is framed not simply as a rejection of these threats, but more so as an 
ideology in opposition to that of their persecutors.  Hence, when the proconsul orders 
Polycarp to deny Christ, what he receives instead is an affirmation of Christ’s Kingship.33  
Similarly, the proconsul’s demand for Apollonius to sacrifice is countered by the martyr’s 
confident declaration that God is the Creator of all things and the pagan gods are merely 
lifeless idols.34  When faced with the proconsul’s threat of execution, Ponius unhesitatingly 
reinterprets this threat eschatologically, not as death but a rushing head-on ‚towards 
life.‛35  Among the different responses given by the martyrs, the one that reverberates most 
powerfully in the Martyrium Polycarpi and the other Acta remains their confession: ‚I am a 
Christian‛ (Χριστιανός εἰμι).  Often, it is upon this single confession that the martyrs are 
                                                 
 32 The use of athletic and military metaphors to depict the Christian struggle against evil is, 
of course, not unique to the Acta Martyrorum.  They have been used as early as the Pauline epistles 
(Eph. 6.10-17; 1 Tim. 6.12; 2 Tim. 3.7).  Nonetheless, they take on a richer meaning when used in 
relationship to the spectacle motifs.  The Martyrs of Lyons 1.6; mart. Das. 4.1; Grig,  21-2. 
 
 33 mart. Poly. 9.3. 
 
 34 mart. Apoll. 7-8. 
 
 35 The Martyrdom of Polycarp similar affirms that ‚good things‛ will await the martyrs after 
their sufferings.  mart. Poly. 2.3; mart. Pion. 20.5. 
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condemned.  Certainly, this is the confession that would mark out the martyrs’ identity 
and set them apart from their pagan and unbelieving persecutors.36 
 Apart from the martyr’s dissent, another narrative device commonly deployed to 
accentuate this binary opposition is the introduction of divine miracles, or theophanies, as 
both signs of God’s support and vindication of the martyrs, and His judgment against their 
persecutors.  Both forms of this literary motif are evident in the Martyrium Polycarpi.  The 
first is the introduction of these as literal divine miracles or visions, such as Polycarp’s 
vision of a burning pillow and his hearing of God’s encouraging voice before his trial.37  On 
occasions, they operate more like fictitious literary devices, as in the case of the author 
supposing that ‚the Lord was standing by and conversing with‛ the Smyrnaen martyrs as 
they were being tortured, and the flames which consumed Polycarp’s body taking on 
apparently the shape of a sail – a sight visible only to those it was given to see.38    
 Having said this, the Acta Martyrorum also differ significantly from their biblical 
counterparts in their extensive use of the motif of Roman spectacle. ‚The category of the 
‘Roman spectacle’,‛ notes Castelli, 
comprises a wide range of public performances, including chariot races in the circus; 
athletic competitions in the palestra and the stadium; comedies, tragedies, mimes, 
and pantomimes in the theatres; military triumphs through the streets of Rome 
culminating on the Capitoline; and staged battles, mythological re-enactments, 
gladiatorial contests, and executions in the amphitheatre and the arena.39 
 
                                                 
 36 The story of Justin’s martyrdom is probably the most poignant expression of this point, 
since Justin and his companions were summarily condemned for this confession.  Boyarin,  95. 
 
 37 mart. Poly. 5.2, 9.1. 
 
 38 mart. Poly. 2.2, 15.1. 
 
 39 Castelli,  107. 
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For these martyr texts, the amphitheatre and arena, in particular, are often a venue for not 
only the martyrs’ trials and executions, but also a climatic scene of confrontation between 
the martyrs and their persecutors.  The Martyrdom of Polycarp, for example, would have the 
Smyrnean bishop tried by the proconsul and, later, burnt at the stadium, surrounded by a 
host of jeering spectators.40  Yet, in the hands of the Acta authors, these martyrs are no 
longer the mere criminals they are supposed to be by their original spectators.  Instead of 
the spectacle of Roman execution, these martyrs are recast as participants contesting in an 
athletic competition of cosmic proportions, where they are now spiritual athletes engaged 
in a courageous and noble contest against the Devil.41  Moreover, their spectators are no 
longer the prosecutors or the mocking crowds, but God and His heavenly host, who cheer 
them on as they face their deaths.42  
 
The Performance of Martyr Texts 
 Central to this recasting of the spectacle motif, or indeed, the use of the other 
narrative devices discussed, is a deep-seated conviction that the martyr’s stories are to be 
told not for the sake of the martyrs’ glory per se.  Rather, their stories are always directed 
towards a greater purpose, which is the edification of their Christian listeners.  For this 
reason, there is an intrinsic performative quality in these martyr texts.  This may be better 
                                                 
 40 For similar trial and execution scenes in the amphitheatre, see The Martyrs of Lyons 37-56, 
The Martyrdom of Saints Perpetua and Felicitas 19-20 and The Martyrdom of Pionius the Presbyter and his 
Companions 21. 
 
 41 mart. Apoll. 47; Act. Eupli 2.2; mart. Das. 4.1-4, 9.2.   
 
 42 Castelli,  104-19, 124 
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understood when we consider how the motif of divine presence or approval operate 
within these texts.   
 To be sure the divine miracles, or theophanies, experienced by the martyr must, in 
the first place, be intended for the martyr’s comfort, as it is surely the case for the divine 
voice heard by Polycarp just before his trial.  Yet, when these signs are inscribed into the 
Acta texts, whether literal or fictitious, they are clearly re-construed for the sake of an 
altogether different implied audience, namely, the Christian communities commemorating 
the martyrs’ deaths.  For these implied readers, every time these miracle motifs are read, 
they would be understood not so much as a comfort for their own persecutions, if any, but 
to confirm the veracity of the faith they share with the martyrs.  The same can be said of 
the other motifs of athletic spectacle, and spiritual soldiers, or even the martyr’s climatic 
confession of christianos eimi.  When weaved together in the martyrs’ stories and performed 
before each successive generation of Christians, these motifs are intended more as 
powerful reminders and confirmations of the victory of the martyr and, ultimately, that of 
their Church.43 
 Such an understanding of the Acta as performative texts becomes particularly 
important when we consider their reception in the Post-Constantine Church.  With the 
conversion of Constantine and the advent of his pro-Christian policies, the fourth century 
Church, by and large, saw the end of Christian persecution, at least on the pagan front.44  
                                                 
 43 As Grig puts it, ‚the triumph of the martyr, of the church of the martyr, was (re)enacted 
with every reading of the acts."  Grig,  52. 
 
 44 This is not to say that persecutions of Christians have ceased as such.  The theological in-
fighting between the Arian and Nicene Christians was to yield more casualties.  As mentioned in 
our introduction, Julian’s political manoeuvres against the Christians during his short reign would 
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Moreover, this imperial favouritism also precipitated the growing popularity of 
Christianity, with the net result that whole social groups were incorporated into the 
Church, including many from the affluent and aristocratic circles in the Empire.45  These 
developments can only heighten the chronological, spiritual and experiential distance 
between the post-Constantine Christians and the martyr traditions, and render it 
increasingly difficult for these Christians to identify with, let alone imitate, the martyrs’ 
stories and virtues.   
 In the light of these developments, it should not surprise us that the later Acta and 
martyr homilies would often display a high degree of theatricality and spectacularity in 
their attempts to narrow the spiritual distance between the martyrs and their new 
audiences, and to render the martyrs’ feats more plausible to these listeners.  This is 
especially true for many of the fourth century martyr homilies.  While the kernel of the 
martyrs’ stories and the narrative motifs used to depict them remain similar in these 
homilies, the form that they take, their rhetorical expressions, their narrative details and 
development, and their pedagogical significance, frequently become more elaborate and 
varied, especially in the ‘hands’ of rhetorically trained preachers like Gregory of Nazianzus 
or John Chrysostom. 46  Such is the case for Asterius of Amasea’s ekphrasis of Euphemia’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
remain fresh in the memories of Christians decades after his death, so much so that a fifth century 
bishop, like Cyril of Alexandria, still saw it necessary to compose a treatise against the emperor.  
 
 45 See our discussion of Chrysostom’s pastoral context in Chapter 2, pp. 96-98.   
 
 46 Both Grig and Castelli, for example, have drawn attention to an increasingly graphic 
depiction of the martyrs’ stories in the later Acta and homilies, which, they suggest, are intended to 
strengthen the rhetorical force of these traditions.  As Grig puts it, ‚the more the torments are 
multiplied, the more opportunities the victim has for demonstrating victory.  The final result, the 
death of the victim, is of course the ultimate victory, in the Christian scheme."  While it is 
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portrait.  While the existence of the picture remains debatable, Asterius’ paranetic aims are 
clear, namely, to draw his audience into Euphemia’s story by means of vivid descriptions 
of her martyrdom, so that they may appreciate and, hopefully, imitate her courage, 
holiness and hope.47 
 Apart from the theatrical quality of fourth century martyr homilies, another unique 
characteristic of these sermons is the fact that their narrative setting is no longer the arena 
where the martyrs were executed or the immediate moments of grieving by the martyr’s 
companions.  Rather, these martyr stories are retold in a very different setting, namely, 
before the graves or relics of these martyrs – a tradition that began as early as the mid 
second century A.D.48  To be present at the burial grounds of a martyr, touching and 
feeling the coffin that cover his relics, must surely have heightened the Christians’ sense of 
the martyr’s presence in a very physical and tangible way.  This is not unlike walking 
along the beaches of Normandy and being told that this is the very site where the battle of 
Bloody Omaha took place.  Moreover, the martyr figure, by a time no later than the mid 
fourth century, would also be esteemed by the Church as a unique prayer intercessor 
before Christ.  This, coupled with the emerging stories of miracles at the martyriums or by 
                                                                                                                                                    
questionable whether the later depictions of the martyrs are necessarily more graphic than the 
earlier ones, their general point, I think, remains valid.  Grig,  66-67; Castelli,  121-22. 
 
 47 B.A.G.M. Dehandschutter, "Asterius of Amasea," in 'Let Us Die That We May Live' : Greek 
Homilies on Christian Martyrs from Asia Minor, Palestine, and Syria (C. Ad 350-Ad 450), ed. Johan 
Leemans (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 174-76. 
 
 48 The earliest textual evidence is given in the Martyrdom of Polycarp, where the author notes 
the intentional collection of Polycarp’s relics for the celebration of ‚the birthday of his martyrdom‛ 
– a clear allusion to a martyr festival or commemoration.  mart. Poly. 18.3. 
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the martyrs’ relics, would most certainly strengthen the Christians’ awe for the saintly 
figure and their desire to imitate him whenever they hear his story told.   
 In the light of these sentiments, it is not surprising that the early Christians would 
revere the martyrium as a sacred and unique site where they can encounter the saint and 
seek his intercession.  This conviction is most clearly expressed in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
Homily on Theodore, where, towards the end of the sermon, Gregory suddenly directs his 
address to the martyr by calling him the ‚president of this feast,‛ and even imploring him 
to leave his heavenly abode and visit his grave, so that he may pray on behalf of the 
Church.49  This incorporation of the martyr’s grave and relics, along with its associated 
miraculous powers and efficacious prayers, into the martyr’s narrative setting would, in 
turn, establish these features as a new narrative scene and motifs for subsequent martyr 
story-telling.  This is undoubtedly the case for the martyr relics discovered (inventio) 
during this period and the healing powers that are supposedly displayed by them, many of 
which would become popular, if not essential, aspects of subsequent martyr narratives.50   
 Having surveyed the developments of Christian martyrdom narratives in the 
period prior to Chrysostom, we will now look at how the Antiochene preacher brings this 
tradition, along with the Greco-Roman rhetorical conventions that he was trained in, to 
bear on his rhetorical portraits of the martyrs.  In this process, we will not only highlight 
the rhetorical strategies that he develops for this purpose, but also explicate the ideological 
functions that he intends for these saints. 
                                                 
 49 s. Thdr. 70 (Translated by Leemans, in Let us Die, 90-1). 
 
 50 Grig,   86-94. 
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Greco-Roman Rhetoric and Chrysostom’s Praise of the Martyrs 
 The majority of Chrysostom’s martyr homilies were preached at the city of Antioch, 
usually during the martyr festivals celebrated at either the martyriums or churches.  
Generally speaking, his homilies conform to the norms of Greek epideictic oratory, 
whether it is in terms of their objectives, literary structure or rhetorical motifs.   Like most 
epideictic speeches, Chrysostom’s martyr homilies are usually preached for the sake of 
honouring his subjects, in this case, the martyrs, and to persuade his audiences on the 
plausibility of his claims.  For Chrysostom, this is achieved chiefly through the literary 
structure of epideictic rhetoric, with its emphasis on prothesis (the statement of proposition) 
and pistis (proof of the statement), circumscribed by a prooimion (introduction) and epilogos 
(conclusion).51   
 While Chrysostom occasionally begins his homilies by praising the martyrs in 
general, or the martyr concerned, he would, more often than not, abide by prooimoion 
conventions and direct his praise and blame at his audiences, such as praising those who 
faithfully attend the martyrs’ feasts and chiding others who stay away.52  This appeal to his 
audiences then sets the stage of the introduction of his prothesis.  Here, his homiletical 
objectives are clear, namely, to identify and exalt the virtues of the martyr concerned.  
Having said this, the actual form that his sermons take varies quite significantly, 
                                                 
 51 Chrysostom is not averse to digressions in his martyr homilies, as is the case in his On 
Phocas, where he ends up not talking much about the martyr, but quite a lot about Nicene 
Christology.   Aristotle, Rh. 3.13.4 (1414b).  s. hier. Phoca 9-11. 
 
 52 s. hier. Phoca 1, Ignat. mart. 1, Rh. 1415a 
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depending on the character of the martyr concerned.  His panegyric for St. Ignatius, for 
example, emphasizes the saint’s stature as both a bishop and the martyr, in order that he 
might unveil, from these roles, the many virtues of the saint.  If an aspect of the martyr’s 
life is questionable, as in the case of the Maccabean martyrs’ status as Christian martyrs, he 
would address this from the onset, in order to pave the way for a more elaborate 
discussion of their virtues.53   
 More often than not, Chrysostom’s starting point is a unique aspect of the martyr’s 
life or the circumstances of his death.  This, in turn, becomes the focal point for his 
discussion and exaltation of the martyr’s virtue.  His homily on the female martyrs, 
Bernike, Prosdoke and Domnina, is a good case in point.  From the onset, he highlights the 
ladies’ female nature, claiming that it is, by default, ‚weak and fragile,‛ and susceptible to 
the Devil’s wiles.   This, however, serves only to accentuate their courage and love of God, 
since these female martyrs could, for the sake of their faith, transcend their inherent 
weakness and boldly embrace death – a spectre that has terrified even holy men like Moses 
and Abraham.54  The same is observed in his On Saint Romanus, where the tongue cut off 
from the saint’s mouth becomes the focus of his discussion.  ‚Why,‛ Chrysostom asks, 
‚didn’t the Devil lead him away to tortures and punishments and penalties, but instead cut 
off his tongue?‛  By saying this, he draws his listeners’ attention to the significance of 
Romanus’ tongue and, through it, helps them appreciate the martyr’s virtue as a teacher of 
                                                 
 53 His On Eleazar and the Seven Boys was probably preached in Constantinople, where the 
Maccabean martyrs’ legitimate status as Christian martyrs was questioned.  Consequently, a 
substantial portion of his homily was spent in allaying this doubt.  Eleaz. sep. puer. 4. 
 
 54 Ber. et Pros. 1. 
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persecuted Christians and his later miraculous ability to continue his instruction despite 
having a tongueless mouth!55   
 Chrysostom’s pisteis are, more often than not, substantiated by a retelling of the 
martyr’s story.56  For this reason, a large part of his homily would consist of a series of 
narrations, or diēgēseis, set up to prove, or amplify, a specific virtue that is claimed for the 
martyr.57  To a great extent, these narrations ‘borrow’ greatly from the literary structure of 
the Acta, that is, with its emphasis on the circumstances of the martyr’s arrest, his trial and 
subsequent execution.58  At the same time, Chrysostom is clearly selective in his use of 
these literary motifs, often recasting them to suit the epideictic objectives of his homily.  
Hence, even though St. Lucian’s trial and confession, ‚I am a Christian,‛ remains one of the 
highlights in his On Saint Lucian, the focus of his Homily 1 on the Maccabees is the 
weaknesses of his martyrs instead, and how they managed to transcend their human 
limitations by the aid of God.59 
 Frequently, rhetorical techniques, like the ēthopoiia, ekphrasis and synkrisis, are 
deployed in his narrations as a means of enhancing the plausibility of these stories and, 
                                                 
 55 Romanum 4-8. 
 
 56 The only exceptions are, perhaps, when he digresses from the subject itself, as in the case 
of On Phocas, or when his homily addresses the virtues of the martyrs in general, e.g., On All the 
Martyrs (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 241-55).  
 
 57 Once again, this is in line with Greco-Roman conventions regarding the relationship 
between proof and narration.  Aristotle, Rh. 1.38. 
 
 58 See, for example, his De sanctis Bernice et Prosdoce, In Juventinum et Maximum martyres and 
De sancta Pelagia virgine et martyre. 
 
 59 This emphasis on the martyr’s transcendence over his weaknesses is a significant meta-
narrative in Chrysostom’s martyr homilies and would be discussed in the next section.  Luc. mart. 
(PG 50.525.2); 2-10; Macc. 1.2-10. 
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more importantly, bridging the chronological or spiritual distance that clearly exists 
between the martyrs and the late fourth century Christians.  Take his On Saint Romanus, for 
example, where he has the Devil deliberating on the different ways that he can afflict 
Romanus, before settling on the severance of the martyr’s tongue: 
"I strewed coals;' he said, "but they [the martyrs] ran over them as if [they were] roses.  I lit 
up a fire, but they hurled themselves [into it] as if into streams of chilled water. I scourged 
their ribs, and cut open deep furrows and produced torrents of blood, but they were 
decorated this way - as though covered all over in a golden flow.  I hurled them over cliffs 
and drowned them at sea, but they acted not as if they were descending to the depths 
but as if they were ascending to heaven itself.  Skipping and rejoicing and dancing as 
if they were in a sacred pageant or playing around in a green meadow, so each 
seized their tortures, as if they were receiving not tortures but spring flowers and were 
being crowned, and through the exaggerated state of their own enthusiasm they undercut 
my tortures.‛  ‚So what should I do? [<] Do I cut off his head? But [if I do that], what he (sc. 
Romanus) is praying for, is what occurs, and his disciples receive more substantial 
advice in practice *of martyrdom+.‛  [<] For this reason he (sc. the Devil) cut off his (sc. 
Romanus’) tongue, so that robbed of the voice which the martyr’s disciples enjoyed and 
deprived of his counsel.  *<+ they would become more timid and return to their former 
anguish.60 
 
Two objectives are achieved in this fictitious ēthopoiia of the Devil’s scheming.  First of all, 
by considering these different ‘options’ of torture and regarding them as ineffective against 
Romanus,  Chrysostom is clearly hinting that even if these tortures - terrifying as they 
sound, are inflicted upon Romanus, they would not dent his courage one bit.  Secondly, 
this ēthopoiia adopts, as a narrative framework, an important theme of martyrdom 
literature, namely, the eschatological conviction that the martyr’s death is his entry into the 
blessings of God, whether it is the receipt of crowns or initiation into a heavenly life.  More 
will be said about this theme later on.  Suffice to say, its present introduction tells us not so 
much so about the Devil’s eschatology, but serves more as a reaffirmation of Chrysostom 
and his audience’s beliefs in the heavenly rewards of martyrdom. 
                                                 
 60 Romanum 7 (Mayer, The Cult of the Saints, 232-33). 
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 Besides the ēthopoiia, another rhetorical technique that Chrysostom often deploys to 
animate the martyr’s story is ekphrasis.   To some extent, this is already demonstrated in the 
above enumeration of the martyrs’ tortures.  Yet, it is best exemplified in Chrysostom’s 
portrayal of St. Drosis’ death at the pyre: 
For this reason I call that pyre both an extremely pure spring of water, and an 
astonishing dye bath, and a smelting furnace.  For truly, like gold in a smelting furnace, 
so too did that blessed woman’s soul become purer because of that pyre.  For although 
her flesh melted away, and her bones were charred to a crisp, and were burnt away, 
and the lymphatic fluid in her body flowed out in every direction, her soul's faith 
became firmer and more dazzling.  And while the people who were watching these 
events thought that she had died, she was purified all the more.  Indeed, just as in the 
case of gold, whereas the ignorant person who stands and watches it liquefying and 
flowing out and mixing with the ash thinks that it is lost and has perished, the 
craftsman who truly has a precise knowledge of these matters knows that through this 
technique it becomes purer, and after its incineration he collects it from everywhere 
and extracts the gleaming [metal]; so too in her case, while the Christians who saw her 
flesh liquefying and flowing out had become ash and dust, the Christians understood 
very precisely  that in liquefying she shed every stain and, upon receiving immortality, 
ascended in a more brilliant state.61  
 
Surely, such a graphic depiction of the martyr’s liquefaction can only be aimed at re-
animating the execution scene in his audiences’ mind, so that they may be equally awed by 
her courage, as those who first watched her die.   Having said this, it is doubtful whether 
the immediate audience of Drosis’ execution ever likened her gruesome death to the 
refinement of gold.  Yet, by associating her death with the purification of a precious metal, 
Chrysostom would have succeeded in not only enlivening his audience’s imagination with 
a more familiar picture, but he would also have laid the ground for his eschatological 
expectations for the martyr, that is, the martyr, like refined gold, would attain a greater 
height of spiritual perfection, in this case, a sinless immortality. 
                                                 
 61 Dros. mart. 9 (Mayer, 200-01). 
 
257 
 
 Another equally prominent rhetorical device that Chrysostom uses to amplify his 
martyrs is the synkrisis.  Frequently, this takes the form of a comparison of the martyr with 
other saints, as in the case of the female martyrs, Bernike, Prosdoke, and Domnina, who are 
presented as greater than Moses, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in their lack of fear for death.  
On other occasions, it is a straightforward comparison with a lesser and more sinister 
figure, as may be seen in his Homily 2 on the Maccabees, where the youngest Maccabean 
martyr is held up as a philosopher, endowed with much spiritual wisdom and piety, as 
compared to the spiritual blindness and impiety of his persecutor, Antiochus Epiphanies. 62 
 Apart from these rhetorical techniques, the common arguments used in epideictic 
oratory, that is, enthymemes and examples (paradeigmata), are regularly observed in 
Chrysostom’s praise of the martyrs.63  The former is well-illustrated in his panegyric for St. 
Ignatius.  Here, he first draws attention to the saint’s status as a bishop, before proceeding 
to deduce the various virtues implicit in his appointment.  For example, the fact that 
Ignatius was appointed bishop by the ‚blessed apostles‛ must mean that they had 
‚witnessed every possible human virtue‛ in him.  Since he was appointed as a leader 
during the early and turbulent years of Church, it must also indicate that he had the 
‚considerable foresight‛ and wisdom needed to fulfil this mammoth task.  In a similar vein, 
the fact that Ignatius was a bishop of a city as large as Antioch, with a population of more 
than 200,000, must also imply that he was an extremely capable leader. 64  With regards to 
                                                 
 62 Macc. 2 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 149-50). 
 
 63 See the section, Epideictic Rhetoric and Paradeigmata, in Chapter 2. 
 
 64 Ignat. mart. 4, 7-8, 10. 
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the paradeigmata, these are usually deployed by comparing the martyr’s act with a similar 
deed performed by a biblical exemplar.  Thus, Bernike, Prosdoke and Domnina’s fleeing 
from Antioch is likened to that of Abraham’s fleeing from Harran (Gen. 12.1).  In line with 
4 Maccabees, Chrysostom would also regard the Maccabean mother as imitating the 
courage of Abraham, who similarly sacrificed his son for the sake of God.65 
 Based on our above discussions, it is clear that Chrysostom takes seriously the 
rhetorical training that he acquired from his paideia and uses it abundantly in his 
homiletical exaltation of the martyrs in general.  This must be borne in mind when we 
interpret the apparently disparaging remarks that he occasionally makes on the art of 
rhetoric.  This is certainly the case for his On Saint Lucian, where he would have St. Lucian 
regard rhetoric as superfluous in the martyr’s contest.  What is implied here is not so much 
so a plain rejection of the value of rhetoric per se, but an exaltation of a different form of 
rhetoric, that is, the persuasiveness of the martyr’s life and deeds. 66  Furthermore, what we 
may easily forget is the important fact that the rhetoric of the martyr’s deed has, by 
Chrysostom’s time, become a thing of the past.  An important way in which its inspiring 
power can be resurrected or reanimated to arouse new audiences, like those listening to 
Chrysostom, is by means of a rhetorical exaltation of the martyrs.  This rhetoric of the 
martyr’s deed or the rhetoric of martyrdom will be the focus of the remaining chapter.  
Specifically, we will examine how Chrysostom appropriates the traditions of Greco-Roman 
rhetoric and Christian martyrdom as means of developing his own rhetorical approach 
                                                 
 65 4 Macc. 16.20; Macc. 1 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 141). 
 
 66 Luc. mart. 8. 
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towards exalting the martyrs.  Having done so, we will then consider how his distinctive 
rhetoric may contribute to the shaping of his listeners’ Christian identity.  
 
Chrysostom’s Rhetoric of Martyrdom 
The Martyr as Icon of Divine Power 
 Chrysostom’s high regard for the rhetorical power of the martyr’s deeds is, by no 
means, unique to him.  Writing almost three centuries earlier, Ignatius similarly remarks 
that his impending martyrdom is a vehicle of God’s message (λόγος θεοῦ), with a 
rhetorical force of its own.67  Yet, just like the deeds of his Lord Jesus Christ, this rhetorical 
force of Ignatius’ martyrdom, along with those of the other martyrs, can only be felt in the 
distant past, and cannot be appreciated immediately by Christians in the here and now.  
For this to happen, the rhetoric of Ignatius’ martyrdom must be mediated to each 
generation by means of speech, that is, a rhetorical re-enactment of the martyr’s acts, so 
that the plausibility and persuasiveness of his deeds may recapture the imagination of his 
new audiences.  In this sense, this recollection of the martyr’s lives is surely similar to the 
typical Greco-Roman encomium, where the acts of the subject are also retold persuasively, 
in order to convince the audience of the subject’s praiseworthiness.  Where it differs, I 
think, is the consistent conviction on the part of preachers, like Chrysostom, that the 
rhetorical force of a martyr is grounded not so much so on the persuasiveness of the 
                                                 
 67 While Ignatius does not consider his death as work of ‚persuasive rhetoric‛ (πειρμονῆς), 
he is undoubtedly convinced that his martyrdom would declare a powerful message, that is, by his 
very imitation of Christ’s death, he would also confirm the fact of Christ’s incarnation and death.  
This ‘rhetoric’, as Kelly has suggested, is mostly clearly aimed at the docetic teachings that emerged 
during this period.  Rom. 2.1, 4.2.  J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th revised ed. (London: A. 
and C. Black, 1977), 141. 
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orator’s words, but on the acts of the martyr himself.  There is a second and more 
important difference.  When a martyr is praised by Chrysostom, what is at stake here is not 
merely the exaltation of the martyr’s deeds and virtues.  Ultimately, his rhetoric of the 
martyr’s deed is iconic in intent, namely, to direct his listeners to the figure standing 
behind the martyr, that is, their common God, and to help them see afresh His power, 
glory and grace.   
 In Chrysostom’s homilies, this iconic nature of his rhetoric of martyrdom operates 
at different levels.    First of all, the martyr’s life may be portrayed as a means of confirming 
the veracity of Scriptures.  This can take the form of a straightforward illustration of 
biblical teachings, as in the case of his depiction of Bernike and her daughters’ fleeing from 
Antioch as a fulfilment of Matthew 10.21-23.  Equally common is a deductive application of 
the martyr’s experience.  This is best demonstrated in his repeated attempts to argue that 
the martyr’s valiant death, whether literally, or through the loss of the martyr’s tongue, is a 
convincing sign of Christ’s resurrection.68  A more subtle approach, however, is observed 
in his frequent comparison of the martyr with the familiar exemplars found in Scripture.  
As we discussed earlier, such comparisons are often helpful in elucidating the virtues of 
the martyrs concerned.  This elucidation, however, is by no means unilateral.  In many 
ways, the martyrs, chronologically and culturally speaking, are more proximate to 
Chrysostom’s Greco-Roman audiences than, say, the Iron Age figures of Abraham and 
David – a fact that is only enhanced by the presence of the martyrs’ graves and relics near 
the city.  Consequently, Chrysostom’s comparison of the martyrs with their biblical 
                                                 
 68 Ber. et Pros. 1; Dros. mart. 5. 
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counterparts, e.g., his comparison of St. Drosis’ death by the pyre with the three youths in 
Daniel 3, would serve not only to illuminate the virtue of St. Drosis herself, but also 
reaffirm the plausibility and exemplary character of the three youths’ story.69 
 Secondly, this iconic nature of Chrysostom’s martyrdom rhetoric is present in his 
homilies in the form of meta-narratives governing his discourse of the martyr’s virtues.  
Earlier, we have shown that Chrysostom’s praise of the martyrs frequently focuses on a 
unique attribute of the martyr’s life as a starting point for exalting his virtue.  Almost 
always, this focal point is an aspect of the martyr’s life that best demonstrates his human 
weakness.  More often than not, this is also a weakness that is commonly shared by most 
human beings.  Yet, it is exactly through this weakness that the martyr’s virtue is revealed, 
namely, as a transcendence of his weakness by the grace and power of God – an emphasis 
that is undoubtedly due to Chrysostom’s soteriological ideals.70  This meta-narrative is 
clearly operative in his Homily on the Maccabees, where the apparent weaknesses of Eleazar, 
the mother and her seven sons are emphasized, in order that his listeners ‚might learn in 
full the generosity and ineffable power of the one who set up the [martyrdom+ contest.‛71   
 It is, however, more clearly illustrated in his portrayal of the virgin martyr, Pelagia.  
In this homily, Chrysostom presents Pelagia as a ‚gentle girl, knowing nothing beyond her 
chamber.‛  Yet, when the soldiers came to arrest her, she had the courage to not only face 
them, but also to mislead them, so that she can retreat to her own chambers and boldly 
                                                 
 69 Dros. mart. 8. 
 
 70 Cf. Chapter 3 for how the meta-narrative of transcendence functions as a narrative 
embodiment of Chrysostom’s soteriology. 
 
 71 Macc. 1.3-4. 
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take her life to protect ‚the crown of her virginity.‛  For Chrysostom, such demonstration 
of courage and wisdom by a youthful and inexperienced virgin can be due only to the help 
of God.  It was God’s aid, he explains, that first enabled her to develop these personal 
qualities.  Similarly, it was Christ’s support that encouraged her in those last moments 
when she was about to take her life in her chamber:   
she wasn’t alone inside, but had Jesus as an adviser.  He was by her side, he touched 
her heart, he cheered her soul, he alone cast out her fear.  He didn’t do these things at 
random, but because the martyr had made herself worthy of his help.72 
 
Chrysostom is, of course, deploying here a narrative device common in the Acta 
Martyrorum, that is, the motif of divine presence, by claiming that Pelagia had Jesus by her 
side to encourage her.  By using this motif, he is undoubtedly conjuring the ideas of  
divine approval, aid and encouragement regularly associated with this device.73  Having 
said this, there is a distinct difference between Chrysostom’s appropriation of this divine 
presence motif, both here and elsewhere in his martyr homilies, and that which is 
commonly found in the Acta.  In the Acta, the divine presence motif is usually subsumed 
under the more important meta-narrative of participatio Christo, where the martyr is 
ultimately exemplary because he is a conscious imitator of, or participant in Christ’s 
sufferings.74  While this meta-narrative persists in Chrysostom’s homilies, the more 
                                                 
 72 Pel. vir. Mart. 1 (Mayer, Let us Die, 152). 
 
 73 Such a rendering of this motif is already present in the Martyrdom of Polycarp, where 
Christ is presented as ‚standing by and conversing with‛ the Smyrnaen martyrs.  Later, Polycarp 
would be similarly encouraged by hearing a divine voice, just before his trial.  mart. Poly. 2.2. 
 
 74 The entire Martyrdom of Polycarp, for example, is intended to depict the martyr as an 
exemplary participant in Christ’s passion.  The Acts of Carpus, Papylus, and Agathonice similarly 
concludes by having Carpus thank Christ for counting him ‚worthy of having this share *of 
martyrdom+ in you.‛  Likewise, the martyrs of Lyons are portrayed as being ‚intensely eager to 
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dominant meta-narrative in Chrysostom’s homilies is now that of the martyr’s 
transcendence over his humanity by the grace of God.  It is this meta-narrative, I believe, 
that controls not only Chrysostom’s use of the divine presence motif, but also the other 
literary devices that he inherits from the Acta traditions.  In other words, the Pauline notion 
of ‚his power is perfected in weakness‛ (2 Cor. 12.9) has overtaken the prevailing meta-
narrative of participatio Christo in Chrysostom’ portrayal of the martyrs.75   
 Apart from this motif of divine presence, Chrysostom’s rhetorical conception of 
martyrdom is also indebted to the Acta traditions in several ways.  Of these, the most 
obvious is his keen adoption of the literary motifs used in the Acta’s depiction of the 
martyrs.  The martyrs, St. Barlaam and the Maccabeans, for example, are readily presented 
as athletes engaged in a contest for God, being cheered on by the angels and archangels.76  
Elsewhere, the martyrs, in general, are praised as ‚a battle-array and squadron of martyrs‛ 
engaged, obviously, in spiritual warfare against the Devil and his dominions.77  Quite often, 
he would also present martyrs, especially those who are female and virgins, as brides of 
Christ.  Thus he would reconceive St. Drosis’ death at the pyre as a bridal procession, 
where the martyr is escorted by the angels to her bridegroom and ‚holy bridal canopy‛ in 
                                                                                                                                                    
imitate and emulate Christ‛ through their deaths.  Mart. Carp. Pa. Ag. 41; The Martyr of Lyons 2.2 
(Musurillo, Acts of Christian Martyrs, 27, 83). 
 
 75 This is most clearly stated in his Homily 1 on the Maccabees, where Chrysostom remarks 
that God uses as martyrs those who are, humanly speaking, weak, in order to demonstrate his 
‚generosity and ineffable power.‛  Macc. 1.4 .  
 
 76 Barl. mart. 8; Macc. 2.2. 
 
 77 S. martyr. 1. See also Juv. Max. mart. 7. 
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heaven.78  Similarly, the scene where Bernike leads her daughters into the river is regarded 
not so much so as a mother drowning her children, but rather as a mother ‚escorting them 
under the holy bridal canopy itself.‛79   
 Like the Acta, Chrysostom regularly interprets these motifs within an eschatological 
framework.  Hence, the martyrs do not so much so die as to have ‚raced up to the holy 
city,‛ being carried off or escorted by the angels to the ‚crowns of righteousness‛ awaiting 
them in heaven.80  Nevertheless, he does differ from the Acta in one significant way, 
namely, his more elaborate conception of the martyr as an angelic figure in his homilies.  
To be sure, this idea is already implicit in the Apocalypse’s depiction of the martyrs as 
worshippers in heaven.81  Indeed, its clearest expression is already found in the first of the 
Acta genre, namely, the Martyrdom of Polycarp, where the Smyrnaen martyrs are praised as 
‚no longer humans but already angels.‛82  Despite this precedence, this martyr-angel motif, 
as it seems, is rarely emphasized explicitly in the subsequent Acta.83  This is, however, not 
                                                 
 78 Dros. mart. 9. 
 
 79 Ber. et Pros. 20 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 173). 
 
 80 Ber. et Pros. 19, Macc. 1.7; Juv. Max. mart. 13; s. martyr. 13. 
 
 81 Rev. 7.14-17. 
 
 82 mart. Poly. 2.3. 
 
 83 In the Acta compiled by Musurillo, this angelic motif would re-emerge only in the fourth 
century story of the martyrs, Agape, Irene, Chione and their Companions.  Here, the Diocletian 
martyrs are presented, first, as ascetic figures enjoying a heavenly life in the mountains, and, later, 
as participants in the angels’ endless praise of God in heaven upon their martyrdom.  Such a 
conception, however, is most likely indebted to the influence of the fourth century monastic 
movement, which tends to present the monks as ascetic and angelic figures, rather than the Acta 
tradition per se.  Nevertheless, it is not implausible that the Acta authors regarded the martyrs as 
angel-like beings, since the Acta regularly characterize the martyrs with narrative motifs 
reminiscent to those used for angels.  For further discussion, see Chapter 1’s discussion of the 
angelic motif in early Christian discourse, pp. 63-65.  mart. Ag. Ir. Ch. 1.1-3, 2.2. 
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the case for Chrysostom, who frequently depicts the martyrs as angelic figures, no different 
from their heavenly counterparts. 84  In his On the Holy Martyrs, he would even go so far as 
to assert that the martyrs are greater than the angels, since, unlike the angels, they can even 
mimic Christ’s death in their bodies.  They are 
in no way inferior to the host of angels which the patriarch Jacob saw, but readily 
comparable and equal to it.  For martyrs and angels are distinct in name only, but 
come together in works.  Angels inhabit heavens, but martyrs do too.  The former are 
ageless and immortal; this the martyrs will possess too.  Yes, but don’t the former 
have a nature that’s incorporeal?  And so what?  For even if the martyrs are enclosed 
in a body, yet it is immortal.  Rather even before immortality, Christ’s death adorns 
their bodies more than immortality.  The sky, decorated as it is with the chorus of 
stars, is not as brilliant as the bodies of the martyrs, decorated with their brilliant 
chorus of wounds.  As a result, because they died, through this above all they have 
the greater share and received their prizes before immortality, crowned by death.85  
 
 Given the paucity of references to the angelic motif in the Acta, it is unlikely that 
these sources would have provided Chrysostom a sufficient impetus to develop the motif 
in such elaborate terms.  Rather, his use of this motif is most likely due to the fourth 
century conception of the monk as both a successor of the martyr and an exemplary 
Christian who has recapitulated Adam’s angelic life in Paradise.86  Having said this, it is 
noteworthy that Chrysostom’s martyrs, more often than not, attain the angelic life only after 
they enter the contest of martyrdom, especially at their death.  This is not the case for his 
                                                 
 84 Mart. Aeg. 4; Juv. et Max. mart. 7. 
 
 85 S. martyr. 1 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 218-9). 
 
 86 This is put in somewhat different terms in On Saint Drosis, where Chrysostom remarks 
that ‚after his *Christ’s+ coming those who inhabit the earth developed *<+ from human beings into 
angels - all those who follow him in truth."  Cf. Chapter 4, pp. 192-93 for Chrysostom’s portrayal of 
the ascetic’s life as a recapitulation of Adam’s angelic life.  Dros. mart. 5 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 
197). 
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ascetic exemplars who are generally portrayed as having realized, at least to some degree, 
this spiritual perfection in their present lives. 
 
Rhetoric of Appropriation 
 Thus far, we have seen how Chrysostom’s rhetoric of the martyrs is, essentially, a 
rhetoric of plausibility, where all his oratorical skills are brought to bear to reanimate the 
martyrs’ deeds in his audiences’ mind, so as to convince them of the praiseworthiness of 
the martyrs concerned.  Furthermore, we have also drawn attention to the Christian 
aspects of his martyrdom rhetoric, the most important of which are the iconic nature of the 
martyrs’ deeds and the Christian meta-narratives that he regularly deploys to depict these 
martyrs.    When these different elements of his rhetoric are woven together, the end result 
is, most certainly, a very convincing picture of the martyr’s deeds and virtues.  In the case 
of a typical Greco-Roman encomium, this is also where the speech usually ends.   
 For Chrysostom, however, this is only the beginning of something much more 
important, namely, the persuasion of his audiences to appropriate the martyrs’ lives and 
virtues for themselves.  There are three aspects to this rhetoric of appropriation, namely, 
identification, imitation and veneration. With regards to identification, the aim here is to 
galvanize his listeners in such a way that they would take ‘ownership’ of the martyr 
concerned.  In other words, the martyr becomes not merely a virtuous person worthy of 
imitation, but is recognized, essentially, as a spiritual forefather beloved by his audiences.  
In Chrysostom’s homilies, this is often achieved through a rhetorical identification of his 
audience as participants in the martyr’s life, as may be seen in his concluding reflections on 
St. Ignatius’ martyrdom in Rome:  
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God removed him from you for a short time and happily gave him [back] to you with 
greater glory. And, just as those who borrow money pay back whatever they receive 
with interest, so too God, after using this valuable treasure among you for a short time 
and showing it to that city, gave it back to you with greater brilliance. My point is that 
you sent away a bishop, and received a martyr. You sent [him] away with prayers, and 
received [him] with crowns.  (italics mine)87  
 
The use of the second person plural here is clearly strategic, and aimed at incorporating 
Chrysostom’s audience into the martyr’s story.  By numbering them among those who had 
sent Ignatius to Rome and, later, celebrated the return of his relics, he would not only have 
bridged the chronological distance between his listeners and Ignatius, but, more 
importantly, rendered the martyr more endearing to them as well.88   
 A more striking example, however, is to be found in Chrysostom’s homily on St. 
Meletius, a bishop whom he also counts as a martyr.89  Unlike most martyrs, Meletius (d. 
381) died only recently and was personally known to many of the Antiochenes.  
Chrysostom takes full advantage of this by beginning his sermon with an appeal to his 
listeners’ love for their bishop: 
you demonstrate such good will concerning your shepherds, even after they are dead 
and gone. [<] you too are blessed because after you received the deposit of his love, you 
persisted in preserving it intact for the depositor up to the present.  [<] He is to be 
envied because he fathered such [daughters and] sons.  To be envied are you, to, 
because you were allotted such a father. (italics mine)90 
 
                                                 
 87 Ignat. mart. 17 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 115). 
  
 88 This homily is probably the earliest textual evidence of the translation of Ignatius’ relics 
to Antioch.  Lightfoot, however, doubts that the translation actually took place and considers 
Chrysostom’s reference as simply ‚an imaginary picture of the return of the relics.‛  Joseph Barber 
Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers: Ignatius and Polycarp Part 2, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1889), 46. 
    
 89 As mentioned in our earlier introduction to his homily on St. Babylas, Chrysostom 
Meletius is most probably the bishop who enthusiastically revered Babylas by building a 
martyrium for him and, more importantly, ‚preserved in himself the martyrs’ image.‛  hier. Bab. 10. 
 
 90 Mel. Ant. 1 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 42-3). 
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By depicting Meletius as a spiritual father to the Antiochenes, Chrysostom has once again 
united, by means of rhetoric, the lives of his audiences with that of their bishop.  Yet more 
is involved here, as may be seen in what he says immediately after this. 
Blessed Meletius, hidden in this coffin, is not evident to us with our physical eyes, yet 
through you, the fruit, the strength of his special grace is revealed. [<] For he has so 
inflamed your mind towards passion for him that you are heated through at just his 
name and are excited at the very mention of it. [<] For this is the custom of lovers and 
such is their habit, to embrace even just the names of their loved ones and to get heated 
up at their very mention, which is what you, too, have experienced in the case of this 
blessed man.91 
 
Given the popularity of Meletius among the Antiochenes, there is no reason to doubt that 
Chrysostom is describing a common sentiment here.  Nevertheless, I would also argue 
that this depiction of the Antiochenes’ relationship and love for Meletius is equally 
prescriptive about how his listeners should foster their memory of the bishop.  In other 
words, by idealizing the Antiochenes as the spiritual fruit of Meletius and the tangible 
means by which he still exists among them, and by presenting them as having such a 
passionate love for their bishop as that shared between lovers, Chrysostom is subtly 
reinforcing, or even establishing, how his listeners should remember  and adore this 
bishop-martyr. 
 In his martyr homilies, this second aspect of Chrysostom’s rhetoric of identification 
is, quite often, bound up with his constant exhortation of Christians to visit the graves of 
the martyrs. 92  Like many of his contemporaries, Chrysostom keenly recognizes that 
physicality and tangibility of the martyrium inadvertently deepens a Christian’s sense of 
                                                 
 91 Ibid. 1-2 (Ibid. 42). 
 
 92 Juv. Max. mart. 10; hom. in Matt. 37. 
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the martyr’s immediacy, or presence.  This, in turn, should yield many spiritual benefits 
for the Christian.   
that’s why God deposited in our hands the bodies of the saints until the time of the 
resurrection, so that we might have a rationale for a strict Christian way of life.93 
 
 Having said this, Chrysostom also clearly understands that a mere recollection of 
the martyr’s story and a proximity to his relics in no way guarantee a proper appropriation 
of both by his listeners.  For this reason, his encouragements to visit the martyriums are 
almost always accompanied by descriptions, or shall we say, instructions, on how the 
martyr’s story and relics should be incorporated into his audiences’ lives.  This is well-
demonstrated in his reflections on the relics of Julian.  His holy bones, explains 
Chrysostom, should become a ‚constant reminder of virtue‛ for Christians.94 
For even if a person is utterly lazy, they immediately leap up and become more 
enthused and bounce off to battle, when they see a fighter's armour [<] bloodied, 
taking encouragement from the sight of the weapons to attempt the same deeds.  Even 
if we’re utterly timid, how then won’t we have considerable enthusiasm when we see 
not weapons but the very body of the holy man that was honoured with being 
bloodied through its confessing Christ, when this sight is falling into our mind like a 
fire and summoning us to the same contest? 
 
Now, it is not self-evident that when a man sees a bloodied piece of armour, he would be 
inspired to continue the dead soldier’s battle.  The exact opposite is equally plausible.  
Likewise, the very sight of the martyr’s relics does not necessary encourage a Christian to 
imitate his spiritual contest.  Nevertheless, by interpreting the sight of the martyr’s relics 
along these lines, Chrysostom essentially provides a controlling narrative for how the 
martyr’s story and relics should be remembered and appropriated by his audiences.  
                                                 
 93 Jul. mart. 4 (Mayer, Let us Die, 137). 
 
 94 Ibid. (Ibid., 135). 
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Moreover, Chrysostom rarely leaves his instructions in abstracto, but often develops them 
in accordance to his listeners’ context, as it is the case for this homily, where he would add, 
moments later, that Julian’s body: 
doesn't just work miracles but also persuades on to live a Christian life.  For if you're 
rich and proud and have an inflated soul, when you come here and see the martyr, and 
work out the gap between your wealth and his riches, you'll at once suppress your 
conceit and shed your inflammation and so depart with considerable health in your 
soul.  If you consider yourself poor and contemptible, when you come and see the 
martyr's wealth and scorn the many out in the world you'll depart in such a way that 
you'll have filled yourself with much discipline. [...] When you see that you haven’t 
suffered as much as this holy martyr, you'll take back sufficient comfort from here.95 
 
 In other words, the very sight of the martyr’s body should remind his listeners about the 
true nature of Christian wealth, namely, that it resides not in one’s material riches, but in 
that of his soul.  It is for this reason that the rich should not become conceited, while the 
poor need not feel inferior about their poverty. 
 This paranetic aspect of the martyr’s memory brings us, next, to the second element 
of Chrysostom’s rhetoric of appropriation: imitation.  To be sure, the imitation of exemplary 
figures for one’s moral development is a deeply ingrained assumption among the Greco-
Romans, be they pagan or Christian.  Yet, Chrysostom is also keenly aware that, in the case 
of the martyrs, this is no straight forward matter, since opportunities for a literal 
martyrdom have largely disappeared in the post-Constantine era.  
‚How is it possible," you ask, "for us to imitate martyrs now?  After all, it isn't a time 
of persecution?" Yes, I know. Yet while it isn't a time of persecution, it is a time of 
martyrdom.  It isn't a time of wrestling matches of that sort, but it is a time of crowns. 
Human beings aren't in pursuit, but demons are in pursuit. A tyrant isn't in 
persecution mode, but the Devil's in persecution mode, crueller than any tyrant. You 
don't see burning coals lying in front of you, but you do see desire's flame kindled. 
They trampled on burning coals; trample on nature's pyre. They sparred with wild 
animals; bridle your anger, the savage and untamed wild animal. They stood fast 
against unbearable pains; subvert the unnatural and wicked thoughts that swell in 
                                                 
 95 Ibid. (Ibid., 137). 
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your heart. It's in this way you will imitate martyrs. "For our struggle now isn't 
against blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the 
cosmic powers of this darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil."  Nature's desire is 
a fire, a fire that is inextinguishable and constant. It is a rabid and mad dog; no matter 
how many times you get rid of it, it leaps at you every time and doesn't give up. The 
flame of the burning coals is savage, but this is crueller – that is, the flame of desire.96 
 
 What Chrysostom is advocating here is a form of white martyrdom that 
emphasizes a spiritual, rather than a literal death.  Structured along the lines of Greco-
Roman virtue ethics, it is a call for Christians to slay the sinful desires (ἐπιθυμία) that 
constantly plague them, in order that they might develop the same virtues that had once 
enabled the martyrs to embrace their deaths.97  With regard to the form that this teaching 
takes in Chrysostom’s martyr homilies, it is quite varied and is largely a function of both 
the martyr’s life and the spiritual condition of his listeners.   Quite often, Chrysostom 
would perceive certain aspects of the martyr’s life as commonly shared by his audiences 
and encourage his listeners to imitate the martyr in this aspect.  It is with this in mind that 
both the Maccabean mother and Bernike are commended as exemplary figures for mothers 
listening to their stories, while St. Lucian, with his patient endurance of starvation, is 
presented as an apt reminder for Christians not to indulge in gluttony.98  Having said this, 
the martyrs also commonly exemplify the virtues of spiritual courage, patience and 
                                                 
 96 Barl. Mart. 2 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 180). 
 
 97 Such a spiritualization of martyrdom is not unique to Chrysostom, but is often practised 
by other fourth century fathers, such as Basil and Gregory of Nyssa (cf. Basil’s A homily on the 
Martyr Gordius and Gregory’s A homily on Theodore the Recruit).  Although developed in the third 
century by fathers such as Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, the earliest roots of this concept 
may be traced to the epistles of Paul (Rom. 6, Phil. 3), where we find the apostle teaching that a 
Christian may identify with Christ’s death and resurrection through his death to sin.  Finally, as we 
mentioned earlier, such ascetic cultivation of virtues is readily recognized by most fathers as a 
means of Christian deification.  Malone, The Monk and the Martyr, 5-40. 
 
 98 Macc. 1.8, 2.2; Ber. et Pros. 23; Luc. mart. 9. 
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endurance under tribulation, and it is this particular paradigm that Chrysostom calls upon 
most often in his frequent attacks against, what he perceives to be, the common spiritual 
ills of his audiences, such as spiritual laziness, indulgence in luxury and the despondency 
of the poor and sick.99 
 A final aspect of this rhetoric of imitation is the so-called multiplying of texts, or the 
narratives of the martyrs.  As mentioned earlier, this is commonly understood as the 
development of further narratives about the relics of the martyrs – a narrative device that 
will be taken up shortly in our discussion of Chrysostom’s rhetoric of veneration.  I would 
argue, however, that there is a second feature to this ‘multiplying’ of martyr texts and this 
relates to how the martyr’s story is incorporated into that of another exemplary figure.  In 
Chrysostom’s homiletical portrayal of Meletius, the bishop clearly comes across as an 
exemplary leader in his own right.  Indeed, Chrysostom goes so far as to claim that God 
had summoned Meletius to the Council of Constantinople, in order that bishops from all 
over the world might watch ‚that holy man‛ and learn from him ‚every virtue appropriate 
to a priest.‛  Having said this, Meletius, for Chrysostom, is also an exemplary figure 
because he demonstrates in his own life how one might appropriate a martyr’s deeds and 
virtues, be it in his reverence of Babylas’ relics, or in his imitation of the martyr’s virtues.100   
                                                 
 99 mart. Aeg. 5; Macc. 1.11; Dros. mart. 6; Pel. vir. Mart. 3, Romanum 12; Jul. mart. 2. 
 
 100 hier. Bab. 10. 
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 A similar stance is observed in Chrysostom’s tribute to Eustathius.101  Here, the 
Antiochene bishop, Flavian, is identified as yet another person who imitates a martyr’s 
virtues, in this case, Eustathius’, in his own life: 
It was on the basis, too, of this training [that is, Paul’s admonition in Acts 20.25-28] that 
blessed Eustathius gave advice to his own disciples.  So, when this wise and noble 
teacher [Flavian] heard this advice, he brought the theory to fruition in practice.102 
 
Once again, by narrating how the virtues of Eustathius are re-enacted in the life of Flavian, 
Chrysostom is also asserting that the martyr’s legacy, or indeed, the rhetoric of his deeds, 
endures even after his time.  As a matter of fact, the stories of the two bishops have become 
one, with Flavian’s story becoming an extension of that of Eustathius.  What is more 
important is also the fact that this new story has become, for the present audience, a 
powerful sign and reminder of how one might perpetuate the life and virtues of the martyr 
is their own lives.      
 This rhetoric of the martyr’s acts, however, is not merely re-enacted in process of 
imitatio martyrium.  For Chrysostom, it is also actualized in the third and final element of 
his rhetoric of appropriation, namely, his rhetoric of veneration.  In his On the Holy Martyr 
Ignatius, Chrysostom likens the martyr to: 
a perpetual warehouse that is drained day after day and does not run dry, 
and makes all who share in it more prosperous, so indeed too this blessed 
Ignatius sends back home full of blessings, confidence, noble thoughts, and a 
great deal of courage those who come to him.103 
                                                 
 101 Although Eustathius did not die a martyr’s death, Chrysostom, nevertheless, ‚styles him 
as a martyr by virtue of Eustathius’ suffering for his confession of Nicene Christianity in the face of 
Arianism.‛  Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 49; Eus. Ant. 5. 
 
 102 Eus. Ant. 10. 
 
 103 Ignat. mart. 17 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 115).   
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What Chrysostom has in mind here is, once again, expressive of the sentiments common 
among his contemporaries, such as Gregory of Nyssa.104  For Chrysostom, the rhetorical 
force of the martyr’s life is not simply confined to the exemplary value of his deeds.  
Rather, it is also expressed in more tangible ways.  First of all, despite his physical death, 
the martyr is regarded as very much alive and present among the contemporary 
Christians, joining them even in their martyrs’ feasts.  It is for this reason that Chrysostom 
would unhesitatingly declare that the martyr, Julian, is: 
watching from nearby, and being close and standing next to the table [of the 
martyrium] itself, doesn't allow the enjoyment to give itself over to sin.  Instead, 
like a tutor or an excellent father, he watches with the eyes of faith and checks 
the laughter [of Christians.105  
 
Beyond this, the martyrs are also active participants in the Christians’ prayers, acting 
frequently as their patrons and interceding before God on their behalf.106 
Let us entreat them [Bernike, Prosdoke and Domnina], let us ask them to be our 
patrons.  For they possess much boldness of speech, not just when they were alive, but 
also now that they are dead – and far more that they are dead.  For now they bear the 
marks of Christ and when they display these marks they can persuade the King of 
anything.  So, since they have so much power and friendship with God, by rendering 
ourselves as one of their own through constant attendance and perpetually coming to 
them, let us embrace through them the loving kindness that comes from God.107 
 
By asserting that the martyrs are very much ‘alive’ and participating in the life of the 
Church, Chrysostom is, essentially, declaring anew that the rhetoric of the martyrs’ acts is 
not merely a thing of the past, but continues to reverberates, even now, in the life of the 
                                                 
 104 See pp. 250.  Clark, Christianity and Roman Society, 57-58. 
 
 105 Jul. mart. 4 (Mayer, Let us Die, 137). 
 
 106 Mel. Ant. 10 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 48). 
 
 107 It is noteworthy that this regard for the martyrs is widespread in both the Latin and 
Greek Churches.  Ber. et Pros. 24 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 175-6); Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints: 
Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (London: SCM, 1981), 5-6. 
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Church.   This rhetoric of the martyrs’ deeds is also actualized in another more powerful 
way.  Speaking of the martyrs, Juventinus and Maximinus, Chrysostom calls them 
pillars, and lookouts, and guard-towers and light-sources, and bulls.  For truly like 
pillars they hold up the Church, and like guard-towers they wall it in, and like lookouts 
who beat off every plot, they create a great deal of calm for those inside. And like light-
sources they drove away the darkness of impiety and like bulls in body and soul, with 
equal enthusiasm, they dragged Christ's trusty yoke.108 
 
Certainly, Chrysostom has in mind here the exemplary value of the martyrs, that is, their 
virtuous lives can help discourage vice and inspire virtue within Christians.  Nevertheless, 
he also regards these same statements as attesting to the miraculous power that is 
displayed, time and again, by the martyr’s relics and graves, whether it is through the 
healing of sickness, exorcism of demons, or even the fending off of enemies from the 
city.109  As Chrysostom explains, this power is grounded not so much so in the martyr 
himself, but in the power of the Holy Spirit, who once helped the martyr triumph in his 
acts, and continues to do so through his relics.  
 This belief is well-illustrated in Chrysostom’s narration of the Babylas’ ‘conflict’ 
with Julian, which we mentioned in our introduction.  In this homily, Chrysostom speaks 
of the martyr’s body as not ‚bereft of animating energy.‛ Instead, ‚a second power greater 
than the soul itself, infuses it - the grace of the Holy Spirit, which, through the miracles it 
performs, confesses to all about the resurrection.‛110  It is on the basis of this power that 
                                                 
 108 Juv. Max. mart. 9 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 99). 
 
 109 Dros. mart. 10; Jul. mart. 4. 
 
 110 Elsewhere, in his praise of Ignatius, Chrysostom claims that the Spirit’s power is present 
even in the coffin of the martyr.  In this same homily, we also find his further justification of the 
powers of the relics.  Specifically, he argues that this power was already present in the old 
dispensation, when the coffin of Elisha displayed a similar healing power (2 Kgs 13.21).  This being 
the case, the new dispensation, with its more abundant spiritual blessings, should naturally enjoy a 
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the rhetoric of Babylas’ martyrdom is re-enacted, this time through a new contest between 
his relics and the oracle of Daphne.  Initially, it would appear that the demonic forces, 
through Julian’s hands, had triumphed over Babylas by having the martyr’s relics 
disinterred from Daphne.  On the contrary, it was Babylas who turned out to be the final 
victor, since the temple of Apollo was subsequently consumed by flames.  For Chrysostom, 
this was immediately taken as a sign of the martyr’s vindication by  God and his triumph 
over his demonic foes – a fact that was supposedly confirmed by Julian’s reluctance to 
‚unleash his anger on the martyr’s martyrium‛ as revenge for the conflagration.111  
 As Brown and others have pointed out, the investment of such power in the 
martyrs, particularly the efficacy of their prayers and relics, is a phenomenon that is 
unprecedented in the Greco-Roman world.112  Nonetheless, it is also apparent that these 
convictions took root very quickly in both the Greek and Latin Church by the late fourth 
century, though not without objections from some quarters.113  As Markus has shown, this 
practice may be understood as an attempt by the post-Constantine Christians to bridge the 
                                                                                                                                                    
greater degree of such spiritual power, as one does see in the powers of the martyrs’ relics and 
coffins.  hier. Bab. 2 (Mayer, Let us Die, 143); Ignat. mart. 18 (Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 116).   
 
 111 Hier. Bab. 8 (Mayer, Let Us Die, 146-7). 
 
 112 Brown,  5; Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 15-19. 
 
 113 The immediate opponents that Chrysostom has in mind are probably pagans, like Julian 
and Libanius.  Yet, it is not implausible that he is also addressing some among his listeners who 
remain sceptical of this practice.  This is evident in the fact that Chrysostom frequently appeals to 
the Scriptures for justifications of his case, an appeal which will sound rather hollow if not spoken 
to a fellow Christian.  Indeed, this objection is explicitly raised elsewhere by a presbyter, Vigilantius, 
against whom Jerome had to launch a defence for the cult. Bab. Jul. et gen. 9; Jerome, C. vig.; Josef 
Lossl, "An Early Christian Identity Crisis Triggered by Changes in the Discourse of Martyrdom: The 
Controversy between Jerome of Strido and Vigilantius of Calagurris," in More Than a Memory: The 
Discourse of Martyrdom and the Construction of Christian Identity in the History of Christianity, Annua 
Nuntia Lovaniensia (Leuven ; Dudley, Mass.: Peeters, 2005), 97. 
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‚generation gap‛ between the martyrs and themselves, that is, to convince themselves that 
‚essentially, nothing had changed and that their Church was still the Church of the 
martyrs.‛  Indeed, 
no radical break could be allowed to divide the triumphant Church of the 
fourth and later centuries from its persecuted predecessor.  The past had to be 
kept alive in the Church’s mind, and not only alive, but renewed in the novel 
conditions of its existence.114 
  
Nevertheless, more can be said regarding Chrysostom’s rhetoric of veneration, beyond its 
role of establishing the chronological and spiritual continuity between the martyrs and the 
present day Christians.  His claims that the martyrs are very much ‘alive’ in the here and 
now, be it through their intercessory prayers or the power of their relics, can also be 
understood as attempts to recapture the dynameis that have once animated the rhetoric of 
the martyrs’ acts and to insist that the same power is still available for his listeners.  In 
other words, his language of veneration is, ultimately speaking, iconic, intended to direct 
his audiences’ focus back to the power, love and glory of God, so that they might also be 
similarly transformed by Him. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have demonstrated the clear continuities between Chrysostom’s 
rhetoric of martyrdom, and the Greco-Roman rhetorical and Christian martyrdom 
traditions that he was brought up with.  Generally speaking, his martyr homilies conform 
                                                 
 114 R. A. Markus, The End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 90. 
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to the literary structure of Greco-Roman epideictic rhetoric and deploy most, if not all, of 
the narrative motifs and themes commonly used in the Acta Martyrorum.  Having said this, 
there are several unique features in his rhetoric of martyrdom that distinguish him from 
both his Greco-Roman and Christian predecessors.  These same rhetorical features also 
play an important role in establishing and clarifying Chrysostom’s ideological intentions 
for the martyr as an exemplary figure.  
 There are two central aspects to Chrysostom’s rhetoric of martyrdom.  The first is 
his rhetoric of the martyrs’ deeds, where the goal is to reanimate the martyrs’ lives and 
deeds in his audience’s mind, so as to render the martyrs’ virtues plausible to them.  In 
this respect, Chrysostom is clearly indebted to the conventions of Greco-Roman epideictic 
oratory, with its deployment of rhetorical techniques such as the ēthopoiia, ekphrasis and 
synkriseis as means of rendering the martyrs’ feats credible to his listeners.   
 Having said this, Chrysostom also differs significantly from his Greco-Roman 
counterparts in that his rhetoric is always iconic in nature, namely, his goal is always to 
redirect his audience’s focus to the God who has empowered the martyrs.  This is clearly 
shown in his frequent use of the meta-narrative of transcendence as a way of upholding 
the martyr as a paradeigma of the Christian’s potential for transcending his human 
weaknesses and attaining greater heights of spiritual perfection through the power of God.  
Indeed, this meta-narrative is to sharply distinguish his rhetoric from not only his pagan 
counterparts but also the Acta traditions’ tendency to present the martyrs’ lives as 
participatio Christo.  To be sure, the notion of participation in Christ’s sufferings continues 
to be an important theme in Chrysostom’s ethical framework.  Nonetheless, it is now 
subsumed under the more important spiritual trait of dependence on God’s aid as a means 
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of transcending one’s human limitations and attaining spiritual perfection, or indeed, 
deification. 
 Nevertheless, the continuities between Chrysostom’s martyr homilies and the Acta 
traditions are also manifestly clear, whether it is his belief in God’s unique presence 
during a martyr’s sufferings, or his conviction that death represents not so much the end 
for the martyr but his entry into the eschatological blessings of God.  Even so, Chrysostom 
is to develop his own unique eschatological vision through his homiletical portrayal of the 
martyr as being a participant in the angelic life.  In doing so, the martyr is reconceived as 
yet another exemplary figure for the angelic lifestyle which Chrysostom is convinced that 
every Christian should realize not only in the eschaton but also, to some degree, in the here 
and now.115  
 As to the second major feature of Chrysostom’s martyr discourse, it is his rhetoric 
of appropriation.  Having convinced his listeners about the plausibility of the martyrs’ 
virtues, Chrysostom’s objective here is to persuade them to further identify with and, 
therefore, love the martyrs, so that they would not only willingly imitate their saintly lives, 
but also venerate them.  Of course, many aspects of his rhetoric here are not without 
precedence in Greco-Roman oratory, especially his call for the imitation of the martyrs.  
Nevertheless, there are several oratorical features that are clearly unique to Chrysostom 
and, I believe, indebted to his Christian worldview.  Among these, the most distinguished 
feature is his language of veneration, which, ultimately, is an insistence that the power 
                                                 
 115 See Chapter 1 for his didactic teachings on the angelic life of the Christian. 
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that once animated the rhetoric of the martyrs’ deeds remains very much available for the 
spiritual transformation of his listeners.  
 Clearly then, the Christian martyr, as portrayed by Chrysostom’s rhetoric of 
martyrdom, is an important exemplar whose very life and death embodies and reinforces 
the Christian ideals that Chrysostom holds dear, such as a wholehearted dependence on 
God’s aid for transcendence over one’s human weaknesses, the importance of cultivating 
the life of the angels and the belief in God’s presence and aid during times of sufferings.  
In addition, Chrysostom’s martyrdom rhetoric also effectively enriches his vision of the 
Christian life in two ways.  The first is its constant reminder to his audiences that the 
dynamis theou that once animated the martyrs remains available for them.  As for the 
second, it is his rhetoric’s continual insistence that Christian self-identity is to be grounded 
upon one’s conscious appropriation of the lives and aspirations of the saints, and also his 
communion with the same.
281 
CONCLUSION 
 In the summer of 2008, my family and I headed for the cinema to watch what we 
had been anticipating eagerly for the last two and a half years: the screening of Prince 
Caspian, the second in the series of films that are based on C.S. Lewis’ epic fantasy, The 
Chronicles of Narnia.1  However, as ardent fans of the novel, we were less than pleased to 
see what seemed to us to be a rather poor adaptation of the story and an unnecessary re-
characterization of one of its leading characters: High King Peter.2  Gone is Lewis’s noble 
and mature Peter Pevensie, who had the wisdom to remind Susan, his sister, not to behave 
like a kid, since she is back in Narnia, where she is a Queen.3  In his place is a teenager 
who is not only struggling with an identity crisis but allows his pride to go disastrously 
awry by leading the Narnians into a premature battle and an unnecessary slaughter by the 
Telmarines.4 
 Setting aside my personal ‘grievances’, the screenwriters’ re-conceptualization of 
Lewis’s lofty king is intriguing, since this new Peter is, in many ways, not unlike a twenty-
first-century adolescent.  Despite all his flaws, this new Peter would eventually rise to the 
occasion, overcome his weaknesses and, ultimately, triumph over his enemies.  By doing 
                                                 
 1 C.S. Lewis, Prince Caspian, Chronicles of Narnia (New York: HarperCollins Children's 
Books, 1951; reprint, 2008). 
 
 2 Several of the novel’s central themes, as Arkelian points out, such as ‚faith, renewal, and 
rejoicing‛ did not make it to the screen intact.  On the whole, the film is, as the title of Arkelian’s 
review, puts it, ‚long on action, short on faith.‛ Jon Arkelian, "Narnia Film Long on Action, Short 
on Faith", The Anglican Church of Canada 
http://www.anglicanjournal.com/culture/040/article/narnia-film-long-on-action-short-on-
faith/?cHash=6d96658f96 (accessed 24 March 2010). 
  
 3 Lewis,  32-33. 
 
 4 This is, of course, my reader response and I suspect that not a few lovers of the movie 
might disagree with my assessment. 
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so, he also becomes, for his teenage audience, a hero figure that they can readily identify 
with and find plausible.5 
 Though preceding the Narnian screenwriters by more than 1,600 years, 
Chrysostom similarly understood that an exemplary figure is, essentially, an ideological 
construct, whose persuasive power is dependent largely on its plausibility to its audiences.  
Where he differs from these screenwriters is the fact that his exemplar discourse is 
conducted in quite a different historical and cultural context.  In Chrysostom’s world of 
Late Antiquity, exemplar discourse was dictated predominantly by five streams of 
exemplar traditions: Greco-Roman paideia, philosophical ethics, biographical and 
rhetorical traditions, and the Christian heritage to which Chrysostom belonged.   
 In this thesis, we have contended that the reading strategies and analytical 
frameworks assumed by these different traditions played an influential role in shaping 
Chrysostom’s approach to exemplar portraits.  When due attention is paid to these 
hermeneutical principles, what we gain is a better understanding of not only how 
Chrysostom constructed these exemplar portraits, but, more importantly, his pedagogical 
and ideological objectives for these literary constructs and the role that they can play in 
elucidating his didactic teachings in general.  In other words, we believe that a 
hermeneutics of exemplar portraits can be developed to facilitate our interpretation of 
Chrysostom’s writings.  So, what does such a hermeneutics of exemplar portraits look like?  
Where can it be applied?  What interpretative benefits does it yield? 
                                                 
 5 Rebecca Cusey, "'Prince Caspian' Walks Tightrope for Christian Fans", USA Today 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-05-16-narnia-christian-caspian_N.htm (accessed 24 
March 2010). 
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 We began in Chapter 1 by arguing that Chrysostom’s education under the system 
of enkyklios paideia would have cultivated in him a deep conviction that imitatio exemplorum 
is both an important and natural way for a person to communicate his ideas and 
worldviews effectively in the Late Antique world.  Within this pedagogical framework, 
the principle of imitatio exemplorum is applicable to the most mundane of learning activities, 
such as the copying of Greek alphabets onto one’s wax tablets.  Yet, as Chrysostom and his 
peers would have recognized, the principle has a far more significant and popular role, 
that is, its ability to communicate one’s ethical ideals.  As we have seen over the course of 
the last five chapters, this is also the primary function that Chrysostom has in mind for his 
exemplar portraits: as embodiments of his ethical ideals and the theology upon which 
these ideals are grounded.   
 In terms of his ethical approach, Chrysostom differs little from his pagan 
counterparts in that he generally conforms to the ethical principles and framework 
bequeathed to him by the Greco-Roman tradition of virtue ethics.  Like the Platonists, he is 
quite at ease speaking about the need for a Christian to discipline his reason, so that it can 
guide the irrational aspects of his soul towards cultivating the aretai.  Likewise, 
Chrysostom is also not averse to presuming a multiplicity of Christian aretai on some 
occasions, while arguing for the unity of the same in other situations.  When defending the 
superiority of celibacy over marriage, he thinks it natural to appropriate the Platonic 
distinction between goods in nature and external goods, and to count monasticism among 
the former while relegating marriage to the latter. 
 Having said this, there are also distinctive Christian overtones to Chrysostom’s 
conception of virtue ethics.  Influenced by his Christian heritage, he would conceive 
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eudaimonia as primarily realized in one’s participation in God’s agapē and His love for 
humanity.  Such a conception of eudaimonia would, in turn, have three implications for his 
understanding of aretai.  First of all, it brings him into agreement with the Platonists and 
many of the early Christians that the cultivation of divine likeness and aretai is a crucial 
means by which one attains eudaimonia.  Secondly, it leads him to regard external goods as 
not only expressions of God’s agapē for humanity but also as instrumental in nature, in 
that external goods are to find their proper excellence in the degree to which they are 
serviceable to God.  Thirdly, within such an ethical framework, the aretē of the human 
nature can only be understood teleologically.  Specifically, the body is regarded as enaretos 
only when it subjects itself to the leadership of the soul.  Likewise, the soul becomes 
enaretos only when attains its proper end, that is, to exercise rational rule over the body 
and to rely on the aid of the Spirit to participate in the agapē of God. 
 Another aspect of Christian influence upon Chrysostom’s ethics is to be seen in his 
preference for the motif of the angelic life as a symbol of the human telos, rather than the 
more abstract Platonic conception of eudaimonia as attaining the life of the gods.  
Specifically, every Christian, at the eschaton, is to become like the angel by attaining 
immortality, celibacy, moral virtue and a citizenship in heaven.  Having said this, there 
remain distinct differences between the Christian and his heavenly counterpart, namely, 
the Christian is to live his angelic life in the body and by the Holy Spirit’s help. 
 Contrary to the assessment of many theologians, what Chrysostom is propounding 
here is not mere Christian moralism.  Rather, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 3, his 
ethical vision is grounded in a robust Christology, soteriology and eschatology.  In line 
with the Irenaean, Athanasian and Cappadocian traditions, Chrysostom conceives the 
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Incarnation as both the means of human salvation and also the prefiguration of human 
telos.  By the Son’s Incarnation, a way has been opened up for all humanity to become 
deified in the flesh through their union with Christ by the Holy Spirit.  This is actualized 
in every Christian whenever the Holy Spirit recreates him into the Image of Christ by 
enabling him to live a life that is increasingly divine, though resolutely human.  For 
Chrysostom, to live such a divine and human life is also tantamount to participation, no 
doubt in a progressive manner, in the victorious recapitulation of Christ.  Seen from this 
perspective then, the motif of the angelic life is but a way for Chrysostom to articulate a 
more glorious end for the Christian, that is, deification. 
 As to how Chrysostom articulates these soteriological and ethical ideals in his 
exemplars, this is achieved primarily through the narrative strategies and rhetorical 
techniques that he learnt from Greco-Roman biographies and rhetoric.  With respect to the 
former, they would have nurtured in Chrysostom an innate sense of how narrative motifs 
may be deployed to characterize his exemplars and accentuate his soteriological and 
ethical ideals.  This ideological appropriation of narrative motifs operates at three levels.  
First of all, narrative motifs are frequently used in an episodic manner, intended to 
communicate a straightforward ethical point.  This is well illustrated in his narrations of 
David’s repentance for his adultery, which, on one occasion, is held up as an example of 
Christian humility, while, on another, as a reminder of divine judgment over sin.   
 Secondly, whenever Chrysostom uses a narrative motif, he would generally take 
on board the ethical or soteriological ideals associated with this motif.  Notwithstanding 
this, he is also quite prepared to reconceive the narrative motif and its associated ideals in 
a manner that allows him to express his own distinctive ethical and soteriological vision.  
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This is clearly the case for his adoption of the angelic life motif.  Traditionally, in earlier 
Judeo-Christian writings, the motif is used mostly as a way of denoting the immortal and 
heavenly life of the faithful, or to stress the inferiority of humanity vis-à-vis the angels.  
Certainly these attributes are still presumed by Chrysostom whenever he speaks of an 
exemplary figure as angelic, as in the case of his many portrayals of the Christian monks.  
Nevertheless, Chrysostom is also quite prepared to reconceive the same motif creatively 
for his own pedagogical purposes.  
 Take his narration of David’s encounter with Saul at the cave, for example.  Here, 
one of the ways that Chrysostom marks out the Israelite king as a distinctively Christian 
exemplar is to regard David’s way of life as no different from the angels.  In other words, 
the angelic motif is now redefined by Chrysostom as a distinctive sociological marker for 
Christian identity.  In the case of his Pauline portraits, however, the same angelic motif 
would become for Chrysostom not a symbol of human inferiority but more so a means of 
declaring a Christian’s deification.  This is surely the intent underlying Chrysostom’s 
frequent exaltation of Paul as being greater than the angels – a rhetorical move that is 
aimed at proclaiming afresh God’s promise that all Christians can attain the heights of 
divinity in Christ.6 
 Having said this, there is a third and more important feature in Chrysostom’s 
appropriation of narrative motifs.  More often than not, he will deploy these literary 
devices by organizing them around specific meta-narratives, so that these devices may 
better communicate the ideologies implicit in these meta-narratives.  In the course of our 
                                                 
 6 Another multivalent motif that Chrysostom often deploys is the motif of virginity.  See 
Chapter 4, pp. 198-206. 
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study, we have identified three meta-narratives that, we believe, are important for his 
exemplar portraits in general.  The first is the enkōmion paradigm which Chrysostom 
inherited from the Greco-Roman biographical and rhetorical traditions – a narrative 
framework that essentially endorses the classical belief that human excellence is a function 
of a person’s God-given phusis and the training that his phusis receives.  This meta-
narrative is evidently assumed in one of Chrysostom’s portrayals of David’s duel with 
Goliath, where David is portrayed as possessing a kingly affection for his people even 
before he became a king, an affection which he presumably developed during his days as 
a shepherd boy.  It is also present in one of his rationalizations of David’s adultery, which 
Chrysostom takes to be the mere result of circumstances, rather than due to David’s nature 
and training.  
 Nevertheless, Chrysostom’s appropriation of this enkōmion paradigm is often not 
straightforward.  Indeed, most of his exemplar portraits are clearly aimed at subverting 
the ethical heart of this paradigm.  As we have demonstrated, Chrysostom, in direct 
opposition to Platonic ethics, believes that human excellence is founded not so much on 
the quality of one’s phusis but upon the aid and grace of God.  The consequence of this is 
that the enkōmion paradigm, with its positive correlation of human phusis and aretai, cannot 
be adopted for his Christian exemplars without a fundamental reconception of this 
narrative framework.  This, Chrysostom achieves, largely through a conscious demeaning 
of his exemplar’s origins, whether it is King David, the apostle Paul, or the Phoenician 
prostitute.  By doing so, Chrysostom also successfully brings the enkōmion paradigm in 
line with the second meta-narrative that he commonly uses for his exemplars: the meta-
narrative of transcendence. 
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 As explained in the analysis of Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits in Chapter 3, the 
object of this meta-narrative of transcendence is to exalt the exemplar as an example of 
God’s deifying work by laying stress on the ways in which the exemplar has transcended 
his human nature.  Within such a narrative scheme, the demeaning of the exemplar’s 
origins has two functions.  The first is to bring into relief the spiritual heights to which 
such a lowly creature has ascended and, in the process, magnify the divine grace that has 
enabled this ascent.  The second is to hold up the exemplar as a demonstration of what a 
Christian, no matter how inferior his nature may be, can potentially attain through the 
grace and power of God.  This, in turn, redefines the exemplar as not simply another role 
model of Christian living but, indeed, the sign and icon of God’s grace and ineffable 
power.   
 With regard to the third meta-narrative, it is the encapsulation of Chrysostom’s 
soteriological conviction that Christian salvation is no less than being refashioned into the 
Imago Christi, which is both human and divine.  Essentially, this calls for the exemplar to 
be portrayed as one who, despite his humanity, is able to recapitulate the deified life of 
Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit.  Once again, this meta-narrative of Imago Christi is 
best demonstrated in Chrysostom’s frequent depiction of Paul as an exemplar who is 
thoroughly human, whether it is in his exercise of his free will or in his human frailty.  Yet 
in spite of this, the apostle also proves to be a figure capable of performing divine-like 
feats by the power of the Holy Spirit.  This is powerfully demonstrated in Paul’s ability to 
transcend his human limitations, whether it was his triumph over all his persecutors or his 
conversion of barbaric tribes.     
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 Despite the formative role that Greco-Roman biographies play in Chrysostom’s 
exemplar portraits, the form that these portraits take would be determined more 
decisively by the rhetorical tradition that he was trained in.  In line with paradeigmata 
rhetoric, Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits are frequently introduced as proofs for his 
didactic arguments and teachings.  These portraits usually take the form of the rhetorical 
techniques prescribed in the progymnasmata, though their actual expressions will depend 
largely on Chrysostom’s pedagogical intent and context.  Among the rhetorical techniques 
he adopts, the following predominate: the first is clearly the enkōmion, whose application 
we have already considered; the second is the synkrisis, where the exemplar concerned is 
compared with another similar exemplar or even a villainous figure, in order to highlight 
the aretai and superiority of the exemplar concerned.  In this way, Chrysostom would not 
only render his exemplar’s virtues more plausible but also reinforce the specific virtue that 
the synkrisis is meant to illustrate.  A similar assumption is observed in Chrysostom’s 
application of the ēthopoiia, whereby a character in his narration is made to utter a fictitious 
speech that would either draw attention to a specific virtue of the exemplar or reveal the 
ethical motivation underlying the exemplar’s deeds.   
 Another popular rhetorical technique or figure of speech that Chrysostom 
regularly employs is ekphrasis.  Here, a vivid rhetorical description of the exemplar’s story 
is employed in order to stimulate the audience’s imagination and visualization of 
exemplar’s life and feats.  In this way then, the audience is led into a deeper and more 
experiential appreciation of the exemplar’s virtues.  Frequently, an ekphrasis plays an iconic 
role in Chrysostom’s teachings, in that it is the window through which his audience can 
see more clearly Chrysostom’s ethical ideals and the soteriology that these ideals 
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presuppose.   Such is the case for his many ekphraseis of Christian ascetics, which, when 
presented to fellow ascetics, are meant to be an affirmation of their vocation and an 
inspiration for them to persevere in their calling.  Yet, when a similar ekphrasis is re-
enacted before a predominantly lay audience, it has an additional cathartic effect, which is 
to deconstruct the laity’s less than godly worldviews and to compel them to repent on the 
one hand and develop new spiritual aspirations on the other. 
 Apart from these rhetorical techniques, another aspect of Greco-Roman rhetoric 
that Chrysostom uses regularly is epideictic rhetoric.  This is certainly the case for his 
panegyrics to Christian saints, especially the Christian martyrs, which, by and large, 
conforms to the rhetorical structure of epideictic oratory.  Nonetheless, this rhetorical 
structure cannot be adopted in situ if it is to achieve fully the pedagogical objectives that 
Chrysostom intends for his soteriological and ethical ideals.  This can be seen in the 
several rhetoric innovations that he develops in his panegyrics for the martyrs.   
 Like Greco-Roman epideictic rhetoric, Chrysostom’s martyr homilies are similar 
attempts at narrating the martyr’s deeds and demonstrating the virtues implicit to these 
feats, so that both the saint’s achievements and virtues may become plausible and 
persuasive before his present day audience.  Where Chrysostom differs is his conviction 
that what is at stake here is not so much so the reputation of the martyr or the plausibility 
of his deeds but rather the power of God that has once animated the martyr’s valiant 
sacrifice.  In other words, what Chrysostom is re-enacting ultimately is the divine power 
that has empowered the saint.  Pedagogically speaking, as long as Chrysostom can 
convince his listeners that the power that once animated the saint remains available for 
them, they will be one step closer to appropriating it for their own lives.   
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 With regard to his narration of the martyr’s life and deeds, Chrysostom, generally 
speaking, does not conform to the enkōmion paradigm.  Rather, in line with his 
soteriological ideals, he adopts the meta-narrative of transcendence and thus finds himself 
demeaning the martyr’s human stature so that the divine grace that empowered the saint 
can be magnified.  As a matter of fact, the dominance of this meta-narrative is to be seen in 
how it subsumes the meta-narrative of participatio Christo that is traditionally associated 
with the martyr literature.  Under this re-conceptualized narrative framework, the martyr 
figure becomes not so much an exemplar of how one might faithfully participate in 
Christ’s sufferings, but how one might endure the same sufferings by the grace and aid of 
God. 
 This rhetoric of the plausibility of the martyr’s deeds or, in fact, the divine power 
animating the martyr, is but one of the two major innovations that Chrysostom introduces 
to his martyr panegyrics.  Equally important is his rhetoric of appropriation, which 
Chrysostom develops as a means of achieving his pedagogical intent for his martyr 
discourse.  There are essentially three elements to this rhetoric of appropriation.  The first 
is the rhetoric of identification, where the audience is persuaded to move from a simple 
admiration of the martyr to a heightened consciousness of their relationship with and love 
for the martyr.  This then sets the stage for the rhetoric of imitation, where Chrysostom 
introduces a variety of ways in which his listeners can imitate the martyr’s deeds in their 
present context.   
 As for the third way by which Chrysostom encourages his audience’s 
appropriation of a martyr’s life and virtues, it is through the rhetoric of veneration.  
Specifically, a martyr figure is portrayed not so much so as a hero of the past, worthy of 
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imitation, but more so as a saint who is both alive and present among his audience, and 
capable of interceding prayerfully on their behalf.  Again, what is at stake here for 
Chrysostom is not so much the spiritual presence of the martyr or the efficacy of his relics.  
Rather, it is the fact that the divine power that has once animated the martyr’s deeds 
remains operative through the saint’s prayers and relics.  Hence, by promoting the 
veneration of the martyrs and their relics, Chrysostom is essentially holding out these two 
as icons of God’s transforming power and, more importantly, as tokens of God’s promise 
that the same power remains available for the present day Christians.   
 Having examined the different ideologies, interpretative methods and reading 
strategies assumed in Chrysostom’s exemplar portraits, we shall conclude by returning to 
the final and perhaps most important question that we asked in the beginning of our 
conclusion, namely, what benefits can such a hermeneutics of exemplar portraits yield?  
During the course of our study, three benefits have been identified.  The first is the 
function of validation or invalidation, where the degree to which Chrysostom’s exemplar 
portraits (praxis) coheres with one’s model of his didactic teachings (theoria) either 
confirms the validity of the latter or calls into question its soundness.  This diagnostic 
function is well-demonstrated in our discussion of Chrysostom’s soteriology, where the 
incoherence between Chrysostom’s Pauline portraits and the popular western conception 
of Chrysostom’s doctrine brings into relief the problems inherent within the western 
model.  The net result of this investigation is a fresh appreciation of Chrysostom’s 
soteriology as essentially a doctrine of deification that is well attested in his Pauline 
portraits. 
293 
 
 With regard to the second and third benefits, these are essentially the benefits of 
ideological reinforcement and supplementation.  Examples of both abound throughout the 
thesis and need not be repeated here.  Suffice it to say, the benefit of reinforcement occurs 
whenever an exemplar portrait proves to be an excellent embodiment and therefore a 
confirmation of an ethical or soteriological ideal that is taught by Chrysostom.  As for the 
benefits of supplementation, these are gained whenever an exemplar portrait 
particularizes a didactic teaching to the extent that it yields additional insights that can 
enrich our overall understanding of the concept.  
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